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The aim of terrorism is to influence a group of people 
or institutions - the psychological target or targets - by 
attacking the appropriate physical targets in order to prompt 
the desired response. Several factors influence the selection 
of physical targets by non-state terrorist groups. These 
include the ideology of the terrorist group concerned, the 
strategy adopted by the group and its capabilities, its need 
to take account of external opinion - including that of 
supporters, the measures adopted to protect likely targets, 
and the security environment within which the terrorist group 
operates. In addition, decision-making is affected by'the 
dynamics within the group which are in turn affected by the 
psychological pressures of clandestinity and the frequent 
risk of death or capture which many terrorists run. 
The relationship between these factors varies from 
group to group, which is inevitable given the idiosyncratic 
nature of most terrorist groups, and the different 
circumstances in which they find themselves. However, it can 
generally be said that ideology sets out the moral framework 
within which terrorists operate - and which determines 
whether terrorists judge it to be legitimate to attack a 
range of target. After this, the determination of which 
targets it will actually be beneficial to attack depends upon 
the strategy which the group has adopted as a means of 
achieving its political objectives. The determination of 
their strategic objectives depends upon the effects which the 
terrorists hope their attacks will achieve. Thus, strategy 
further refines the range of targets initially delimited by 
the group's ideology. 
The other factors mentioned tend to act as constraints 
upon the group, partly - as with security measures - in 
restricting them from carrying out the types of attacks which 
they would desirel but also in encouraging them to carry out 
attacks on certain targets in the hope of gaining benefits 
such as the approval of their supporters, or of gaining 
publicity for their cause. Underlying all of this is the 
human factor, whereby relations within the group, the impact 
of psychological pressure, and individual differences in 
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GLOSSARY 
Abbreviations for groups, organisations, posts and 
publications. Where relevant the states within which 
they originated, where they are based, or where they 
primarily operate, are in brackets. 
17N - Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri (Revolutionary 
Organisation 17th November). Greece. 
ACDEGAM - Asociacion de Campesionos y Ganderos del Magdelena 
Medio (Peasants and Ranchers of the Magdeleno Medio). 
Colombia. 
AD Action Directe (Direct Action). France. 
AIS Armee islamique du salut (Islamic Salvation Army). 
Algeria. 
ALF - Animal Liberation Front. United Kingdom. 
ALN - Acao Libertadora Nacional (Action for National 
Liberation). Brazil. 
AN - Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard). ItalY. 
ANUC - Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National 
Association of Peasant Users). Colombia. 
AP/RN - An Phoblacht/Republican News. Ireland/United Kingdom. 
ATO - Ammunition Technical Officer. 
B2J - Bewegung 2 Juni (June 2nd Movement). Germany. 
BATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. USA. 
EBE - Bijzondere Bijstands Eenheid (Close Combat Company of 
the Royal Dutch Marines). The Netherlands. 
BR - Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades). Italy. 
BR/PCC - Partito Comunista Combattente (Fighting Communist 
Party). Italy. 
CCC - Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Fighting Communist 
Cells). Belgium. 
CCP - Chinese Communist Party. 
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency. United States of America. 
CPI - Communist Party of India. 
CPI(M) - Communist Party of India (Marxist). 
CPI(M-L) - Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). 
vii 
DAS Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative 
Security Department). Colombia. 
DC Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats). Italy. 
Dev Sol - Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left). Turkey. 
DKP - Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist 
Party) . 
DST - Direction de Surveillance du Territoire (). France. 
EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agoniston (National 
Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). Cyprus. 
ERP - Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's 
Revolutionary Group). Argentina. 
ERT - Washington DC Police Emergency Response Team. United 
States of America. 
ETA - Euzkadi ta Askatasuna - (Basque Homeland and Liberty). 
Spain/France. 
FAA - Federal Aviation Agency. United States of America. 
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). 
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States of 
America. 
FIS - Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front). 
Algeria. 
FLN - Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation 
Front - FLN). Algeria. 
FLQ - Front de Liberation du Quebec (Quebec Liberation 
Front). Canada. 
GAL - Gruppos Antiterroristas de Liberacion (Anti-terrorist 
Liberation Group). Spain/France. 
GIA - Groupes Islamique Armee (Armed Islamic Group). Algeria. 
GIGN - Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
(National Gendarmerie Intervention Group). France. 
GOC - General Officer Commanding. 
GRAPO - Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista, Primero de 
Octubre (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance 
Groups). Spain. 
GSG9 Grenzchutzgruppe 9 (Border Protection Unit 9). 
Germany. 
HRU Hostage Rescue Unit. 
viii 
INLA - Irish National Liberation Army. United 
Kingdom/Ireland. 
JDL - Jewish Defence League. United States of America 
JKLF - Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. Jammu & Kashmir 
province, India. 
JRA - Japanese Red Army. Japan. 
KPD - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of 
Germany). 
KLA - Khalistan Liberaiion Army. The Punjab, India. 
KLF - Khalistan Liberation Front. The Punjab, India. 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Sri Lanka. 
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement). 
M15 Military Intelligence section 5, (Security Service). 
United Kingdom. 
M16 - Military Intelligence section 6. Also known as SIS 
(Secret Intelligence Service). United Kingdom. 
MAS - Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers). 
Colombia. 
MIC - Military-Industrial Complex. 
MK - Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). South Africa. 
MNF - Multi National Force in Lebanon, 1982-1984. 
NAR - Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Armed Revolutionary 
Nuclei). Italy. 
NVA - North Vietnamese Army. 
NYCPD - New York City Police Department. United States of 
America. 
OAS Organisation Armee Secrete (Secret Army Organisation). 
Algeria and France. - 
OIRA Official Irish Republican Army. United 
Kingdom/Ireland. 
OP Observation post. 
PCC Partitio Comunista Combattente - (Fighting Communist 
Party). Italy. 
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party). 
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army. United 
Kingdom/Ireland. 
ix 
PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
Israel/Jordan. 
PFLP-GC - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
General Command. Israel/Jordan. 
PKK - Partiye Karkaran-e Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party). 
Turkey, Iraqj Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijanj Syria. 
PL - Prima Linea (Front Line). Italy. 
PLO - Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Israel/Jordan 
PSI - Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party),. 
PWG - People's War Group. Andhra Pradesh province, India. 
RAF - Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction). Germany. 
RAID - Recherche, Assistancel Intervention, Dissuasion 
(Research, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion). 
France. 
RIR - Royal Irish Regiment. United Kingdom. 
RPV - Remotely-piloted vehicles 
RUC - Royal Ulster Constabulary. United Kingdom. 
RZ Rote Zellen (Revolutionary Cells). Germany. 
SAS Special Air Service. United Kingdom. 
SBS - Special Boat Squadron. United Kingdom. 
SL - Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Peru. 
SLA - Symbionese Liberation Army. United States of America. 
S012 - Metropolitan Police Special Operations branch 12 
(Special Branch). London, United Kingdom. 
S013 - Metropolitan Police Special Operations branch 13 
(Anti-terrorist Branch). Londong United Kingdom 
S019 - Metropolitan Police-Special Operations branch 19 
(Force Firearms Unit). London, United Kingdom. 
SOE - Special Operations Executive. United Kingdom. 
SWAT - Special Weapons and Tactics team. United States of 
America. 
TREVI - Terrorism, Radicalisms Extremism and Violence. 
UDA - Ulster Defence Association. United Kingdom. 
UDR - Ulster Defence Regiment. United Kingdom. 
Up - Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union). Colombia. 
x 
UVF - Ulster Volunteer Force. United Kingdom. 
VC - Viet Cong. Vietnam. 
VCP - Vehicle check-points 
VM - Viet Minh. Vietnam. 
WGH - Wehrsport Gruppe Hoffmann (Hoffman Military Sports 
Group). Germany. 
WSGA - Wyoming Stock Growers Association. USA. 
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Determining the factors involved in terrorist target 
selection is, in a sense, rather like determining a murder in 
a detective novel. The difference is that with the novel one 
starts with a victim, and the task is to identify the 
perpetrator through establishing the motive, the means, and 
the opportunity, but with target selection whilst one 
generally knows the three factors, the task is to identify 
who is likely to become the victim. 
Of over 6,000 works on terrorism published between 1968 
and 1988 few deal directly with the factors which encourage 
terrorists to select some targets whilst restraining them 
from selecting others. 1 Whilst Bowyer Bell and Smith have 
produced books which examine the logic behind the strategy 
and tactics of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), and Robert Clark 
has looked at some of the factors which influence the 
targeting strategy of the Basque group ETA (Euzkadi ta 
Askatasuna - Basque Homeland and Liberty), few works have 
concentrated solely upon the general factors which help 
determine terrorist target selection. 2 This study is not an 
attempt to predict exactly what specific groups will do, nor 
is it an up-to-the-minute guide on the latest terrorist 
groups to emerge. The aim is to examine the activities of 
terrorist groups throughout history, and see whether one can 
discover those factors which are important in determining 
terrorists' selection of physical targets. 
1) A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jongmah. Political Terrorism: A new guide 
to actors, authors. -concepts, 
data bases, theories, and 
literatureq (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 
1988)9 177. 
2) J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and-Targets: An Analysis of 
Tactical Aspects of the Armed Struggle, 1969-1989, 
(Swords, Ireland: Poolbeg, 1990). M. L. R. Smith. Fighting 
for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish 
Republican Movement (London: Routledge, 1995). 
R. P. Clark. Th; 7-Basaue Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 
(Madisong Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1984), 123-280. R. P. Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of 
ETA members" and "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980"o 
P. H. Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror: Motif-s 
and Motivations, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986). 
Introduction 
A definition of terrorism 
2 
Initially$ it is necessary to define what is meant by 
the terms terrorism and terrorist. By doing this can one 
differentiate terrorism from other types of political 
violence which a group may use. 3 Unfortunately the terms 
terrorism and terrorist have become useful labels of abuse 
which politicians and partisan commentators use to attack 
people or actions of which they do not approve. For example, 
in July 1991, David Levy, then the Israeli Foreign Minister, 
described the Arab nations' trade boycott of Israel as 
ff economic terrorism". 4 Gearty has observed that: 
the words 'terror' and 'terrorism"have come to be 
regarded as such powerful condemnations that all those 
lookigg for a suitable insult have wanted to appropriate 
them. 
However the fact that a term is misused is not a good reason 
why it should abandoned as somehow discredited or 
politicised, and Gearty specifically rejects doing this. 6 By 
way of comparison Crick observes that although the term 
'democracy' may be misused or appropriated by undemocratic 
governments, this is no reason to abandon it as unusable. 7 
To be valid the concept of terrorism needs to be 
defined. There have been several attempts to define 
terrorism, of which Schmid and Jongman list thirty-five. 8 The 
elements which differentiate terrorist acts from other forms 
of political violence are that the specific acts of violence 
come as a surprise to the people whose persons or property is 
attacked, that the violence is intended to make an actor - 
the psychological target of the violence - behave in a 
particular way by the use of recurrent intimidatory violence, 
and that there is always an underlying if not explicit threat 
that future violence may be serious and even lethal. The 
physical violence is not necessarily aimed directly at the 
3) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in 
Algeria, 1954-1962. (Stanford, Hoover Institution 
Press, 1978), 20. 
4) "Israel attacks G7 linking of boycott with settlements" 
The Guardian, (London), July 19th 1991. 
5) C. Gearty, Terror, (London: Faber & Faber, 1991), 5. 
6) C. Gearty, Terror, 151. 
7) B. Crick. In Defence of_Eolitics, second edition, 
(Harmondswortho England: Penguin, 1982), 56. 
8) A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jongman. Political Terrorism, 32-38. 
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person or people to be influenced - the psychological target, 
but at making him or them behave in a particular way. 
Although the term terrorism has been adopted for this 
type of political violence, the induction of terror is not 
always the aim of terrorist attacks. Martha Crenshaw has 
commented that the: 
too effect may range from terror among those in the direct audience, among whom there are physical victims, 
to shock, curiosity, sympathy, or even admiration in 
groups that are not directly threatened, that only 
indirectly form an audience. Terrorism is not always or 
solely intended to produce the emotion of terror, but it 
is always intended to have psychological implicat6'ons 
that influence political behaviour and attitudes. 
What is important is not generally the induction of terror as 
an end in itself, but that the succession of attacks is meant 
to create a psychological reaction in a person or group of 
people to make them act in a way which the attacker desires. 
The use of violence may also be as much a way for the 
attackers to vent their anger at a given person or group of 
People rather than being part of a carefully calculated 
campaign. However to be acts of political terrorism they must 
be associated with a political conviction, however 
incoherently understood or expressed. 
Accordingly, in this study terrorism is defined as the 
recurrent use or threatened use of politically-motivated and 
clandestinely organised violence, by a group whose aim is to 
intimidate an actor or actors in order to make him or them 
behave in a way which the group desires. 
There is still the problem of defining what one means 
by terming a person or a group as terrorist. Gearty labels 
specific acts as terrorist actsl rather than label groups as 
terrorist in themselves. Instead of attempting to compose a 
conclusive definition of terrorisms he believes that one 
should see acts of violent subversion as existing on a 
continuum which proceeds from acts of lethal non-state 
violence intended to cause terror at one end of the scale, to 
minor acts of armed subversion at the other. 10 Clark also 
believes that the groups involved in such violence should not 
be classified as terrorists because terrorism is a method 
9) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 21. 
10) C. Gearty, Terror, 151-152. 
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rather than an aim. Thus, Clark would describe ETA as a 
political group which from time to time may use terrorism 
rather than as a terrorist group. 11 
These are credible arguments, but they assume that a 
group is only a one-dimensional body and ignore the fact that 
a group can be multi-faceted. In the same way that it is 
possible for somebody to be a socialist, stamp collecting, 
teacher, the one activity not by definition excluding the 
others, so it is possible for a political group to be a 
terrorist group if it carries out terrorist acts. This does 
not mean that the group is solely, or even mainly, dedicated 
to terrorism, but it does mean that the group carries out 
terrorist acts. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, a 
terrorist is somebody who in some form actively assists or 
participates in an act of terrorism, and a terrorist group is 
one which carries out terrorist acts. 
The parameters of research 
This thesis is concerned with the activities of non- 
state terrorist groups and not with all forms of terrorism. 
It does not examine the actions of states or state bodies 
except when they have an impact on terrorist groups. In some 
cases terrorist acts are clearly carried out directly by the 
military, police, intelligence, or other branches of the 
state apparatus. This type of terrorism includes both the 
operations of intelligence agents against recalcitrant 
emigres as allegedly practiced by the Libyan intelligence 
agencies in the 1980s, and the liquidation of internal 
critics, as practiced by the Argentine military government of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. 12 Such activities do not fall 
within the purview of this thesis as this is terrorism by the 
state. 
Some critics argue that in carrying out research on 
non-state terrorism one is ignoring the far larger phenomenon 
11) R. P. Clark. The Basque Insurgents, xv -xvi 
12) U. S. Department of States Bureau of Public Affairs. Libya 
under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression, Special Report 
No. 138 (Washington DC: U. S. Dept of States January 
1986), 1. R. Gillespie. Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's 
Montonerosl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)s 
244-252. J. Burns- The Land That Lost It's Heroes: 
Argentina, The Falklands and Alfonsin, (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1987), 20-2-3. 
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of state terrorism. 
13 George, and Herman and O'Sullivan 
develop the argument that one cannot legitimately examine the 
former without examining the latter, and that if one does it 
is somehow proof of a right-wing, uncritically pro-western 
outlook. 14 This argument assumes that research is meant to 
fulfil a political agenda rather than to satisfy curiosity. 
It is rather like condemning medical researchers who 
concentrate on examining the common cold as being in favour 
of cancer. 
There are other types of indirect government 
involvement in terrorism which, whilst not direct in the 
sense that the government dictates the minutiae of strategy 
and gives direct orders to the perpetratorsl nevertheless 
indicate the strong involvement of a government or of its 
agencies. For example with regard to the activities of GAL 
(Gruppos Antiterroristas de Liberacion - Anti-terrorist 
Liberation Group) which assassinated suspected ETA activists 
in southern France, or death squads in Latin America and 
elsewhere which kill suspected dissidents, the line between 
state terrorism and non-state terrorism has been deliberately 
blurred by the authorities. In these cases the states or at 
least elements within the state apparatus, appear to have 
supported the formation of these groups, and quite possibly 
provided funding and equipment to the groups as deniable 
assassins. 15 
13) E. S. Herman. The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact 
and Propag; nda, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985), 21- 
25. E. S. Herman & G. O'Sullivan. The Terrorism Industry: 
The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of 
Terror, (New York: Pantheon, 1989), xii, 45-47,152, 
157. A. George. "The Discipline of Terrorology"s 
A. George (ed). Western State Terrorism, (Cambridge: 
Polity Pressp 1991), 77. 
14) E. S. Herman & G. O'Sullivan. "'Terrorism' as Ideology and 
Cultural Industry", A-George (ed). Western State 
Terrorism, 39-40 57-629 68-69. A. George. "The 
Discipline of Terrorology", 92-93. 
15) "Gonzalez drawn into 'death squad' scandal", The 
Independent, December 10th 1988. "'Dirty war$ scandal 
worsens", The Independents December 21st 1994. "Madrid 
sues over 'dirty war' claims", The Independent, January 
11th 1995. "The noose is tightened around Felipe's 
neck"l The Guardians February 23rd 1995. P. Taylor. 
States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence, 
(London: BBC Books, 1993), 98-104. M. S. Diokno. 
"'Guardians of Democracy': Vigilantes in the 
Philippines", and J. Caceres. "Violence, National 
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In other cases state support can take the form of 
sponsorship of existing groups in the shape of training and 
material backing, an example being the support given in the 
early 1980s by the governing Congress Party in India to the 
Sikh militant Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwali, and to the 
Tamil separatists of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka. 16 Another example is provided by the 
support in terms of weapons, training, and safe haven given 
to the Red Army Factioh, originally a terrorist group in West 
Germany, by the East German intelligence services. 17 
Lastly there are-those cases where members of state 
agencies become involved in terrorism of their own volition, 
apparently without having the support of the government. An 
example of this is provided by the alleged connivance of 
sections of the Italian intelligence agencies with fascist 
terrorist groups in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s. 18 
One may ask whether the killing of dissidents or 
suspected insurgents by off-duty policemen acting with 
Security and Democratisation in Central America", 
M. Kirkwood (ed). States of Terror: Death Squads or 
Development?, (London: Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, 1989), 48-53,105-107. 
16) M. J. Akbar. India: The Siege Within, (Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguing 1985), 189. M. Tully & S. Jacob. 
Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle,, (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1985), 57-619 1059 121. B-Vaughn. "The Use and 
Abuse of Intelligence Services in India", Intelligence 
and National Security, 8, no. 1, (January 1993). 
17) J. Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy: Twenty Years of Co- 
operation between West Germany's Red Army Faction and 
the GDR Ministry for State Security", Intelligence and 
National Security, 8, no. 4, (October 1993). 
B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Ph. D, University of St Andrews, 
1991,56-61. "East was haven to German terrorists", The 
Times, June 15th 1996. "More German terror suspects 
seized", The Independent, June 16th 1990. "Arrests 
expose E Germany's terrorist links", The Independent, 
June 20th 1990. 
18) C. Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", J. Lodge (ed). The 
Threat of Terrorism, (Brighton, England: Wheatsheafp 
1988)9 92-93,105-106. M. Bull. "Villains of the Peace: 
Terrorism and the Secret Services in Italy", 
Intelligence and National Security, 7, no. 49 (October 
1992). "Italians blame shadowy powers for bringing 
terror to Florence", The Independent on Sund , May 30th 1993. The underlying thesis in P. Willan. Puppet 
Masters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italys 
(London: Constable, 1991), is that many right-wing 
terrorist groups in Italy were manipulated and directed 
to a degree by the Italian secret services. 
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official connivance, is really non-state activity. The 
actions of such groups are considered here because there are 
non-state groups which claim to act in support of the 
authorities - what Bruce calls pro-state terrorism - without 
having the backing of the state. 19 Such activities are the 
actions of groups rather than of the state, even if they 
receive unauthorised support from individuals within the 
state apparatus. Any study of terrorism which neglected 
groups which have had 6ontacts either with governments or 
with disaffected members of a state's security forces, would 
give a disproportionate emphasis to communist and separatist 
groups and would play down the significance of conservative 
and fascist groups. 
Finally this study concentrates upon groups which 
constitute serious threats to life, or extensive damage to 
property, for the purposes of politically-motivated 
intimidation. Statistics released by the US State Department 
indicate that a proportion of what is sometimes defined as 
terrorism includes acts of arson. 
20 Whilst such activities 
are not totally overlooked, the focus is upon groups which 
have deliberately carried out life-threatening actions, or 
which have systematically caused serious damage to property 
over a period of time. 
A further complication is the fact that, although a 
small number of terrorist groups may provide a focus of 
attention, due to their longevity, lethality, or prominence 
of their victims. Martha Crenshaw illustrates the differing 
life-spans of terrorist groups when she lists seventy-seven 
fairly well-known groups which have used terrorism. Of these, 
forty-six had existed for over ten years, twenty existed for 
19) S. Bruce. "The Problem of 'Pro-State' Terrorism: Loyalist 
Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 4, no. 19 (Spring 1992). S. Bruce. 
The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern 
Ireland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 268- 
270. 
20) U. S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 
1989, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of State, 
office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorismo U. S 
Department of State, April 1990), 6. U. S. Department of 
State. Patterns of Globa- Terrorism: 1990 (Washington 
DC: Office of the Secretary of Stateg office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorismi U. S Department of 
State, April 1991), 40. 
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five to ten years, and eleven had a life-span of between one 
and five years. 21 An example of the large number of small and 
rather insignificant and unpublicised terrorist groups is 
provided by Italy. According to Moss a total of 597 'group 
signatures' - 484 left-wing and 113 right-wing - were 
responsible for only one-fifth of terrorist actions in Italy 
between 1969 and 1980. The Red Brigades were only responsible 
for a small minority of the actions for which responsibility 
was claimed, and 80% of actions were unattributed to any 
specific group. 22 Pisano states that 297 'left-wing groups 
and sixty-four right-wing groups claimed responsibility for 
terrorist attacks in Italy between 1975 and 1986 but notes 
that some groups gave more than one name in order to hamper 
investigations. 23 In her study of Colombia, Pearce refers to 
dozens of localised right-wing death squads, formed by 
landowners and narcotics syndicates, with the help of 
elements of the armed forces, most of which operated 
locally. 24 She claims that in 1989 there were 140 death 
squads, of which only eight were organised at a national 
level. 25 The point to note is that terrorism is not 
necessarily confined to articulate, well organised, well 
armed, or long-lived organisations, but that groups with 
these attributes attract more attention and provide more 
material in the form of communiques, news coverage and so 
forth for researchers and journalists. Consequently they 
attract more research and thus seem more common than they 
really are. 
Summary. 
The purpose of this study is to determine the motive, 
means, and opportunity which influence the selection of 
physical targets by terrorist groups. As with a good 
fictional murdert the relevant information does not present 
21) M. Crenshaw, "How terrorism declines", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 3, no. 1, (Summer 1991), 76-77. 
22) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 
1969-1985, (London: Macmi-11an, 1989), 2. 
23) V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in 
Contemporary Italy, (Stanford, California* Hoover 
Institution Press, 1987), 38,51. 
24) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, (London: Latin 
American Bureaul 1990), 71 195. 
25) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrint , 217. 
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itself in such neat categories, but can be identified by 
going through the relevant material. 
Terrorism is defined in this study as the recurrent use 
or threatened use of politically-motivated and clandestinely 
organised violence, by a group whose aim is to intimidate an 
actor or actors in order to make him or them behave in a way 
which the group desires. A terrorist is somebody who in some 
form actively assists or participates in an act of terrorismi 
and a terrorist group ýs one which carries out terrorist 
acts. Having defined the area of study it is now necessary to 




There are many types of terrorism. Differences exist 
concerning the political motivation of the groups concerned, 
their resources, the nature of their operations, and the 
targets which they select. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine and categorise terrorist activities so as to provide 
some sort of order to the various forms which terrorism can 
take. 
Classification of targets. 
The classification of targets brings some sort of order 
to the otherwise disparate types of people and things 
attacked by terrorist groups. Some types of category do not 
need much explanation. Although each terrorist group's 
campaign is unique, it is possible to construct categories 
which can be applied across all groups. In their extensive 
guide to the literature on terrorism, Schmid and Jongman list 
ten different grounds upon which one can construct 
typologies. 1 Classifications of strategies and group 
ideologies are examined later. In this chapter the 
categorisations used refer to the classification of targets. 
When examining terrorist target selection one must be 
aware that there is often more than one target for a 
terrorist operation. As well as the phvsical target there are 
those people or groups of people whose behaviour the 
terrorists wish to affect by their attacks - what are termed 
here as psvchological targets. Jenkins notes that: "Terrorism 
is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. 
Terrorism is theater", although he qualifies this by 
examining other reasons for terrorists operations. 
2 The same 
point is also made by Crenshaw and Wright who refer to 
indirect target groups - what they term-audiences - whose 
behaviour the terrorists may wish to affect. 3 In practice a 
1) A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jongman. Political Terrorism, 40. 
2) B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of 
Warfare, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporationg 
June 1974), 4. 
3) B. M. Jenkins- International Terrorism: A New Kind of 
Warfare, 4-7. B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: The 
Other World War 
' 
(Santa Monical California: RAND 
Corporation, November 1985), 9-11. M. Crenshaw 
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single attack may be intended to influence the behaviour of 
more than one psychological target. Thus if one wanted to 
construct a simple model of how terrorism works, it would be 
something like: 
> PSYCHOLOGICAL reacts TARGET(S) 
TERRORIST -I 




PSYCHOLOGICAL eacts > TARGET(S) > 
In this study, unless otherwise qualified, the term target is 
confined to those people or things which are physically 
attacked. 
Before dealing with the more complex definitions, it is 
as well to deal with the common distinction between soft and 
hard targets. A soft target is one which has little or no 
protection, whilst a hard target is one which has a 
substantial degree of protection. 
Apart from this, targets are classified, firstly 
according to the degree of preparation goes into the 
terrorist operation, and secondly according to the purposes 
which attacking them are supposed to fulfil. These categories 
are quite broad so as to enable comparisons to be made 
between groups. More detailed categories could be used but 
may be so specific as to only be applicable to a narrow range 
of groups, thus preventing comparisons. 
Pre-planned targets and targets of opportunity. 
Not all targets are painstakingly selected beforehand. 
On the one hand there are pre-planned targets, where 
terrorists have deliberately selected the target to be 
attacked and then go about carrying out the attack. Examples 
of this would be a highly complex operations like the afore- 
mentioned kidnapping of Aldo Moro in April 1978, or the 
Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 36-389 137. 
J. Wright. Terrorist-Propaganda: The Red Army Faction 
and the Provisional. IRA, 1968-1986, (London: Macmillan, 
1991), 77. 
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assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Admiral Luis 
Carrero Blanco in December 1973.4 
Pre-planned attacks need not be aimed at specific 
individuals. The bombing of Bologna railway station in August 
1980, which killed eighty-five people, would have required 
advance planning to select the target and to assemble the 
bomb, even though it was intended to kill and injure whatever 
people were in the station at the time, rather than specific 
individuals. 5 Likewise, the PIRA ambush of British 
paratroopers at Warrenpoint, county Down on August 27th 1979, 
a meticulously planned operation which resulted in the death 
of eighteen soldiers, was aimed at kiliing soldiers in 
general, rather than at killing specific individuals within 
the British Army. 6 However, the operation had been planned in 
advance, thus the soldiers were pre-planned targets. 
On the other hand there are targets of opportunity. 
These targets appear when a person or thing, falling within 
the class of what the terrorists see as targets, suddenly 
becomes vulnerable to attack and the terrorists take 
advantage of the opportunity. This is far more likely to 
4) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in 
the Italian State, (London: Marion Boyars, 1989), 108- 
115. J. Agirre Operation 09ro: The Execution of Admiral 
Luis Carrero Blanco (New York: Quadrangle, 1975). 
5) The identity of the group responsible for the Bologna 
bombing has not been conclusively established. Four 
members of a fascist group were convicted of carrying 
out the bombing in 1988, but their convictions was 
overturned on appeal in 1990. There are a number of 
theories concerning the identity of those responsible 
and their motives for carrying out the attack. C. Seton- 
Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", 94. P. Willan. Puppet 
Masters, 13-14,160-167,170-173. S. Christie. Stefano 
Delle Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Terrorist, (London: 
Anarchy Magazine/Refract Publications, 1984), 25,1099 
113. G. Harris. The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme 
Right Today, new edition, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Pressl 1994), 1159 118. C. Schaerf, G. de 
Lutiis, A. Silis F. Carluccis F. Bellucci, S. Argentini. 
Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia: 1969-1988, two 
volumesp (Rome: ISODARCO, n. d), 866. 
6) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. 
, 
The Provisional IRA (London: 
Heinemann, 1987; Corgi, 1988), 314-315. K. J. Kelley. The 
Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (London: Zed 
Books, 1988), 305. D. Hamill. Pig in the Middle: The, 
Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984., (London: Methuen, 
1985), 249-250. M. Urban- Big Boys' Rules: The Secret 
Struggle against the IRA, (London: Faber & Fabert 
1992), 85-86. 
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happen where the terrorist group has selected categories of 
people as legitimate targets9 for example police officers or 
members of an ethnic group, rather than specific individuals. 
It is also more likely to occur when the terrorist group is 
large, for the simple reason that the more group members 
there are, and the more geographically dispersed they ares 
the more chance there is of them encountering a target of 
opportunity. 
When an entire class of people has been selected as a 
potential target, the possibility for them becoming targets 
of opportunity is greatly increased. Catholics in Northern 
Ireland have been abducted and killed after they wandered 
into areas where members of Protestant terrorist groups have 
been present. Thus, in Belfast in the early hours of June 
26th 1966, four Catholics entered a pub where a group of 
extreme Protestants were indulging in a heavy drinking 
session. The group's leader, Augustus 'Gusty' Spenceg went up 
to the bar, and upon the basis of the newcomer's southern 
Irish accents, told his colleagues that the men were IRA 
members, although at that time the IRA was practically 
extinct. Thereupon Spence and his colleagues waited outside 
the pub and shot the Catholics when they emerged, killing one 
of them. 7 Similarly, in the early 1970s a UVF gang in west 
Belfast picked up Catholics from the streets and killed them, 
frequently after prolonged torture. 8 Similar attacks on 
members of ethnic minorities by European fascists are often 
the result of decisions which are abruptly made when an 
identifiable victim happens along, or following a surfeit of 
alcohol on the part of the attackers. 9 
In the early 1970s many of the soldiers attacked by the 
PIRA could be defined as targets of opportunity. Frequently 
7) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguing 1973)9 29-35. 
S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 14. 
8) M. Dillon. The Shankill gutchers 
,, 
(London: Hutchinsong 
1989; Arrow, 1990). S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 173-181. 
9) R. Hill & A. Bell. The Other Face of Terror: Inside Europe's 
Neo-Nazi Network, (London: Grafton, 1988), 1529 153- 
154,211. The question as to whether some of the more 
random attacks should be regarded as acts of terrorism is discussed in T. Bjorgo. "Terrorist Violence against 
Immigrants and Refugees in Scandanavia: Patterns and 
Motives", T. Biorgo & R-Witte. Racist Violence in 
Europe, (London: Macmillan, 1993), 34-38. 
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gun-battles were not pre-planned, but occurred when PIRA 
members picked up some guns from the quartermaster in the 
morning and drove around their area looking for soldiers to 
fire upon. 10 These targets were targets of opportunity. 
Categorising target by purpose of attack. 
Another way to classify targets is according to their 
occupation. The statistics produced by the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) classify those killed in the troubles in 
Northern Ireland according to their role in the security 
forces or as civilians - adding the qualification that the 
latter category includes suspected terrorists. " Similarly 
the report Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989 produced by the 
US State Department classifies the targets of terrorism as; 
Military, Government, Business, Diplomatic, Other. 12 This is 
a perfectly valid way of classifying targets, although one 
can end up with rather a lot of unclassified 'others'. 
This method of categorisation is based upon an 
observable fact - the function or occupation of those who are 
attacked, so it is possible to collate relatively objective 
statistics. Thus for the purposes of statistical analysis the 
description of targets by function is ideal if one accepts 
that this is the reason for them being targeted rather than 
some other factor. 
An alternative to classifying targets according to 
their function is to classify them according to the effect 
which the terrorists hope will result from attacking these 
targets. Crenshaw does this in her study of the Algerian war 
of 1954 to 1962.13 However, categories based upon the purpose 
of the targets being attacked, in that ideally one should 
know the motives of the attackers in the case of each attack. 
This is not always possible. Although terrorists sometimes 
reveal the rationale behind their attacks in communiquess 
10) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 192-1939 196- 
197. F. Martin (director). Behind the Mask, (London: 
Activision, 1989)9 video, interview with Brendan 
Hughes. 
11) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual 
Report 1991 (Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabularyt 
1992), 79. 
12) U. S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: - 1989, viii, 4,6. 
13) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, xv. 
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there is the question as to whether these can always be taken 
on trust. As with any form of communication by a political 
group, a terrorist group will wish to put the best possible 
interpretation upon its actions. Communiques sometimes 
represent an attempt by the terrorist leaders to put an 
acceptable gloss on an action which they would rather had not 
occurred. 14 A further complication is that some terrorist 
groups frequently do not issue communiques. 15 Thus, 
classifying targets ac&ording to the motive of the terrorists 
can involve an attempt to second-guess the terrorists. 
For the purpose of classifying targets by the 
terrorists' purpose in attacking them the following terms are 





These terms relate to the reason why the terrorists are 
believed to have selected these people or things as an object 
for their attack. 
The categories are not mutually exclusive in that a 
target may be attacked for more than one reason. Thus, as 
mentioned aboves Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades 
in April 1978 because the Red Brigades hoped to gain the 
freedom of some of their comrades by kidnapping him - thus 
making him a logistical target, and because they felt he 
symbolised the Italian Christian Democrats thus making him 
a symbolic target. 
Symbolic targets. 
Symbolic targets are those where the primary motive for 
the attack is to prompt a reaction in the psychological 
target. This can be for a number of purposes. Terrorists may 
attack a target so as to draw attention to the group and 
their cause. The PIRA assassination of Lord Mountbatten in 
1979 is reported to have prompted the following exchange 
14) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 142. 
J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targetsj 27,48,111- 
1129 115. 
15) A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jongman. Political Terrorism, 160. 
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between a journalist from New Zealand and a Sinn Fein 
of f icial. 
'Why did you kill a harmless old man like Mountbatten? ' 
asked a journalist who called Sinn Fein's office from New 
Zealand. 'Why are you calling Tp from New Zealand? ' came 
the reply from the Falls Road. " (Italics in original. ) 
Thus Mountbatten was not killed because of anything which he 
might have done himself. As Bishop and Mallie point out, his 
military career had never brought him near Ireland, and 
having presided over India's secession from the British 
Empire he was a totally inappropriate symbol of colonial 
oppression. 17 
A more detached rationale for the Mountbatten attack 
was given by a member of the PIRA Army Council: 
Killing this man had the aim of making the world 
understand - and first and foremost the British - that 
there is a state of war in this country. Given his 
personal importance there was inevitably going to be 
enormous publicity attached to this operation. ... we had 
no hatred for him as a person. It is the society, the 
military and th T8pol itical machine he symbolized that we 
were aiming at. 
This is remarkably similar to the comment made by Dan Breen - 
an IRA member during the Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921 - 
concerning the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Lord 
French in Dublin in December 1919. French was the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland and a former commander of the British 
Army in France during the First World War. 
Against the old soldier himself we had no personal spite, 
but he was the head of an alien Government that held our 
country in bondage. We knew that his death would arouse 
the. world to take notice of our fight for free I? m. His 
name was known throughout the civilised world. 
As with the Mountbatten killings French was attacked because 
of what he represented and because the terrorists thought 
that his death would get widespread attention for the Irish 
republican cause. As Breen concludes, if the attempt on 
16) K. J. Kelley. The Longest War, 306. 
17) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 313. 
18) C. L. Irvin. "Terrorists' Perspectives: Interviews", 
D. L. Paletz & A. P. Schmid (eds). Terrorism and the Media (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1992), 78-79. 
19) D. Breen. My Fight for Irish Freedoms revised and enlarged 
edition, (Dublin: Anvils 1964), 84. 
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French had been successful, people around the world would 
have thought "Ireland must have a grievance. What is it?,,. 20 
Targets do not have to be prominent in order to have a 
symbolic value. Peter Gurneyl the former head of the 
Explosives Section of London's Metropolitan Police Anti- 
Terrorist Squad, has divided PIRA attacks in England between 
what he terms 'spectaculars' and 'pot-boilers'. Pot-boilers, 
which in the rest of this study are termed irritants, are 
low-level attacks such-as the use of small incendiary devices 
to burn shops and property, and bomb hoaxes, the aim being to 
cause inconvenience and aggravation as. a niggling reminder to 
the British that the Provisionals are still a problem which 
will not go away whilst the British remain in Northern 
Ireland. The object of irritants is to keep up a constant 
minimum level of aggravation and inconvenience. When they 
become relatively commonplace even killings, such as the 
killing of individual soldiers and police officers in 
Northern Irelandl can come into the category of irritants 
rather than spectaculars. For the Provisionals, unless a 
large number of the security forces are killed in one 
operation, their deaths serve to keep the subject of the 
Northern Irish conflict alive in the backs of the minds of 
the British public, but they no longer grab the headlines. 
Spectaculars on the other hand are attacks intended to cause 
major damage and to put the Provisional IRA campaign, and 
hence the Northern Ireland conflict, at the top of the 
political agenda. 21 A senior Provisional reinforced this 
stating that whilst they and the security forces had reached 
a stalemate, the PIRA retained the ability to bring the 
overall situation to a crisis. 22 
Even a relatively little known person can take on a 
symbolic value because of the office which they hold or the 
job which they perform. In the Basque Country members of the 
Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) are frequently killed by 
ETA, whilst in Northern Ireland uniformed members of the 
British Army or the RUC are killed by the Provisional IRA, 
20) D. Breen. My Fight for Irish Freedom, 84. 
21) P. Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, (London: Harper Collinss 
1993), 213. 
22) T. P. Coogan. The IRA, (Glasgow: Fontana/Collinsq 1987)9 
604. 
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not because they pose an immediate threat to the terrorists, 
but because they provide a readily recognisable symbol of 
what the group is fighting against. 23 Thus, the PIRA has 
always set a high premium on killing British soldiers because 
they are a more suitable symbol of the British presence in 
Ireland than members of the local security forces - the RUC 
and the UDR/RIR. 24 Thus a symbolic target need not be 
prominent in itself, but must attain a sufficient degree of 
prominence through being attacked to influence the 
psychological target. 
Functional targets. 
Functional targets are people or objects whose 
destruction removes a threat to the terrorist group. The most 
obvious example would be the case of a terrorist being 
confronted by an armed opponent where he had to either kill 
the opponent or risk being killed or apprehended. Such cases 
may occur when the police have trapped a terrorist who then 
tries to shoot his way out in order to avoid death or arrest. 
For examples in October 1974 the Red Brigadist Roberto 
Ognibene shot dead a Carabinieri marshal in an unsuccessful 
attempt to escape from a patrol which had lain in wait for 
him at a BR safe-house. 25 Likewise in June 1975 Ilich Ramirez 
Sanchez - widely known as 'Carlos' - shot his way out of a 
Paris flat where he had been cornered, killing two officers 
of the French DST (Direction de la Surveillance du 
Territoire), wounding another, and killing the informer who 
had betrayed him. 26 
23) S. Segaller. Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s, 
revised edition, (London: Sphere Booksl 1987), 100. 
E. MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, (Fourth Estate, 
1991; London: Arrow, 1992), 14-15,229 33. J. Bowyer 
Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 29. 
24) "IRA switch to mortar and landmine campaign"i The 
Guardian, March 16th 1985. G. Adams. The Politics of 
Irish Freedom, (Brandon: Dingle, Ireland, 1986), 121. 
"What's on the agenda now is an end to partition", The 
Irish Times, December 10th 1986. "IRA rings changes to 
restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987- 
25) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 86. V. S. Pisano. The 
Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary 
ItalY, 157. C. Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in 
Italia, 414. 
26) R. Deacon. The French Secret Service,, (London: Grafton, 
1990), 257. C. Dobson & R. Payne. The Carlos Complex: A 
Study in Terror, revised edition, (London: Coronetp 
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However the threat need not be so immediate. Police or 
intelligence officers who are involved with the investigation 
of terrorist groups, and the facilities which they use, are a 
prime target. The targeting of such police and intelligence 
operatives does have a symbolic aspect in that the successful 
elimination of such people can be exploited for its' 
propaganda potential by the terrorist group. In 1977 the Sinn 
Fein newspaper Republican News carried PIRA statements 
applauding the killings of Detective Constable Patrick 
McNulty, whom the Provisionals claimed was a member of the 
RUC Special Branch in Derry, and of Captain Robert Nairac, a 
British Army Intelligence officer. 27 However, this is a 
secondary benefit for the terrorist group. These are 
primarily functional targets because they pose a direct 
threat to the terrorist group. A section in a British Army 
report on the PIRA in 1978, notes: 
The terrorists are already aware of their own 
vulnerability to Security Force intelligence operators 28 and will increasingly seek to eliminate those involved. 
One of the great successes of the IRA in the rebellion of 
1919-1921 was to paralyse the British intelligence system 
through the systematic elimination of police and intelligence 
operatives. An IRA agent noted that even if a dead detective 
was replaced, the new man would not have his knowledge of the 
situation. 29 
In addition to targeting individuals, facilities used 
by investigators have also been targeted. In September 1992 a 
2,000 pound PIRA bomb destroyed the forensic science 
laboratories in Belfast. The destruction of the laboratories 
1978), 63-68. G. Rosie.. The Directory of International 
Terrorism, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1986), 
258. 
27) "Derry Brigade Warning to RUC Secret Police", Republican 
News, February 12th 1977. C. Ryder. The RUC: A Force 
Under Fire, (London: Methuen, 1989)9 172. "SAS Captain 
Executed", Republican Newso May 21st 1977. M. Dillon. 
The Dirty War, (London: Hutchinson, 1990; Arrowq 1991), 
161-187. M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 53-57. F. Holroyd & 
N. Burbridge. War Without Honour, (Hull, England: 
Medium, 1989), 479 559 74-78. 
28) S. Cronin. Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideol2gZ, (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1980), 348. 
R. Fagilot. Britain'R Military Strategy--in Ireland: Th 
Kitson Expeýiment, (London: Zed Books, 1983)9 233. 
29) T. P. Coogan. Michael Collins: A Biography, (London: 
Hutchinsong 1990), 78. 
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- which in 1991 handled nearly 32,000 items involved in over 
5,000 cases - hampered the attempts of the authorities to 
build up cases against terrorist suspects, and showed how an 
object, albeit one staffed by humans, can become a functional 
target. 30 
Logistical targets. 
Logistical targets are those which are attacked in 
order to provide resources (funds, papers, weapons) for the 
group. Any terrorist organisation which deploys a number of 
more or less full time operatives, and which has to secure 
safe houses, rent cars and hotel rooms; buy weapons, and 
carry out other activities, has to obtain money from 
somewhere in order to function. In countries where it is 
necessary to carry identity documents, raids have been 
carried out in order to obtain the necessary paperwork. Thus 
on November 16th 1971 the Red Army Faction raided the town 
hall at Neustadt am Ruebenberge and stole blank passports, 
identity cards, and official seals. Five days later, on 
November 21st they raided the town hall in Langgonns, Hessen, 
and took identity cards and more official stamps. 
31 
The methods used to obtain money, materials, or 
personnel vary considerably. Straightforward methods such as 
bank robbery can net fairly large amounts of money in a short 
space of time. Starting in 1879, bank robbery was a common 
method used by Russian revolutionary groups of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to secure sufficient 
funds to operate. 32 More recently Carlos Marighela, who led 
the Action for National Liberation (Acao Libertadora Nacional 
- ALN) in Brazil in the late 1960s, saw bank-robbery as a 
30) "Damage in huge blast p ut at Mm", The Independent, 
September 25th 1992. "Court laboratory bombed by IRA"j 
The Timesg September 25th 1992. "Brits haven't a clue"s 
"War News: Lab Flattened", "IRA strikes at Diplock 
system's heart"s An Phoblacht/Republican News 
(hereafter AP/RN)j October 1st 1992. "'Troubles' 
chronology: Wed Sep 23", Fortnight, no 311, (November 
1992), 34. 
31) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a 
Phenomenong trans. A. Bell, (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe 
Verlag, 1985; London: Bodley Head, 1987)9 1159 116. 
J. Becker. Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader- 
Meinhof Gang, (London: Granada, 1978)9 234-236. 
32) W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, (London: Weidenfield & 
Nicolson, 1987), 112. 
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useful source of funds and useful training for other 
activities. 33 Robbery has continued with groups as diverse as 
the Red Army Faction, the Provisional IRA, the PLO, and the 
remnants of the French OAS carrying out robberies in order to 
raise funds. 34 In March 1992, following the second raid in 
six weeks on the post office in Camlough, county Armaghp it 
was reported that during the troubles in Northern Ireland L18 
million had been taken in 17,000 robberies. 35 
Another logistical method is to kidnap people and then 
hold them to ransom. This can take the form of seizing a 
person and then hiding them somewhere until the ransom is 
paid. Alternatively people can be kidnapped and held until 
comrades of the kidnappers are released from imprisonment, 
and of course the kidnappers can present a list of several 
demands. Behind the demands lies the threat that if the 
kidnappers terms are not met the hostage will be killed. 
A very successful kidnapping occurred on September 19th 
1974 when the Montonerosq an Argentine Peronist groupq 
kidnapped the sons of the founder of the grain and flour 
company Bunge y Born - both also being senior executives in 
the company. One was released early for health reasons, but 
the other was not released until June 20th 1975 after a 
number of conditions had been met, the most important being 
the payment of $60 million. 36 
Other kidnappings achieve more modest sums. In March 
1983 ETA kidnapped the president of a bank which had recently 
33) C-Marighela. "Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare", 
"Guerrilla Tactics and Operations", For the-Liberation 
of Brazil, trans. J. Butt & R. Sheed, (Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguins 1971), 72 981t 111-112. 34) "IRA suspected as raiders get away with Z2m", The 
Independent, January 8th 1992. "Brooke going soft on 
IRA says bishop"s The-Jimes, January 8th 1992. "IRA 
fund-raising blamed for surge in Irish robberies", The 
Independent, May 22nd 1990. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 1949 2239 391. W. Laqueur. The Age of 
Terrorism, 97. J. Adams. Lhe Financing of Terror, 
(London: New English Library, 1986; New English Library 
paperback, 1988), 117-120. A. Horne. A Savage War of 
Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, (London: Macmillan, 1977; 
Harmondsworthl England: Penguin, 1979)9 553. 
35) "Raiders target the country post offices", The 
Independent, March 17th 1992. 
36) R. Gillespie. Soldiers of Peron, 180-182. R. Clutterbuck, 
Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, (London: Macmillan, 
1987), 157-158. 
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collapsed. Initially the group demanded 1,200 million pesetas 
(16 million), but ultimately released him on payment of 150 
million pesetas (050,000). 37 However, ETA have also 
instituted a form of extortion termed a 'revolutionary tax'. 
They contact wealthy individuals and threaten to kill them 
unless they pay a set amount to ETA annually. 38 If the 
victims pay, they are not harmed. If they do not they may be 
kidnapped, killed, or deliberately wounded. 39 
Kidnappings aimea at obtaining the release of comrades 
from imprisonment have also occurred fairly frequently. 
Usually the terrorist group will take a hostage, hide them in 
a secret location somewhere, and then demand the release of 
their comrades as the condition of the hostages safe release. 
The Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de 
Liberacion Nacional - MLN), also known as the Tupamaros, 
carried out a number of kidnappings in the early 1970s. On 
July 31st 1970 the Tupamaros kidnapped Dan Mitrione, the 
Chief Public Safety Advisor at the American Embassy in 
Montevideo, and the Brazilian Consul. 40 The Tupamaros 
demanded the release of 150 of their comrades, and alleged 
that Mitrione was a US agent responsible for the torture of 
Tupamaros in Uruguayan police custody. The authorities 
rounded up a number of suspected Tupamaros, including much of 
the leadership. On August 10th 1970 Mitrione's body was found 
dumped. The Tupamaro prisoners were not released by the 
authorities, but the Brazilian Consul was freed on February 
21st 1971 after his family paid $250,000 ransom*41 
Subsequently the Tupamaros kidnapped other diplomats and 
businessmen, both in order to secure the release of comrades, 
and to extort money. 42 
37) M. Bles & R-Low. The Kidnap Business, (1987; London: Star, 
1988) , 198-199. 38) R. P. Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 227-228. E. MacDonald- 
Shoot the Women First, 33. M. Bles & R. Low. The Kidnap 
Business, 200-214. 
39) R. P. Clark. The Basque Insurgentsi 227-228. 
40) A. Labrousse. The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguayl 
trans. D. Livingstone, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970; 
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973), 100. 
D. Ronfeldt. The Mitrione Kidnapping in Uruguayl (Santa 
Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1987), 6-7. 
41) A. Labrousse. The Tupamaros, 127. D. Ronfeldt- The Mitrione 
Kidnapping in Uruguay, 29. 
\ 42) For more detail of one of these kidnappings from the 
perspective of the victim see G. Jackson. People's 
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A West German group which in its initial stages derived 
inspiration from the Tupamaros, to the extent that one of 
their predecessor groups called itself the Tupamaros West 
Berlin, was the June 2nd Movement (Bewegung 2 Juni - B2J). 
43 
The B2J was a relatively small group which on February 27th 
1975 kidnapped the Chairmen of the West Berlin Christian 
Democratsy Peter Lorenz. 44 He was released the day after the 
German authorities released five imprisoned members of their 
group, and put them on. a. flight to Aden. 45 
More recently, in 1989 and 1990, members of the 
Medellin cocaine cartel took journalists, businessmen, and 
the manager of a football team hostage. These were seen by 
the cartel as 'bargaining chips' to be used to prevent the 
Colombian Government from apprehending members of the cartel 
member's families, and to force the Government to back down 
over its threat to extradite cartel members to the USA. 
46 
I Attempts to obtain money through a form of kidnapping 
can be far more overt as happens in the case of hijackingst 
or in sieges where terrorists openly hold hostages within a 
building. In these cases no attempt is made to conceal the 
general whereabouts of the hostages, although their precise 
location within the aircraft or building might not be known. 
The aim is to trade the safe return of the hostages for the 
release of colleagues of the terrorist group. 
In June 1985 Trans World Airways Flight 847 from Athens 
to Rome was hijacked by members of the Lebanese Shia Islamic 
group Hizbollah. 47 They demanded the release of 766 Lebanese 
Prison, (Faber & Faber, 1973; Newton Abbots England: 
Reader's Union, 1974). 
43) F. Lopez-Alves. "Political Crises, Strategic Choices and 
Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan 
Tupamaros"l Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 2, 
(April 1989), 216. B. Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing. How it 
all Began: The Personal Account of a West German Urban 
Guerrilla, trans. H-Ellenbogen & W. Parker, (Munich: 
Trikont Verlag, 1975; Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1977), 49- 
50. 
44) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 179. 
45) J. Becker. Hitler's Children, 297-298. S. Aust. The Baader- 
Meinhof Group, 286-289. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing 
Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 40. 
46) "Drug barons threaten to kill hostages", The Independent, 
November 1st 1990. 
47) J. T. Choi. Acts-of violence ai4ainst civil aviation: 
historical survey, Perspectives and responsesq Ph-D, 
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prisoners who were held in the Israeli detention camp at 
Atlit, the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the Israeli- 
created South Lebanese Army (SLA) from southern Lebanon. 
Later they demanded the release to Algiers of a comrade who 
had been arrested at Athens Airport, and threatened to kill 
the seven Greek hostages on board if he was not released. On 
June 15th one of the hostages2 a US Navy diver, was shot dead 
at Beirut. 
The hijacking ended on June 30th after negotiations 
through the Syrian Government and Nabih Berri, the leader of 
the Lebanese militia group AMAL. The terrorist caught at 
Athens had been freed on June 15th, and the Lebanese held in 
Atlit were freed over a period of three months, although the 
Israelis claimed that this had always been their intention. 
Other demands were not met. The Israeli and SLA presence in 
southern Lebanon was not withdrawn. In the course of the 
hijacking, the release of two Lebanese held in Madrid for an 
attempted assassination was demanded, and the terrorists also 
demanded the release of seventeen Shia prisoners in Kuwait, 
allegedly involved in bombing the US and French Embassies 
there in 1983.48 Neither of these demands were met. In 
December 1984 a Kuwait Airways flight from Dubai to Karachi 
had been hijacked in an unsuccessful attempt to free the 
seventeen Shias in Kuwait, and the subsequent hijacking of a 
Kuwait Airways flight from Bangkok to Kuwait in April 1988 
also failed to gain the release of the Shia prisoners. 49 They 
were eventually freed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. 
The fact that a target has a logistical value does not 
necessarily preclude it from having a functional or symbolic 
University of St Andrews, 1992,206-243. E. F. Mickolust 
T. Sandlerl J. M. Murdock. International Terrorism in the 
1980s: A Chronology of Events. Volume 11.1984-1987, 
219-225. G. Rosie. The Directory of International 
Terrorism, 280. 
48) E. F. Mickolus, T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. International 
Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events. Volume 
1.1980-1983., (Amest USA: Iowa State Universityq 1989)9 
468-469. 
49) E. F. Mickolusp T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. International 
Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987,139-142. G. Rosie. 
The Directory of International Terrorism, 168-169. 
R. E. Hill. Problems of international cooperation to, 
improve standards of aviation security with reference 
to the passenger, Ph-Dj University of St Andrews, 19901 
56-94. 
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value as well. When members of the Palestinian organisation 
Black September seized eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 
Munich Olympics, they had three aims according to Fatah's 
head of security and intelligence Salah Khalafj known as Abu 
Iyad. 50 
... to affirm the existence of the Palestinian people; to 
give our cause resounding coverage - positive or 
negativel it mattered little - by taking advantage of the 
extraordinary concentration of mass media at Munich; and 
finally, to force Israel to release fedayeen [members of 
the various Palestinian esistance groups] in a number 
initially fixed at 200.51 
The fact that the operation ended in the death of all of the 
hostages and several of the terrorists did not stop it from 
being a success, in fact it probably highlighted the 
Palestinian cause far more than a peaceful resolution and 
exchange of captives would have done. Thus, although intended 
to fulfil logistical objectives, the Munich kidnappings 
actually fulfilled a symbolic objective by forcing the 
Palestinian question onto the international agenda. 52 
The assassination of Resident Magistrate Alan Bell in 
Dublin on March 26th 1920 shows how a person can be both a 
logistical and functional target. Bell was investigating the 
location of bank accounts holding funds which had been raised 
by the IRA and Sinn Fein. Whilst on a tram on his way to 
work, a group of young IRA men apprehended him, took him off 
the tram and shot him in the street. 53 By killing Bell they 
50) There is some debate as to whether Black September, named 
expulsion of the various Palestinian groups from Jordan 
which began in September 1970, was truly an independent 
organisation, or a front organisation for Fatah 
operations. See H. Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation: People, '-Power and Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 54-55. A. Iyad & 
E. Rouleau. My Home My Land: A Narrative of the 
Palestinian Struggle, trans. L. B. Koseoglul (Paris: 
Fayollej 1978; New York: Times Books, 1981), 98. 
A. Gowers & T. Walker. Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian 
Revolution, revised paperback edition, (London: Corgi, 1991), 117-120. A-Frangi. The PLO and Palestine, trans. 
P. Knight, (Frankfurt: R. G. Fischer Verlag, 1982; London: 
Zed Books, 1983), 120. 
51) A. Iyad & E. Rouleau. My Home My Land,, 106. 
52) A. Iyad & E. Rouleau. My Home My Land, 112-113. 
53) R. Kee. Ourselves Alone: Volume Three of the Green Flag, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972; Quartet, 1976)9 
101. C. Townshend. The British Campaign in Ireland, 
1919-1921: The Development Of Political and Military 
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not only eliminated a functional threat, they safeguarded 
their logistical resources. 
Expressive targets. 
One cannot ignore human caprices and terrorism can be 
an emotional response to a situation rather than a part of an 
overall strategy. The lone anarchists who carried out bomb 
and knife attacks in France in the 1890s frequently appear to 
have been motivated by personal anger at perceived injustices 
rather than by political programmes. 54 Auguste Vaillant's 
bomb attack on the Chamber of Deputies on December 9th 1893, 
for which he was executed, seems to have been inspired as 
much by despair at the poverty in which he and his family 
were living as by any symbolic political motive. 55 Likewise, 
Emile Henry, who bombed the Cafe Terminus in Paris in 
February 1894, claimed at his trial that among the 
bourgeoisie there were no innocents, and that it was 
therefore justifiable to attack them for their oppression of 
ordinary people. He stated: 
I wanted to show the bourgeoisie that their pleasures 
would no longer be complete, that their insolent triumphs 
would be disturbed, that their golden calf would tremble 
violently on its pedestal, untfi the final shock would 
cast it down in mud and blood. 
Lupsha deals with this phenomenon, citing indignation 
as a possible motive for carrying out an act of political 
violence. 57 He defines indignation as; 
.. the attitude and behavioural manifestations of 58 wrathfulness because of unworthy or unjust treatment. 
Merari refers to a similar concept in discussing 'expressive 
terrorism' citing the terrorist campaigns by South Moluccans 
in the Netherlands and the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Policiesl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 65. 
T. P. Coogan. Michael Collins, 188. 
54) G. Woodcock. Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and 
Movements, (USA: The World Publishing Company, 1962; 
Harmondsworthp England: Penguin, 1975), 286-295. 
J. Joll. The Anarchists, second edition, (London: 
Methuen, 1979), 113-119. D. Miller. Anarchism, (London: 
J. M. Dent & Sons, 1984), 111-112. 
55) G. Woodcock- Anarchism, 292. J. Joll. The Anarchistsi 113. 
56) J. Joll. The Anarchists, 118. 
57) P. A. Lupsha. "Explanation of Political Violence: Some 
Psychological Theories Versus Indignation", Politics 
and Society, 2, no. 1, (Fall 1971). 
58) P. A. Lupsha. "Explanation of Political Violence", 102. 
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Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) as examples. 59 Arguably the 
South Moluccan campaign was quite rational in that they 
perceived a need to highlight the political position of the 
Moluccans, and did so. ASALA on the other hand appears to 
have been largely motivated by the desire to exact revenge 
against the Turks for the death of 11 million Armenians in 
1915, although it does call for an independent state in the 
formerly Armenian provinces of Turkey. 60 
Such motives can'also apply to individual operations 
where revenge is a major motivation. In June 1984 Chief of 
the Indian Army Staff, General Vaidya ordered the storming of 
the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar - the holiest Sikh shrine 
- during operations against Sikh militants and terrorists. 
The Temple was severely damaged and many Sikhs were killed, 
including the militant leader Sant Jarnail Singh 
Bhindranwale. The Sikhs did not forget. In August 1986, at 
Pune in southern India, Sikh terrorists on motor cycles 
overtook and fired on the car of the retired General Vaidya, 
killing him and wounding his wife and bodyguard. 
61 
It can be more difficult to fit attacks on expressive 
targets into a study of terrorist target selection than the 
other three categories. Due to the fact that such attacks 
have an emotional motivationt one cannot necessarily divine 
the logical processes which provide the rationale for attacks 
on symbolic, functional, and logistical targets. However it 
is important to remember that with terrorism, as with other 
human activities, not all decisions taken are coldly logical. 
59) A. Merari. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 5j no. 49 (Winter 
1993), 237. 
60) K. Tololyan. "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorismj Religion 
and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora"i 
P. Wilkinson & A. M. Stewart (eds). Contemporary Research 
on Terrorism, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 
1987; 1989), 93. W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 227. 
J. E. Vorbach. "Monte Melkonian: Armenian Revolutionary 
Leader", Terrorism and Political Violencet 6, no. 29 
(Summer 1994), 178. 
61) "Terrorists kill India's former army chief", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, August 21st 1986. "Vaidya killers 
hanged", The Hindu: Internati_onal, October 17th 1992. 
M. Tully & S. Jacob- Amritsar, 155-191. M. J. Akbar. India: 
The Siege Within, 201-205. 
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Types of terrorist operation 
There are several types of terrorist operation. 
62 The 
typology employed in this section is based upon the nature of 
the operation. The categories are: 
0 Assassination. 
I Discriminate attack. 





0 Mass destruction attack. 
An assassination is an attack which is intended to kill 
a specific person or specific people. The target need not be 
well known or powerful, but the attack must have been aimed 
at killing that person or those people in particular. A 
lethal attack on, for instance, a police officer, which is 
aimed at killing any police officer, is not an assassination 
because the object of the attack is not a specific person. 
However if a specific police officer is selected and attacked 
then it is an assassination. Other people may be killed or 
injured in the course of an assassination attempt, but these 
casualties are incidental, or are at most secondary targets - 
such as bodyguards - who have to be eliminated so that the 
terrorists can attack their primary target. This was the case 
with the Tamil suicide bomber who killed the Congress Party 
leader and former Indian Prime Ministerl Rajiv Gandhip 
together with herself and about twenty bystanders at an 
election rally in Madras in April 1991.63 
A discriminate attack is an attack where the aim is 
kill or injure human targets from a specific category of 
people, but not necessarily specific individuals. Again an 
example of this would be an attacks on uniformed police 
62) B. M. Jenkins.. The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony befr-orethe 
Long Commissiong (Santa Monical California: RAND 
Corporation, February 1984), 2. 
63) "Rajiv Gandhi assassinated in bomb blast"q The Timest May 
22nd 1991. "Rajiv Gandhi murdered by bombers at 
election rally", The Independent, May 22nd 1991. "What 
One-Eyed Jack knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991- 
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officers, but it could apply to a broader group, such as any 
member of a particular religious or ethnic group. Other 
people may be harmed by the attack, but, again, this is 
incidental to the objective, as occurred in county Armagh, 
Northern Ireland, in July 1990 when a landmine detonated by a 
Provisional IRA unit killed three RUC officers and a Catholic 
nun. 64 
A mass-casualtv attack is one where the aim is to kill 
or injure as many people as possible with little regard as to 
the types of people harmed. To call such attacks 
indiscriminate would not be totally accurate as most attacks 
contain a degree of discrimination with regard to the people 
or objects harmed, or the location of the attack. At the very 
least terrorists tend to ensure that their own supporters are 
not harmed. An example occurred in April 1986 when Nizar 
Hindawi - who was reportedly working for Syrian intelligence 
- duped his unsuspecting pregnant girlfriend into carrying a 
bomb on board an aeroplane. He specifically chose a flight 
belonging to the Israeli airline El Al because he was 
allegedly instructed by Syrian intelligence officers to 
attack Israeli targets. 
65 Whilst he did not know the people 
likely to be on board the aeroplane - with the exception of 
his girlfriend - by specifically choosing El Al he was 
showing a degree of discrimination in that his victims were 
likely to be Jewish, Israeli, or at least flying to Israel in 
an aeroplane operated by an Israeli airline. Other attacks, 
such as the detonation of powerful bombs in public places, 
are undoubtedly intended to kill or injure a large number of 
people irrespective of who they are as specific individuals. 
An abduction is an operation where a person is seized 
and taken to a secret place*where they are held pending their 
release or their death. Such operations frequently take the 
form of kidnappings where the terrorists attempt to gain some 
form of benefit - usually a ransom or the release of 
64) "IRA blast kills nun and three RUC men"l The Times, July 
25th 1990. "Catholic nun and three RUC men killed by 
IRA landmine", The Independent, July 25th 1990. 
65) P. Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective International 
Aviation Security System"s Terrorism and Political 
Violencel 5, no. 29 (Summer 1993), 105. E. F. Mickolus, 
T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. International Terrorism in the 
1980s, 1984-1987,, 376-378. S. Emerson & B. Duffy. The 
Fall of Pan Am 103, (London: Futura, 1990), 199-200. 
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prisoners - in return for the release of the person abducted. 
The ostensible aim of the kidnapping in March 1978 of former 
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, was to secure the release 
of Red Brigade prisoners, although it was also probably 
intended to derail the accommodation between the Italian 
Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party by 
precipitating a political crisis. 66 In other cases there may 
be no intention of freeing the victim. In September 1990 a 
PIRA unit stopped a minibus just after it had crossed from 
the Republic of Ireland into Northern Ireland, and abducted 
an RUC officer. He was interrogated, then shot, his body 
being found a few days later. 67 
A siege - sometimes termed a barricade and hostage 
incident - occurs when terrorists seize hostages and then 
barricade themselves behind cover with the intention of 
holding them until their demands are met. Usually such 
operations are pre-planned, as occurred when Arab-Iranians 
seized the Iranian Embassy in London in April 1980, and held 
the people there hostage. The terrorists' chief aim was to 
publicise their demand for autonomy for their area of Iran, 
but they also demanded the release of ninety-one prisoners 
held in Iran and safe conduct out of Britain. 68 However, 
terrorists who are trying to evade capture may seize hostages 
and try to bargain their way out of captivity. This happened 
in London in December 1975 when four PIRA members running 
from the police, broke into a flat and seized the couple who 
lived there. Although the terrorists demanded a getaway 
aeroplane, one of them subsequently said that they were 
66) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 219. A. Jamieson. The Heart 
Attacked, 151,157,160. Interview with Prospero 
Gallineri in "Secret History: The Last Days of Aldo 
Moro", Channel 49 television, July 20th 1992. 
67) "Murdered RUC man's body found"i The Independent, 
September 14th 1990. "IRA admits shooting of sergeant"t 
The Times, September 19th 1990. B. O'Brien. The Long 
War: The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today, (Dublin: 
O'Brien Press, 1993), 207. 
68) Sunday Times Insight Team. Siege: Prince's Gate. London, 
April 30-May 5 19809 (Feltham, England: Hamlyn, 1980), 
31,45,52,61-62. E. F. Mickolusl T. Sandler, 
J. M. Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s, 
1980-1983,40-42. P. Schlesinger. Media, State and 
Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities, (London: Sage, 1991), 31. 
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playing for time, hoping that other PIRA members would 
recover equipment from their safe house 0 
69 
A hijacking is an operation where the terrorists seize 
control of a vehicle, such as an aircraft, ship, or car. The 
terrorists often seize the occupants as bargaining counters 
with a government or some other actor. The Dawson's Field 
incident of 1970, where PFLP members hijacked three aircraft 
of different nationalities is an early example of hijacking 
aircraft and their paspengers in order to exert pressure on 
several governments. 70 In an interview carried out before 
these hijackings, the leader of the PFLP, George Habashq 
pointed out that hijackings fulfilled another purpose. 
Though the West may have been shocked by it, the 
hijacking of the planes was popular among Palestinians 
and the Arab masses in general - and to us that matters a 
lot. The struggle is far from being a purely military 
one; it is psychological tool and we have to raise the 
morale of the masses while at the same time harassing the 
Israelis. 71 
Another example, the hijacking of the Mediterranean 
cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985, appears to have 
been precipitated by the discovery of armed Palestinians 
aboard the cruise ship. The initial plan was to disembark at 
the Israeli port of Ashdod and to attack whatever they found 
there. Nevertheless, once forced into the open the terrorists 
held the passengers hostage, killing one, demanded the 
release of fifty Palestinians from Israeli prisons, and also 
demanded safe conduct to a destination of their choice. 
Whilst they received safe conduct from the Egyptian 
Government, their aircraft was intercepted in international 
airspace by US Navy jets and forced to land in Italy'where 
four kidnappers were imprisoned. 72 
69) G. McKee & R. Franey. Time Bomb, (London: Bloomsburyl 
1988), 326-347. 
70) P. Snow & D. Phillips. Leila's-Hijack War: The True Story 
of 25 Days in September 1970, (London: Pan, 1970). 
G. Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 94- 
96. 
71) G. Chaliand. The Palestinian Resistance, 167. 
72) D. C. Martin & J-Walcott. Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story- 
of America's--War Against Terrorisms (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1988), 235-257. O. North & W. Novak. Under Fire: An 
American Story, (New York: Harper Collinst 1991)t 199- 
211. S. Segaller. Invisible Armies, 250-271. 
Terrorist typologies 32 
An act of sabotage is an attack intended to cause 
material damage to a specific material target. Although there 
may be no intention to harm human targets there is always the 
possibility that people will get hurt whatever the intention 
of the terrorists. Examples include the numerous incendiary 
attacks which the Provisional IRA carried out on commercial 
premises in Northern Ireland and England throughout the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 73 
A mass destruction attack on the other hand is intended 
to cause a large amount of material damage. Prime examples of 
these would be the two massive bombs which the PIRA detonated 
in the City of London in April 1992 and April 1993, where 
Lloyd's List quotes insured losses at 9350 million in the 
former case and 1650 million in the latter. 74 However the 
potential risk to human life in such attacks was emphasised 
by the death of three civilians with over seventy-five 
injured in the 1992 explosion, and one killed with over fifty 
injured in that of 1993.75 
It should be noted that more than one category of 
attack may be used in an operation. For example a large bomb 
could be intended to cause both mass casualties and mass 
destruction, although in practice most large bombings are 
primarily intended to cause one or the other. 
73) "Incendiary devices increasingly used in terror attacks", 
The Independent, December 2nd 1991. "IRA switch tactics 
with store firebombs, disruption of rail commuters and 
mortar attack on Downing Streetv The Guardiang January 
11th 1992. "IRA claims responsibility for planting 
firebombs, The Independent, September 2nd 1991. 
"Mainland attacks admitted by IRA", The Timess 
September 2nd 1991. ' 
74) "Insured loss may hit 9150m", Lloyd's List, February 12th 
1996. 
75) "London counts the cost of IRA bombs"l The Independent, 
April 13th 1992. "Back-to-work City defies the IRA"q 
The Times, April 13th 1992. "City bomb claims may reach 
Zlbn", The Independentl April 14th 1992. "Troubles 
chronology: Apr 10", Fortnight, May '92. "IRA City 
bombers identified by police", The Independenti July 
15th 1992. "Cost will exhaust pool of insurance money"s 
The Independent, April 26th 1993. "One bomb: i1bn 
devastation", The Independent on Sunday, April 24th 
1993. "Taxpayers foot IRA bomb bill", The Timesq April 
26th 1993. "Security to be stepped up in City after 
blast"s "Toll of injured rises to 51", both in The 
Independent, April 26th 1993. 
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Summary. 
The aim of this chapter has been to bring some degree 
of order to the multiplicity of operational and target types 
which one may encounter in a study of terrorist operations. 
Firstly, targets can be divided between the physical target - 
the person or object actually attacked, and the psychological 
target - the people whom the terrorists wish to influence. 
Targets can also be divided between pre-planned targets 
and targets of opportunity. A pre-planned target is one where 
the terrorists have already selected a target and planned the 
attack some time in advance. A target 9f opportunity on the 
other hand, is one which suddenly, and with little warning, 
presents itself to the terrorists - who proceed to attack it 
or not as they see fit at the time. 
Specific terrorist operations can be divided into eight 
types: assassination, discriminate attack, mass casualty 
attack, abduction, siege, hijacking, sabotage, and mass 
destruction attack. The terrorist group in question may use 
some or all of these operations as part of their campaign. 
Not all groups use the full repertoire of operations, but 
select those which fit in with the objectives which they wish 
the attack to achieve. 
Terrorist targets can also be categorised according to 
the reason why they have been attacked. Where the aim is to 
affect the psychological target, the target attacked can be 
deemed a symbolic target. This is the type of attack which is 
most often associated with the terrorising aspect of 
terrorism, although the perpetrators of the attack may be 
trying to induce other psychological feelings such as anger 
or irritation. Where the aim is to remove a direct threat to 
the group the target of the attack can be said to be a 
functional target. When terrorists carry out an operation 
where the aim is to increase the assets of the terrorist 
group - for instance by getting money or freeing comrades - 
the target can be considered a logistical target. Lastlys 
where the terrorists attack a person, institution, or object 
for primarily emotional reasons, the target is an expressive 
target. In many cases terrorist attacks may fall under more 
than one category because of the multiplicity of motives. 
Terrorist attacks are very rarely isolated incidents. A 
terrorist attack carries the implicit threat that others will 
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follow until the political aims of the terrorists are 
fulfilled. To understand the logic behind the selection of 
particular targets, it is helpful to see terrorist operations 
within the context of the overall designs of the group 
concerned. Whilst to outsiders terrorist actions may appear 
to be purposeless, in practice they are closely tied to the 
political beliefs of the terrorists. 
35 
The Effect of Ideology 
Introduction. 
In his study of political culturep Rosenbaum defines 
ideology as: 
The degree to which an individual has an explicit, 
structured set of political values or attitudes that help 
him to interpret and respond to political events; this 
may involve a fairly coherent belief system (such as 
'conservatism' oi ! socialism') or a set of isolated but 
related beliefs. 
Thus, an ideology can range from a coherent series of 
principles to a muddled collection of jut prejudices. In the 
case of some ideologies - particularly religion or 
separatisml but others as well - one may also find that an 
ideology includes historical or even semi-mythical beliefs. 
2 
What is important in the context of this study is that 
ideology provides a motive - and in some cases a formula - 
for action. In this study the term ideology refers to the 
beliefs, values, principles, and objectives, however ill- 
defined or tenuous, by which a group may define its 
distinctive political identity and aims, and justify its 
actions. Terrorism itself is a method, not an ideology. 
one should distinguish between the professed ideology 
of the group and the actual beliefs of individual members. 
Whereas the leaders of the group often have a good 
understanding of, and allegiance to, the ideology of the 
group, the followers may have a less distinct idea of what 
the group stands for. This is illustrated in the accounts of 
various far-right organisations in Britain in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and in the letters from imprisoned Italian 
fascists in di Giovanni's compilation. 3 The organisers at the 
1) W. A. Rosenbaum. Political Culture, (London: Nelson, 1975)9 
120. 
2) M. Kramer. "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon"t 
Terrorism and Political Violencel 3, no. 39 (Autumn 
1991), 32-33. K. Tololyan. "Cultural Narrative and the 
Motivation of the Terrorist", D. C. Rapoport (ed) Insi 
Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 1988). 9 
221. A. T. Q. Stewart. The Narrow Ground: The Roots of 
Conflict in Ulster, revised edition, (London: Faberv 
1989), 180-181. J. Darby. "The Historical Background"s 
J. Darby (ed). Northern Ireland: The Background to the 
Conflict, (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983)9 15. 
3) R. Hill & A-Bell. The Other Face of Terror, 95,121-1221 
125,157,169. Searchlight. From Ballots to Bombs: The 
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top of such groups usually believe in a fairly specific 
political ideology, and have clear political objectives, but 
for many of their followers a sufficient motive for belonging 
to the group is provided by adherence to the group and a 
visceral dislike of the 'enemy'. 
In some cases the connection between terrorist activity 
and political ideology may not be straightforward due to 
other influences. For instance, the desire of groups or 
communities to dominate the area they live in can take 
precedence over abstract ideological considerations. Thus, in 
Sri Lanka, the Punjab, Peru, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere, 
communal, social, and economic rivalries may account for the 
selection of local targets by a group which bases itself upon 
a broader ideological justification. Gearty argues that where 
violence is mainly used to achieve communal goals one is not 
really dealing with political terrorism as it is understood 
in the West. 4 However, achieving local dominance is relevant 
to the exercise or maintenance of power and may well relate 
to the success or failure of a wider conflict. Therefore it 
is in itself a use of violence in order to achieve political 
ends. 
Categories of ideology. 
Whilst ideology generally sets the limits within which 
terrorists select their targets, different ideologies provide 
different targets. The ideological categories used to 







Inside Story of the National Front's Political 
Soldiers, (London: Searchlight, after 1989)9 16-19. 
C. di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars: Letters from 
True Stories of Terror, Agony and Hope, (Slough, 
England: St Paul Publications, 1990), 959 99-100- 
4) C. Geartyj Terror, 102. 
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I Fascism. 
I Single-issue. 
I Organised Crime. 
Separatism. The concepts of separatism and nationalism 
are inextricably linked. There are several theories as to 
what makes up a nation, and consequently several definitions 
of nationalism. 5 This study adopts the definition of Smith 
who defines nationalism as: 
., * an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomyj unity and identity on beýalf of a population 
deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or 
potential 'nations. 6 
In this study a separatist group is one which aims at gaining 
political independence for a given geographical area and 
population from the governance of what the group perceives as 
a foreign political unit, either for the purposes of gaining 
total independence, or to attach themselves to a state with 
which they feel a greater affinity. Separatist groups believe 
that they represent the interests and aspirations of a 
national or ethnic group - whether or not that group realises 
it - by seeking to liberate them from the current 'foreign' 
rulers. 
Separatism is a narrower concept than nationalism. 
Whereas all separatists are nationalists, not all 
nationalists are necessarily separatists. Some groups 
espousing nationalism do not wish to separate from their 
existing state. Fascist and conservative groups often declare 
their loyalty to their nation, although fascists usually wish 
to change the nature of the state itself, whilst 
conservatives generally wish to preserve it. A separatist 
terrorist group is one which uses terrorism for that end. 
Examples include ETA in the Basque country in Spain, 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, 
5) For a selection see J-Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds). 
Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
M. Williams (ed). International Relations in the 
Twentieth Century: A Reader, (Basingstoke, England: 
Macmillan, 1989), 42-77. E. J. Hobsbawm. Nations and 
Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Realityp 
second edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Presso 
1992). A. D. Smith. National Identitys (Harmondsworthi 
England: Penguin, 1991). 
6) A. D. Smith. National Identity, 73. 
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who wish to set up separate states for the Basques and Tamils 
respectively. 7 Alternatively, separatist groups like the 
Greek-Cypriot group EOKA in the 1950s, or the present-day 
Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, wish to secede from the 
existing government and join another state - in these cases 
Greece and the Republic of Ireland. 8 
Religion. Like separatism, religion commands from its 
adherents a high degree of fealty to an intangible entity. As 
with separatism's relationship to nationalityl people are 
generally born into their religion. Whereas people usually 
choose whether or not to be communists, liberals, fascists, 
or whatever other ideology they may adopt, their religion and 
nationality is something which they generally inherit. 
Members of a religious terrorist group use terrorism to 
promote their perception of the doctrines and political 
interests of their religion. This includes groups such as the 
Armed Islamic Group (Groupes Islamique Armee - GIA) in 
Algeria, Hizbollah in the Lebanon, and the Jewish Underground 
which flourished in parts of Israel in the early 1980s. 9 
Groups promoting an extensive political role for their 
religion believe that their governments are morally obliged 
to govern according to the tenets of that religion. 
This study does not examine those millenarian groups 
that do not have definable political aims. A millenarian 
group is one which believes that some form of apocalyptic 
change is at hand, and "... anticipates collective, earthly, 
7) F. Lleraq J. M. Mata & C. L. Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army to 
Social Movement - The Post-Franco Schism of the Basque 
Nationalist Movement", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 5, no. 3, (Autumn 1993)", 106. 
G. Samaranayake. "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and 
Prospects of Management: An Empirical Inquiry"t 
Terrorism and Political Violences 3, no. 2, (Summer 
1991)9 so. 
8) G. Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's 
Struggle, trans. A. A. Pallis, (London: Longmans, 1964)9 
91-92. M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 482. 
9) "Algerian dissident seeks UK asylum"l The Independents 
August 6th 1994. M. Crenshaw. "Political Violence in 
Algeria", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 39 
(Autumn 1994), 265,269-272,273. M. Kramer. "Hizbullah: 
The Calculus of Jihad", M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (eds). 
Fundamentalisms and the State, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Pressq 1993). E. Sprinzak. "From Messianic 
Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush 
Emunim Underground", D. C. Rapoport (ed) Inside Terrorist 
Organizationa. 
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imminent, total, supernatural salvation". 10 In the case of 
Christian millenarianism for instance, it can either mean 
that Christ will come before the millenium, destroying the 
existing order in the process, or that incremental human 
action will bring about an apocalyptic millenium, after which 
Christ will come. 11 The majority of such groups are not 
violent. 12 Where they have been - primarily in the USA - they 
appear to have been motivated by an extreme right-wing 
political agenda rathei- than by their religious beliefs as 
such. Millenarian groups which carry out violence in the hope 
that they will hasten the coming of Christ or any other 
divinity are not covered by this study their aim is not to 
influence the behaviour of other people but merely to cause 
carnage for religious purposes. 
Liberalism. Liberal ideology promotes the establishment 
of democratic methods of representation in government, the 
equality of individuals before the law, and the maintenance 
of the civil rights of the individual. A liberal terrorist 
group is one which uses terrorism in order to secure a 
government of this nature. 
Some people may have difficulty in accepting that a 
liberal group could use terrorism as a weapon, or in defining 
any group which uses terrorism as 'liberal's Referring to the 
use of the term 'terrorist' as a perjorative, Jenkins has 
perceptively noted that "Terrorism is what the bad guys 
do". 13 As liberals, in the broadest sense of the term, tend 
to be seen as the 'good guys', the concept of a liberal 
terrorist group is seen by some as a contradiction in terms. 
Gearty notes his own disinclination to bracket the African 
National Congress (ANC) in South Africa - which he sees as a 
liberation movement - with the Provisional IRA, Red Brigadess 
or Red Army Faction. 14 This is really to confuse means and 
10) M. Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' 
Movements", Terrorism and Political Violence, 19 no. 49 
(October 1989), 410. 
11) M. Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' 
Movements", 410. 
12) M. Barkun. "Millenarian Groups and Law Enforcement 
Agencies: The Lessons of Waco", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 6, no. 1, (Spring 1994), 93. 
13) B. M. Jenkins. Terrorism Works - Sometimess (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, April 1974)9 2. 
14) C. Geartyq Terror, 3-4,98. 
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ends. Terrorism is a method which can be used by 'good guys' 
or 'bad guys'. What distinguishes the groups is not the 
method which they use, but the objectives for which terrorism 
is being used. 
There are historical examples of liberal terrorist 
groups. The People's Will in Russia in the 1870s and 1880s 
and the Social Revolutionaries in the early twentieth century 
were primarily concerned with the overthrow of the Tsarist 
autocracy and the intr6duction of democratic reforms. 15 
Laqueur has described the Russian terrorists of the 1870s and 
1880s as "liberals with a bomb" and notes their condemnation 
in 1881 of the assassination of American President James 
Garfield, on the grounds that normal political activity was 
possible in the USA 0 
16 
The ANC provides a recent example of terrorism being 
used by a group with a liberal ideology. The ANC's political 
programme the Freedom Charter of 1955 and subsequent 
amendments was not radical by democratic norms. It was not 
an anti-white document, but called for the political and 
legal equality of all South African citizens, a moderate 
redistribution of wealth, and the limited nationalisation of 
parts of the economy. 17 Thus, the Charter was largely a 
statement of traditional western liberal values, with a 
modest element of economic radicalism. Until 1985 ANC 
violence - carried out by Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we 
Sizwe - MK) was ideally supposed to take the shape of 
sabotage and self-defence, but from 1985 bomb attacks were 
made on whites in general. 18 
15) E. Crankshaw. The Shadow of the Winter Palace: The Drift 
to Revolution, 1825-1917, (London: Macmillan, 1976; 
Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1981), 303-305. 
Z. Ivianski. "Fathers and Sons: A Study of Jewish 
Involvement in the Revolutionary Movement and Terrorism 
in Tsarist Russia"s Terrorism and Political Violence, 
1, no 2, (April 1989), 145. B. Savinkov. Memoirs of a 
Terrorist, trans. J. Shaplen, (Millwood, New York: Kraus 
Reprint, 1972), 175,195. P. Wilkinson. Political 
Terrorism, (London: Macmillan, 1974), 65. 
16) W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 18,70. 
17) H. Holland. The Struggle: A History of the African 
National Congressl (London: Graftons 1989), 99,213- 
214. H. W. Degenhardt (ed). Revolutionary and Dissident 
Movements: An International Guide, (Harlow, England: 
Longmans, 1988), 327-328. 
18) A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jongman. Political Terrorism, 655-656. 
H. Holland. The Struggle, 129,1329 138-141,205-206. 
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Anarchism. As an ideology anarchism is resistant to an 
authoritative definition. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon - according 
to Woodcock the first person to accept the title 'anarchist' 
- is quoted as saying to an admirer of his 'system'; IfMy 
system? I have no system. "'. 19 One can generally say that 
anarchists oppose the authority of one group of people over 
other people, and oppose the idea of power being exercised by 
the possessors of private wealth. They also believe that the 
state is an unnecessary and oppressive institutiong and wish 
to replace it with structures which operate on a cooperative, 
voluntary basis, and which are directly answerable in detail 
to those on whose behalf they administer. 20 
An anarchist terrorist group is one which uses 
terrorism in order to overthrow the existing system of 
government, and replace it with one which accords with 
anarchist thought. Examples of anarchist terrorists include 
the French anarchists of the late nineteenth century and the 
Angry Brigade in Britain in the early 1970s. 21 
Communism. Communism has a solid core of fundamental 
principles. These derive from the writings of Karl Marx in 
the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and the revision 
and adaptation of these ideas in the first quarter of the 
twentieth by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, later known as Lenin. 
Marxist-Leninist communism professes that in any society 
there is a constant struggle between the ruling classes who 
own the instruments for the distribution of wealth and power, 
and the classes who work for them. In industrial societies 
Marx termed the capitalist ruling class as the bourgeoisie 
and the ruled industrial working class as the proletariat. 
Communists see the state as an instrument of repression which 
19) G. Woodcock. "Anarchism: A Historical Introduction"i 
G. Woodcock (ed). The Anarchist Readgr, (Glasgow: 
Fontana/Collins, 1977), 13-14. 
20) D. Robertson. The Penguin Dictionary of Politicst 
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1986), 7-8. 
G. Woodcock. "Anarchism: A Historical Introduction", 21- 
27. 
21) G. Woodcock. Anarchism, 286-295. J. Joll. The Anarchists$ 
130-138. D. Miller. Anarchism, 111-112. G. Carr. The 
Angry Brigade: The Cause and the Casel (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1975). Angry Brigade. The Angry Brigade, 
1967-1984: Documents and Chronologyp (Bratach Dubh 
Anarchist Pamphlets, 1978; London: Elephant Editions, 
1985). 
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the bourgeoisie uses to maintain their wealth and power. 
Whilst Marx saw developing class consciousness as leading to 
inevitable victory of the working class, Lenin believed that 
a small, clandestine revolutionary leadership is required to 
provide the necessary impetus. 22 Hence the development of 
Marxist-Leninist communism, where a small revolutionary 
vanguard would lead the masses to victory and true communism. 
Later variants take into account the work of subsequent 
followers of Marxism-Leninism, in particular those of the 
Chinese communist leader - later premier - Mao Tse-tung, and 
Latin American communist revolutionarigs such as Che Guevara 
and Carlos Marighela. 23 
Communist terrorist groups aim at overthrowing the 
existing political and economic system through the use of 
terrorism, in the hope that the violence will politicise the 
masses and incite them to rise up and destroy the capitalist 
system. Examples of communist terrorist groups include the 
Red Brigades and Front Line in Italy, the Red Army Faction 
and the June 2nd Movement in Germany, the Japanese Red Army, 
Shining Path in Peru, and the Naxalites in India. 
Conservatism. There are various types of conservatism, 
but it has a consistent core of beliefs, the essence of which 
is that conservatives desire to defend the existing social, 
economic, or political order against radical change. Where 
radical change has occurred, conservatives may try to achieve 
a reversion to the earlier state of affairs. 24 A conservative 
terrorist group is one which uses terrorism in order to 
defend the existing order, or to gain a reversion to an 
22) K. Marx & F. Engels. The Communist Manifesto, trans. 
S. Moore (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1967), 79-94. 
V. I. Lenin. What is to'be Done? Burning Questions of our 
Movement, English translation, (Stuttgart: Dietzj 1902; 
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), 31,37-43l 115-117, 
125-126. 
23) Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, three 
volumesg (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). Mao 
Tse-tung. Basic Tactics, trans. S. R. Schram, (New York: 
Praeger, 1966). C. Guevara. Guerrilla Warfarej (New 
York: Praeger, 1961; Harmondsworthq England: Penguin, 
1969). C. Marighela. For the Liberation of Brazil. 
24) D-Robertson. The Penguin Diet-ionary of Politics, 65. 
R. Scruton. The Meaning of Conservatism, 21. 
N. K. O'Sullivan. Conservatism, (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1976), 9. R-Kirk (ed). The Portable Conservative 
Reader, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguing 1982), xv- 
xviii. 
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earlier arrangement. As with liberalism, some may find 
difficulties in reconciling the idea of conservatives 
carrying out terrorist attacks, but the fact is that some 
groups with a conservative political ideology have used 
terrorist methods. 
Conservative terrorism is frequently manifested as a 
form of political vigilantism, although vigilantism is not 
confined to conservative groups. Rosenbaum and Sederberg 
define vigilantism as: 
Acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal 
boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violato to defend that 
order from some form of subversion. 29s 
Vigilantism is not necessarily a political action and one can 
distinguish between vigilantism as a method of controlling 
crime and vigilantism as a method of social or political 
control. 26 Of the former type Rosenbaum and Sederberg note: 
see vigilantism tends to connote rowdy cowboys lynching 
an unfortunate horse thief. It is commonly summarized as 'taking the law into one's own hands'. 27 
However, vigilantism can also be used as a form of political 
terrorism in order to consolidate existing power structures. 
Like terrorism, political vigilantism is not in itself an 
ideology but is a method. Conservative vigilantes intimidate 
and attack those whom they perceive to constitute a threat to 
the existing order. 
There have been a number of conservative terrorist 
groups. The Secret Army Organisation (Organisation Armee 
Secrete - OAS), flourished in French Algeria in 1961 and 
1962, and sought to prevent the independence-of Algeria from 
France because its members 
, 
believed that independence would 
harm the interests of the Europeans who had been settling 
there since the 1830s. 28 Similarly, the Ulster Defence 
Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force have both 
attempted to prevent the secession of Northern Ireland from 
25) H. J. Rosenbaum & P. C. Sederberg. "Vigilantism", Comparative 
Politics, 6, no. 4, (1974), 542. 
26) A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jongman. Political Terrorismq 46. 
27) H. J. Rosenbaum & P-C-Sederberg. "Vigilantism", 542. 
28) A. Horne A Savage War of Peace, 30-32,441,488. 
P. Henissart. Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria, (London: Rupert Hart-Davisj 1971)9 21,243, 
316. 
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the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland because they 
fear that this would harm Northern Irish Protestants. 29 
Lastly, a number of Colombian land owners, narcotics dealers, 
and military officers set up scores of 'death squads' in the 
1980s, in order to protect themselves and their political 
interests against left-wing guerrillas, trade unionsl peasant 
movements9 and reforming governments, by intimidating or 
eliminating their perceived opponents. 30 
Fascism. Fascism'is a revolutionary doctrine based upon 
some fairly distinct tenets. These include a belief in the 
intrinsic superiority of one's self-perceived race, a desire 
for non-democratic authoritarian government over an 
homogenous organic nation, and - normally - the visceral 
dislike or hatred of those people who are seen to be somehow 
different from the perceived norm. 31 The most obvious 
characteristic of fascism is its racialism. This can take the 
attribute of extreme nationalism, but at its most extreme one 
finds the racial ideology of the Nazis where supposedly 
inferior races are deemed to be only worthy of destruction. 32 
Fascists wish to transform the social, political, and 
economic relationships within society, asserting that 
society's interests can best be served by the imposition of 
authoritarian leadership by an elite. 33 This elite need not 
be formed of already existing political elites in liberal 
29) D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster Defence Association: A Case of 
Change and Continuity, M. Social. Sc, Queen's University, 
Belfast, 1988. S. Bruce. The Red Hand. S. Nelson. 
Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: 
-Loyalists and 
the 
Northern Ireland Conflict, (Belfast: Appletree Press, 
1984). 
30) "King Coke", The Independents July 21st 1990. "In 
Medellin, walls do not a prison make, The Independent, 
August 8th 1992. J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the 
Labyrinth 
,, 
11 177-178,247. A. M. Bravo. "Frontier 
culture takes to cocaine"i M. L. Smith (ed). Why people 
grow drugs: Narcotics and Development in the Third 
Worldl (London: Panos, 1992), 75. C. Watson. "Guerrilla 
Groups in Colombia: Reconstituting the Political 
Process"l Terrorism an_d olitical Violence, 4, no. 2, (Summer 1992), 95-96. 
31) G. Harris. The Dark Side of Europe, 17. 
32) A. Hitler. Mein Kampf 
,, 
trans. R. Manheim, (London: Pimlico, 
1992), 258-263,363-369,512. Z. Sternhell. "Fascist 




House, 1976, Harmondsworths England: Penguin, 1979)9 
328. 
33) A. Hitler. Mein Kampf', 405-406,409-410. 
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democracies, indeed fascists tend to see the existing 
political elites as effete and corrupt. Ultimately fascists 
aim to establish an organic, homogeneous state, based upon 
the primacy of order and loyalty to the state, or to a 
broader racial loyalty such as the pan-European ideal held by 
some European fascists. 34 
Fascists generally yearn for strong, heroic leadership 
figures, rather than for the seemingly mundane politicians of 
everyday life. Ordinary people, even the supposedly 
ethnically pure, are seen as a mass or herd, to be led by a 
strong leader. 35 Allied to this is a form of nihilism, with a 
propensity towards the use and glorification of violence. 
Fascist ideologists, such as Evola, have raised the status of 
violence and warfare from a matter of policy, to a virtuous 
activity in their own right. 36 Jones notes this tendency 
amongst the members of the Freikorps, right-wing paramilitary 
groups in Germany after the First World War. These put down 
communist risings with great brutality and served as a 
predecessor to Hitler's NSDAP (Nationalsocialistische 
deutsche Arbeiterpartei - National Socialist German Worker's 
Party), otherwise known as the Nazis. 37 
Fascism does not have a core of written works in the 
same way that communism does. Whereas Hitler's Mein Kampf may 
fulfil that role for some, many post-war Italian fascists 
derived inspiration from the Italian writer Julius Evola, 
whilst some British fascists are said to derive ideas from 
34) G. Harris. The Dark Side of Europe, 17,28-31,223. 
R. Drake. "Julius Evola and the Ideological Origins of 
the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy"j P. H. Merkl 
(ed). Political Violence and Terror, 76-77. R. Drake. 
The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in 
Contemporary Italy, (Bloomingtong IN: Indiana 
University Pressq 1989)9 120,1249 128-129. 
35) A. Hitler. Mein Kampf, 73-75,165l 3089 341-3429 408-410. 
P. Wilkinson. The New-Fascists, revised edition, (Grant 
McIntyre, 1981; London: Pan, 1983), 9-10. G. Harris. The 
Dark Side of Europe, 17. D. Mack Smith. Mussolini, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981; Granada, 1983), 
218-219,235. R. Drake. The Revolutionary Mystique and 
Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, 3. 
36) D. Mack Smith. 
, 
Mussolini, 115,216,289. T. Sheehan. "Myth 
and Violence: The Fascism of Julius Evola and Alain de 
Benoist", Social Research, 48, (Spring 1981)9 57-58. 
R. Drake. The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in 
Contemporary Italy, 119,129,130. 
37) N. H. Jones. Hitler's Heralds: The Story of the Freikorps, 
1918-1923, (London: John Murray, 1987), 1059 111. 
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Gregor Strasser, a contemporary of Hitler who stressed the 
anti-capitalist nature of Nazism and was killed during the 
Nazi purges of June 1934.38 In the USA some of the quasi- 
religious, fascist-anarchist groups which have developed in 
recent years take much of their inspiration from a fictional 
work called, The Turner Diaries, which envisages the overthrow 
of a dictatorial Zionist government in America by a group of 
terrorists who achieve their aim through acts of apocalyptic 
destruction. 39 Fascism. shows a tendency to be coloured by 
local influences and local ideologues and the nature of 
fascist groups varies from one place to another. 
European examples of fascist terrorist groups include 
New Order (Ordine Nuovo - ON), a group which flourished in 
Italy from the 1956 until the late 1970s, the Hoffman 
Military Sports Group (Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman), which 
flourished in West Germany in the 1980s, and a smattering of 
small fringe groups in other European states. 40 
Over the last fifteen years or so a strange fascist- 
anarchist hybrid has evolved in the USA which regards any 
form of government above the state level as evil, but 
nevertheless retains strong authoritarian and racialist 
views. Groups such as the 'Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the 
Lord'9 The Order, Posse Comitatusl and various other white 
supremacist, anti-Jewish, and anti-federal government groups, 
38) R. Drake. "Julius Evola and the Ideological Origins of the 
Radical Right in Contemporary Italy", 62,77-78. 
T. Sheehan. "Myth and Violence", 48, (Spring 1981), 50- 
51. C. di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars, 39. 
A. Bullock. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, revised edition, 
(London: Book Club Associates, 1973), 136-138,237, 
303,402. R. Hill & A. Bell. The Other Face of Terror, 
292-293. 
39) M. Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' 
Movements", 416-417,430. J. Kaplan. "The Context of 
American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case 
of the 'Identity Christian' Church of Israel"q 
Terrorism and Political Violencep 5, no. 1, (Spring 
1993), 34,46,65 n. 28. 
40) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 43. S. Christie. Stefano Delle 
Chiaiej 18-19. H. J. Horchem. "Terrorism in Western 
Europe", R. Clutterbuck (ed). The Future of Political 
Violence: Destabilization, Disorder and Terrorismy 
(London: Macmillan, 1986), 152-153. G. Harris. The Dark 
Side of Europe, 107-142. B. Hoffman. Right-Wing 
Terrorism in West Ge 
- 
rmany, (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Corporationg 1986), 3-4. T. Biorgo & R. Witte (eds). 
Racist Violence in Europe, p passim. 
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have developed a rag-bag of ideologies. Some of these groups 
refer to the federal government as the Zionist Occupation 
Government (ZOG), and proclaim that the federal government is 
part of a conspiracy - often Jewish, which plans to hand 
America over to a dictatorial world government. Apart from 
the racialist and religious aspects of these ideologies, and 
the authoritarianism of many of the groups, some of the 
American anti-federalists would also appear to be anarchistic 
in their self-proclaimbd individualism and hostility to the 
American state, resulting in attacks on tax offices, and 
federal buildings and officials. 41 This serves to emphasise 
the extent to which the beliefs of specific groups can 
straddle the conventional ideological categories. 
Single-issue. A single-issue group is one which 
confines its political actions to a restricted area of 
politics. Such groups may not intend to change the system of 
government and radically alter social or economic 
relationships - although individual members may wish to do 
so. Instead they try to exert influence or pressure over 
relatively narrow policy areas. Non-terrorist examples of 
such pressure groups included Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, the British Union Against Vivisection (BUAV), and 
Amnesty International. 
A single-issue terrorist group is one which uses 
terrorism to promote its objectives. Examples include some 
animal liberationists in Britain and some anti-abortionists 
in the USA. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in Britaing 
with its various off-shoots such as the Justice Department 
41) "Militiamen go to war on American gun laws", The Daily 
Telegraph, November 21st 1994. "Militias gird loins for 
the great battle"i The Guardian, April 22nd 1995. "A 
holy war, home grown in America", The Sunday Telegraphl 
April 23rd 1995. "With God and gun, rugged 
individualism turns to hate", The Sunday Times, April 
23rd 1995. "The Enemy Within", The Observerl April 23rd 
1995. "FBI puzzles over 'Gestapo' train wreckers", The 
Independent, October 11th 1995. "Militia muscles in on 
town", The Guardian, November 14th 1995. "War on the 
range", The Guardian, November 22nd 1995. "Two arrested 
over US tax office bomb", The Daily Telegraph, December 
29th 1995. "Tax grudge clue in Reno bomb plot"q The 
Independentp December 30th 1995. M. Barkun. "Millenarian 
Aspects of 'White Supremacist' Movements", 414,423, 
428,429. J. Kaplan. "The Context of American 
Millenarian Revolutionary Theology"t (Spring 1993), 38, 
429 49. 
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and the Animal Rights Militia, has carried out bomb attacks 
and sabotage over the cause of animal rights in the United 
Kingdom. Some American anti-abortionists have carried out 
assassinations and bombing campaigns against abortion clinics 
and their personnel. 
42 
In the USA, groups opposed to various forms of 
development or environmental degradation have carried out 
acts of sabotage, but thus far have not killed or injured 
anybody. In 1927 farmers in the Owens Valley in California 
bombed the newly-constructed aqueduct which drained water 
from the valley to the city of Los Angeles, but failed in 
their attempts to stop the diversion or get the compensation 
which they sought. 
43 More recently the environmental group 
Earth First! has opposed environmental degradation such as 
widespread tree-felling, but has only used forms of sabotage 
such as damaging electricity pylons, vandalising machinery 
and carried out tree-spiking. Spiking - the insertion of 
spikes into trees which may be felled, can be dangerous as 
chain-saws or the saws in lumber-mills can rebound or break 
up at speed if they hit a spike. 
44 
The single-issue category does not include terrorist 
groups carrying out attacks linked to an issue area but which 
have wider ambitions. Thus, the Revolutionary Cells in West 
Germany attacked the offices of firms involved in the 
extension of the runway at Frankfurt Airport, whilst ETA 
assassinated managers and engineers involved in the 
construction of a nuclear power station at Lemoniz in the 
42) "Four legs good, two legs bad: a recipe for terror", The 
Independent on Sunday, August 28th 1994. D. Henshaw. 
Animal Warfare: The Story of the Animal Liberation 
Front (London: Fontana, 1989). R. Garner. Animal 
politics and-morality, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993), 215-242. "Killing for Life", 
The Independent, magazine supplement, September 10th 
1994. "Where doctors wear bullet-proof vests", The 
Daily Telegraphl October 20th 1994. "Vengeance", The 
Economist, January 7th 1995. B. Hoffman. Recent trends 
and future prospects of terrorism in the United States, 
21. 
43) W. L. Kahrl. Water and Power: The Conflict over Los 
Angeles' Water Supply in the Owens Valley, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), 305-306. 
44) "The wild defence of the wild", The Sunday Corresponde 
June 3rd 1990. "Breaking the monkeywrench", The 
Independent, magazine supplement, March 2nd 1991. 
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Basque Country. 45 In both cases the groups concerned had 
wider political aims. 
Single-issue ideologies are generally straightforward. 
They tend to oppose what they see as an evil rather than 
campaign in favour of something. Thus the animal rights 
groups oppose what they see as systematic cruelty against 
animals and the anti-abortion groups oppose abortion. In both 
cases the various groups concerned believe that the groups 
whose interests they claim to represent, animals and unborn 
children respectively, are as entitled not to have pain or 
death inflicted upon them as adult human beings. Whilst these 
groups may wish to mobilise public support, they believe that 
these rights should override the views of the majority. 46 
Single-issue terrorists believe that they are entitled to use 
violence in order to prevent evil acts, to gain revenge on 
the perpetrators, or to publicise the injustices which they 
believe to be occurring. The nature of the targets attacked 
underlines this approach. 
Organised Crime. In this study a criminal group is a 
group which commits acts in breach of the criminal law 
primarily in order to obtain material benefits. The term 
organised crime refers to groups which have a permanent or 
semi-permanent organisation and which tend to concentrate on 
those crimes which bring in a constant flow of income. 47 
Depending on the laws in the state concerned this could 
include running protection rackets, fraud, the production and 
distribution of illegal narcotic drugs, and dealing in 
prohibited goods such as illegal weapons. For an organised 
criminal group to be considered a terrorist group it must use 
45) P. Janke. "Europe", R-Clutterbuck (ed). The Future of 
Political Violence, 99. R. P. Clark. The Basque 
Insurgentsq 100,105,107. 
46) P. Singer. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics For Our 
Treatment of Animals, (New York: Avon, 1977), 1-26. 
P. Singer. The animal liberation movement: it's 
philosophy, its achievements, and its future, 
(Nottingham: Old Hammond Press, no date), 5-10. 
F. Ginsburg. "Saving America's Souls: Operation Rescue's 
Crusade against Abortion"s M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby 
(eds). Fundamentalisms and the State, 557) 573-574. 
D. Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 33-34,92-93. 
47) P. Williams. "Transnational Criminal Organisations and 
International Security", Survival, 36, no 1, (Spring 
1994), 106. 
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terrorist methods in order to achieve political objectives 
which further its interests. 
With criminal organisations a grey area emerges at the 
intersection between crime and political terrorism, in trying 
to determine which operations are straightforward criminal 
operations, and which ones are acts of political terrorism. 
Crime-related violence is generally intended to secure 
personal material gain through robberies, extortions and 
other criminal activities, although it is possible that 
informers and efficient law-enforcement officers will also be 
attacked as threats. However, the groups studied here go 
further. 
The Sicilian anti-Mafia magistrate, Judge Giovanni 
Falcone divides the crimes of the Mafia into three levels. 
48 
The first level consists of the everyday crimes which provide 
the economic rationale of the organisation; smuggling, 
extortions kidnapping, and the like. The second level 
includes those crimes which are an indirect consequence of 
the first level crimes, for example the killing of a Mafia 
member who has somehow wronged the organisation. However, it 
is the third level which concerns this study, those killings 
which are carried out to ensure the survival of the 
organisation. 
*** the murder of a Prefect of Police, of a Police 
Commissioner, of a difficult magistrate. 
49 
Although some of the crimes at the second level may be of 
relevance to this study, it is those of the third level which 
are of particular interest where they are intended to obtain 
specific political objectives. Attacks against targets 
outside this framework are also relevant to this study when 
they are designed to affect political events. 
This pattern has been notable in Italy and Colombia, 
where criminal organisations have used violence to gain 
immunity from the law or to safeguard their interests. 
50 
According to Falcone: 
48) G. Falcone &M Padovani. Men of Honour: The Truth About 
the Mafia, (Paris: Edition 1,1991; London: Fourth 
Estate, 1992), 160. 
49) G. Falcone &M Padovani. Men of-Honour, 160. 
50) R. D. Tomasek. "Complex Interdependency Theory: Drug Barons 
as Transnational. Groups", W. C. Olson & J. R. Lee (eds). 
The Theory and Practice of International Relations, 
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Political problems as such do not overly concern [the 
Mafia] as long as it does not feel a direct threat to its 
power or its profits. It satisfies itself with electing 
'friendly' administrators and politicians, and 
occasionally members of the organisation itself. This is 
in order to direct the flow of public spending, or to 
pass laws which will favour its opportunities for profit, 
whift stopping other laws which could adversely affect 
it. 
However: 
This does not mean that Cosa Nostra [the Sicilian Mafia] 
can't turn its hand to politics if it needs to. It did so 
in its own violent and hasty wa , assassinating men who 
were causing it problems ... 
U 
The Colombian narcotics organisations have used similar 
methods. Whilst organised criminality is not a recognised 
ideology, in Italy and Colombia it is inextricably linked 
with politics. It requires quiescence if not complicity from 
the authorities, public officials, politicians, in relation 
to the activities of the criminal organisation and also 
requires the eradication of serious threats to the 
organisation's existence or activities. 
53 Such threats do not 
just consist of those people or institutions which pose a 
direct or immediate challenge to the organisation, but those 
groups or groups which may create a political climate which 
is inimical to the criminal organisation's activities. 
It may be argued that such actions cannot be properly 
classified as an act of political terrorism because they 
concern the furtherance of the group's criminal activities of 
trying to maximise profits and evade capture. These groups do 
not have an intelligible overriding political programme, nor 
do they desire to replace or shore up an existing order, save 
where this has a direct impact upon the criminal group. 
However, even when criminal groups act to protect their own 
interestsl these actions constitute a direct and fundamental 
threat to the stability and sovereignty of the state. By 
using violence to intimidate the authorities into placing 
organised crime beyond the scope of the lawl these groups are 
pursuing an objective which is ultimately political. 
(Englewood Cliffso New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 
281-282. 
51) G. Falcone &M Padovani. Menof Honour, 157. 
52) G. Falcone &M Padovani. Men of Honour, 159. 
53) G. Falcone &M Padovani. Men of Honour, 157-158,161-162. 
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Catanzaro notes with regard to the Mafia, that as its 
national and international financial interests have expanded, 
and it has become more heavily involved with the activities 
of public bodies, particular with the appropriation of public 
funds, so it has become increasingly involved in political 
decision-making. 54 Likewise, in Colombia drug traffickers 
intervened directly in the political process when they 
threatened the authorities with carnage and chaos if they 
extradited major traffickers to the USA. 55 By attacking the 
legal and political system - the Colombian drug cartels 
threatened and assassinated judges, policemen, and a national 
Presidential candidate - the criminal groupings attempted to 
limit the actions of the political system in areas which 
affected them, and largely succeeded. 
56 
Organised criminal groups also appear to have political 
preferences. Narcotics trafficking groups in Colombia have 
colluded with conservative terrorist groups in attacking 
left-wing politicians, union organisers, and peasant leaders. 
According to Rensselaer Lee: 
"** [Colombian] cocaine barons share a common political 
agenda that includes blocking the extradition of drug 
traffickers, immobilizing the criminal justice gTstems 
and selectively persecuting the Colombian left. 
54) R. Catanzaro. Men of Respect: A Social History of the 
Sicilian Mafia, (Padua: Liviana Editrice spa, 1988; New 
York: Free Press, 1992), 214-216. 
55) P. Williams. "Transnational Criminal Organisations and 
International Security", 111. "Escobar dies, and the 
cocaine trade gets stronger", "Obituary: Pablo 
Escobar", both in The Independents December 4th 1993. 
56) J. Pearce. 
, 
Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 1,194-195. 
P. D. Scott & J. Marshall., Cocaine-Politics: Drugs, 
Armies, and the CIA in Central America 
,, 
(Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991), 76,90. 
S. Strong. Whitewash: Pablo Escobar and the Cocaine 
Wars, (London: Macmillan, 1995), 138-153. "Colombian 
police close in on drug baron", The Independent, April 
13th 1990. "Colombia moves to protect lives of election 
candidates", The Independent, May 5th 1990. "Mother's 
Day of mourning as car bombs kill 26", The Independent, 
May 14th 1990. "Colombian drug dealers' bombs kill 26 
shoppers", The Times, May 14th 1990. "King Coke", The 
Independents July 21st 1990. "Going oet Going ... Gone", The Guardian, December 4th 1993. "The king is 
dead ... long live cocaine", The Independent, weekend 
supplements December 11th 1993. "Escobar diest and the 
cocaine trade gets stronger", "Obituary: Pablo 
Escobar", both in The Independent, December 4th 1993. 
57) Quoted in P. D. Scott & J. Marshall. Cocaine Politics, 80. 
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Likewise, the Mafia was, until the recent disintegration of 
the Italian political establishment, heavily involved with 
the Christian Democratsq with extreme conservative economic 
interests and probably with fascist terrorist groups. 
58 Thus 
to say that all organised crime is totally apolitical is 
inaccurate. 
Although particular terrorist groups can be placed 
within the categories outlined aboveg each group has its own 
characteristics and curiosities. In the same way that the 
beliefs of the two main conservative political parties in 
France may differ greatly from each other and from those of 
the Conservative party in Britain or the Christian Democrats 
in Germany, so terrorists broadly within the same ideological 
camp may still have greatly differences in their beliefs. 
Variations of opinion between ideologically similar groups 
are noteworthy because they provide an insight into the 
thinking of the terrorists and may affect target selection. 
The categories are not mutually exclusive and it is 
perfectly possible for a group to hold to more than one 
political aspiration. The beliefs of some groups form 
ideological hybrids mixing elements of different ideologies. 
For instance the categories of communist and separatist are 
listed separately, but the Basque group ETA9 together with 
its political partner Herri Batasuna (HB)j considers itself 
to be both separatist and Marxist. 59 In practice this caused 
several splits in ETA in the 1960s and 1970s. 60 
Similarly the Palestinian group Hamas can be described 
as both a religious group and as a separatist group. It 
combines doctrines which it claims to be a true 
interpretation of basic Islamic tenets with the desire to set 
58) "A creaking system faces its final test of strength", The 
Guardian, April 6th 1993. R. Catanzaro. Men of-Respec 
181. 
59) Herri Batasuna. 
, 
The 'Herri Batasuna' the Basque Country 
needs. Herri Batasuna. The Recognition of Democratic 
Rigths-Fsicl in Basque Country, 3-4,5. R. P. Clark. The 
Basque Insurgentso 275-276. F. Jiminez. "Spain: The 
Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 49 (Winter 
1992), 111. 
60) B. Pollack & G. Hunter. "Dictatorship, Democracy and 
Terrorism in Spain", J. Lodge (ed). The Threat of 
Terrorism, 127-130. F. Llera, J. M. Mata & C. L. Irwin. 
"ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement'll 115-116. 
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up an Islamic Palestinian state in the territories which now 
include Israel, the Israeli-occupied territories of the west 
bank of the Jordan, and the areas currently under the 
governance of the PLO. 
61 Insofar as it is an Islamic group 
Hamas can be classified as a religious terrorist group, but 
it is also separatist because it advocates Palestinian 
autonomy from Israeli control. 
The role of ideology ip target selection. 
The political ideology of a group largely defines how 
its members see the world around them. Events and the actions 
of various people - both potential targets and other actors - 
are interpreted in terms of their perceived relevance to the 
terrorists' cause, even if the actors concerned were not 
thinking of the terrorists at the time when they carried out 
their actions. Thusq a separatist terrorist will see matters 
in relation to the perceived oppression of his country, 
whilst a conservative terrorist will see it in terms of 
perceived subversive threats to the existing order. For 
instance, according to Patricia Hearst, Emily Harris of the 
Symbionese Liberation Army justified the possibility of law 
students being killed by a bomb under a police car on the 
grounds that: 
Those law students are studying to be lawyers and they'll 
go to work for some big, piggy, corporation, and so they 
are pigs too. 62 
For the terrorist concerned, the student's action in studying 
law, was seen in terms of Harris' ideological mindset rather 
than their own perception of what they were doing. 
Likewise, in 1977 the Provisional IRA carried out a 
short-lived campaign of assassination against prominent 
businessmen on the grounds that the very presence of such 
firms was felt to underpin the British occupation of Northern 
Ireland. 63 Doubtless the businessmen concerned had never seen 
61) H. M. Cubert. "The Militant Palestinian Organizations and 
the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 4, no. 1, (Spring 1992)q 32-33. 
62) P. C. Hearst & A. Moscow. Every Secret Thing, (London: 
Methuen, 1982; Arrow, 1983), 351. 
63) "Change of tactics by the Provos", Financial Times, 
February 4th 1977. "Can Ulster sustain its pepperpot 
investment", The Guardiang February 4th 1977. "Gunmen 
fail in bid to assassinate two leading Belfast 
businessmen", The Irish Time_s, February 11th 1977. 
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their actions in this light, but the terrorists tendency to 
see any action in terms of their own ideological concerns 
meant that they became targets. The importance for this study 
is that the effect of ideology on the world-view of 
terrorists can determine how they view people and 
institutions in relation to their cause, and how their view 
of the existing situation influences their view of the action 
they should take. As will be seen later, this affects broader 
strategic ideas, but it also has a direct impact on target 
selection. 
When a group takes the decision to use violence, an 
early step is to determine who or what will be attacked. The 
ideology of a terrorist group identifies the 'enemies' of the 
group by providing a measure against which to assess the 
'goodness' or 'badness', 'innocence' or 'guilt' of people or 
institutions. This gives rise to the idea that certain 
targets are somehow 'legitimate' targets. The concept of the 
legitimate target should not be confused with common or legal 
notions of guilt and innocence. For instance members of the 
ALF frequently claim that although technically breaking the 
law, they are in fact responding to a higher law which 
compels them to act as they do. 64 Similarly, a member of the 
Provisional IRA has commented: 
01 don't expect to be judged by your rules: if Brits ýoethat, 
then they'll see the IRA as a lot of ruthless 
maniacs which by their definition I suppose we are. 
Ruthless, definitely yes: and maniacs if that's what 
people are who're never going to see sense as you define 
it, well yes that'd be an appropriat w d. The IRA has 
its own logic and oh no it's not you s. 
An example of the difference in such 'logic', between 
the terrorists' perception and that of the more generally 
accepted institutions, occurred in April 1991 when the Red 
Army Faction shot dead Detlev Rohwedder, the head of the 
agency responsible for overseeing the privatisation of 
companies formerly owned by the East German state. Following 
the assassination the editorial in the London-based newspaper 
The Independent condemned the RAF as, "oso a tiny band of 
"Businessmen not expendable, unlike Brit troops", 
Republican News, March 26th 1977. 
64) D. Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 31,100-101. 




Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfasty 
(London: Jonathon Cape, 1993), 324. 
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sick people representing no views beyond those concocted in 
their own closed minds", whilst the newspaper's obituarist 
called Rohwedder: t1see one of the good guys on the German 
political scene". 
66 However, the RAF communique following the 
assassination accused Rohwedder - who had previously been 
State Secretary in the West German Economics Ministry - of 
having sold arms to fascist regimes in the Third World, and 
of having traded nuclear know-how for uranium from the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. They called him: 
One of those armchair murderers who daily go over dead 
bodies and who in the interest of power and profihj plan 
the misery and death of millions of human beings. 
and went on to condemn him as a "brutal reorganizer" when 
manager at Hoechst Chemicals. They also condemned the 
expansion of Germany, the imposition of 'free market 
economics' on East Germany and the Third World, and condemned 
the nature of capitalism and the price it exacted from those 
in the Third World. 68 By killing Rohwedder the RAF believed 
they were striking at the roots of the development of a 
racialist and capitalist "Greater Germany" and were sending a 
message to people in the former East Germany. 69 
The point to note here is that the moral and political 
perception of the terrorists was vastly different from that 
represented by the newspaper because, concerning both 
political philosophy and the acceptability of terrorist 
violence, the terrorists and the newspaper editorialsts saw 
Rohwedder through the prism of totally different ideologies. 
The killing of Rohwedder was perfectly in line with RAF 
ideology. Whilst, as a senior businessman, they saw Rohwedder 
as a potential target, the RAF specifically selected him 
because of his symbolic value - as a symbol of the threat of 
a 'Greater Germany' following reunification, and as a leading 
symbol of German capitalism - whose death would mobilise 
support amongst workers in the former-East Germany. For the 
66) "Germany tested to its limits", The Independent, April 
3rd 1991. "Obituary: Detlev Rohwedder"I The 
Independent, April 3rd 1991. 
67) Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists: The 
Fighting Communist Organizations, (London: Frank Cassp 
1992), 79. 
68) Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 79- 
84. 
69) Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 82. 
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RAF the killing of Rohwedder was not only an effective use of 
violence, judged by their ideology they would have seen it in 
some respects as a moral act. 
Terrorists seek to identify their victims as being in 
some way 'guilty', and deserving of the treatment meted out 
to them by the terrorist group. 70 This absolves the terrorist 
- at least temporarily - of feelings of guilt for his actions 
because a person who is defined as an enemy deserving 
punishment, obviously deserves to be attacked. This 
legitimises the terrorists actions in their own minds, in 
those of their followers, and they hope in the minds of those 
people who are uncommitted. 
Thus in July 1990 the Provisional IRA killed the 
Conservative MP Ian Gow with an under-car bomb because he was 
a close friend of the then Prime Minister and was deemed to 
be "... central to policy decisions. **,,. 
71 He was seen as 
part of the 'British war machine' responsible for the British 
presence in Northern Ireland, and was therefore categorised 
as a legitimate target. In their terms he was guilty of 
active opposition to the Provisionals and of support for the 
'British war machine'., and his friendhip with Margaret 
Thatcher and association with her policies made him an even 
more tempting target. 
72 
Such rationalisation is not confined to terrorist 
groups, and is common in wartime. According to Glenn Gray: 
The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image 
of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the 
act of killing from the act of murder by makin 130 f the 
former an act deserving all honour and praise. 
Thus, during the Second World War British soldiers killed 
their German adversaries, and vice versa, because they were 
the enemy, despite holding little personal animosity towards 
them as individuals. 
74 Aerial bombing raids against German 
70) B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: The Other World 
War, 16. 
71) "Gow killed because of his influence on Thatcher, IRA 
says", The Independents August 1st 1990. 
72) D. McKittrick. Endgame: The Search for Peace in Northern 
Ireland, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1994), 89-90. 
73) Quoted in R. Holmes. Firing-Line, (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1985; Harmondsworthl England: Penguin, 1987)9 360. 
74) i. Ellis., The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World 
War 119 (Newton Abbot, England: David & Charles, 1980; 
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cities were presented to the British people as revenge for 
similar raids by the German Luftwaffe, and the malignancy of 
the German people was cited by Churchill as one of the 
justifications for the raids. 75 Thus, when necessary 
dehumanising the enemy can be done by democracies as well as 
by terrorists. 76 
For terrorists, in addition to a person or thing being 
seen as a legitimate targetq attacking that target must 
usually be seen to achieve a purpose. The importance of 
terrorist operations being clearly justifiable is emphasised 
by Abraham Guillen who notes: 
In revolutionary war any guerrilla action that needs 
explaining to the people is useless; 7ýt should 
be 
meaningful and convincing by itself. 
Terrorists would probably think of an attack on a functional 
target, such as an effective police officer, as justifiable 
because it eliminates a threat to the group. On the other 
hand the selection of a symbolic target requires rather more 
in the way of justification if attacking it is to have any 
meaning. There are some targets which can be legitimately 
attacked within the constraints of the group's ideology, and 
some which cannot. 
78 
London: Corgi, 1982), 319-320. R. Holmes. Firing Line, v 370,373-375. 
75) A. Calder. The People's War: Britain 1939-1945, (London: 
Jonathan Capel 1969; Granada, 1982), 566-567. 
M. Hastings. Bomber Commands (London: Michael Joseph, 
1979; Pan, 1981), 125-1269 135-136. M. Walzer. Just and 
Unjust Wars, 256. 
76) For a more detailed discussion of the moral arguments 
concerning area bombing see M. Hastingse Bomber Command, 
144-147. G. Best. Humanity in Warfare: The Modern 
History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980; Methuen, 1983)9 
267-285. M. Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars, 255-262. 
77) A. Guillen. "What can be done? (Strategy of the Urban 
Guerrilla)", D. C. Hodges (ed). Philo 
, sophy of 
the Urban 
Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham 
Quillen, trans. D-C-Hodges, (New York: William Morrow & 
Co, 1973), 266. 
78) B. M. Jenkins. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, (Santa 
Monica, California: RAND Corporation, July 1985), 7. 
Der Spiegel, August 7th 1978 cited in G. Bass et al. 
Motivations and-Possible Actions of Potential Criminal 
Adversaries of US Nuclear Programs, (Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporations February 1980), 7. 
B. M. Jenkins., High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate 
War: The-Impact of New Technology on Low Level 
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Consequently, an important effect of ideology on 
terrorists is that it transforms people or objects into 
representative symbols. Thus, in March 1985 Ezio Tarantelli, 
a Professor of Economics at the University of Rome and 
adviser to the Italian Government, was shot dead by the PCC 
(Partitio Comunista Combattente - Fighting Communist Party; a 
faction of the Red Brigades) because they deemed him "one of 
the most authoritative technical-political exponents in the 
service of large capital". 
79 Members of the security forces 
in Northern Ireland have been seen by Irish republicans as 
'Brits' to be 'stiffed' [killed] or as a 'uniform' 
representing the 'occupying force' in Ireland. 
80 Likewise, 
loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland have regarded 
Catholics as 'taigs' -a derogatory term for Irish Catholics. 
Six Catholic men drinking in a country pub were shot dead by 
loyalist gunmen, one of whom called them "Fenian bastards"i 
the Fenians being a nineteenth century republican 
revolutionary movement. 
81 A loyalist who bombed a pub in a 
Catholic area in 1974 said years later: 
We dehumanised the other side and branded them animals. 
We didn't think of them in terms of them being people. If 
we couldn't get the IRA, we would have to slaughter 
members of the Catholic community who after all seemed to 
support them. 
82 
By reducing people to mere ciphers it clearly becomes easier 
to justify killing them. 
This approach is illustrated by a member of the Red 
Brigades describing how a person can be deemed a legitimate 
target. 
0 .. you carry out an enquiry on someone so there is a 
sort of political enquiry beforehand, but psychologically 
Violence, (Santa Monical California: RAND Corporation, 
January 1975), 11. 
79) Red Brigades - Fighting Communist Party. "Communique on 
the Assassination of Ezio Tarantelli, a Rome University 
Economics Professor, in Rome on 27 March 1985"t 
Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists: 
The Fighting Communist Organizations, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1992), 203. 
80) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 182,195. 
K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 126,357-358. 
81) "UVF gunmen 'laughed as they fled' pub massacre", The 
Guardian, January 25th 1995. S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 54. 
M. Dillon. The Shankill 
- 
Butchers, xxiv, 24,65,166. 
82) "Tragedy of Ulster's relentless cycle of violence", The 
Independent,, February 6th 1992. 
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it becomes something different, you single out someone 
who is responsible; it is not the State as before ... 
with policemen, and the Flying Squad [but] real physical 
people, this chap does this ... and has done that and you 
start a trial ... The trial begins when you single out 
someone on paperl that is to say, you make a person 
correspond to a political need ... that chap is 
responsible, it is him right here and now, there is 
already a trial logic 00, when you've already decided 
that he is guilty ... and what makes you different is the 
penalty, the penalty that you allot to that person who is 
guilty of those things ... he is not even a person any 
more, he has been emptied and yn load him up with other 
crimes, other responsibilities. 
A repentant Brigadist, Massimiliano Bravi, has also noted: 
The ideals of justice turned into murderous violence 
directed against the men who represented the State (the 
human being totally crushed in his social role) and in 
our eyes they were the guardians and perpetrators of evey 
possible injustice and social suffegl*ng. They were 'the 
unjust' and we were the 'avengerS'. 
The question of guilt or innocence is therefore subject to 
the moral imperatives of the terrorists rather than to 
legalities. A similar line of thought emerges from a PIRA 
member, demonstrating the idiosyncratic nature of terrorist's 
morality. 
Our definition of who the enemy is isn't one which 
follows the same line as yours either. We regard all 
people who support the armed forces of the British 
Government in any way as legitimate targets. ... We'll define whether someone's helping the security forces or 
not: it's not for you to make the definition and 
criticise us for not agreeing with it. I don't know if I 
make that clear: probably not and if that's gQ then I 
have to say it doesn't greatly matter to me. 00 
Hencel whilst a workman involved in the construction of a 
police station might see himself as an innocent civilian, the 
Provisionals see him as a 'collaborator'l and therefore 
liable to 'execution'. 86 
One does not have to carry out or fail to carry out 
some action in order to be deemed a legitimate target. Just 
83) R. Catanzaro. "Subjective experience and objective 
reality: an account of violence in the words of its 
protagonists"g R. Catanzaro (ed). The Red Brigades & 
Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy, 190-191. 
84) C. di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars, 61. 
85) T. Parker. May the Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfastp 
325-326. 
86) "We remain totally committed and confident in victory' 
Oglaigh na hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "The 
IRA statement"l AP/RNq January 23rd 1992. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 421. 
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being who or what one is may be enough to condemn a person or 
institution in the eyes of a terrorist. The notion of 
culpability can take on a rather perverse nature. For 
example, the Japanese Red Army terrorists who carried out the 
Lod Airport massacre in Israel in May 1972 did so in the 
cause of Palestinian nationalism. The PFLP justified the 
death of the Puerto Rican pilgrims who made up the bulk of 
the victims on the grounds that by being in Israel they were 
held to have tacitly recognised the Israeli state. 87 
Crenshaw makes the point that during the Algerian 
Rebellion of 1954 to 1962 the FLN saw bomb attacks upon 
European civilians as legitimate. Although as individuals 
European civilians may not have harmed Algerians or the cause 
of Algerian independence, their very presence - being who 
they were where they were - made them symbols of French and 
European settler authority in Algeria. Moreover, by virtue of 
being Europeans, the death and injury of these civilians had 
a direct influence on the conflict because it polarised the 
European from the Algerian population. Hence, for Crenshaw: 
Although it is often cited as a definitional aspect of 
terrorism, the problem of 'innocence' or 'guilt' is in 
reality a matter of moral perspective. 'Innocent' victims 
are best interpreted as people who have no direct 88 influence on the outcome of the revolutionary conflict. 
one might argue with this redefinition of the term 
'innocent', but Crenshaw is right in believing that the 
terrorist's judgement of what is or is not a legitimate 
target is largely subjective. That subjective judgement is 
frequently based upon a morality which is derived from the 
group's ideology. 
This approach explains how being a member of a 
particular religion or race can make one a target for 
terrorist attacks without objectively seeming to have done 
anything blameworthy. For instance, a building housing the 
Delegation of Argentine-Israeli Associations and the 
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association was bombed in July 
87) W. R. Farrell. Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese 
Red Army, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Bookst 
1990), 142. B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: The 
Other World War, 48. 
88) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 19. 
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1994.89 As the attack was thought to be in retaliation for an 
Israeli attack on a Hizbollah base in the Lebanon the 
previous June, a Lebanese authority on the Hizbollah was 
asked why Jews were targeted in Argentina rather than in 
Israel. The reply was that: 
The Jews of Israel come from Poland, from Russia, from 
Europe or from atin America ... What is the difference? 
It is the same. 
ýO 
Thus, any Jews were collectively seen as a legitimate target 
for attacks which aimed at punishing a specific institution - 
the state of Israel - to which they were perceived to be 
affiliated. 
Not every terrorist attack on every target is preceded 
by a detailed ideological examination. Where the target is 
readily identifiable and any decisions as to the guilt of the 
target have been made, the selection of the target is quite 
straightforward. Bishop and Mallie point out that the initial 
PIRA decision to kill British soldiers did not require much 
thought. 
Their response had been a return to IRA traditional 
practices. According to Cahill [allegedly one time head 
of the PIRA Belfast Brigade and later Chief of Staff] no 
formal decision was taken over the legitimacy of shooting 
soldiers - 'military targets were always on'. By opening 
up on the Army they were simply resuming hostilities 
against anyone in the Qu en's uniform in a war that they 
had never declared over. 
81 
Likewise, in November 1987 a PIRA spokesman noted that there 
was no need for a local unit to hold a meeting with senior 
members of the group in order to gain permission to carry out 
a bombing against soldiers. 
92 The decision that British 
soldiers were a legitimate target had been settled a long 
time ago by republican ideology and did not need to be 
discussed before every operation. 
As well as determining potential targets ideology also 
allows terrorists to displace the blame for their actions 
89) "16 killed in bomb attack on Jewish groups in Argentina"I 
The Independent, July 19th 1994. "Explosion levels 
building housing Jewish groups", The Guardian, July 
19th 1994. 
90) "Hizbollah adopts an 'eye for an eye' tactic", The 
Independent, July 20th 1994. 
91) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. 
-The 
Provisional IRA, 171. 
92) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA"s The Independent, November 
11th 1987. 
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onto other people. According to Abu Iyad, the Black September 
operation at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, which 
resulted in the death of eleven Israeli athletes, was caused 
by the International Olympic Committee and the international 
community as a whole failing to accord proper recognition to 
the Palestinians. Likewise, he attributed the bulk of the 
deaths to the German rescue attempt at Furstenfeldbruck 
Airport rather than to the terrorists decision to carry out 
the operation in the first place. 
93 Similarly, Iyad refers to 
the kidnappers who seized five diplomats in the Saudi Embassy 
in Khartoum in March 1973 as having been "forced to execute" 
two Americans and a Belgian when Sudanese forces stormed the 
Embassy. 94 Similarly, the leader of a group of Palestinian 
hijackers who seized a Lufthansa aeroplane in October 1977 is 
quoted as having stated "We don't want to shed blood ... but 
as the imperialist fascist West German regime rejects our 
demands we have no choice", and at another point claimed 
"What happens now is solely the fault of the fascist German 
government and of Helmut Schmidt". 95 
Provisional IRA and republican spokesmen have similarly 
claimed that all deaths in the Northern Irish are ultimately 
the responsibility of the British for not leaving Northern 
Ireland. 96 In January 1987 the Provisionals claimed they were 
forced to carry out bombings against commercial premises in 
Northern Ireland by the authorities' claim that normality had 
returned to Belfast. 
97 Thus, the terrorist's ideology often 
allows them to blame other people for the consequences of 
their own actions. 
Sometimes, the ideological justification for an attack 
is supplied after the attack has occurred rather than having 
been worked out beforehand. It appears that the higher levels 
of the Provisional IRA have justified actions by local units 
93) A. Iyad & E. Rouleau. My Home MY Land, 106,111. 
94) A. Iyad & E. Rouleau. My Home My Land, 102. G. ROBie. The 
Directory of International Terrorism, 260-261. 
95) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 530. Also see P-Koch & 
K. Hermann. Assault at Mogadishu, trans. J. Man, 
(Hamburg: Stern, 1977; London: Corgi, 1977), 139-140. 
96) "All killings and tragedies stem from British 
interference"l Republican News, February 25th 1978. 
D. McKittrick. Despatches from-Belfast, (Belfast: 
Blackstaff, 1989), 86. 
97) "IRA warns of more bombs", The observer, February 1st 
1987. 
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after the event, although they would not have sanctioned the 
operations they had received prior notice. 98 Moss records 
that in some cases in the late 1970s the Red Brigades in 
Turin did not issue their communique justifying an attack 
until after they had seen the press reaction, and tailored it 
accordingly. 99 According to Willan, during this period BR 
targeting was based on slipshod research and trivial 
considerations, and that on one occasion after they shot and 
wounded the wrong person, they rewrote the original 
communique so as to give the impression that the victim had 
been their intended target. 100 Thus, whilst ideological 
considerations lay out the parameters within which terrorists 
select their targets, one must not imagine that all attacks 
are necessarily particularly well thought-out in ideological 
terms. 
Targeting patterns of different ideological groups. 
One of the ways of illustrating the influence of 
ideology on terrorist targeting is to compare the types of 
targets attacked by different groups. Differences between 
groups with different ideologies, and similarities between 
groups with similar ideologies, may demonstrate to a degree 
the extent to which ideology affects target selection. A 
comparison of people killed by the republican and loyalist 
terrorist groups in Northern Ireland is instructive because 
it illustrates the differences in target selection between 
separatist groups and conservative groups operating within 
the same geographical arena with a background of mutual 
communal antipathy, whilst a similar comparison between the 
Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades allows'one to contrast 
groups with broadly similar though distinct communist 
ideologies operating in different areas. 
Case study: republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland. 
In general separatist terrorists tend to attack those 
people who are members of, or cooperate with, organisations 
which they see as representing the occupier. For instance, 
98) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern 
Ireland, 256. J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targetsq 
279 48,116. 
99) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 58. 
100) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 201-202. 
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the Basque group ETA selected the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) 
-a national paramilitary-style Police force whose members 
are generally recruited outside the areas in which they 
serve, national police, and the military as their primary 
targets. 101 According to Clarke, law enforcement officials 
and members of the armed forces make up 68% of those killed 
by ETA and 40.5% of those wounded between 1968 and 1980, 
whilst Llera, Mata, and Irwin estimate that policemen and 
military officers make'up 59.1% of the total fatalities 
caused by ETA operations between 1968 and 1988.102 Of these 
the heaviest casualties occurred amongst the Civil Guard. 103 
Clark alleges that, in the 1960s and early 1970s the Civil 
Guard were widely feared in the Basque provinces, and this - 
together with their role in the eyes of ETA members as 
symbols of Spanish occupation - would give some indication as 
to why they were seen as an automatic target. 104 
Conservative terrorist groups use terrorism in order to 
protect the existing interests of the people they claim to 
represent and, sometimes, to protect the state from what they 
claim to be subversion. In Colombia in the 1980s for examplep 
vigilante 'death squads' were set up by large landowners, 
cattle-ranchers, drug traffickers - who often become land- 
owners using drugs money, and members of the Colombian armed 
forces. 105 The initial task of Colombian conservative 
terrorist groups such as Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a 
Secuestradores - MAS) and the Association of Peasants and 
Ranchers of the Magdeleno Medio (Asociacion de Campesionos y 
Ganderos del Magdelena Medio - ACDEGAM), was supposedly to 
combat communist guerrillas such as the April 19th Movement 
(Movimiento 19 de Abril - M-19), and the Revolutionary Armed 
101) R. P. Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 40. 
102) R. P. Clark. "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980"o 
P. H. Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror, 136. 
F. Llera, J. M. Mata & C. L. Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army 
to Social Movement"t 132. 
103) R. P. Clark. "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980", 136. 
B. Pollack & G. Hunter. "Dictatorship) Democracy and 
Terrorism in Spain", 126. 
104) R. P. Clark. The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond, 
(Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1979), 170-174. 
Private information. 
105) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177-178,247. 
Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia: 
Myth and reality, (London: Amnesty International, 
1994), 52. 
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Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia - FARC). 
106 However, they also targeted members of 
the FARC's successor political party, the Patriotic Union 
(Union Patriotica - UP), peasant groups such as the National 
Association of Peasant Users (Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios 
Campesinos - ANUC), trade unionists, and other groups seeking 
to change the balance of political power in Colombia. 107 
According to Pearce over 700 members of the UP were 
killed between 1985 ano March 1989, and by 1994 Amnesty 
International estimated that the figure had risen to 
1,500.108 Hundreds of trade unionists and workers have been 
killed, particularly if they were taking strike action 
against their employers. 109 Ordinary workers appear to have 
been killed in order to intimidate others, whilst judges and 
those investigating such killings have been threatened and 
killed. 110 Although such killings have been condemned by 
members of the Government, plantation owners, employers, and 
ranchers publicly equated peasant movements and trade unions 
with subversion and communism, and the death squads justified 
the assassination as action against subversives. 111 Thus the 
Colombian conservative terrorists demonstrate a targeting 
pattern one might expect by targeting those whom they 
believed to be subversive of the existing order. 
The respective patterns of ETA and the Colombian death 
squads are replicated to an extent by the separatist and 
conservative terrorists in Northern Ireland. For the 
106) "King Coke", The Independent, July 21st 1990. "In 
Medellin, walls do not a prison makel The Independent, 
August 8th 1992. J-Pearce. Colombia: Inside the 
Labyrinthl 177,247. C. Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in 
Colombia", 95-96. 
107) J. Pearce. Colombia: 
--Inside 
the Labyrinth, 1,260-261. 
A. M. Bravo. "Frontier culture takes to cocaine", 75. 
C. Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia"l 96. P. D. Scott 
& J. Marshall. Cocaine Politics, 89. 
108) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinthq 239,262. 
Amnesty International. Politi_cal violence in Colombia, 
1. 
109) J. Pearce. Colombia: 
--Inside 
the__Labyrinth, 252-2539 260- 
261. 
110) J. Pearce. Colombia: 
--Inside 
the Labyrinth, 243,249,254- 
255. Amnesty International. Getting away with murderp 
74,88-89. 
111) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside. the Labyrinth, 196,253,262. 
Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombiaq 
58,61-62. 
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republicans, and in particular the Provisional IRA which is 
the largest republican terrorist group, target selection is 
fairly simple. Anybody who is a member of the security 
forces, or who aids them, is automatically considered a 
legitimate target. One of the ways in which they define their 
enemies is to denounce them as members of the 'British war 
machine'. This is a fairly wide ranging category which the 
Provisionals use to classify all those whom they consider to 
be involved in the struggle against themselves. Thus, as well 
as the Army, RUC, UDR/RIR, and the other British armed 
services such as the Navy and Air Force, it also includes 
contractors who work on military or police buildings in 
Northern Ireland, politicians or officials involved in the 
formulation of policy towards Northern Ireland, informers, 
and anybody whom the PIRA deem to be actively collaborating 
with the security forces. 112 
Despite criticism that many of their targets are, 
according to republican ideology, fellow Irishmen, the 
Provisionals have accommodated the targeting of Northern 
Irish security forces within their ideological framework by 
claiming that as members of the 'British war-machine' the RUC 
and UDR/RIR are legitimate targets, as well as denouncing 
them as sectarian organisations. 113 
A problem faced by the loyalist terrorists in Northern 
Ireland is that whilst republican terrorists can identify 
security force members relatively easily, it is difficult for 
loyalists to identify and target members of republican 
terrorist groups. As a result they often attack any 
Catholics, believing them to be sympathetic to republican 
terrorism, or at the very least culpable for not putting 
112) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The 
Independent, September 29th 1990. '"We remain totally 
committed and confident in victory' - Oglaigh na 
hEireann", AP/RNj February 14th 1991. "The IRA 
statement", AP/RNj January 23rd 1992. J. Bowyer Bell, 
IRA Tactics and Targets, 29-32. 
113) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The 
Independent, September 29th 1990. "Freedom's soldiers 
laid to rest in historic Tyrone"q AP/RNj June 13th 
1991. "UDR 'comes of age': Loyalist militia renamed", 
AP/RN, July 25th 1991. "Terrorists in and out of 
uniform", AP/RN, July 4th 1991. "Royal salute to Murder 
Regiment", AP/RNI June 4th 1992. 
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pressure on the Provisionals to stop their campaign. 114 Thus 
in April 1971 an article in the newsletter of the Woodvale 
Defence Association -a loyalist vigilante group in an area 
of Belfast - stated: 
It has been proved regardless to what community relations 
or some MPs sayq the biggest pelygntage of the Catholic 
population are backing the IRA. 
In January 1972 the same newsletter commented: 
... the Catholic community is the IRA. For this we make 
no apology. ... no-one, not even clever nurnalists or 
politicians can deny this is the 
In many respects this suspicion of tacit Catholic 
complicity with republican terrorist groups appears to have 
been shared by many ordinary Protestants in Northern 
Ireland. 117 By attacking Catholics, loyalist terrorists hoped 
to put pressure upon the PIRA to stop its campaign and to 
prevent governmental moves towards a united Ireland. 118 The 
attitude was summed up in October 1993 by a spokesman for the 
Ulster Freedom Fighters when he said: 
We are out to terrorise the terrorists. To get to the 
stage when old grannies up the Falls will call on the IRA 
to stop, because it is ordinary Catholics that are 
gettinj hit, not the provos behind steel security 
doors. 19 
Sectarian attacks also provided a means for loyalist 
terrorists to obtain a form of revenge. As Bruce points outj 
apart from the relatively small number of active republicans, 
loyalists did not have identifiable enemy targets. 120 
114) S. Bruce., The Red Hand, 261,277. S. Nelson. Ulster's 
Uncertain Defenders, 120. M. Dillon. The Shankill 
Butchers, 17. 
115) D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 32-33. 
116) D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 81. 
117) "Gritting it out on Border farmlands", The Irish Times,, 
March 3rd 1983. "Centre of hatred returns to Armagh", 
The Irish Times, j November 23rd. 1983. J. Darby. 
Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern 
Ireland, 136-137. S-Bruce. The Edge of the Union: The 
Ulster Loyalist Political Vision, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Presso 1994), 42-43. T. Parker. May the Lord 
in His mercy be kind to Belfast, 293-294. 
118) "Loyalist group threatens Catholic massacre", The 
Independent, September 8th 1993. "Loyalists come out 
shooting to defend lost cause", The Times, September 
9th 1993. 
119) "For Queen and Country"i The Guardian - supplementi 
October 19th 1993. 
120) S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 58,277. 
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However, the loyalists could respond to republican attacks by 
attacking Catholics, rationalising the attacks on the grounds 
that those whom they killed were somehow responsible for 
republican actions. In July 1976 a loyalist newsletter 
claimed: 
TABLE 3.1 
KILLINGS PERPETRATED BY LOYALIST AND REPUBLICAN GROUPS 
IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1969-1993. 
LOYALIST REPUBLICAN 
Number % Number % 
British Armya 1 0.1 448 26.3 
UDR/RIRa 3 0.4 236 13.9 
RUCA 6 o. 7 297 17.4 
Prison officersa 2 0.2 25 1.5 
Alleged informers 16 1.9 65 3.8 
b Security force workers 0 0.0 35 2.1 
Internal feudsc 46 5.4 45 2.6 
Opposing terroristsd 28 3.3 27 1.6 
Political activisýse 32 3.8 12 0.7 
Overtly sectarian 670 79.3 152 8.9 
Otherg 41 4.9 363 21.3 
Total number killed 845 100.0 1705 100.1 
n. b. Percentages are rounded up or down to nearest 0.1%. 
Loyalist category includes UDAj UVF, PAF and all other 
loyalist groups. Republican category includes PIRA, OIRA, 
INLA, IPLO, and all other republican groups. 
a Includes former members. 
b Civilian contractors and direct employees carrying out work 
for the security forces. 
c Loyalists killed by loyalists and republicans killed by 
republicans. 
d Republicans killed by loyalists and loyalists killed by 
republicans. 
e Nationalists and republicans killed by loyalists and 
unionists and loyalists killed by republicans. 
f Catholics killed by loyalists primarily because of their 
religion and Protestants killed by republicans for the same 
reason. 
g Excludes killings outside Northern Ireland. Excludes 
terrorists killed by their own bomb but includes other 
unintended deaths. 
Source: M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead ... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993, (Belfast: 
Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994), 196-203. 
We can say without fear of contradiction that 98% of 
'innocent' Roman Catholic victims have, in fact, 
contributed either by actual presence, or by giving 
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informationýlthereby assisting in the murder of 
Loyalists. 1 
The claims that the victims were active republicans were 
generally false. 
The pattern shown above in Table 3.1 may be somewhat 
skewed by the gap between the intentions of the terrorist 
group and the results actually achieved. However, one can see 
that in their lethal attacks the separatist republicans 
appear to have primarily targeted members of the security 
forces, although a sizeable percentage of people have been 
killed because they were Protestant and a large number of 
attacks have involved the unintended deaths of bystanders. 
For the loyalists on the other hand, attacks have been mainly 
directed against the supposedly subversive Catholics, with a 
relatively small though sizeable number of republican 
terrorists or political activists being killed, and a fair 
number of other loyalists also being killed. 
The concentration of loyalist attacks against Catholic 
civilians confirms that the Catholic population as a whole is 
seen as a target. The communal nature of much of the violence 
in Northern Ireland can be seen in the number of sectarian 
killings on both sides, but there is a much higher 
concentration of primarily sectarian killings amongst the 
human targets attacked by the loyalist groups than by the 
republican groups. This is what one would expect to see with 
a conservative terrorist group which regards a particular 
community as suspect or subversive. 
Case study: the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army 
Faction in West Germany. 
There are also differences in targeting patterns 
between groups with similar ideologies in different 
locations. Looking specifically at the ideology of two 
distinct groups - the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army 
Faction in West Germany - one finds that although the 
ultimate aims were similar - to overthrow the capitalist 
system, there were important ideological differences which 
translated into differences in target selection. These 
differences were publicised when documents captured by the 
Italian police in June 1988 revealed the relative failure of 
121) D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 256. 
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the RAF and the BR faction known as the Fighting Communist 
Party (Partito Comunista Combattente - BR/PCC) to agree a 
coordinated strategy -a particular aim of the RAF at that 
time. 122 
TABLE 3.2 
CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE KILLED, WOUNDED OR KIDNAPPED BY 
COMMUNIST TERRORIST GROUPS IN ITALY AND WEST GERMANY. 
Italy: 1970-82 W. Germany: 1967-91a 
Number % Number % 
Police 69 23.1 9 7.7 
Judicial 13 4.3 b 4 3.4 
Penal 14 4.7 0 0.0 
Political 27 9.0 5c 4.3 
Business 85 28.4 5 4.3 
Media 9 3.0 17d 14.5 
Others 82e 27.4 77f 65.8 
Total number 299 117 
a. To April 2nd 1991. 
b. Includes officials or politicians in judicial-related 
posts. 
C. Includes senior officials. 
d. Includes sixteen injured in bombing of Springer offices. 
e. Includes seventeen targeted doctors. 
f. Includes sixty people killed or injured in attacks on US 
military facilities. 
n. b. Percentages rounded up or down to nearest 0.1%. 
Sources: D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 
1969-1985, (London: Macmillan, 1989), 38. B. A. Scharlau. 
"Chronology of Major Events"l (Unpublished manuscript, 
1992). D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group 
(1972-1991) to , Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). 
European Terrorism Today & Tomorrow, (Washington D. C.: 
Brassey's (US), 1992), 57-79,84-86. 
The targeting pattern of communist terrorist groups in 
Italy and West Germany can be seen above in Table 3.29 though 
as mentioned one must allow for discrepancies between what 
the terrorists intended to do and the actual result. 
Additionally, the small number of attacks involved in the 
West German example, combined with the fact that many of the 
anti-American attacks were bombs which aimed at causing heavy 
casualties, means that the attacks on American military 
122) Red Brigades & Red Army Faction. "Excerpts from Notes of 
a Meeting between the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction 
in January 1988". Y-Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (ed). 
Europe's Red Terrorists, 219-227. 
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facilities caused a high proportion of the casualties 
inflicted by the German communist terrorists. Nevertheless, 
the table demonstrates some important points and highlights 
differences between the Italian and West German cases. 
Firstly the police make up a relatively high proportion 
of casualties. In the Italian case this is evident from the 
figures. In the West German case, if one discounts the sixty 
casualties at U. S. bases, police officers make up 15.8% of 
the total casualties. However, the West German policemen were 
either secondary targets - as was the case when three 
bodyguards were killed during the Schleyer kidnapping, or 
became casualties when terrorists resisted arrest. In 1971 
Ulrike Meinhof stated that the RAF would not target police 
officers who were not specifically trying to harm them. 
123 On 
the other hand, whilst twenty-seven Italian police officers 
were killed or injured trying to arrest terrorists or as 
bodyguards to a primary target, the remaining thirty were 
deliberately selected as functional targets, or as symbolic 
targets in order to directly attack and demoralise the 
'functionaries' of the state. 
124 
A contrast also exists between the targeting of the 
business sector by Italian communist terrorists compared to 
the West German groups. With the exception of the bombing of 
the Springer publishing works in 1972, and the kidnapping of 
Hans-Martin Schleyer in 1977, the RAF did not target 
businessmen for assassination or abduction until the mid 
1980s. After this point the RAF targeted high-level 
businessmen who represented the 'Military-Industrial Complex' 
or international capitalism as a whole. When the RAF shot 
Ernst Zimmermang the Chairman of the Federal Association of 
the German Aeronauticss Spaceq and Armaments Industry, at his 
home in Munich in February 19859 they justified the killing 
on the grounds that Zimerman's federation: 
*99 had the function to Push through the interests of the MIC here in this state, on the Westey2, European level, 
and thus on the international level. 
123) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 143. 
124) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in ItalX, 38. 
L'Espressol February 24th 1980. L'Espresso, October 
31st 1982. 
125) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group 
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Thus Zimerman was seen as a representative symbol of the MIC. 
Likewise, in July 1986 the RAF detonated a bomb in a 
cart, killing Dr Karl-Heinz Beckurts and his driver on their 
way to work. Beckurts was a director of the electronics firm 
Siemens, and a member of the nuclear energy working group of 
the German National Industries Association. As such the RAF 
said that he represented 
* the course of international capital in the current ýýase 
of political; economic, and military strategy of 
the overall imperialist system ... Siemens - like almost 
no other company in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany) 
- represents the concentrated power and aggression of the 
most reactionary factions of the 1h urgeoisie organized 
by 
the military-industrial complex. 
Subsequent business targets - Alfred Herrhauseng Chairman of 
the Deutsche Bank, killed by a car-bomb in November 1989, and 
Detlev Rohwedder, the Director of the Treuhandanstalt 
[Trusteeship Office for East German State Property)9 shot 
dead by a sniper in April 1991 - were both characterised by 
the RAF as men who represented the capitalist system's 
attempt to dominate and subjugate the lives of western 
workers, workers in the Third World, and of workers in 
Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet system. 127 The 
important point to note is that the attacks were aimed at 
highlighting wide issues rather than specific industrial 
conflicts, and thus the human business targets of the Red 
Army Faction were high-ranking businessmen whose death would 
gain publicity, rather than middle-managers involved in 
industrial disputes. 
In contrast, the Italian groups were well organised in 
some of the factories and gave a high political priority to 
intervening in domestic industrial conflicts. The Red 
Brigades targeted managers where companies were involved in 
(1972-1991)11, Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). 
European-Terrorism Today & Tomorrow, (Washington D. C.: 
Brassey's (US), 1992), 67. 
126) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist 
Group", 69. 
127) Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of 
Alfred Herrhausen, Chairman of Deutsche Bank, in 
Frankfurt on 30 November 1989", Red Army Faction. 
"Communique on the -Assassination of Detlev Rohwedder, 
President of Treuhandanstaltg in Dusseldorf on 1 April 
1991", Y. Alexander & D-Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red 
Terrorists, 689 80. 
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conflicts with their staff, although in other cases, as with 
the Front Line attack on a business school, Italian communist 
terrorists attacked the business sector in general. 128 Those 
managers who were attacked tended to have supervisory or 
personnel functions rather than high-level executive 
positions. 129 Attacks usually took the form of maiming, with 
the victims being shot in the legs. Although a senior manager 
bled to death after being shot in the leg in September 1978, 
it was not until 1980 any were deliberately killed; one at 
Marghera near Venice and two in Milan. 130 The decision to 
kill the managers in Milan - Renato Briano of Magneti Marelli 
and Manfredo Mazzanti of Falck - was not taken by the BR 
leadership, but by a dissident, factory-based section of BR 
which called itself the 'Walter Alasia column' in memory of a 
Milan BR leader who died in a gun-battle with the police in 
1976.131 The BR condemned the actions of the Walter Alasia 
column as undisciplined, although the Veneto column of BR was 
responsible for the killing in January 1980 of Silvio Gori - 
a manager at the Marghera plant of Petrolchimico, and 
kidnapped and later killed Giuseppe Taliercio, the personnel 
manager of the Montedison plant at Marghera where a number of 
workers had been made redundant. 132 
From the mid-1980s sections of the BR, which by then 
had fragmented, carried out lethal attacks on prominent 
people in the industrial sector. However these were generally 
advisers rather than businessmen. 133 After Professor Ezio 
Tarentelli - an economist, trade union consultant and adviser 
to the Italian Government - was shot dead at the University 
of Rome in March 1985, a BR communique branded him as a man 
128) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 75-76,99. D. Moss. The 
Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy,, 81-117. 
V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in 
Contemporar y Italyl 169. E-MacDonald. Shoot the Women 
First, 176- 177. 
129) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 85. 
130) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 85. 
C. Schaerf e t al. Venti Anni, 
-di 
Violenza in Italia, 
volume one, 736. 
131) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 93. 
132) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 188-189. V. S. Pisano. The 
Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary 
Ital , 163, 165. 
133) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 210,212,215-216. 
D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy , 79,80. 
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who had "... learned the arts and techniques of capitalist 
exploitation and accused him of framing policies which 
would lead to the imposition of lower working standards upon 
ordinary workers. 
134 In contrast to the RAF's target 
selection, the BR targets in the mid-1980s were high-level 
government consultants or appointees rather than prominent 
businessmen. 
Although both the RAF and BR targeted senior political 
or official figures, the nature of the targets differed. 
Those attacked by the Red Army Faction tended to be quite 
senior officials. For example Dr Gerhold von Braunmuehl, the 
head of the political department in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, was shot dead in October 1986. Assassination 
attempts were made in September 1988 on Dr Hans Tietmeyer, a 
state secretary in the Ministry of Finance and later head of 
the Bundesbank, and in July 1990 on Hans Neusel, the second- 
ranking official in the Ministry of the Interior, and the 
official in charge of internal security. 
135 No attacks have 
been made by the RAF on senior German politicians, although 
in 1975 the June 2nd Movement kidnapped Peter Lorenz, the 
Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union - 
CDU) candidate for Mayor of Berlin. 
136 
on the other hand, despite the professed BR aim to 
attack the 'Heart of the State' the political human targets 
attacked by the various communist groups in Italy have mainly 
consisted of junior and middle-ranking members of political 
groups. 137 The exceptions were the attacks on the semi- 
official academic advisers mentioned above, and the 
kidnapping and subsequent killing of the former Prime 
Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. Twenty-four of the twenty-eight 
political targets killed, wounded, or kidnapped by Italian 
communist terrorists between 1968 and 1982 were members of 
the conservative Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana - 
DC), who were the major partners in the various ruling 
134) Red Brigades - Fighting Communist Party. "Communique on 
the Assassination of Ezio Tarantelli", Y. Alexander & 
D. Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 203-204. 
135) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist 
Group", 70,71-72,74-75. 
136) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 286-288. J. Becker. 
Hitler's Children, 297-298. 
137) A. Jamieson. The-Heart Attacked, 120. 
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coalitions in Italy between 1945 and 1993.138 These attacks 
were in line with the BR 'Strategic Resolution' of November 
1977 which aimed to: 
ATTACK, HITj LIQUIDATE AND DEFINITIVELY ROUT THE 
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTYj AXIS OF THE RESTRUCTURING ?F 
THE STATE AND OF THE IMPERIALIST COUNTER-REVOLUTION. 13 
The Red Brigadists saw the DC as having a central role in the 
'Imperialist State of Multinationals', and attacked them 
accordingly. 140 Four-fýfths of the attacks on the Christian 
Democrats occurred between 1977 and 1979. Attacks on DC 
property in Rome occurred about once a fortnight during that 
period, putting the party in what Moss terms "an acute sense 
of being under siege" 0 
141 
Although both the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades 
were avowedly communist groups, there were notable 
differences in their ideology and this affected their choice 
of targets. The BR put a much higher premium upon the 
overthrow of the Italian state, whilst the RAF saw their 
objective as the destruction of international capitalism and 
imperialism. Furthermore, the original anarchistic outlook of 
the original leaders of the Red Army Faction contrasted with 
the origins of the BR in the Italian Communist Party, and 
might have translated itself into a greater concentration on 
targets with a greater symbolic value. 142 Whilst the RAF 
attack higher-profile targets than the Red Brigadesq 
reflecting their ideological opposition to international 
capitalism, the Red Brigades, with their roots in the 
northern Italian factories and opposition to the Italian 
state, concentrated far more on attacking local factory 
managers and police officers. Ideology was not the only 
reason for the differences in targeting strategy - for 
example, the BR had many more members than the RAF and could 
carry out more actions, including actions against less 
138) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Ttaly, 
120. 
139) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 108. 
140) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-W ng Violence in Italy, 
122. 
141) D-Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 
120. 
142) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 10-12,63,76-77,146- 
149. J. Becker. Hitler's Children, 17,62,109,264p 366 
ff. 2. 
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prominent targets. However, the RAF could have attacked low- 
profile human targets with much greater ease than the high- 
profile targets which were attacked, but deliberately chose 
not to. The differences in targeting pattern illustrate that 
the differing ideologies of the groups greatly affected which 
targets they chose. 
Summary. 
The political idpology of a group defines how it sees 
the world. In the context of terrorist target selection, 
ideology identifies those people, objects or institutions 
which can be considered as legitimate targets because the 
terrorists regard them as culpable of an offence according to 
the group's beliefs. As the Northern Irish, German, and 
Italian examples show, differences in target selection can be 
found between terrorist groups operating in the same areas 
but with different ideologies, and even between groups with 
similar ideologies but operating under different 
circumstances. Other influences affect the behaviour of 
members of a terrorist group, but a factor which they have in 
common is that they share allegiance to an ideology which 
provides the underlying rationale for their actions. 
Ultimately, the ideology provides a framework of beliefs upon 
which political decisions are based, and provides a motive 
for action. However, to be effective, ideas must be 
translated into action, and one of the ways in which this is 




In an article Michael Howard defines strategy as: 
ý** the deployment and use 1 of armed 
forces to attain a 
iven political objective. 
This study adapts that definition in that a strategy is taken 
to be the plan by which a terrorist group seeks to deploy and 
use its resources with the aim of achieving its ultimate 
political objectives. * 
The role which strategic thought plays in determining 
the activities of terrorists differ greatly between groups. 
Since their actions are generally dictated by their own 
perceptions rather than from a detached standpoint there are 
dangers in assuming that terrorists - or other actors in 
politics - behave in a way which is objectively rational. In 
practice, the pressures connected with surviving as a 
terrorist do much to distort a person's ability to make 
rational decisions. However, except where their actions are 
wholly expressive, most terrorists do try to relate their 
violent acts to specific objectives. 
There is a risk of making overly detailed 
generalisations about the actions of terrorist groups. A 
model which seeks to explain the strategy of groups as 
disparate as the Animal Liberation Front, the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, and a vigilante death squadl runs 
the risk of either needing so many caveats as to make it 
inoperable, or of being so blandly general as to be of little 
utility. Nevertheless, general observations can be made about 
the impact of strategic considerations on terrorist target 
selection. 
The place of terrorism in strategic planning. 
Terrorism is only one of a number of methods which a 
group may use as part of it's strategy for achieving it's 
political goals. For those who do use it, terrorism may be 
merely one means to an end. The overall strategy of a group 
may include other violent methods ranging from riots to 
1) M. Howard. The Causes of War, (London: Maurice Temple 
Smith, 1983; Unwin, 1984), 101. For other definitions 
see L. Freedman (ed). War, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 191-244. 
Strategy 79 
conventional warfare, and also include non-violent methods 
such as civil disobedience and constitutional political 
activity. The intention of the Irish republican movement to 
simultaneously pursue a strategy embracing political and 
violent action was put forward most eloquently by the 
Director of Publicity for Provisional Sinn Fein, Danny 
Morrison, at the Sinn Fein annual conference in 1981. 
Who here really believes that we can win the war through 
the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a 
ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this handl 
we take power in Ireland? 2 
Similarly, soon after the Provisional IRA announced their 
ceasefire on August 31st 1994, a Sinn Fein representative 
stated: 
one thing we all know is that the struggle is not over5 
We are into a new and important phase of the struggle. 
Thus, the republican campaign for a united Ireland would 
continue with a strategy which - for the time-being - did not 
include the use of anti-state violence, but was an 'unarmed 
4 strategy'. This example, and the fact that the ceasfire 
ended in February 1996, also demonstrates that groups can 
change their strategy over time. 
5 
The foundations of a terrorist group's strategy are 
often found in the world-view prescribed by their ideology. 
This makes sense as the ideology lays down the political 
objectives towards which their strategy should be directedt 
shapes the way in which terrorists see the world around them, 
and therefore shapes their choice of the most appropriate 
strategy to adopt. For example, the Red Brigade's leaders 
believed that the Italian political and economic system was 
reorganising due to a state of crisis, with the possibility 
6 of a coup d'etat by the authoritarian right. Their terrorist 
2) L. Clarke., Broadening the Battlefield: The H-Blocks and the 
, 
Rise of Sinn Fein, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987), 
208. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 378. 
3) "IRA declares peace"q The Independent, September 1st 1994. 
4) B. Rowan. Behind the Lines: The Story of the IRA and 
. 
Loyalist Ceasefires, (Belfast: Blackstaffq 1995), 84. 
E. Mallie & D. McKittrick. The Fight for Peace: The 
, 
Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process, (London: 
Heinemann, 1996), 311-312,381-384. 
5) E. Mallie & D. McKittrick. The Fight for Peace, 363. 
6) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 75,76,81-82. D-Moss Ih-e 
, 
Politics of-Left-Wing Violene in ItalZ, 59,83,85-86, 
124. Red Brigades - Fighting Communist Party. 
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strategy, which aimed at undermining the system with a view 
to encouraging a working-class revolt, appears thoroughly 
logical provided one accepts the basic premises of their 
80 
ideology. Likewise, ir one accepLs LnaL irisn repuuiiuun 
ideology in the early 1970s saw the British presence in 
Northern Ireland as a colonial one, and considers that 
Britain had recently herself of an empire - sometimes under 
pressure of terrorism as in Palestines Cyprus, and Aden - it 
was logical for the PIRA to suppose that the British would 
7 
withdraw from Northern Ireland given sufficient violence. 
Whether or not one accepts their basic premise, their 
ideology led to a strategy which sought to transform Northern 
Ireland into a liability which the 'colonial' British 
Government would be glad to dispose of. 
In his study of the military strategy of the 
Provisional IRA, Smith confirms the link between ideology and 
strategyp stating that a group's strategy should logically 
proceed from it's ideology, taking into account the context 
within which the group operates. However, he believes that in 
practice the PIRA's strategy in the early-1970s derived 
directly from the historical ideology of militant Irish 
republicanism without any great appreciation of other 
8 
relevant factors. Thus, instead of what Smith sees as the 
logical progression: 
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policy to achieve 
ends) 
he believes that the strategy of the Provisional IRA at that 
time was more dependent on ideological preconceptions, and 
can best be described as: 
"Communique on the Assassination of Ezio Tarantelli", 
205. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 203. 
7) M. McGuire. To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IR 
(London: Macmillan, 1973; Quartet, 1973), 12,69. 
P. Bishop & E-Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 171. 
8) M. L. R. Smith. Fightingg for Ireland-2,140. 
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For Smith, the ideological predisposition of Irish 
republicanism towards the use of violence determined strategy 
with little reference to other factors. When the Provisional 
IRA began their campaign in 1970, killing British soldiers 
was already a deep-seated part of the republican heritage. 9 
This emphasises the point that one must not be overawed 
by the term strategy into imagining a complex or mysterious 
process, and avoid retrospectively imposing a rational and 
symmetrical pattern of decision-making upon a process which 
may well be rushed and conducted under great pressure. 10 The 
long-term plans of terrorists - however crude they may appear 
- are strategies. For instance, in the mid-1970s a PIRA 
leader described their campaign as "... blattering on until 
the Brits leave". " Whilst this might not appear to be a 
particularly sophisticated strategy, it outlined a credible 
strategy of psychological attrition with the achievement of a 
definite political goal - the 'Brits' leaving Northern 
Ireland - as the long-term objective. 
Even with terrorist groups possessing a clear political 
objective, there sometimes appears to be little sense of 
planning beyond preparing for the next attack. Jenkins noted 
in the mid 1970s that many terrorist groups fail to make the 
progression from the tactical concerns of planning specific 
operations to devising an overall strategy to achieve their 
ultimate political objectives. 12 Although the terrorists know 
what their political objectives are, and are convinced of the 
need for violence to attain them, they do not know how to use 
violence effectively. One could draw a parallel with someone 
who wishes to get from point A to point B and has the use of 
9) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 171. 
10) J. Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent 
Inefficiency of the Underground", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 21 no. 2, (Summer 1990). 
11) "Inside the IRA", The Sunday Times, July 3rd 1977. 
12) B. M. Jenkins- Soldiers ver_sus Gunmen: The-Challenge of 
Urban Guerrilla Warfare, (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Corporation, March 1974), 4. 
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a car to make the journey, but does not possess an accurate 
road map. Consequently, he ends up driving around aimlessly 
in the hope of finally reaching his destination. In this 
situation a form of strategy through inertia may develop. 
Indeed, Crenshaw believes that terrorisms once started, 
ultimately takes on a momentum of its own and there is little 
reason to believe that a strategy will be substantially 
altered unless it is seen to be demonstrably failing. 13 
Not all terrorist campaigns last long enough to develop 
beyond their initial stages. 14 As noted earlier, many 
terrorist groups only carry out a small number of attacks 
before ceasing to operate. Other groups may last long enough 
to carry out a series of attacks and issue some communiques 
before they are put out of action. The Angry Brigade in 
Britain only lasted as a really effective terrorist group 
between mid 1970 and late 1971, and became largely inactive 
following the arrest and conviction of the group's leaders, 
whilst in Belgium the Fighting Communist Cells (CCC- Cellules 
Communistes Combattantes) was similarly broken up by a number 
of arrests in December 1985 after carrying out twenty-six 
bombings in Belgium over a fourteen month period. 15 
Other terrorist campaigns have been protracted, and in 
these cases it is possible or even likely that strategies 
will be altered over time in order to adapt to changing 
circumstances or changes in the group's capability. It is 
also possible thatt due to capture, death, or tretirement'g 
the people initially making strategic decisions for the 
terrorist group will have been replaced by people with a 
different outlook. Thus, Israeli assassination squads and 
internal feuds have killed leading members of the PLO9 in 
Germany a number of the Red Army Faction leaders have been 
13) M. Crenshaw "-The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism", 
journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, no 3, (September 
1972), 394. 
14) For information on the longevity of various terrorist 
groups see Table 1 in M. Crenshaw, "How terrorism 
declines", 76-77; and Figure 2 in Y. Alexander & 
D. Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 47. 





Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red 
Terrorists, 148-150. 
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imprisoned over the years, and in Northern Ireland the INLA 
has lost leading members in internal feuds. 16 
The Provisional IRA provides an example of the changes 
to be seen in a groups' long-term strategy. They have changed 
their terrorist and political strategy - though not their 
ultimate political objectives - on a number of occasions. 
Their original strategy was to maintain a high level of 
violence and kill a large number of security force members in 
a short period of time, By the mid 1970s this strategy had 
been largely suppressed by an intensive security force 
commitment which led to the death or capture of a large 
number of PIRA members, and demonstrated the ability of the 
British Government to endure a certain level of violence 
within the Province. 
17 
In response the Provisionals switched to a protracted 
'long war' terrorist campaign, which consisted of a lower 
level of violence combined with the political mobilisation of 
the Catholics of Northern Ireland by Provisional Sinn Fein. 
18 
The objective of the 'long war' strategy was to gradually 
wear down the resistance of the British Government and public 
by maintaining a lower but constant level of violence against 
a number of targets - primarily the security forces and civil 
and commercial targets in Northern Ireland and England, with 
16) On the changes in the leadership of the Red Army Faction 
see D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist 
Group". and B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. On the INLA see J. Holland 
& H. McDonald. INLA: Deadly Divisions, (Dublin: Torc, 
1994), 229-2309 282-299. On the policy of assassinating 
leading Palestinian terrorists see D. Tinnin. Hit Team, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976; Futural 1977). 
D. Raviv & Y. Melman. Every Spy a Prince: The Complete 
History of Israel's Intelligence Communityp (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 184-192,393-398. 
17) "Ulster's rocky road to peace"i The Observer, (London)q 
December 15th 1977. P. Bishop & E. Mallie, The 
Provisional IRA, 321. P. Taylor. Beating the Terrorists: 
, 
Interrorgation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, 
(Harmondsworthp England: Penguin, 1980), 80-81,154- 
158,193-194. M. Dillon. Killer in Clowntown: Joe 
Doherty, the IRA and the Special Relationships (London: 
Hutchinson; Arrow, 1992), 59. 
18) T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 581. L. Clarke. Broadening the 
Battlefield, 32,35. K. J. Kelley. The Longest Warp 233- 
236,243. 
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the occasional spectacular attack in order to maintain a 
climate of widespread apprehension. 
19 
In August 1994 the PIRA leadership altered its strategy 
again when it temporarily ceased the use of violence against 
the state and the economy, followed by the loyalist groups 
the following month. 20 However both loyalist and republican 
groups continued to injure or kill people whom they alleged 
were 'anti-social' elements such as criminals or drug 
traffickers, to a greater extent than they did before the 
ceasefire. As well as the overtly-stated aim of curbing 
criminality - in particular drug-trafficking - it seems 
likely that this also represented a strategic decision to 
maintain the compliant nature of the local population in case 
of a resumption of the conflict. 
21 Thus when the Provisionals 
ended the ceasefire with a bomb in the Docklands area of 
London in February 1996, they would not have felt the need to 
worry excessively about the risk of overt repudiation from 
the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland. 
22 
This example shows how terrorism can be integrated into 
a broader strategy for the purpose of achieving political 
goals. In general terrorists do not view their actions as 
uncoordinated violence and have some idea of the overall 
19) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The 
Independent, September 29th 1990. "'We remain totally 
committed and confident in victory' -Oglaigh na 
hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "The IRA 
statement", AP/RN, January 23rd 1992. T. P. Coogan. The 
IRA, 604,693. J. Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 
29-32. L. Clarke. Broadening the Battlefieldl 56-57. 
B. O'Brien. The Long War, 152. 
20) "IRA declares peace"i The Independent, September 1st 
1994. "Loyalists match IRA ceasefire", *"Combined 
Loyalist Military Command statement"l The Independent, 
October 14th 1994. 
21) L. Kennedy. "Rough Justice", Fortnightq November 1995. 
"How the guns kept drugs out of Belfast", The 
Independent, December 21st 1995. "Godfathers of 
violence step up beatings to keep grip on power", The 
Daily Telegraph, December 29th 1995. "Murky motives for 
giving drug dealers rough justice"q The Guardiang 
January 3rd 1996. M. O'Doherty. "Dealing in Death", New 
Statesman & Society, January 22nd 1996. B. Rowan. Behind 
the Lines. For a republican viewpoint see "Drugs in the 
Six CouTties: A Secret Society", AP/RN9 January 25th 
1996, and "Drugs summit targeted North", AP/RNj 
February 1st 1996. 
22) "'The ceasefire is over': IRA bombers blast London", The 
independent,, February 10th 1996. "Bomb shatters IRA 
ceasefire", The Times, February 10th 1996. 
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effects which they want their violence to achieve. They 
believe that these effects will in turn help them to achieve 
their political goals. For this reason the effects which the 
terrorists wish their violence to achieve - their strategic 
objectives - need to be examined. 
The strategic objectives of terrorist groups. 
The strategic objectives of terrorists are not the same 
as their ultimate political objectives, but are the long-term 
effects which they wish to impose on their psychological 
target through the use of terrorist violence. The success of 
a terrorist strategy depends upon the terrorists finding the 
type of pressure or encouragement to exert upon their 
psychological target in order to produce the desired 
responses. For instance a group which wishes to gain a great 
deal of publicity for its cause will not progress far if it 
confines itself to unpublicised acts of sabotage against 
unimportant buildings or institutions. Therefore it will 
probably select targets against whom attacks will gain a 
great deal of attention for the group and its cause. 
Similarly, it would be a waste of effort and possibly 
counter-productive for terrorists to cause a widespread panic 
by indiscriminately killing large numbers of people with 
mass-casualty bomb attacks if their aim was to intimidate a 
specific group of people into behaving in a certain manner. 
To be effective they would have to select their physical 
targets in such a way that their psychological targets were 
frightened into compliance and were aware of the likely 
consequences if they did not comply with the wishes of the 
group* 
The strategic objectives which groups pursue through 
the use of terrorism can vary greatly, and some groups seek 
to maximise the impact of their actions by pursuing more than 
one objective. In her study of the FLN, Crenshaw identifies a 
number of psychological reactions which terrorist groups may 
seek to evoke through their acts, ranging from curiosity to 
terror. 23 When pursuing their strategic objectives, the goals 
which the terrorist group hopes to achieve go beyond the 
immediate consequences of a terrorist acts and relate 
23) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 21. 
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directly to creating the conditions where the group may 
achieve their political objectives. 
The strategic objectives which terrorists may pursue 
have been assembled into seven categories. Some of them have 
been adapted from categories used by Martha Crenshaw and 
Thomas Perry Thornton. 24 The categories are: 







They are explained below. 
Threat elimination consists simply of the elimination 
of those people, organisations, or objects which pose a 
direct threat to the members or interests of the terrorist 
organisation. This would include the killing of informers, 
effective investigators, or anybody whose actions threatened 
the group. The elimination of threats makes it much easier 
for the group to concentrate upon achieving other strategic 
objectives and ultimately its political goals. A classic 
example of threat elimination was the campaign of 
assassination which the Dublin IRA under Michael Collins 
waged against the police and military intelligence services 
in the city between 1919 and 1921, and which the IRA waged 
against informers and intelligence officers in other parts of 
Ireland. 25 Likewise, the assassination by the Mafia of the 
top two investigating magistrates in Sicily in the summer of 
24) M. Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 41-85. 
T. P. Thornton. "Terror as a Weapon of Political 
Agitation", H. Eckstein (ed). Internal War: Problems and 
Approaches, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1964). 
25) T. P. Coogan- Michael Collins: A Biography, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1990), 78,116-117,129,157-160. 
C. Townshend. The British Cam-Daign_in Ireland, 41-429 
129-130. T-Barry. Guerrilla Days in Ireland, (Dublin: 
The Irish Press, 1949; Tralee, Ireland: Anvil, 1962)9 
18-19,99-107. E-Butler. Barry's Flying Column: The 
story of the I. R. A. 's Cork No. 3 Brigade 1919-21 , (London: Leo Cooper, 1971; Tandem, 1972)9 120-122. 
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1992, led to the immediate resignation of seven other senior 
investigating magistrates on the island. However, over the 
longer term the killings galvanised the Italian authorities 
into taking more effective action against the Mafia. 26 The 
elimination of threats is a strategic objective of interest 
to all forms of terrorist group. 
Compliance occurs when the psychological targets obey 
the will of the terrorist group for fear of attacks upon the 
themselves or upon people or objects of great value to them. 
The terrorist's strategic objective is to establish control 
in the relationship between the terrorists and the 
psychological target for the purposes of furthering the 
terrorists ends. In practical terms such a strategy ensures 
that the terrorists are able to secure whatever logistic 
support they need and to protect themselves against the risk 
of informers or internal dissidence. Ideally it should also 
give the terrorists sole political leadership amongst 
possible sympathisers, and prevent effective opposition. 
A group which intends to cause disorientation aims to 
destroy the certainties of everyday life by the use, or 
threatened use, of violence. This strategic objective comes 
closest to the classical understanding of terrorism in that 
the aim is to create a constant feeling of anxiety in the 
psychological target and to destroy the psychological 
target's faith in the capacity of anyone to protect it. The 
strategic objective of disorientation can be differentiated 
from the strategic objective of compliance in that whereas 
with the latter one can obtain relief from fear by complying 
with the terrorist's demands, with the former there is no 
certain course of action which the Psychological target can 
take which will relieve the anxiety caused. The terrorist's 
aim is to cause anxiety as an end in itself in the hope that 
this will induce the desired reaction. Colonel Roger 
Trinquier, who was heavily involved in French counter- 
insurgency operations during the Algerian conflict of 1954- 
26) "Mafia strikes one more from its enemy hit-list", The Times, July 20th 1992. "Sicilians clash with police 
after being banned from funeral", The Times, July 22nd 
1992. A. Stille. Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First ltalý. Lan Republic, (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1995), 373-377. 
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1962, has outlined his understanding of the intent and effect 
of the terrorist campaign of the FLN against civilians. 
In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lives 
continually under the threat of violent death. In the 
presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has 
the depressing feeling of being an isolated and 
defenseless target. The fact that public authority and 
the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security 
adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state 
whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He 
is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists who 
alone are able to protect him. 
The intended objective, which is to calse the 
population to vacillate is thus attained. 2 
Thus, the terrorist group frightens the population at large 
and makes them more likely to act as the terrorists wish. 
The objective of such attacks may also be to intimidate 
the authorities into to acceding to the demands of the 
terrorist group by threatening to undermine the ability of 
the government to govern a fear-ridden population. For 
instance, the use of indiscriminate mass casualty car- 
bombings by powerful drug trafficking groups in Colombia was 
aimed at producing chaos in order to undermine the authority 
of the Government. The political aim there was the limited 
one of intimidating the government into agreeing not to 
extradite drug traffickers. 
28 Alternatively the aim may be to 
induce a sense of anxiety in a smaller group of people in 
order to destroy their ability to function effectively. For 
instance the campaign of assassination against the nobility 
by the People's Will in Tsarist Russia was intended in part 
to break the will of the ruling class to continue ruling. 
29 
If the group openly uses such methods it is unlikely to 
be seeking any form of support from the types of people being 
attacked. It is therefore more likely to be used against 
people the terrorists regard as enemies, or at best as 
manipulable and dispensable. Alternatively, as with the 
27) R. Trinquier. Modern Warfare: A French View of 
Counterinsurgency, (London: Pall Hall Press, 1964), 16- 
17. 
28) "Mother's Day of mourning as car bombs kill 26"l The 
Independent, May 14th 1990. S-Strong. Whitewash, 282- 
284. "Car bomb kills 18 as Maoists extend terror 
tactics to Lima"j The Times, July 18th 1992. 
29) G. Tarnovski. "Terrorism and Routine", P. Kropotkin. "The 
Spirit of Revolt", both in W-Laqueur (ed). The 
Terrorism Reader, 82,96. 
Strategy 89 
Italian fascist groups examined later in this chapter, the 
terrorists may try to conceal their identity and hope to 
benefit from the instability caused by the attacks. 
A strategic objective of attrition is one where the 
terrorists intend to erode the will of the psychological 
target, without necessarily destroying its political, 
economic, or military capability, by attacking physical 
targets on which the psychological target sets some value. 
Whilst not precluding large-scale attacks, the emphasis of 
such a strategy is upon a continual series of small-scale 
attacks over a period of time in the hope that cumulatively 
these will break the psychological target's resistance. 
For the terrorists, it is important that the physical 
targets attacked are ones upon which the psychological target 
places a fairly high value. If it does not, then the attacks 
will not have the debilitating effect desired by the 
terrorists. A classic case of this is the Provisional IRA's 
campaign to force the British Government to withdraw from 
Northern Ireland, primarily by putting pressure on two 
psychological targets - the British governing classes and the 
British public - with attacks on the British Army and upon 
civil targets in Northern Ireland and England. 30 A PIRA 
spokesman has outlined the rationale behind the attacks on 
British soldiers. 
Our aim is to create such psychological damage to the 
Brits that they'll withdraw. Sick of the exR nse, the hassle, the coffins coming back to England. 
" 
Following the bombing of the railway line at Clapham Junction 
in February 1991, and the ensuing disruption, the PIRA 
stated: 
The economic cost of disruption to daily life in Britain 
will continue to rise as long as the British government 
and its army continýl to occupy part of Ireland's 
national territory. 
30) M. McGuire. To Take Arms, 69. L. Clarke. Broadening the 
Battlefield, 40-42,56-57. T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 579, 
604,693. K. J. Kelley. The Longest War, 202-203,210, 
265. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 2509 
332. B. O'Brien. The Long War, 23,152. G. McKee & 
R. Franey. Time Bomb$ 18-19,308,330. 
31) T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 604. 
32) "British pay price as IRA strikes", AP/RN, February 14th 
1991. 
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Again, after the assassination of Ian Gow MP in July 1990 a 
PIRA representative said: 
The war which Britain wages in Ireland has inflicted a 
very heavy price on all sections of our people. ... The 
IRA have quite forcibly told the British, the British 
Establishment, those who legislate for the war in 
Ireland, that they too will have to pay a price. 
It's our intention, and we have the means, to 
continue to exact that price from the British 
Establishment. We will increasingly bring the war to the 
attention of the British public, and to the doorsteps of 
those who sustain the conflict. And their lifestyles will 
not stan 93 the strain that our lifestyles do for we have 
nothing. 
Thus the Provisionals' attacks have been intended to induce a 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland by the attritional 
effect of their attacks upon the endurance of two 
psychological targets - the British governing classes, and 
the British public. 
Provocation occurs where the terrorist group carry out 
actions in the hope of making the psychological target - in 
this case the enemy - act in a way which will alienate those 
people who were previously uncommitted or possibly even 
unsympathetic towards the terrorists, as well as people who 
sympathise with them. For insurgent groups the aim is often 
to provoke repressive security measures by the authorities in 
order to make them unpopular and to increase the popularity 
of the insurgents. This idea was popular in the 1960s amongst 
communist Latin American insurgents in the 1960s such as Che 
Guevara and Carlos Marighela. 34 The premise behind such 
actions is that the authorities, once provoked, will act in a 
heavy-handed or brutal fashion, unintentionally goading the 
public into furthering the objectives of the'terrorist group 
through non-cooperation with the authorities or even direct 
support for the terrorists. 
For example, in Northern Ireland in May 19929 a spate 
of incidents occurred around the town of Coalisland, county 
Tyrone. British soldiers appear to have entered bars and 
33) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The 
Independentl September 29th 1990. 
34) C. Guevara. "Guerrilla Warfare -A Method", W. Laqueur 
(ed). The Guerrilla Reader, 203-204. C. Marighela. 
"Problems and Principles of Strategy", and "The 
Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare"q For the 
Liberation of Brazil, trans. J. Butt & R. Sheed, 
(Harmondsworthq England: Penguin, 1971), 46,95. 
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assaulted civilians, in one case after a colleague had his 
legs blown off by a bomb. Accounts of the incidents and 
photographs of soldiers attacking civilians appeared in a 
national newspaper, providing a propaganda opportunity which 
the republican press exploited to the full. 35 
Conversely, fascist groups have carried out actions in 
the hope that they will be blamed on anti-state groupsl and 
provoke a security clampdown on the supposed subversives. A 
document concerning thb 'strategy of tension' in Italy in the 
1960s and 1970s - where mass casualty bomb attacks were 
intended to cause an atmosphere of political crisis and lead 
to a call for an authoritarian government - makes it clear 
that these actions were to be carried out in such a way as to 
implicate 'communist and pro-Chinese' organisations. 36 
It is important for terrorists seeking to provoke a 
response to determine who they wish to provoke into a 
reaction, what type of reaction they wantq and how to provoke 
that reaction. This is difficult to gauge and groups should 
be careful. The Tupamaros in Uruguay in the early 1970s 
provoked the military into overthrowing the democratic 
government - which they did want, and crushing the Tupamaros 
with utter ruthlessness - which they did not. 
37 
A strategic objective of advertisement is intended to 
make people aware of the existence of the terrorists and 
their cause. Such operations are primarily designed to gain 
publicity for the group, or possibly to lift the spirits of 
those people in whose interests the terrorists may believe 
themselves to be acting. In practice most overt terrorist 
35) "Paratroops accused of pub attacks"i The*Independent, May 
15th 1992. "Ulster Para officer suspended after claims 
of violencep The Times, May 15th 1992. "Ulster 
brigadier 'insensitive to human rights"', The 
Independentl May 26th 1992. "Send them home"s 
Coalisland exposes British army terror"i both in AP/RN, 
May 21st 1992. "Army involved in new harassment dispute 
in Ulster"$ The independent, May 27th 1992. "Picture 
backs claims of rifle butt assault", The Independent, 
May 30th 1992. "British army chief removed but paras 
remain"q "Anglian Regiment thuggery in Derry", both in 
AP/RN, May 28th 1992. "Six Paras face clashes charges", 
The Times, September 29th 1992. 
36) S. Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaiej 32. P. Willan. Puppet 
Masters, 23. 
37) F. Lopez-Alves. "Political Crises, Strategic Choices and 
Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan 
Tupamaros"i 2269 232. 
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activities advertise the terrorist group and their cause just 
by happening, but some groups carry out operations whose 
primary aim is the maximisation of publicity. A prime case of 
this was the spate of high-profile operations by Palestinian 
groups in the early 1970s, including a number of aircraft 
hijackings and the PLO kidnapping and subsequent killing of 
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. As Khalil 
Foutah, of the Palestine Affairs Center noted in 1990: 
In the 70s when we started hijacking planes, I mean the 
Palestinian movement, well they were trying to publicize 
the cause and were asking the media to come and cover the 
cause. What they did in Munich, for example, they did it 
for the newspapers, probably because during that time, 
before 1982, there was only one side of the story 
presented. Nobody mentioned us. 
38 
Jenkins has noted with regard to Palestinian terrorism in the 
1970s: 
Without endorsing terrorism, one must wonder what success 
they could have won had they operated within the 
established bounds of conventional warfare and polite 
diplomacy. 39 
By carrying out such operations, some Palestinian groups felt 
that they finally gained recognition of their existence, if 
not initially of their cause. 
Attacks aimed at gaining endorsement are those which 
are calculated to mobilise support for the group concerned. 
In such cases the terrorists carry out actions which they 
hope will receive the approval of their supporters and 
possibly that of people who are merely curious or who are 
totally uninvolved or uninterested in the terrorists' cause. 
For instance, the PFLP leader George Habash noted the 
motivating effect which such actions had on those who 
favoured the Palestinian cause when the PFLP hijacked three 
aircraft in September 1970 in order to secure the release of 
Palestinian prisoners in West Germany, Switzerland, and 
Britain. 
The struggle is far from being a purely military one; it 
is psychological too, and we have to raise the morale of 
the masses while at the same time harassing the 
Israelis. 40 
38) C. L. Irvin. "Terrorists' Perspectives: Interviews", 78. 
39) B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of 
Warfare, 6. 
40) G. Chaliand. The Palestinian Resistance, 167. 
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Thus, in addition to the concrete gains of obtaining the 
prisoners release, the hijackings were also aimed at gaining 
the support of the Palestinian people for the PFLP and the 
Palestinian cause in general. Furthermore, it advertised the 
Palestinian cause to the wider world, demonstrating how a 
single operation can contribute to the achievement of more 
than one strategic objective. Another example of this has 
been the attacks on unpopular people by the Shining Path -a 
Peruvian communist group examined below in greater depth - 
which have been carried out at least partially in order to 
gain popular support for the group. 41 
In other cases the terrorists may seek to gain support 
at the expense of other groups espousing a similar ideology. 
Kramer refers to this when he refers to the 'imitative 
rivalry' which existed between two Lebanese Islamic groups - 
Hizbollah and Amal - in the mid 1980s. Although open conflict 
later broke out between the two, for a period of about five 
years the rivalry was expressed in several ideological forms, 
one of which manifested itself in the form of each attempting 
to outdo the other in the amount of damage inflicted upon the 
Israelis in southern Lebanon and the Western presence in 
Beirut. 42 A similar rivalry appears to have existed between 
the Red Brigades and Front Line in the late 1970s, 
particularly in Milan where Moss notes that Front Line 
attacks had a greater tendency to be aimed at human targets 
than in Florence where there was less competition from BR. 43 
Terrorist groups can pursue a number of these strategic 
objectives simultaneously as part of their overall campaign 
if they have sufficient resources. In Revolutionary Terrorism 
Crenshaw demonstrates how the FLN did this during their 
rebellion against the French in Algeria by, for instance, 
carrying out mass-casualty bomb attacks against the European 
population of Algeria with the aim of disorientating and 
scaring them on the one hand and the assassination of 
41) R. H. Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in 
Andahuaylas", D. S. Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, 
(London: Hurst & Co, 1992), 93. T. D. Mason & 
J. Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero 
Luminoso in Peru", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, 
no. 4, (October 1989), 531. 
42) M. Kramer. "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", 
35. 
43) D. Moss. 1he Politics of-Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 73. 
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dissident Algerians with the aim of ensuring overall 
compliance amongst Algerians on the other. 
44 
Similarly, when examining the strategy of the 
Provisional IRA as detailed in their training manual, one can 
see that their aim has been to achieve a number of the 
strategic objectives outlined in this chapter. 
45 In this case 
the strategic objectives involved are placed in brackets 
after the goal outlined by the PIRA. 
A war of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed 
at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so 
as to create a demand from their people at home for 
their withdrawal. (Attrition and Advertisement. ) 
2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's financial 
investment in our country unprofitable while at the 
same time curbing long term financial investment in our 
country. (Attrition and Advertisement. ) 
3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past 
several years ungovernable except by colonial military 
rule. (Disorientation and Provocation. ) 
4. To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by 
National and International propaganda and publicity 
campaigns. (Endorsement and Advertisement. ) 
5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, 
collaborators and informers. (Endorsement, Compliance, 
and Threat Elimination. ) 
Arguably the Provisionals have also attempted to achieve 
disorientation amongst the Protestant population of Northern 
Ireland and the public in England through their use of bombs 
in public areas, although they deny that this is done 
deliberately. 46 The extent to which one aspect of their 
strategy - the killing of British soldiers fulfils a number 
44) M. Crenshaw. Revolutionary Terrorism, xvi 36,399 44-469 
579 41-85. 
45) T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 693. B. O'Brien. The Long War, 23. 
46) "11 die in Cenotaph blast"q The Ind_ependent, November 9th 
1987. "Attacks fits into a pattern of errors", The 
Independentl April 13th 1989. "Bombings indicate new 
direction in mainland campaign", The Times, February 
19th 1992. "Damage in huge blast put at E20m", The 
Independent, September 25th 1992. "'Troubles' 
chronology: Wed Sep 23"s Fortnight, no 311, (November 
1992), 34. "IRA bombers kill child, 4", The Independent 
on Sunday, March 21st 1993. "Tim Parry, victim of IRA 
bomb blast dies after ventilator is switched off", The 
Independents March 26th 1993. D. McKittrick. Despatches 
from Belfast, 146-151. "Brits put civilian lives at 
risk", AP/RNj January 30th 1992. "We are doing all in 
our power to shorten this war", AP/RN, March 12th 1992. 
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of strategic objectives, can be outlined using the model 
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In practice, within the overall compass of their long war 
strategy, the Provisionals have pursued a number of strategic 
objectives simultaneously, whilst at times putting more 
emphasis on one aspect than on others. 
Each terrorist campaign is unique and the categories 
discussed above merely represent an attempt to bring some 
sort of system to their activities. Terrorist planners, or 
the people who execute terrorist operations, do not think in 
terms of neat strategic categories, but in relation to the 
differing concrete circumstances which they face. As well as 
the differences between the strategies of different terrorist 
groups, one can also find that the strategies of a single 
terrorist group can change over time, and this inevitably 
affects target selection. In order to understand how 
strategic considerations may affect a terrorist group's 
selection of targets it may be useful to consider the 
development of a specific group's strategy in its entirety, 
see how this has varied over time, and try to determine what 
factors have influenced it. 
Case Study: The Red Army Faction in West Germany. 
In some respects the RAF is atypical in that it has 
lasted for a very long time - about twenty-five years - 
compared to other European communist groups, and the attacks 
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KEY: Pol=Political. Off=Official- CJS=Criminal Justice System 
(police, judiciary, lawyers, penal system and 
associated premises - includes prison escapes), 
Bus=Business, NATO=Military personnel or installations 
belonging to members of the NATO alliance (Mainly 
American but includes attacks on German and Canadian 
personnel or installations). Rob=Robberies carried out 
(for money, weapons, or official documents). 
Other=attacks on other targets (includes those attacks 
where nature of target is not described in sources). 
SOURCE: B. A. Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", 
(Unpublished manuscript, 1992). D. Pluchinsky. "An 
organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's 
Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972-1991)", 57-86. 
(Pluchinsky covers 1972-1991. ) 
a 30+ bombings of unspecified targets after suicide of Ulrike 
Meinhof in May 1976. 
b Several bombings after suicides of Andreas Baader, Gudrun 
Enssling and Jan-Carl Raspe in October 1977. 
c Unspecified number of bombings after death of Sigurd Debus 
on hunger strike in April 1981. 
d Twenty-three incendiary attacks and fifteen bombings 
against various targets (half against NATO, others 
unnattributed) during RAF hunger strike of December 4th 
1984 to February 2nd 1985. 
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degree of precision and with relatively few mistakes. 
However, this very precision makes the group suitable for 
analysis concerning target selection because, unlike other 
groups, there is less chance of mistakenly counting 
accidental victims of terrorist attacks as the intended 
victims. It is therefore possible to extrapolate from the 
group's recorded activities those influences which may 
affected the strategy of terrorist groups. 
The changes in the strategy of the RAF can, to a 
degree, be seen in Table 4.1 which shows the types of targets 
attacked by the group and its original founders between April 
1968 and April 1991. This table shows those planned actions 
which have definitely been attributed to the RAF by Scharlau 
or Pluchinsky. It is possible that a number of relatively 
minor events have not been included. Incidents where a number 
of people have died have been classified as one attack, being 
attributed to the primary target. An example of this is the 
kidnapping of employers leader Hans-Martin Schleyer where his 
bodyguards and driver were killed during the abduction. In 
this case Schleyer, (a business target) is counted as the 
target of the attack rather than the bodyguards (a criminal 
justice system target) whose deaths were - for the terrorists 
-a secondary consideration. 
To comprehend the strategy of the Red Army Faction one 
must understand the ideology which formed their political 
objectives. The RAF saw themselves as the vanguard of a wider 
framework of anti-imperialist communist groups. Founded 
during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, they believed 
that the demonstrative effect of their attacks against 
imperialism in the heartland of the capitalist West - as 
represented by the personnel and installations of the US 
armed forces in Germany - would act as an inspiration to 
groups elsewhere and hence encourage worldwide revolution and 
the overthrow of capitalism. 47 This involved RAF opposition 
to the institutions of the capitalist West German state, but 
the group was not primarily interested in the overthrow of 
the West German Government and seizure of power there. 48 
47) M. Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 100. J. Becker. Hitler's 
Children, 264. 
48) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing lerrorism in the Federal-Republic 
of Germany, 33,83. H. Horchem. "The Lost Revolution of 
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Their primary strategic objective was to advertise their 
cause - in particular those matters about which they felt 
strongly - and to mobilise the support for worldwide 
revolution amongst potential sympathisers within West Germany 
and elsewhere. In this respect they were very different to 
the more insular Red Brigades in Italy, and failed to form a 
cooperative working arrangement with them, although they did 
manage to establish an understanding with one of the factions 
which emerged when the'BR splintered in the early 1980s. 
49 
In addition to ideological considerations, an important 
constraint upon the RAF was that their relatively small 
manpower limited the number of operations which they could 
carry out. Thus, to gain widespread attention they had to 
ensure that a high proportion of their attacks were 
spectacular. The relatively limited scope of what they deemed 
to be legitimate targets ruled out the easier option of 
gaining attention by causing mass casualtiesq so instead they 
generally attacked prominent targets with a high symbolic 
value. 
A point to note is that the RAF received some aid in 
terms of refuge, training, and possibly equipment, from 
outside groups. These were Palestinian separatist groups in 
the early 1970s and the East German intelligence agencies. 
The East German intelligence agencies seem to have stepped up 
their support for the group in the early 1980s and may have 
had some input into discussions regarding strategy as well as 
providing them with the material wherewithal to launch 
attacks using relatively sophisticated equipment. 50 This 
might have influenced strategy and target selection at that 
time. 
West Germany's Terrorists", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 1, no. 3, (July 1989), 354. 
49) Red Brigades & Red Army Faction. "Excerpts from Notes of 
a Meeting between the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction 
in January 1988"1 222,226. Red Brigades/Fighting 
Communist Party & Red Army Faction. "Joint Communique: 
PCC with Red Army Faction, dated September 1988", Both 
in Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red 
Terrorists. 
50) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 32,44l 58-59. S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof 
Group, 89-99,118. J. Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 66- 
67. H. Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 2, (Summer 
1991), 64. 
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Pluchinsky notes that from the early 1980s RAF 
operations could be divided between the more complex attacks 
carried out by the fifteen to twenty-five full-time 
terrorists at the top or 'commando' level of the group, and 
easier operations carried out by the second-rank 'Illegal 
Militants' or 'Resistance' level RAF members. He states that 
a pattern evolved whereby a commando-level group would attack 
a high-profile target and release a communique which set out 
current ideological thinking, and that resistance-level 
terrorists would follow this prompt with a cluster of attacks 
against lower-profile material targets of a related nature. 51 
Thus, the assassination in July 1986 of a board member of a 
major West German company with links to the arms trade, was 
followed by a series of bomb attacks on companies or 
buildings associated with NATO or the armaments industry. 52 
Such a cluster of attacks, labelled an 'offensive' by the 
RAF, would then peter out until the next 'offensive'. 
A constant feature of the RAF strategy was the attacks 
aimed at the US presence in Germany. Whilst the terrorist's 
protest was primarily against the alleged iniquities of 
imperialist military activities in the Third World rather 
than the American presence in Germany as such, the German- 
based US forces provided a readily available and, to the 
terrorists, appropriate symbol of the American-centred 
imperialist system. Thus, most of these RAF attacks were 
against US military facilities rather than other symbolic 
American targets. 
The first operation where the RAF deliberately caused a 
pre-planned fatality - as opposed to killing. police officers 
whilst resisting arrest - occurred in March 1972 when a bomb 
killed an American Colonel and wounded thirteen other people 
at Fifth US Army Corps HQ near Frankfurt. A communique 
condemned "US imperialists" for bombing North Vietnam and 
stated: 
West Germany and West Berlin are no longer a safe 
hinterland for the extermination strategy in Vietnam. 
there will no longer be any place in the world where týeeý 
51) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group "l 49. 
52) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
11 
Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group 68-691 
84-85. 
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can be 5 gafe 
from attacks by the revolutionary guerrilla 
units. 
In May 1972 another bomb killed three US soldiers, this time 
at the HQ of the US Army Europe in Heidelberg. The communique 
which followed also alluded to the American presence in 
Vietnam. 54 
Following the suicide of the RAF's founding first 
generation of leaders in 1976 and 1977, the pattern of anti- 
American attacks was continued by a second generation of 
leaders. The initial attacks included two attempts to kill 
senior US generals (Haig in 1979, Kroezen in 1981), and there 
were also attacks on US military installations and other NATO 
facilities in West Germany. Later, during the ninth RAF 
hunger-strike in the prisons between December 4th 1984 and 
February 2nd 1985, the second-rank Resistance level of the 
RAF carried out thirty-eight bombings and incendiary attacks, 
half of which were directed against NATO facilities. 55 The 
most lethal anti-NATO/US attack in the 1980s took place on 
August 7th and 8th 1985 when an RAF commando-level unit 
killed a US serviceman to obtain his identity documents, and 
used them to gain access to the US air-base at Rhein-Main, 
where they left a car-bomb which killed two people and 
injured about twenty. 56 The RAF justified the attack - in the 
face of criticism from supporters of an ordinary US 
serviceman - by claiming that the air base was a centre for 
the organisation of US-inspired wars in the Third World, and 
that the serviceman concerned had chosen to join the American 
armed services. 57 More recently a non-military American 
53) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 57. 
B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 298. 
54) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 299. D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and 
Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction 
Terrorist Group "l 59. 
55) H. Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 66. 
56) B. A. Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", (Unpublished 
manuscript, 1992). B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in 
the Federal Republic of German , 305. D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's 
Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 67-68. 
57) B. A. Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events". B. A. Scharlau. 
Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 305. D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist 
Group", 67-68. 
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target was attacked in February 1991 when an RAF group 
strafed the US Embassy in Bonn with gunfire. This occurred 
during the Second Gulf War where US forces were taking the 
prominent role in the war against Iraq, and the subsequent 
communique accused the USA of "... taking the lead in the war 
of extermination against the Iraqi people". 
58 
Whilst a constant series of anti-American attacks can 
be seen in Table 4.1 other aspects of the RAF's campaign have 
lasted for shorter periods. In the initial phase of the 
campaign in 1970-1971, when the group was led by the founder 
members, the RAF devoted much of their activity to carrying 
out robberies. These included bank robberies intended to 
obtain money, break-ins at two town halls in order to obtain 
blank official documents and official stamps, and the theft 
of weapons from a US Army base. This is an understandable 
feature in the setting up of a terrorist group which - at 
this stage - had little outside support and few resources of 
their own. Horchem refers to the period 1970 to 1972 as the 
RAF's 'logistic build-up'. 59 A slight resurgence of such 
activities can be seen in three robberies during the period 
1982 to 1984, presumably to make up for the weapons, 
documents, and money seized in the police raids which 
followed the arrest of the 'second generation' leadership. 60 
In addition to seeking to obtain material resources, 
the RAF also tried to free imprisoned comrades following the 
capture of many of the founder members of the group. This was 
a reflection upon the effectiveness of the sophisticated 
internal security apparatus which the Federal German 
Government put into place during the 1970s and maintained 
thereafter. 61 However it also represented a partial shift 
58) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group "s 76. 
B. A. Scharlau.. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 308. 
59) H. J. Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, (London: 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1986)9 15. 
60) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group 11,48. 
61) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 198-225. H. J. Horchem. -Terrorism in West 
Germany, 15-17. For a highly critical account of the 
development of internal security measures in West 
Germany see S. Cobler. Law. Order and Politics in West 
Germanyt (Harmondsworths England: Penguin, 1978). 
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from the original strategic objectives of the group, to an 
attempt to satisfy the logistical and emotional requirements 
of the group by freeing their colleagues. 
The heavy targeting of criminal justice personnel 
between 1972 and 1977 - relative to the small total number of 
RAF actions - is indicative of the pressure to free the 
prisoners which the RAF wished to place upon the judicial and 
legal system. Other operations whose objective was to secure 
the release of prisoners included an embassy siege 
(Stockholm, April 1975), the assassination of the Federal 
Prosecutor General (Siegfried Bubackl April 1977), and two 
abductions (the banker Juergen Ponto - killed during the 
attempt in July 1977; the industrialist and employers' leader 
Hans-Martin Schleyer - abducted in September 1977 and killed 
the following month). In the case of the abductions the RAF 
emulated the successful example of the June 2nd Movement in 
West Berlin. In February 1975 the B2J had secured the release 
of imprisoned comrades, the payment of a ransom, and a great 
deal of publicity, when they kidnapped Peter Lorenz, the 
Christian Democrat candidate in the West Berlin mayoral 
elections. 
62 
After the failure to obtain the release of the 
imprisoned RAF leaders, and the suicides in prison of Meinhof 
in 1976 and Baader, Ensslin and Raspe in 1977, attacks aimed 
at obtaining the release of prisoners abated. 63 Nevertheless, 
concern with the prison issue did not disappear. Both 
Pluchinsky and Scharlau note that RAF communiques following 
attacks often complained about the conditions in which 
prisoners were held, and a high proportion of attacks 
occurred during or soon after the frequent hunger strikes by 
imprisoned RAF members. In March 1993 the RAF blew up a 
prison being constructed near Darmstadt to demonstrate their 
concern regarding prison conditions. 
64 Scharlau also notes 
that for the RAF the hunger strikes performed the function of 
62) S. Aust. 
, 
The Baader-Meinhof Group, 286-288,435. P. Taylor. 
States of Terror, 74-75. A. P. Schmid. & J. de Graaf. 
Violence as Communication: Tnsurgent Terrorism and the 
Western News--Media, (London: Sage, 1982), 48-49. 
63) H. Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 65. 
64) P. Taylor. States of Terror, 189. J-Schmeidel. "My Enemy's 
Enemy", 69 n. 2. 
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politicising and mobilising sympathisers to the point that 
some joined the group. 
65 
Logistical factors like gaining funds or the release of 
prisoners were not the only considerations which led to some 
aspects of RAF strategy being emphasised more than others. 
Ideological imperatives also led to changes in strategy as 
reflected by the types of target attacked. In the mid 1980s 
the RAF attempted to form, and lead, an alliance of western 
European communist terrorist groups. This was in line with 
their belief that the capitalist powers were seeking to 
create a strong western Europe as an economic and military 
pillar of the imperialist world order. RAF communiques from 
the mid 1980s onwards often sought to portray their 
operations as attacks upon European capitalism and contained 
frequent calls to other groups to act together against 
western European capitalism and imperialism. 
66 They appear to 
have reached a working arrangement with the French communist 
terrorist group Direct Action (AD - Action Directe) and - 
concerning theoretical matters at least - with the BR/PCC in 
67 Italy to operate as a 'West European guerrilla's 
This 'West European guerilla' strategy was combined 
with an RAF campaign of attacks against what it termed the 
'Military-Industrial Complex' (MIC), an interdependent and 
overlapping series of political, official, military, and 
business institutions with links to the military, to NATO, or 
to the nuclear industry. According to the RAF: 
The military-industrial complex (MIC) is of decisive 
importance in the following areas which are central to 
65) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 50-51, 
54. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 61-62,93-999 101. 
66) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 49-501 
74,75. H. Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army 
Faction", 69-70. 
67) Red Army Faction & Direct Action. "RAF and Direct Action 
communique of January 1985 entitled 'For the unity of 
West European revolutionaries"i Red Brigades/Fighting 
Communist Party & Red Army Faction. "Joint Communique: 
PCC with Red Army Faction, dated September 1988". Both 
in Y. Alexander & D-Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red 
Terrorists. 
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capitalist reconstruction: research and production o new 
technologies, electronics, and weapons war economy. 66 
Whilst this reflected the ideological preoccupations of the 
RAF, in view of East German support for the RAF it should be 
noted that this interpretation also accorded with the Warsaw 
Pact aim of destabilising support for NATO and frustrating 
the build-up of American nuclear weapons in western Europe. 
In addition to attacks on military facilities, the RAF 
also attacked companies and individuals within companies or 
government service whom the RAF deemed to be part of the MIC. 
This can be seen in the series of attacks on business targets 
from the mid 1980s onwards. For example, on February 1st 1985 
two RAF members shot Ernst Zimmerman, the chairman of the 
Federal Association of the German Aeronautics, Space, and 
Armaments Industry and also chairman of the Munich Motor 
Turbine Union (MTU) -a company which made parts for tanks. 
69 
The subsequent communique outlined the thinking behind their 
MIC strategy and explained why Zimmerman was killed: 
[The Federal Association of which Zimmerman was chairman] 
had the function to push through the interests of the MIC 
here in this statel on the Western European level, and 
thus on the international level. By attacking the pillars 
of imperialist power in the FRG [Federal Republic of 
Germany]/Western Europe, we take a hand in the mounting 
crisis and determine its course and its solution for the 
offensive war of the liberation. " 
A week earlier a French communist group, Direct Action, had 
assassinated General Rene Audran - Director of the 
International Affairs section of the French Ministry of 
Defence, and responsible for French arms sales abroad, 
contract negotiations, and international arms cooperation. AD 
saw him as representing the growth of Franco-German political 
and military cooperation. Symbolically the AD communique was 
in French and German and Horchem believes that the Audran and 
Zimmerman attacks were coordinated. 71 If so this is an 
68) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 66. 
69) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 66. 
B. A. Scharlau. 
, 
Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 97. 
70) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 66. 
71) Direct Action. "Communique on the assassination of 
General Rene Audrans Director of International Affairs 
at the French Ministry of Defence in Paris on 25 
N 
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example of the way in which objectives connected to different 
strands of the RAF strategy could be fulfilled by a single 
attack. As well as an attack on the military-industrial 
complex, the Zimmerman and Audran attacks represented the 
practical working of the 'Western European guerrilla' 
approach. Both aspects of the attacks were highlighted in the 
relevant communiques where the RAF and AD highlighted their 
view of the role of the military-industrial complex, and 
advertised the existence of the Western European Guerrilla. 
Subsequently, in July 1986, the RAF assassinated Karl- 
Heinz Beckurts,. a company director of Siemens and chairman of 
an industrial working group on nuclear energy. Their 
communique claimed that Beckurts and the companies he worked 
for represented: 
0*0 the concentrated power and aggression of the most 
reactionary factions of the b urgeoisie organized by the 
military-industrial complex. f 
Attacks against material targets from the middle 1980s were 
also often against business targets which the RAF deemed to 
be connected to the MIC. For instance, on July 24th 1986 an 
RAF unit bombed a laser research institute, wrongly thinking 
that it was involved in research concerning the American 
anti-intercontinental missile laser-defence system, called 
the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and unofficially known 
as 'Star Wars'. The following day another RAF group bombed 
the premises of Dornier Aerospace. In mid-September 1986 an 
RAF bomb exploded in a Munich office building housing the 
offices of Panavia Aircraft and a number of NATO-related 
agencies. 73 
Not all of the attacks against the concept of a 
powerful western Europe were directed against business 
January 1985", Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). 
Europe's Red Terrorists. M. Dartnell. "France's Action 
Directe: Terrorists in Search of a Revolution It 9 Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no. 4, (Winter 
1990), 472-473. H. Horcheme "The Decline of the Red Army 
Faction", 68. 
72) D. Pluchinsky. "An organizational and Operational,, Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group , 69. 73) B. A. Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", (Unpublished 
manuscript, 1992). B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, 306. D. Pluchinsky. "An 
Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's 
Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 84-85. 
Strategy 106 
targets. In October 1986 an RAF commando-level unit shot dead 
Gerold von Braunmuehl, the head of the political unit at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In their communique the RAF 
deemed the victim: 
* one of the central figures in the formation of ýestern 
Europe's policies in the imperialist system as a 
whole. 74 
The communique accused NATO and various European institutions 
of implementing the "strategic, political, economic, and 
military plans and projects of the imperialistic bourgeoisie 
of Western Europe". 
75 Thus, whilst the overall objective of 
the RAF remained constant - the overthrow of the system of 
imperialism and world capitalism, the emphasis placed on 
attacking different aspects of that system varied over time. 
In the final stage of the RAF's existence, before its 
seeming dissolution in the early 1990s, the group struck at 
people and institutions which it saw as representing the rise 
of a more powerful united Germany as part of a powerful, 
imperialist, western Europe. The killing in April 1991 of 
Detlev Rohwedder, the head of the agency responsible for 
privatising state industries in the former East Germany, was 
the most graphic illustration of this aspect of the RAF's 
campaign. 76 First the RAF made the ritualistic denouncement 
of Rohwedder as having been involved in the export of arms 
and uranium, and of ruthless management practices at the 
chemical giant Hoechst. The communique proceeded to accuse 
him of carrying out the German Government's desire to destroy 
the security provided for ordinary people by the existing 
economic and social structure in East Germany in order to 
make it suitable for domination by the capitalist system. 77 
The communique went on to condemn plans for a nationalistic 
'Greater Germany', to condemn the soulless materialism which 
the RAF believed was being forced upon the people of the 
74) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
if 
Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group , 70. 75) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 70. 
76) "East German reform hit by murder of privatisation 
chief", The Times, April 3rd 1991. 
77) Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of 
Detlev Rohwedderj President of Treuhandanstalt, in 
Dusseldorf on 1 April 199111, Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky 
(eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 81-82. 
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former East Germany, and to oppose the imperialist domination 
of the Third World. The communique summed up much of the RAF 
philosophy when it concluded: 
ACHIEVE THE CONDITIONS FOR HUMANE AND SELF-DETERMINED 
LIFE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REACTIONARY GREATER 
GERMAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN PLANS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF 
PEOPLE HERE AND IN THE THIRD WORLD. 
Red Army Fact 1? 9 
4 April 1991 
This statement reaffirmed the RAF's anti-imperialism, its 
opposition to capitalism at home and abroad, and the 
importance placed on revolutionary struggles in the Third 
World. 
With the fall of communism in central and eastern 
Europe in 1989, and the reunification of Germany in 1990, the 
RAF were hamstrung by the fact that these areas were no 
longer available as a safe haven. In April 1992, in the wake 
of conciliatory comments from the German Interior Minister, 
Klaus Kinkel, an RAF communique offered to end the 
campaign. 79 They conceded that their campaign of 
assassination had exacerbated the situation which the RAF 
sought to oppose, and had failed to mobilise widespread 
support. However, they demanded the release of RAF prisoners 
in ill-health or who had been imprisoned for long periods, 
and that remaining RAF prisoners should be held together 
until their release. Sine then an RAF bomb demolished a 
prison being constructed near Darmstadt in March 1993, whilst 
in July 1993 an RAF member and a member of the GSG9 anti- 
terrorist squad were killed in a shoot-out at Bad Kleinen in 
north-eastern Germany. 
80 The RAF appears to have become 
dormant - at least for the time being. 
78) Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of 
Detlev Rohwedder", 84. 
79) B. A. Scharlau & D. Philips. "Not the End of German Left- 
Wing Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, 
no. 3, (Autumn 1992), 110-115. Red Army Faction. 
"Communique, dated 10 April 1992, offering to Suspend 
the RAF's terrorist Campaign against the German State"t 
Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red 
Terrorists, 85-89. 
80) "Shooting mystery tarnishes German anti-terrorist squad"$ 
The Independents July 6th 1993. "Elite squad faces the 
axe", The European, July 8th-11th 1993. "Bonn 'errors' 
in shoot-out", The Independent, August 19th 1993. 
P. Taylor. States of Terror, 189. J. Schmeidel. "My 
Enemy's Enemy", 69 n. 2. 
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A few points can be made about the RAF's strategy and 
the way in which this affected target selection. The most 
important point to note is that the RAF's leaders saw their 
role as to highlight the iniquities of the capitalist and 
imperialist system by the use of violence so as to stimulate 
potential revolutionaries around the world. At the same time 
they often sought to highlight specific issues - for 
instance, the Vietnam War, the treatment of RAF prisoners, or 
poverty in the Third WQrld - as a part of their overall 
campaign. In order to do this they had to gain attention by 
selecting high-profile targets for attack. Relatively few of 
their pre-planned attacks aimed at threat elimination. They 
only eliminated immediate threats such as police officers who 
were about to capture the terrorists. Likewise, none of their 
attacks were aimed at enforcing the compliance of the public 
to the RAF's demands, or even of specific parts of the 
publicl with the exception of robberies and operations 
intended to put pressure upon the authorities to release RAF 
prisoners. The strategic objectives of the RAF were to 
advertise their cause and to gain the endorsement of 
revolutionaries elsewhere with a view to increasing support 
and gaining recruits. 
In order to achieve these goals it made sense to attack 
high-profile human targetsl even though these were often more 
heavily protected than other targets. Of the thirteen men 
against whom the RAF carried out pre-planned attacks, six 
were protected by bodyguards. 81 As will be seen later, this 
pattern of target selection has not been the case with other 
groups, where there is generally a discernible shift over 
time towards attacking softer targets. With the RAF however, 
it seems likely that because their relatively small manpower 
limited the number of operations which the group could carry 
out, they had to ensure that a high proportion of these 
attacks were spectacular enough to gain widespread attention. 
The relatively limited scope of what they deemed to be 
legitimate targets ruled out the easier options of gaining 
publicity by carrying out mass casualty attacks against 
civilian targets, so instead they attacked high-profile 
81) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group 11,55. 
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targets with a high symbolic value I which included ordinary 
members of the US military. 
Even though their manpower was limited, their record in 
attacking heavily protected human targets shows that they had 
both the weaponry and the technical expertise to carry out 
such operations successfully. This may have been attributable 
to a degree to the help which they received from Palestinian 
terrorists and from East German agencies. Pluchinsky seems to 
consider that the RAF has not been particularly successful 
with eleven out of twenty-four operations being considered 
tactical or operational failures (that is either the 
operation failed in its immediate objective - such as killing 
a specific person, or in its longer-term objective - such as 
trading a hostage for imprisoned comrades). 82 Suffice to say 
that if a similar percentage of PIRA operations had been 
successful they would have decimated the security forces in 
Northern Ireland. 
There were relatively few attacks upon law enforcement 
personnel. As mentioned, the RAF did not attack ordinary 
police officers as a matter of policy. They did, however, 
carry out attacks against high-profile law enforcement 
targets. For example in August 1975 the group set up a 
multiple rocket-launcher opposite the Federal Prosecutor's 
office in Karlsruhe - though this did not go off, and in July 
1990 detonated a car bomb in an attempt to kill the State 
Secretary with responsibility for internal security at the 
Ministry of the Interior. 83 However these were both highly 
symbolic targets. It is curious that the RAF did not 
seriously target police investigators or intelligence 
personnel, given the threat posed by the security apparatus) 
but it seems likely that the group did not view them as a 
threat which needed to be eliminated. Also, they might have 
82) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational,, Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group , 55-56. In this article Pluchinsky states a 45% success rates 
but as he considers eleven out of twenty-four 
operations were tactical or operational failures 
(roughly 45%)l it would seem that the remaining 
thirteen (roughly 55%) were successes. 
83) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 61-62, 
74-75. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Winjý! Terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 302,308. 
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seen attacks on the police as a diversion of scarce manpower 
resources which could be better used against targets where 
the results would be more beneficial to their cause. 
In sum, the overall strategy of the RAF was geared to 
obtaining as much publicity as possible for both their 
overall cause - worldwide communism and anti-imperialism$ and 
to highlight specific issues. In doing this they had to make 
effective use of their slender manpower and rather more ample 
weaponry and technical-expertise. This resulted in a campaign 
with a high proportion of tactically difficult attacks on 
high-profile human targets together with a greater number of 
attacks on softer material targets. However, whilst the RAF's 
campaign was successful in advertising the issues with which 
the RAF was concerned, it was unsuccessful in gaining the 
endorsement of many people either within or outside Germany. 
Overall the terrorist campaign was - as the RAF admitted in 
their last communique - unsuccessful in terms of achieving 
their political objectives. 84 Given the breadth of the RAF's 
political objective - the overthrow of capitalism around the 
world - it could be argued that no strategy would have 
succeeded, but it is true to say that even as a means of 
mobilising support for the cause, the RAF's strategy was 
remarkably unsuccessful. 
Whilst an examination of the RAF's strategy is 
instructive in terms of showing how strategy can affect 
target selection, it would be wrong to promote this 
particular group as a particular model from which universal 
lessons can be drawn. Other terrorist groups have operated 
under different circumstances and with different 
opportunities. To gain a balanced perspective on the 
influence of strategy upon target selection these need to be 
considered. 
The effect of strategy on target selection. 
It is important to understand how the strategic 
objectives which terrorists set themselves may determine 
their selection of targets. To maximise the likelihood of 
84) B. A. Scharlau & D. Philips. "Not the End of German Left- 
Wing Terrorism". Red Army Faction. "Communique, dated 
10 April 1992, offering to Suspend the RAF's terrorist 
Campaign against the German State". 
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achieving their strategic objectives terrorists have to 
select their targets with a degree of care. It can prove 
difficult to gauge precisely what the reaction will be to a 
terrorist acts or to the terrorist's strategy. Terrorist 
attacks might not produce the desired effect and may prove 
counter-productive if they alienate actual or prospective 
supporters. 
The degree of strategic planning involved can vary 
between groups. Some groups or individuals use terrorism 
where the violence is primarily an expressive act rather than 
one which aims to influence other people's behaviour. In such 
cases one could say that the psychological target of the 
terrorist act is the terrorist himself. The previously 
mentioned French anarchists of the 1890s are an example of 
people using terrorist violence primarily as a means of 
personal catharsis rather than as part of a planned strategy. 
Similarly, racial attacks by European fascist terrorists in 
the 1990s seem to have been motivated more by a desire to 
cause pain to immigrants, non-whites, and non-conformists, 
rather than by any clearly discernible strategic thought. 85 
The strategic objectives of other terrorist groups 
appear to be planned in great detail and are heavily derived 
from the ideological preconceptions of the group. An example 
of this can be seen in the attempts of the Peruvian communist 
group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso - SL) to apply strategic 
principles derived from the writings of Mao Tse-tung. 86 
The basis of Mao's theories is the use of guerrilla 
warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare where semi- 
formed military formations seek to wear the enemy down with 
hit-and-run attacks, whilst avoiding full-scale battless 
until the enemy is so weak that he can be defeated in open 
battle. Guerrilla warfare is not the same as terrorism in 
85) T. Bjorgo. "Terrorist Violence against Immigrants and 
Refugees in Scandanavia: Patterns and Motives"l 38-39. 
Hasselbach suggests that longer-term planning has 
started to evolve amongst German and Austrian neo- 
Nazis. See I. Hasselbach & T. Reiss. Fuhrer-Ex: Memoirs 
of a Former Neo-Naziq (London: Chat'to & Windus, 1996), 
274-276. 
86) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", Selected-Works of Mao Tse-tung, 
volume 1. Mao Tse-tung. "On Protracted War", and 
"Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan", 
both in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, volume 2. 
Strategy 112 
that the guerrilla's objective is ultimately to defeat the 
enemy in battle, either by themselves or with the assistance 
of other existing military forces. 
87 Terrorism by itself 
cannot achieve such a military victory and is primarily 
intended to have a psychological effect. Howeverl terrorism 
is often used by groups involved in guerrilla warfare. 
The Maoist model of rural guerrilla insurgency was 
based on the assumption that the population of 1930s China 
consisted mainly of the rural peasantry. In contrast to the 
concentration on urban workers by Marx and Lenin, Mao saw the 
peasantry as a potentially revolutionary class. He believed 
that the role of the Chinese Communist Party was to mobilise 
the peasants in the areas where the communists had a 
presence. These formed fairly secure safe havens or base 
areas where the communist forces were relatively safe from 
attack and could assemble supplies and gain recruits. 
88 Giap 
- who put many of Mao's ideas into practice in against the 
French, Americans, and South Vietnamese authorities in 
Vietnam - points out that one way of securing such an area 
once occupied was to kill opponents - termed 'traitors', and 
to gain public support by eliminating unpopular people such 
as landlords. 
89 Once the safe area was secured the communists 
could start forming sizeable armed forces - both guerrillas 
and the regular 'Red' Army - to fight their opponents. Given 
the disparity between the initially weak communist forces, 
and the more powerful opposition, the aim of the communists 
was to stay on the defensive militarily, avoiding clashes 
where the Red Army could be destroyed in its entirety. Once 
the opposition had over-extended its forces in pursuing both 
the Red Army and the communist guerrillasq the Red Army would 
87) W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 147-148. 
88) Mao Tse-tung. "On correcting mistaken ideas in the 
Party", 106. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in 
China's Revolutionary War", 192. Mao Tse-tung. "Report 
of an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan". 
Mao Tse-tung. "Pay attention to economic work"i 129- 
136. Mao Tse-tung. "Be concerned with the well-being of 
the masses, pay attention to methods of work", 146, 
149. Mao Tse-tung. "On correcting mistaken ideas in the 
Party", all in Selected Worksl volume 19 106. "The 
Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", 
Selected Works, volume 2,323. 





Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, (New 
York: Praegerl 1962; Bantam, 1968), 17,83. 
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be able to push back the enemy offensive, thus gaining more 
time to consolidate. 90 At the same time the communists would 
go on the offensive politically, increasing their support 
amongst the peasantry, thus increasing their material 
resources and manpower. 91 
Mao's strategy for the communists to build up their own 
forces whilst wearing down those of the oppositiong meant 
that the war would take on the pattern of an initial 
defensive phase, during which the communists avoided defeat, 
followed by a period of equilibrium during which the 
communists consolidated their hold in the countryside and 
built up their regular forces. Finally the Red Army - now 
militarily superior - would take the offensive, penning the 
enemy into the towns and finally defeating him in open 
battle. 92 
Ironically, bearing in mind the school of followers 
which he acquired, Mao was particularly insistent that whilst 
one could adopt some useful ideas from other conflicts, one 
could not derive universal strategic precepts from the 
specific circumstances of a particular conflict. 93 For Mao 
the relevant factors included the vast geographical size of 
China, the social and economic development of the country, 
and the relative strength of the enemy compared to the forces 
of the Chinese Communist Party. 94 This emphasis upon the 
particular circumstances of a conflict is relevant to the 
Peruvian example because the case of the Shining Path 
demonstrates how the Maoist model has been adapted to the 
circumstances of the conflict in Peru. 
The Shining Path has conducted a rural. revolutionary 
strategy which has broadly been based on the Maoist model. 
90) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", 211-220. 
91) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", 202. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of 
strategy in guerrilla war against Japan", 84. 
92) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", 213. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of 
strategy in guerrilla war against Japan", 85. Mao Tse- 
tung. "On Protracted War"s 136-140. 
93) M. Tse-tung. "Problems of Strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", 179,1819 189. M. Tse-tung. "On 
Protracted War", 121. 
94) M. Tse-tung. "On Protracted War", 197-198. 
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Indeed the original SL leader, Abimael Guzman, sees himself 
as the ideological successor to Mao. 95 However, SL has also 
grafted on elements of the grievances and beliefs of the 
Andean Quechua indians in order to construct and maintain a 
base of support in Ayacucho province, and has undertaken 
urban operations. 96 
As Mao prescribes, Guzman spent a great deal of time in 
building up a support base for SL amongst the rural 
population in Ayacucho. From the formation of SL in 1970, 
until the start of the violence in 1980, Guzman built up an 
organisation, working full-time on the project from 1976 
onwards. 97 Since 1980 SL has fought what it has termed 'A War 
of Little Wars' or as Smith describes it: 
'09 a thousand little wars spread across the Andes. Each 
skirmish is fought on its own terms, without the 
adversaries necessarily being aware that war has broken 
out ... The oppressor is not an abstract regime but the 
priest, the schoolteacher, the judge, the po ice officer, 
the engineer, or the government bureaucrat. 91 
Some of the targets which would be selected in a traditional 
Maoist campaign have been attacked by SL. Smith notes that 
when estimating the possibilities of operating in a 
particular area, the SL will find out who is the most 
unpopular person in the community, and also which people are 
the most respected. The former will be killed, whilst the 
95) S. Strong. Shining Path: The World's Deadliest 
Revolutionary Force, (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 
71. 
96) S. Strong. Shining Path, 29,40-439 71,75-76,84-85,91, 
99-102. M. L. Smith. "Taking the High Ground: Shining 
Path and the Andes", G-Gorritti. "Shining Path's Stalin 
and Trotsky", both in D. S. Palmer (ed). Shining Path of 
Peru, (London: Hurst & Co, 1992), 19-209 279 151. 
T. D. Mason & J. Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of 
Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 529. W. A. Hazleton & S. Woy- 
Hazleton. "Sendero Luminoso: A Communist Party Crosses 
a River of Blood", Terrorism and_Political Violence, 4, 
no. 2, (Summer 1992), 68. 
97) S. Strong. Shining Path, 36-39. W. A. Hazleton & S. Woy- 
Hazleton. "Sendero Luminoso", 66-68. 
98) M. L. Smith. "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the 
Andes", 19-20. 
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latter will be persuaded or pressurised into cooperation or 
at least neutrality, or else made to leave. 
99 Locally 
unpopular targets such as landlords, shopkeepers and 
administrators, have been killed by the Shining Path. 
100 
Where a rural village or religious community has 
opposed the Shining Pathl or development programmes and 
facilities have been started which might act as an 
alternative focus of loyalty, the organisation has carried 
out attacks and in some instances large-scale massacres as a 
demonstration of the consequences of non-compliance. 101 
Furthermorel because of the growth of the Peruvian capital, 
Lima, SL has organised urban cells, and has tried to develop 
social programmes - whilst attacking those organised by other 
bodies - in order to mobilise support amongst the poor 
migrants from country areas. In addition, indiscriminate car 
bombs were detonated in Lima in the early 1990s with the aim 
of creating chaos, the objective being to loosen the hold of 
the authorities over the population by threatening the 
security of ordinary people. 102 These terrorist activities 
are in addition to guerrilla attacks upon the Peruvian Police 
and Army which aim to expel the institutions and influence of 
99) M. L. Smith. "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the 
Andes", 25. 
100) R. H. Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in 
Andahuaylas", 93. T. D. Mason & J. Swartzfager. "Land 
Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 531. 
101) "In the killing fields of Peru", The Guardian, 
supplement, April 6th 1994. S. Strong. Shining Path, 
148-149,181,183. B. J. Isbell. "Shining Path and 
Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho", D. S. Palmer (ed). 
Shining Path-of Peru, 73-74. R. H. Berg, "Peasant 
Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas", 92. 
T. D. Mason & J. Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of 
Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 531. S. Woy-Hazleton & 
W. A. Hazleton. "Shining Path and the Marxist Left"t 
D. S. Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, 216. 
102) "Peru's guerrillas make slum into a 'shining example"', 
The Independent, November 30th 1991. "Car bomb kills 18 
as Maoists extend terror tactics to Lima", The Times, 
July 18th 1992. "Terror grips Peru's capital as rebels 
take on the state", The Guardian, August 17th 1992. 
"The end of a long march down the Shining Path", The 
Independent, October 3rd 1992. "S. Woy-Hazleton & 
W. A. Hazleton. "Shining Path and the Marxist Left", 214. 
M. L. Smith. "Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate 
Vitarte", D. S. Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Perus 
(London: Hurst & Co, 1992), 127-128,136,138. 
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the Peruvian state from areas which SL intends to take over 
with a final view to taking Lima itself. 
103 
SL has maintained its broad allegiance to Maoist 
principles, but in co-opting some of the concerns of the 
Andean Indians, and by extending its operations to Limaq the 
Shining Path has also adopted Mao's advice to fit strategy to 
the political and social realities of the existing situation. 
In terms of target selection SL has sought to follow Maoist 
strategy in building up initial support in the countryside 
with a view to isolating the cities, but has used methods of 
a far greater brutality than Mao or Giap were willing to 
concede - in writing at least. 
An example of the effect of strategic considerations at 
the other end of the ideological spectrum can be seen in the 
case of fascist terrorists in Italy. Table 4.2 shows a number 
of the mass casualty bomb attacks carried out by fascist 
groups or linked groups from the late 1960s onwards. In his 
account of the activities of the fascist terrorist Stefano 
Delle Chiaie, Stuart Christie cites a 1969 document 
concerning the so-called 'strategy of tension' from one of 
the Italian groups to the Aginter Press, a fascist front 
organisation in Lisbon. This states: 
Our belief is that the first phase of political activity 
ought to be to create the conditions favouring the 
installation of chaos in all of the regime's structures. 
This should necessarily begin with the undermining of the 
state's economy as a whole so as to arrive at confusion 
throughout the whole legal apparatus This leads on to a 
situation of strong political tension, fear in the world 
of industry and hoybility towards the government and the 
political parties. 
The document makes it clear that these actions are to be 
carried out in such a way as to implicate tcommunist and pro- 
Chinese' organisations. 
105 In fact the first suspects 
arrested for the explosion in the Banca Nazionale 
dell'Agricoltura in the Piazza Fontana, Milan, on September 
103) S. Strong. Shining Path, 110,121-122,135-136. 
104) S. Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie, 32. Willan dates the 
document from November 1968. P-Willan. Puppet Masters, 
23. 
105) S. Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie, 32. 
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12th 1969, were anarchists although the likely culprits were 
fascists. 106 
TABLE 4.2 
LETHAL MASS CASUALTY BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS 
IN ITALY WHERE FASCIST GROUPS OR MAFIA ARE THE SUSPECTS. 
Date Location Dead Injured 
December 12th 1969 Lobby of National 
Agricultural Bank, Milan. 17 88 
May 28th 1974 Anti-fascist rally, Piazza 
della Loggia, Brescia. 8 94 
August 4th 1974 Bologna - Florence Italicus 
train, tunnel near Bologna. 12 105 
August 1st 1980 Second-class waiting room, 
Bologna railway station. 85 177 
December 23rd 1984 Naples - Milan Rapido 904 
train, tunnel near Bologna. 15 267 
May 27th 1993 Car bomb outside Uffizi 
Gallery, Florence. 5 30 
July 27th 1993 Car bomb outside Royal 
Villa Art Gallery, Milan. 5 20 
Source: A. Jamieson- The Heart Attacked, 21. "Uffizi gallery 
blast strikes at heart of Italian culture", The Times, 
May 28th 1993. "Italians blame shadowy powers for 
bringing terror to Florence", The Independent on 
Sunday, May 30th 1993. "Italian bombings leave five 
dead", The Times, July 28th 1993. "President says bombs 
will not halt renewal", The Independent, July 29th 
1993. "Executive held over Uffizi bomb"s The European, 
February 8th-14th 1996. N. B. The casualty figures vary 
slightly from one account to another particularly with 
regard to the number of people injured. 
As well as corresponding with the strategic objectives 
of the Italian fascists' groups, such a strategy is perfectly 
in line with the dictates of fascist ideology. It corresponds 
to the idea that the mass of people are manipulable, what 
Hitler called "... a herd of sheep and blockheads". 107 Also, 
the idea that a crisis is necessary before the fascists seize 
power accords with the situation in Italy in 1922 and Germany 
in the early 1930s. In those cases the crisis was genuine, 
and was aggravated and exploited by the use of fascist street 
violence. 
108 For later breeds of fascists, the necessary 
widespread anxiety was to be created by the destruction of 
everyday security due to seemingly arbitrary explosions. 
106) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 
Masters, 123. 
107) A. Hitler. Mein Kampf, 73. 
108) D. Mack Smith. Mussolini,, 56-65. 
250. 
22,60. P. Willan Puppet 
A. Bullock. Hitler, 187- 
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Their hope was that this would propel the public to turn to a 
strong leader or provoke a military coup. 109 
Additional attacks have been carried out with the 
apparent aim of causing several fatalities but with less 
success. For example on the same day in December 1969 as the 
bomb in Milan, another bomb failed to explode in another 
Milanese bank, and three bombs went off in Rome injuring 
fourteen people but without causing fatalities. 110 Similarly, 
in Rome in the early h6urs of July 28th 1993, bombs at the 
Basilica of St John Lateran and at the church of San Giorgio 
in Velabro injured a total of eighteen people. 111 
A report at the time of the bomb outside the Uffizi 
Gallery in Florence in May 1993 linked the type of explosive 
used there to that used in the bomb on the Rapido 904 train 
in December 1984, and in the Mafia assassination of the 
Sicilian anti-Mafia magistrate Judge Giovanni Falcone in May 
1992.112 Shawcross and Young suggest that the Rapido 904 
bombing was possibly carried out in order to divert attention 
from the activities of the Mafia, by a group which included 
fascist terrorists, the Mafia, and the Camorra. 113 This, 
together with the likely collusion of elements in the Italian 
security and criminal justice establishment, indicates 
probable cooperation between fascist groups and Italian 
organised criminal groups. 
114 
Such an alliance is not surprising as with the 
possible exception of the Rapido 904 bombing the attacks 
have taken place at times of political turbulence when the 
existing political order, including the apparent immunity of 
organised criminal groups, was perceived to be at risk. These 
109) P-Willan. Puppet Masters, 23. V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics 
of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary It'aly, 51. 
110) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 123. 
111) "Italian bombings leave five dead", The Times, July 28th 
1993. "President says bombs will not halt renewal", The 
Independent, July 29th 1993. 
112) "Italians blame shadowy Powers for bringing terror to 
Florence", The Independent on Sundayt May 30th 1993. 
113) "Mafia terrorist campaign feared", The Independent, May 
16th 1993. T. Shawcross & M-Young. Mafia Wars: The 
Confessions of Tommaso Buscettal (Glasgow: Fontana, 
1988), 299-300. P. Willan. Puuet 
- 
Masters, 173-177. 
114) "Executive held over Uffizi bomb"i The European, 
February 8th-14th 1996. "Italian police arrest the 
Mafia's 'boss of bosses", The Independent, May 21st 
1996. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 173-177. 
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risks consisted of the success of the PCI up to the early 
1980sq and from revelations in the early 1990s concerning 
organised crime and the corruption of the Italian political 
and business establishment. 
115 In such a situation the 
creation of a state of disorientation amongst the public has 
obvious advantages for the fascist, conservative, and 
criminal groupings concerned, and would therefore be a highly 
desirable strategic objective. 
For most terrorist groups the elimination of threats, 
potential threats, and dissidents is an important element of 
terrorist strategy. However the way in which they are 
eliminated, and the amount of publicity which their 
elimination receives is also important and hence may affect 
target selection, the method of attack, and the way in which 
an attack or threat is both executed and justified. In his 
memoirs George Grivas, the commander of the Greek-Cypriot 
group EOKA in the 1950sq records an order which he gave for 
the killing of a man who had informed on his colleagues under 
interrogation. 
The execution will be a lesson to everyone, showing that 
no one may ask for pardon on Ihe excuse that their 
treachery was due to torture. 
16 
Radio Athens, which strongly supported EOKA's policy of 
Cypriot union with Greece, aided the group by broadcasting 
the names of alleged informers, thus bringing communal 
pressure to bear on dissidents or potential dissidents within 
the Greek-Cypriot community. 
117 According to Foley, by mid 
1956 EOKA had killed fifty informers, and both Dewar and 
Paget note the large proportion of Greek-Cypriots killed by 
the group, an indeterminate number of whom were merely 
suspected of being informers. 
118 
115) "Last supper at the bribery banquet", The Tndependentj 
March 4th 1993. "Rotten to the core", The Independent 
on Sunday, April 11th 1993. "Andreotti 'was Mafia's man 
at the heart of the state"', The Guardian, March 30th 
1993. "Andreotti accused of ordering murder"l The 
Independent, June 10th 1993. A. Stille. Excellent 
Cadavers, 390-403. 
116) G. Grivas - Dighenis & C. Foley (ed). The Memoirs of 
General Grivas, (London: Longmans, 1964), 159. 
117) C. Foley. Legacy of Strife: CvPrus from Rebellion to 
Civil War, (London: Longmans, 1962; Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguing 1964), 66. 
118) C. Foley. Legacy of Strife, 59. M. Dewar. Brush Fire Wars: 
Campaigns of the British Army since 1945, (New York: St 
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As well as dissuading potential informers, EOKA's 
strategy was intended to exert control over the civil 
population. The bulk of the Greek-Cypriot population appears 
to have backed the group willingly, but EOKA also used 
threats against recalcitrants. 
119 British products were 
boycotted on EOKA's orders and, after a dispute over schools 
flying the Greek flag in defiance of the authorities, 
children were kept away from the state-run schools. 120 
Crawshaw cites a leaflý_-t which she claims was circulated to 
parents who continued to send their children to state 
schools. 
With regret we have observed your anti-national behaviour 
in sending your child to the Technical School where our 
enemies may corrupt his spirit with their propaganda. 
There exist out own proper schools which offer Greek 
culture and education. 
If you do not decide to transfer your child to a 
Greek school then you and your child will be branded as 
common traitors. Your own name and that of your child 
will be published so that you will be despised by the 
people and condemned wherever you may be. 
There is still time. 
EOKA, 14 July, 1957.121 
Dewar alleges that school headmasters were intimidated by 
EOKA, and states that by spring 19569 only eighty-one out of 
499 elementary schools remained open. 
122 Thus, whilst they 
could count on majority support within the Greek-Cypriot 
community, EOKA achieved almost total compliance through the 
use of threats and violence against dissidents, and maximised 
the effect by ensuring that such violence was widely 
publicised. 
Summary. 
The examples examined in this chapter indicate the 
effect which strategy can have on terrorist target selection. 
They show how important ideology is in the formulation of 
strategic thinking, but ideology is not by itself the only 
Martin's Press, 1984), 77. J. Paget. Counter-Insurgency 
Campaigning, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 140,144. 
119) J. Paget. Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 142-148. 
120) N. Crawshaw. The Cyprus Revolt: An account of the 
struggle for union with Greece, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1978)9 312. C. Foley. Legacy of Strife, 43,114. 
121) N. Crawshaw. The Cyprus Revolt, 243. 
122) M. Dewar- Brush Fire Wars., 73. N. Crawshaw. The Cyprus 
Revolt, 145. 
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factor to influence the selection of physical targets. Other 
factors such as the activities of the security forces, the 
nature of support for the group, and external political 
events are also important. 
The aim of a terrorist group is to induce a particular 
response from a chosen psychological target by the use of 
violence. Whilst the tactical objective is to carry out 
specific operations supcessfully, the aim of a group's 
strategy is to attain the groups longer-term political 
objectives. A strategy may consist wholly of the use of 
terrorism, or terrorism may form only part of a broader 
strategy which includes other methods such as guerrilla 
warfare or conventional politics. 
The role of strategic thinking in terrorist operations 
varies from one group to another. Some groups, such as the 
Shining Path, have devised pre-planned overall strategies 
embracing methods such as guerrilla warfare or overt 
political activity in addition to terrorism. At the other 
extreme, other groups, such as some of the racialist groups 
in Europe, have used terrorism in a spontaneous, unsystematic 
and haphazard fashion which almost defies the appellation of 
the term strategy to their activities. Their violence often 
seems to be expressive and to have no particular end in mind 
except to cause hurt and fear. Despite this disparity between 
groups in the level of strategic thought employed, some 
aspects of terrorist strategy do bear examination in 
determining the extent to which they might affect terrorist 
target selection by nearly all terrorist groups. 
An important point to note is the centrality of the 
group's ideology in devising its strategy. By designating 
legitimate targets, the ideology of the group sets out the 
parameters within which the group operates. Ideology can also 
provide terrorists with the outline of a strategy which 
suggests the types of targets to be attacked. This has 
particularly been the case with communist groups which have 
adopted the strategic thought of theorists such as Mao and 
Marighela. However, as Smith and Bowyer Bell argue in the 
case of the Provisional IRAs the strategy of other groups may 
be derived from the ideology and historical background of the 
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group-123 However, ideology does not by itself determine 
strategy, and does not determine the selection of targets. 
Whilst it may be used by the group to determine those targets 
which it is considered legitimate to attack, it cannot 
explain why one legitimate target may be chosen over another. 
The next factor which affects the selection of targets 
is the strategic objective or objectives which the terrorists 
have set themselves - in other words the effect or effects 
which they wish their violence to achieve. Terrorist's 
strategies are intended to achieve political objectives. They 
are designed to maximise the pressure on the psychological 
target to act in the way which the terrorists desire. 
Obviously, a group which wishes to disorientate the public 
will use different methods to one which wishes to gain the 
positive support or endorsement of the public and accordingly 
they will choose different targets. Thus, whilst fascist 
groups in Italy sought to frighten the public into calling 
for an authoritarian ruler by carrying out the mass-casualty 
bombings outlined above, communist terrorist groups in the 
same country sought to gain the support of striking workers 
by attacking industrial managers, particularly in companies 
such as Fiat where industrial relations were poor. 124 
In assessing the motive, means, and opportunity which 
determine terrorist target selection, one can see that the 
wish to influence the psychological target in a particular 
way, through an appropriate strategy of violence, provides 
terrorists with an important motive for their actions. 
Consequently, strategy - like ideology - can be considered an 
important part of the terrorist's motive when selecting their 
targets. Howeverl terrorist strategies are not based purely 
123) M. L. R. Smith. Fighting for Ireland?,, 139. J. Bowyer Bell, 
IRA Tactics and Targets, 26-28. 
124) G. C. Caselli & D. della Porta. "The history of the Red 
Brigades: organizational structures and strategies of 
action (1970-82)"1 R. Catanzaro (ed). The Red Brigades & 
Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy, 75. A. Jamieson. The Heart 
Attacked, 57,77-79. D. Moss. The P-olitics of Left-Wing, 
Violence in Italys 83,84. Associated Press, October 
4th 1979. "A Torino un dirigente FIAT ferito dalle 
Brigate Rosse Avera suo figlio in braccio"s Corriere 
della Sera, October 5th 1979. C-Schaerf et al. Venti 
Anni di Violenza in Italia, 842. V. S. Pisano. The 
Dynamics of Subversion and_Violence in Contemporary 
Italy, 61,78. 
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upon motives, but are limited by practical constraints. As 
the example of the Red Army Faction shows, terrorists have to 
take into account the constraints placed by their own 
capabilities, the protection around potential targets, and 
the environment within which the terrorists have to operate. 
Whereas abstract strategic thinking deals in the results 
desired from terrorism, tactics are concerned with the 
practical means which are used to achieve those results and 




Although terrorist operations vary in their methods and 
objectives they usually involve a number of stages. 
Terrorists may not consciously think of themselves as 
following these stages, but it is likely that they will 
include the following stages in their operations. 
I Setting up a logistical network (such as safe houses, 
weapons dumps, identity papers, vehicles). 
I Selection of potential targets. 
0 Gathering information on potential targets. 
I Reconnaissance of potential targets. 
I Planning an operation. 
I Insertion of weapons into the area of operations. 
0 Insertion of operators into the area of operations. 
I Execution of the operation. 
0 Withdrawal of operational team. 
I Issue of communiques. 
If the operation is a kidnapping or hijacking then the 
captivity of the hostage, receipt of ransom or released 
colleagues, and any other actions, will also have to be dealt 
with. 
Some operations may require a great degree of planning, 
or may require the acquisition of detailed information, 
whilst others can be carried out almost on the spur of the 
moment. Similarlys the planners of an operation may not 
consciously deal with each stage of an operation because the 
practices involved are instinctive. Nevertheless, these 
stages are usually a component of any terrorist operation. 
Setting up a logistics network. 
The logistics of a terrorist group consist of the 
support structure necessary to sustain it. A logistics 
network includes the means to transport weapons and 
personnel, to house members of the group without arousing 
suspicion, and generally to allow the group to function. It 
includes the provision of safe houses, weapons dumpsy 
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vehicles, and whatever identity documents might be 
appropriate. 
For a prolonged terrorist campaign to be sustained at a 
fairly high level of intensity, some form of logistics 
network is necessary, so that members of the group have 
places to stay, places to hide their weapons, and are able to 
sustain themselves without being discovered. In cases where 
members of the terrorist group have not yet been detected and 
forced into clandestinity by the authorities, some of the 
features of the logistical structure may be superfluous. This 
has largely been the case with 'part-time' terrorists such as 
members of the Revolutionary Cells in Germany and the 
'irregular' members of the Red Brigades in Italy, who only 
devote some of their time to terrorist activities. ' These 
terrorists can openly lead a relatively ordinary life with 
somewhere to live and a legal identity, and they have no 
difficulty in obtaining the ordinary means of sustenance. 
They can operate as terrorists using their own identity, 
vehicles, and residences until they are detected. However, 
once they have been identified as terrorists they can become 
so dependent upon the logistical infrastructure that it 
becomes difficult to carry out basic functions of normal life 
- such as renting or buying accommodation and buying food - 
without running the risk of detection. 2 
For this reason some terrorist groups set up a 
logistics network before they start their campaign of 
violence. In Cyprus, George Grivas spent the best part of 
three years setting up the organisation EOKA, and its 
infrastructure before the terrorist campaign. began. 3 
McKittrick reports that the Provisional IRA is thought to 
have set up a network of safe houses and weapons dumps in 
Great Britain in the mid 1980s, soon after they received 
1) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 42,61-62. H. J. Horchem. Terrorism in West 
Germanyl 6. A. Jamieson. The-Heart Attacked, 78. 
G. C. Caselli & D. della Porta. 'ý-T-he history of the Red 
Brigades"s 73,88. 
2) J. Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent 
Inefficiency of the Underground", 202. 
3) G. Grivas - Dighenis & C. Foley (ed). The Memoirs of General 
Grivas, 13-32. 
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large shipments of weapons and explosives from Libya. 4 
However their campaign of sustained terrorist violence in 
England did not begin until 1988, after the logistical 
structure for the campaign had been set up. 
Setting up a logistics network for one operation is 
only necessary when the operation itself is complex. Thus the 
kidnappings of Moro and Dozier in Italy, and of Schleyer in 
Germanyl necessitated the renting or purchase of flats to be 
used to hold the abductees whilst negotiations were carried 
out for the terms of their release. Similarly, in the 
aftermath of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 
April 1991, the Indian police unearthed a large network which 
was set up in order to support the assassination attempt. 5 
on the other hand, for one-off attacks upon targets of 
opportunity, or for isolated low-intensity attacks, a 
specifically dedicated logistics structure is not necessary 
and would probably be an encumbrance. For several vigilante 
groups, because they are frequently tolerated by the 
authorities or at least by some of the agencies of the state, 
the requirements for a clandestine support network are not 
great. In Colombia, vigilante death squads seem to have 
operated with a high degree of impunity. Consequently members 
of these groups would not have had to live a clandestine 
life. 6 Likewise, unlike the Provisional IRA and the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 
was not banned in Northern Ireland until July 1992. As a 
result, whereas people whom the authorities could prove to be 
PIRA members - admittedly a difficult task without evidence 
of terrorist-related activities - had to live clandestine 
lives as mere membership is an offence, members of the UDA 
were not so constrained until July 1992.7 
4) "Semtex stockpile the key to IRA's wider campaign", The 
Independent, June 4th 1990. "The IRA", The Independent 
on Sunday, November 22nd 1992. "IRA mainland campaign 
'likely to last for years"'i The Independent, November 
24th 1992. 
5) "What One-Eyed Jack knows"i The Independent, July 1st 
1991. "Entering a Decisive Phase", India Todayp 
February 28th 1995. 
6) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177,196,205. 
7) J. Cusack & M. Taylor. The Resurgence of a Terrorist 
organization - Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no 3 (Autumn 
1993), 3. 
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In contrast, the problems of trying to sustain a 
clandestine existence provided communist terrorist groups in 
Italy with some of their greatest problems. Under Italian 
law, people are required to carry identification documents 
and there are laws which require that people renting 
accommodation register the tenants of the residence. This 
makes it much more difficult to maintain clandestinity and 
makes it imperative for the group concerned to assemble a 
network which can allow activists to remain underground in 
safety. 8 
The selection of potential targets. 
A potential target is a person, thing, or category of 
people or things which the terrorist group may choose to 
attackj rather than somebody or something which they have 
chosen to attack. The selection of potential targets is the 
process by which the group decide which targets they might 
consider attacking before they have taken into account other 
factors which determine which targets they will attack. 
The selection of a category of people or things as 
targets need not necessarily be well thought out before an 
operation takes place. Use of the term 'operation' may give 
the impression of a meticulously planned and painstakingly 
organised action. Whilst with a pre-selected target this is 
normally the case, where a target of opportunity presents 
itself, there is little if any planning. Provided that the 
general category of targets has been agreed, in however 
rudimentary a fashion, it is quite possible that the 
terrorists will carry out an attack immediately. This has 
often been the case with Belfast Catholics who have been 
attacked by loyalist terrorists, or non-Europeans attacked by 
racialist extremists in some European states. 9 
8) E. MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 141. G. C. Caselli & 
D. della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades", 73. 
D. Moss. The Politics of_Left-Winsz Violence in Ital 
55,145. C. Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy"s 103. 
9) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Irelandq 
29-35. M. Dillon. The Shankill Butcherss passim. S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 14,173-181, For an account and 
chronology of racialist killings in Europe, including 
both motiveless attacks and Politically directed killings see "Death in Europe: the toll for 1992", 
Campaign Against Racism & Fascism, (London), 12, 
(January/February 1993). "Deadly Europe"i Campaign 
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The killing of Jimmy Brown, leader of the republican 
splinter group known as the Irish People's Liberation 
Organisation (IPLO), in August 1992, was such an 
opportunistic attack by a rival within the group. The man who 
was in a car with Brown, stated that they had pulled up by a 
man Brown knew when the man unexpectedly produced a gun and 
shot Brown dead. According to the witness there was no way 
that the killer could have known that Brown would be there at 
that time. 10 
When operations are pre-planned a number of potential 
targets may be selected on the basis of their ideological 
legitimacy as targets with the intention of choosing one of 
them as the final target after other factors have been 
considered. This occurred when Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the 
Red Brigades in March 1978. The Brigadist's aim was to 
capture a leading politician in order to draw attention to 
the cause of the Red Brigades, to highlight the impotence of 
the Italian state, to prevent a political alliance between 
the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party, and to 
question a leading Christian Democrat about the corruption 
which the Red Brigades suspected lay at the heart of the 
Italian state-" They also demanded the release of Red 
Brigadists being held prisoner. 12 However, there had been 
other potential targets. The BR had considered kidnapping the 
Prime Minister - Giulio Andreotti, or a former Prime Minister 
and President of the Senate - Amintore Fanfani. 13 It was only 
after the BR decided that Fanfani's personal routine was too 
unpredictable and Andreotti's protective security too tight, 
that the BR decided to kidnap the relatively routine and 
Against Racism & Fascism, 18, (January/February 1994). 
For a detailed local account of the nature of racial 
attacks see Director of Housing, Oldham Metropolitan 
Borough. Racial Harassment Policyl unpublished local 
government report, (Oldham, England: Oldham 
Metropolitan Borough, December 7th 1988)928-30. 
10) J. Holland & H. McDonald- INLA, 335,338. 
11) A. Jamieson- The Heart Attacked, 26,38-40t 109-110,146, 
177. D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in 
Italyp 155. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 216-217,271-273. 
12) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 219. A-Jamieson. The Heart 
Attacked, 151,157,160. 
13) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 108. P. Willan. Puppet 
Mastersq 222. 
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poorly protected Moro. 
14 Thus, whilst the selection of Moro, 
Fanfani, and Andreotti as potential targets was based on the 
Red Brigadist's ideology and strategy, other factors 
determined that Moro was selected. 
Gathering information on potential targets. 
Once the potential targets or categories of targets 
have been decided upon, the group can carry out the research 
necessary to discover where the target is likely to be 
located. The ideal is where members or sympathisers of the 
terrorist group have personal knowledge of the activities of 
potential targets. The anti-Tsarist terrorist Savinkov, who 
was active in the early twentieth century, describes the 
usefulness of Tatiana Alexandrovna Leontyeva, the daughter of 
the Vice-Governor of Yakutsk province, and an aristocrat by 
birth. She was well connected with "... rich and official St 
Petersburg"i had the opportunity of being presented at the 
Imperial Court, and with time could become a lady-in-waiting 
to the Empress. Although she wished to be an active 
terrorist, Savinkov preferred her to gather information 
whilst unknown to the police as a terrorist sympathiser. 
Later in his account Savinkov cites a colleague's description 
of Leontyeva as "pure gold". 
15 
More recently, in July 1977 the Chief Executive of the 
Dresdner Bank, Jurgen Pontol let Susanne Albrecht - the 
daughter of a family friend - into his house with two of her 
friends. He was shot dead during the ensuing Red Army Faction 
kidnap attempt. 16 In the aftermath the Federal Interior 
Minister commented: 
: *0 there is no capitalist who does not have a terrorist 
in his own intimate circle of friends or relations. ... There are no circles, however high, in our society - and 
this is the really alarming thing - which do not have 
14) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 40-41,108. P. Willan. 
Puppet Masters, 223-224. 
15) B. Savinkov. Memoirs of a Terrorist, 79,120. R. Hingley. 
The Russian Secret Police: Mus covite, Imperial Russian 
and Soviet Political Security Operations, 1565-1970, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1970), 96-97. 
16) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 61. 
S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 406-408* 
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people like Susanne Albre Ot somewhere in their immediate 
or more distant vicinity. 
This point was echoed by the German correspondent of The 
Times in 1993 when he noted that the network of sympathisers 
and supporters for the RAF were well placed to identify 
members of the German elite and discover weaknesses in their 
security. 
18 
Sometimes sympathisers just happen to be in the right 
place at the right time. According to Coogan, during the 
Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921 the post office in Dublin put 
the cousin of Michael Collins - effectively the operational 
leader of the IRA - in charge of handling secret coded 
messages. The cousin of another IRA man was a typist in 
Dublin Castle, at that time the headquarters of the British 
administration in Ireland, where she had access to 
information which included the names and addresses of 
intelligence operatives. 19 Additional sources of information 
were: some detectives in the political 'G' section of the 
Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), policemen with access to 
the RIC cipher codes, a secretary in the headquarters of the 
6th Army Division in Cork, and a senior civil servant in 
Dublin Castle. 20 
More recently, both republican and loyalist terrorists 
in Ireland have received information from well-placed 
sympathisers. The Provisional IRA has been able to obtain 
highly sensitive information from the RUC, the prison 
service, the Northern Irish Civil Service, and the Gardai in 
the Republic of Ireland, either by intimidating people within 
these organisations, or through sympathisers who work in 
them. 21 In the same way some members of the security forces 
17) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 418. 
18) "Culture of violence cuts deep in Bonn", The Times, July 
6th 1993. 
19) T. P. Coogan. Michael Collins, 82-83. 
20) T. P. Coogan. Michael Coll-ins, 75-84,107,147-148. 
D. Neligan. The Spy in the Castle, (London: MacGibbon & 
Kee, 1968). 
21) "Teenagers who enlist for terror", The Independent on 
Sunday, August 5th 1990. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 287-288. "Informers die after 
policeman's betrayal", The Daily Telegraph ,, 
March 22nd 
1981. C. Ryder. The RUC, 242-244. "Leaked messages from 
RUC 'may help terrorists"i The Independent, June 18th 
1991. "Maze officer who helped IRA to kill colleague 
gets life", The Times, June 22nd 1990. "Prison warder 
given life for role in IRA murder", The Independento 
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in Northern Ireland have passed information on suspected 
republicans to loyalist terrorists, allowing them to locate 
targets for assassination. 
22 
Alternativelyl terrorists can gain access to secret 
information by electronic means. In the mid 1970s the 
Provisional IRA was found to have been intercepting security 
force communications with phone taps, and by the mid 1980s at 
the latest was able to intercept radio messages by the use of 
scanners capable of intercepting radio communications. This 
information allowed PIRA units to locate and either avoid or 
attack security force units. 
23 Likewise, Fisk reports that 
units of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria are said to have 
radio scanners which they use to intercept messages to police 
patrols, thus aiding them in setting up ambushes. 24 
Electronic eavesdropping has also aided the 
assassination of specific people. Pearce states that 
narcotics traffickers in Colombia tapped the telephone of the 
Attorney Generall Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, before his 
assassination in April 1984.25 Similarly, it has been 
reported that the Sicilian Mafia learned of the movements of 
an anti-Mafia magistratel Paolo Borsellino, by tapping his 
mother's telephone. Borsellino, together with five police 
June 22nd 1990. "IRA spy jailed by Dublin court", The 
Times, February 8th 1991. "IRA used Garda file to 
target man", The Independent, April 17th 1991. "Dublin 
admits Garda leak to IRA", The Independent, April 17th 
1991. "Former Garda jailed for giving IRA information", 
The Independents February 1st 1992. 
22) "Supergrass fears may have prompted poster displays", The 
Independentg February 6th 1990. "Tories urge inquiry 
into smear plot allegations", The Times February 6th 
1990. "RUC receives Stevens report on loyalist leaks", 
The Independent, April 6th 1990. "Report finds RUC 
collusion", The Independent, May 18th 1990. S. Bruce. 
The Red Hand, 212-218,261-264. D. McKittrick. Endgames 
154. 
23) Miami Herald, January 29th 1979. F. Doherty. "SIGINT used 
by Anti-State Forces: A Case Study of Provisional IRA 
Operations", C. Bledowska (ed). War and Order: , Researching State Structures, (London: Junction Booksp 
1983). M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 71-72. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional_IRA, 405. 
24) "Perfect ambush on the road to Paradise", The 
Independent, March 10th 1995. 




bodyguards, was killed by a bomb placed outside his mother's 
flat on July 19th 1992026 
Information can often be gleaned from publicly 
available sources. In a humourous article in The Spectator 
D. J. Enright made an interesting point. 
This book is dangerous, it must be banned. 
It names names and states addresses, it reveals 
careers and important positions, lists antecedents and 
marriages (potenti4l for blackmail) and children who can 
be kidnapped and held as hostages. It specifies places of 
resort where ambush can be laid by terrorists. Not even 
recreation will be safe from assassins. 
The book could easily fall into hostile hands. It 
must be taken out of circulation. 
Entitled Who's Who, it is publisheg by A&C. Black 
of London. The sequel is Who Was Who. 2 
A brief examination of the 1988 copy of Who's Who provides a 
very useful list of private addresses for anyone wishing to 
cut a swathe through the British political elite. Included 
are the home addresses of Roy Mason -a former Northern 
Ireland Secretary much reviled by the Provisional IRA, the 
late Nicholas Ridley - then Environment Secretary and member 
of the Cabinet, Christopher Patten - at that time Minister 
for Overseas Development, but also a former junior minister 
in Northern Ireland, and Anthony Blair - at that time a 
backbench MP, but now leader of the Labour Party. 28 For their 
campaign of assassination in England the Provisional IRA are 
believed to have identified the home addresses of prominent 
individuals from open sources such as Who's Whos the Civil 
Service Year List, the Army List, and television 
broadcasts. 29 Thus the presence of somebody in such sources 
makes it more likely that they will be selected as a target. 
This can have drawbacks for the group carrying out the 
research because they may be using outdated information. When 
the PIRA set off a bomb at the former home of a former 
26) "Car bombers kill another top Italian judge", The Times, 
July 20th 1992. "Tentacles that tie down the Italian 
state", The Independent, August 6th 1992. A. Stille. 
Excellent Cadaversq 372-373. 
27) "Ban! ", The Spectator, April 15th 1989. 
28) A&C. Black Ltd. Who's Who 1988: An annual biographical 
dictionary, (London: A&C Black, 1988). 
29) "Bookworms who burrow for IRA"q The Sunday Correspondent, 
August 12th 1990. S. O'Doherty, The Volunteer: A Former 
IRA Man's True Story, (London: Harper Collins, 1993)9 
T4 0. 
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Conservative Party Treasurer Lord McAlpine in June 1990, The 
Independent reported that it was still listed as his home in 
the then current edition of Who's Who. 30 In the same way, 
when the PIRA tried to assassinate the former Cabinet 
Secretary, Lord Armstrong in August 1990, they placed the 
bomb under a car parked in the drive of a house which he had 
moved away from, but which was last listed as his home in 
Who's Who in 1976.31 
The information revealed after police raids on 
terrorist safe houses can be quite revealing about the ways 
in which they gather information. When the police searched a 
flat in November 1990, which had allegedly been used by two 
PIRA men, they found a 1979 copy of Who's Who together with a 
list of potential targets. 
32 On the list were Sir Charles 
Tidbury - chairman of the William & Mary tercentenary trust 
and a former worker for the Conservative Party - with details 
showing his London and country addresses, and car 
registrations of two neighbours. Also found were details 
concerning two previous Northern Ireland Secretaries, Roy 
Mason and James Prior, senior politicians including Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, Douglas Hurd, Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith -a 
Conservative MP, Major-General Sir Julian Thompson, General 
Sir Michael Trant, Sir John Fieldhouse - former Chief of the 
Defence Staff, and Major-General Sir John Acland. Newspaper 
photographs of some of these people were also attached. On 
another occasion the police found a hit list at a safe house 
in Luton. This had the names of various senior and middle- 
ranking politicians and businessmen. The terrorists had also 
noted the private addresses and family details of senior 
military personnel, and had made notes describing the most 
convenient routes to their homes. 33 
30) "McAlpine bomb indicates switch in IRA campaign", The 
Independents June 14th 1990. 
31) "Car bomb attack on Thatcher advisor fails", The 
Independent, August 7th 1990. "Peer target of botched 
car bombing", The Guardian, August 7th 1990. 
32) t9tIRA hit list and arsenal' were found in car"q The 
Independent, January 23rd 1992. "Prior the top target 
on IRA hit list court told", The Times, January 23rd 
1992. 
33) "Arrests failed to stop attacks", The Independents 
December 7th 1990. 
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Other terrorists use such methods. On July 6th 1977 
Willy Peter Stoll -a member of the Red Army Faction - 
visited the Hamburg Institute of International Economics and 
requested information on Jurgen Ponto - the Chief Executive 
of the Dresdner Bank, and Hans-Martin Schleyer - the 
President of the West German Employers Federation. He claimed 
this was for a thesis on leading economists. 
34 Twenty-four 
days later, on July 30th Ponto was shot dead during the 
attempt to kidnap him. On September 5th of the same year 
Schleyer was kidnapped and six weeks later was killed. 
According to Schiller, members of the Berlin-based June 2nd 
Movement used a book entitled The Rich and Super-Rich in 
Austria when selecting a target for abduction. They chose an 
Austrian textile manufacturer, Michael Palmers who was 
described in the book as often moving large sums of money, 
and who preferred payment in cash. 
35 The B2J kidnapped him in 
November 1977, receiving a payment of DM 4.3 million in 
return for his release. 
36 
An article in a newspaper might give a terrorist many 
of the details which he or she needs in order to plan an 
attack. In April 1994 The Spectator outlined many useful 
details concerning the then British Permanent Representative 
to the European Community, Sir John Kerr. The article 
mentioned that Sir John lived at 17 Rue Ducale in Brussels, 
worked at 6 Rond-Point Schumann, and provided an interesting 
detail about his routine. Every week he briefed officials 
from the British Government. This involved a journey to 
London: 
999 which begins at the crack of 
dawn every Friday when 
Theo, his ginger-chopped Flemish driver, takes him in the 
armour-plated Jaguar to Zaventem airpoýt, whence he 
catches the 7 a. m. red-eye to London. 
3 
Thus the article identified the type of car in which 
Kerr travelled and what his chauffeur looked like, allowing 
34) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 423. J. Becker. Hitler's 
Children, 345. 
35) D. T. Schiller. "The European Experience", B. M. Jenkins 
(ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection (Stoneham, 
Massachusetts: Butterworth, 1985), 56-57. 
36) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 303. 
37) "Fine, remarkable, dirty and devious", The Spectator, 
April 9th 1994. 
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the assassin or kidnapper to positively identify the target, 
and gave useful details about Sir John's travel arrangements. 
This would make him a more tempting target than somebody 
about whom the potential assassins or kidnappers knew 
nothing. In line with best practice the routes of potential 
target should be varied, but these can become predictable 
over time unless much care is taken. 38 
In practice terrorist attacks on mobile targets are 
very common. According'to Russell and Miller 95% of 
abductions occur when the victim is in transit between home 
and work and 80% whilst the victim is in a vehicle whilst 
Scott states that 85% of all kidnappings and assassinations 
occur whilst the victim is in transit, though the latter term 
is undefined. 
39 In a comparative sample of political and non- 
political murders in Northern Ireland, Lyons and Harbinson 
found that whereas 85% of the non-political murders were 
committed in the home of the victim with only 12% occurring 
when travelling, with political murders only 6% occurred in 
the home and 74% occurred when travelling. 40 
It may seem that too much emphasis has been placed upon 
the possible effect of the release of a relatively small 
amount of information. However, people have been picked out 
as possible targets on the basis of seemingly insignificant 
snippets of knowledge. In 1972 the Basque group ETA selected 
the Spanish Prime Minister as a likely target for kidnapping 
or assassination when a minor part of his daily routine - the 
fact that he attended church at 9 a. m every day - became 
known. He was killed by a car-bomb in December 1973.41 
38) A. J. Scott. "Transportation Security", B. M. Jenkins (ed). 
Terrorism and Personal Protection, 358-359. P. Taylor. 
States of Terror, 80-82, shows how, despite route 
changes, it was possible for the Red Army Faction to 
launch an attack on the Commander of NATO forces in 
Europe, General Alexander Haig, in 1979. 
35) C. A. Russell & B. H. Miller. "Terrorist Targets and the 
Executive Target", Y-Alexander & R. A. Kilmarx (eds) 
Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and 
Response, (New York: Praegerl 1979), 69. A. J. Scotti. 
"Transportation Security"i B. M. Jenkins (ed). Terrorism 
and Personal Protection, 354. 
40) H. A. Lyons & H. J. Harbinson. "A Comparison of Political and 
Non-Political Murderers in Northern Ireland", 195. 
41) J. Agirre. Operation Ogro, 3. 
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Furthermore, British diplomats have been targets for both 
abduction or assassination over the past three decades. 
42 
With targets of opportunity information gathering is 
not as important. Attacks on these targets are normally 
carried out by individuals or groups who place themselves 
somewhere where targets are likely to present themselves. An 
example of this would be laying an ambush for a security 
force patrol in an area where such patrols are relatively 
frequent. For such an attack the terrorists usually must have 
some idea as to the likely location of possible targets, and 
have the appropriate weapons available. 
Reconnaissance of potential targets. 
For a pre-planned attack to succeed, the terrorists 
must usually establish where the target will be at a specific 
time. In the case of a fixed unprotected target, such as a 
building, this is not a problem. Similarly, if the intention 
is to leave a bomb in a public place where it can cause the 
maximum damage to people or surroundings, then the terrorist 
does not need to carry out much in the way of reconnaissance. 
However, if the target is a specific person or mobile 
object it is usually necessary to establish where the target 
will be at a given time. Even if it is immobile the 
terrorists need to know whether it is protected. They have to 
do this to gauge the degree of force needed to overcome any 
protective security, and to plan their escape after the 
operation has been carried out. 
The withdrawal of the operational team will be examined 
later in this chapterl butq with the exception of attackers 
who do not expect to survive the attack themselves, most 
operations are planned on the assumption that they will only 
proceed if there is a reasonable chance of the attackers 
42) C. E. Baumann. "Diplomatic Kidnappings", B. M. Jenkins (ed). 
Terrorism and Personal-Protection. A. Selth. Against 
Every Human Law: The Terrorist Threat-to Diplomacy, 
(Rushcutter's Bay: Australian National University 
Press, 1988)9 18-319 182. Central Intelligence Agency. 
Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980s (Washington 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981)9 10. J. Gellner. 
Bayonets in the Streets: Urban 
- guerrilla at 
home and 
abroad, (Don Mills, Ontario: Collier-Macmillan Canada, 
1974), 92-128. G. Jackson. People's Prison. J. Bowyer 
Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 71-72. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 308-309. 
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escaping. 43 Apart from the natural desire to survive on the 
part of the individual, most terrorist groups are not large 
enough to be able to risk heavy losses on a regular basis. 
The priority for terrorists seeking to attack a human 
target is to establish whether the target has a routine. Most 
people do, unless they deliberately vary it in order to avoid 
becoming a target. The requirements of work or other patterns 
in one's life, mean that people govern their lives according 
to the dictates of the clock. For example, in January 1982 
Italian police found written details concerning the 
observation of a Rome magistrate's routine by potntial 
assassins. 
In the morning he opens the curtains around 7.30. Between 
8.15 and 8.25 the men of his escort arrive outside the 
house. There are usually 3 of them: one stays at the 
wheel, the second gets out and looks around, the third 
goes up to the house and comes back with him. Between 
8.30 and 8.40 ... . 
44 
Reports concerning the observation of security force 
patrols by ETA and the Provisional IRA show that 
reconnaissance is used to establish the routine of members of 
enemy organisations, as well as that of specific individuals. 
By observing the patterns of patrols for instance, terrorists 
can determine when a security force patrol is likely to be in 
a particular place, and when it is likely to be vulnerable. 
In relation to a planned Provisional IRA ambush of a British 
Army patrol in May 1980, Dillon notes how the terrorists 
observed that vehicles were slowed down or stopped by the 
traffic lights at a busy junction. The ambushers commandeered 
a house overlooking the junction, and with an M60 medium 
machine-gun and rifles, waited for a military vehicle to 
appear. In this case it was in vain as the ambushers were 
themselves under surveillance, and the house was stormed at 
the cost of one soldier killed. 45 
Reconnaissance is frequently carried out by a separate 
terrorist unit to the one which actually carries out the 
attack. In line with the reorganisation of the Provisionals 
into a tightly-run cell system in the late 1970s, Dillon 
43) B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: The Other World 
War, 17. 
44) Corriere della Sera, January 13th 1987. 
45) M. Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 83-104. 
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notes that the reconnaissance of a potential target will 
often be carried out by an intelligence cell, with the attack 
itself being carried out by an Active Service Unit (ASU). 
46 
In the same fashion, Clark lists the reported activities of 
an intelligence cell of ETA which was arrested in May 1980. 
For four or five Sundays in a row they monitored the 
movements of a former Mayor of Bilbao in order to pass the 
information to an ETA assassination team. The resulting 
attempt was unsuccessfýil. The same group gathered information 
on the airports at Bilbao and Vitoria, in particular on the 
Civil Guard patrols which protected them. The intelligence 
cell obtained photographs, blueprints, and other information 
concerning electric power plants in Vizcaya Province, 
together with a list of people occupying key positions in the 
plants. They also gathered information concerning two members 
of the national police force who lived in Algorta*47 
Even for a target which is immobile, terrorists may 
carry out reconnaissance to ensure that the operation can be 
carried out according to plan. Katayama states that three 
members of the Japanese Red Army flew to Tel Aviv in 
September 1971 in order to reconnoitre Lod Airport. This 
included taking photographs within the airport. 
48 Likewise, 
two suspected PIRA members are reported to have been seen 
reconnoitring a Royal Marine training base in Devon in June 
1990 whilst under police surveillance, and police believed 
that PIRA members observed the Royal Marine barracks at Deal 
in Kent for two weeks before they bombed it. 49 Another raid 
on a PIRA safe house outside London found, amongst other 
things, Ordnance Survey maps of the areas around Salisbury 
Plain and Aldershot, areas which contain military bases. 
50 
46) M. Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 62. Details of a PIRA 
document captured in 1977 which outlined the 
reorganisation can be found in L. Clarke. Broadening the 
Battlefield, 251-253. 
47) R. P. Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 301. 
48) Y. Katayama. Terrorism in-Japan since 1969: A study of the 
activities of the Japanese Red Army, Ph. D, University 
of Aberdeen, 1989,82. 
49) "'IRA hit list and arsenal' were found in car", The 
Independent, January 23rd 1992. "Bandsman tells jury of 
escape in Deal bombing", The Independent, December 11th 
1990. 
50) "Arrests failed to stop attacks", The Independentq 
December 7th 1990. 
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An example of the way in which a routine aspect of 
one's life can lead to a vulnerability is the way in which 
churchgoing can become a rather hazardous practice for 
potential targets. Attacks upon targets who are in church, or 
are on their way to or from church or other places of 
worship, have long been popular. The victim is off-guard, and 
their presence at church is usually known in advance due to 
the predictability of pervice times. 
51 He cites the 
assassination attempt upon Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici at 
the Duomo in Florence in 1478 as an instance of this, but 
there are more recent examples to hand. 
52 In April 1925 the 
Bulgarian Cabinet was nearly wiped out by a bomb in the Sveta 
Nedelia Cathedral in Sofia. 53 Irish republican terrorists 
from the 1920s up to the present have assassinated or 
attempted to assassinate pre-selected individuals at church 
services, or on their way to or from them. 
54 The most 
prominent victim was Kevin O'Higgins - at that time Irish 
Vice-President, Minister of Justice and Minister for External 
Affairs - who was shot dead by members of a republican 
splinter group on his way to mass near Dublin on July 10th 
1927.55 
Attacking particular target groups is also easily 
undertaken if one attacks places of worship. All one has to 
know is when people are likely to be in the building for 
51) F. L. Ford. Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to 
Terrorism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
UniversTty Press, 1985), 136. 
52) F. L. Ford. Political Murder, 137. 
53) A. D. Harvey. "Research Note: The Attempt to Assassinate 
the Bulgarian Cabineti 16 April 1925", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 4, no. 1, (Spring 1992). 
54) R. Bell, R. Johnstone, R. Wilson (eds). "Chronology of 
events: 16.1.83", Troubled Times: Fortnight Magazine 
and the Troubles in Northern Ireland 1970-1991, 
(Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1991), 196. "Catholic judge 
killed by IRA", The Times, January 17th 1983. "Family 
ambushed by IRA after Mass", The Times April 9th 1984. 
The Guardian, April 9th 1984. "Travers murder weapons 
used in six other Belfast killings"l The Guardian, 
April 10th 1984. "Gunmen 'switched target"', The 
Guardian, April 11th 1984. T. Barry. Guerrilla Days in 
Ireland, 18-19. J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targetsl 
65-67. 
55) T. De Vere White. Kevin OHiggins, (Dublin: Anvil, 1948; 
1986), 240-242. J. J. Lee. Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics 
and Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 154. 
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religious services. Thus by attacking the mosque at Hebron, 
the Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldsteins was able to kill 
twenty-nine Palestinian Muslims. 56 Similarly, synagogues were 
attacked in Paris, Antwerp, Rome, and Vienna in the 1980s by 
terrorists aiming to attack Jewish targets. 
57 In Northern 
Ireland in November 1983, a group from the INLA sprayed the 
Mountain Lodge Gospel Hall in Darkley, county Armagh, with 
gunfire. Three Pentecostal Protestants died and seven were 
injured. 58 Eight years-earlier Loyalist gunmen had shot two 
Catholic students dead as they emerged from a church in 
Belfast. 59 In all of these cases identification of the 
targets was simple, because by being at the place of worship 
in question the targets revealed their religious affiliation, 
and thus minimised the need for detailed reconnaissance. 
Planning the operation. 
Having selected potential targets, and carried out a 
detailed enough reconnaissance to detect any vulnerabilities, 
the terrorists next determine how to attack the target. This 
aspect of the operation may be quite sketchy. When a target 
of opportunity suddenly presents itself to a terrorist group, 
little in the way of planning is necessary. Bruce and Dillon 
describe how Catholics and members of rival loyalist 
paramilitary groups became the targets of a UVF team on the 
Shankill Road, Belfast, when they were unfortunate enough to 
stray into the area where that group held sway. 
60 In such 
cases little planning is necessary. 
56) "The massacre of the innocents", The Independent, 
February 26th 1994. "Anger and violence erupt across 
the Muslim world", Independent on Sunday, February 27th 
1994. "Israel and PLO try to save peace", The Sunday 
Times, February 27th 1994. "Soldiers say Hebron killer 
was not alone", The Independent, March 18th 1994. 
57) G. Rosie. 
, 
The Directory of International Terrorism, 53, 
251. 
58) "Three die as gunmen fire on congregation"s The Guardians 
November 21st 1983. "The deadly gospel of a mad dog 
movement", The Guardians November 22nd 1983. "The 
hateful logic of the Pentecostal killings", The 
Economists November 26th 1983. J. Holland & H. McDonald. 
INLA, 2T5-227. 
59) "Family ambushed by IRA after Mass", The Times, April 9th 
1984. The Guardiant April 9th 1984. 
60) S. Bruce. 
, 
The Red Hand, 54-56. M. Dillon. The Shankill 
Butchersq 65,192-195,1989 207. 
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On other occasions a great deal of time may be spent on 
planning attacks. Bowyer Bell disputes whether terrorists on 
the run have the time to formulate complex operations whilst 
at the same time evading the attentions of the security 
agencies. 
61 Alternatively, the former Carabinieri officer 
Capotorto suggests that terrorists have a great deal of time 
available in which they have little else to do but plan their 
operations. 62 The circumstances of different groups may vary, 
but the weight of the evidence suggests that Capotorto is 
closer to the reality. Bowyer Bell's account relates more 
closely to the very intense period of encounter gun-battles 
in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s where a number of PIRA 
members would drive around their area looking for soldiers to 
fire upon. 63 That was a period of incessant violence, and as 
Bowyer Bell recognises elsewhere, since that period a greater 
degree of planning takes place before PIRA attacks are 
carried out, even against straightforward military targets in 
Northern Ireland. 64 
This can be seen from the above-mentioned attempt to 
ambush British Army convoys in Belfast in 1980 and PIRA 
spokesmen have admitted that it is now more difficult to 
attack British soldiers successfully. 
65 The way in which 
patrols are now coordinated in mutually supporting patterns, 
operating in tandem with strategically placed observation 
posts, makes it more difficult for terrorists to be sure that 
they can get away safely after an attack. 66 For that reason 
61) J. Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent 
Inefficiency of the Underground". 
62) G. Capotorto, "How Terrorists look at Kidnappings", 
B. M. Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection, 3. 
63) P. Bishop & E. Mallie, The Provisional IRAq 192-1939 196- 
197,246. Interview with Brendan Hughes in F. Martin 
(dir). Behind the Mask, video. 
64) J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 61-65. 
65) "IRA admits mounting difficulty in Ulster attacks"i The 
Guardian, January 7th 1984. "IRA rings changes to 
restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987. 
66) M. Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, (London: 
Arms & Armour Press, 1985), 180-186. D. Hamill. Pig in 
the Middle, 119,133,141. M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 
398-417. The veracity of Dewar's remarks on operational 
methods can be judged by the fact that they have been 
partially reproduced in a republican magazine. 
"Operational comments of a British Army officer", Iris, 
11, (October 1987). 
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the previous unplanned mode of attack is not only obsolete, 
but potentially suicidal, 
Terrorist groups do not plan their operations in a 
uniform fashion. With the exception of targets of 
opportunityý there is normally some form of planning. With 
small autonomous groups, such as the first generation of the 
Red Army Factionj planning seems to be have been done in the 
manner of general discussion by those directly involved, 
although with the process dominated by the more vocal members 
of the group. 67 On the other hand the Red Brigades, at least 
in their most successful period in the mid 1970s, had what 
Caselli and della Porta term a "centralised and oligarchic 
bureaucracy". 68 Plans were approved by the Executive 
Committee, and then delegated to the columns for execution, 
although Moss states that there were considerable differences 
between the theory of a highly centralised organisation and 
the practice of a fairly decentralised one where local groups 
picked their own targets and disregarded orders from above469 
In the PIRA, because the control of weapons is usually at the 
brigade or battalion level - one level above the operational 
active service units, plans for attacks generally have to be 
cleared at the next level above before they are allowed to 
proceed. 
70 
The insertion of weapons into the area of operations. 
The weapons used by terrorists can vary from the 
crudest of weapons up to extremely sophisticated explosive 
devices. On the one hand Allen Feldman quotes a UDA gunman as 
saying: 
67) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 92-93. B. A. Scharlau. 
Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
176. J. M. Post. "Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite: The 
Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour"o International 
Journal of Group Psychotherapy, 36, no 2, (April 1986), 
216. 
68) G. C. Caselli & D-della Porta. "The history of the Red 
Brigades", 82. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 84-85. 
69) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-wing Violence in Italy, 57. 
70) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA"q The Independent, November 
11th 1987. L. Clarke. Broadening the Battlefieldl 252. 
B. O'Brien. The Long War, 158. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 312. 
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You can go in and terrorize you5lnext-door neighbour if 
you have a hammer in your hand. 
On the other hand the Red Army Faction bomb which killed the 
President of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, in 1989, 
was detonated by a photoelectronic cell which projected an 
infra-red beam across the road onto a reflector which 
returned it. When Herrhausen's car broke the beam the bomb 
exploded, fatally wounding Herrhausen. 
72 
Knives or heavy, blunt objects can be used against 
people or objects which have little in the way of 
protection. 73 The Naxalites, an Indian Maoist movement which 
flourished in the late 1960s and early 1970s, used knives 
partly because of the psychological effect which the use of 
such ferocious methods would have upon landowners - what the 
Naxalites termed 'feudal elements' - whom the Naxalites 
wished to scare out of the countryside of West Bengal. 
74 Such 
weapons also have the advantage that if one is stopped by the 
police with a knife or a hammer, it is possible to make up 
some form of explanation. Trying to explain away a pistol or 
a quantity of explosives could be somewhat difficult by 
comparison. 
75 As a result such weapons, whilst limited in the 
amount of damage which they can do, are relatively easily 
transported to the place of an operation. 
Other weapons are more difficult to get into the area 
where the operation is to take place. From the terrorists 
point of view, the ideal would be for the attackers to carry 
the weapons to the area of operations, use the weapons, and 
then withdraw. Sometimes this happens. In 1977 Patricia 
Clough, Rome correspondent for The Times, described how the 
typical maiming attack was carried out by communist terrorist 
groups in Italy. 
The scene is almost always the same: the victim leaves 
his home for work at the usual hour and on the way to his 
71) A. Feldman. Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the 
Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991) 48. 
72) U. S. Department of States Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 
Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices, (Washington 
DC: U. S. Department of State, 1994), 3-9. 
73) M. Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 66-67. 
74) B. Dasgupta. The Naxalite 
- 
Movement (pub New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers, 1974), 409 45-46. 
75) S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 183-184. 
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car, bus stop or office, notices two or three young 
people in jeans standing idly in the street. 
As he approaches they pull out pistols, aim carefully 
at his legs and fire repeatedly. He fallsq shouting for 
help, while his assa ants run to a waiting car and are 
driven off at speed. 
In cases like this the weapons appear to be carried to and 
from the attack by the terrorists. The risk is that they may 
be apprehended either before or after the operation and, 
arrested for possession of an illegal weapon if not killed in 
a gun-fight. If forensic evidence such as ballistics tests 
can link the weapon to terrorist operations, the person found 
in possession of the weapon could be charged with 
participation in whatever killings, woundings, or other 
offences, have been carried out with that weapon. 
For this reason some groups use couriers to move 
weapons to the point where they are to be used, or to a safe 
house which is close to the point where the attack is to take 
place, and then remove them after they have been used. Thus a 
gunman can only be caught in possession of a gun for the 
short period when he is using it, or waiting for the target 
to appear. 77 By minimising the amount of time that a gunman 
has possession of the gun, the chances of him being 
apprehended with it are also minimised. Terrorist groups are 
rarely large enough to be able to afford the loss of their 
most skilled operators, whether gunmen, bomb-makers, or bomb- 
setters. In some cases, the operator might be suspected by 
the authorities and is therefore more liable to be stopped 
and searched even if he cannot be arrested. The courier on 
the other hand should be somebody who is not suspected by the 
authorities, who is not likely to arouse suspicion, and who 
is ultimately more expendable than a skilled terrorist 
operator. 
Getting bombs into the area of operations is in some 
ways similar to the problems involved in moving guns, except 
that some bombs are far bulkier. Small bombs can be carried 
on the person. The incendiary devices used by the PIRA as 
part of their economic campaign are no larger than a cassette 
76) "Scenario for a knee-cap job in Italy", The Times, July 
23rd 1977. 
77) G. Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla-Warfare, 66. A. Feldman. 
Formations of Violence, 42-45. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 247-248. 
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tape holder, and can easily be carried into a shop by a 
terrorist, and then placed so as to cause damage. 78 Bulkier 
bombs can also be moved into position if adequately 
disguised. Thus one PIRA member noted: 
if someone is to carry a bomb in a pram, it is better ýýat 
a woman is pushing the pr m, because a man doing 
that might attract attention". 
19 
Women seem to be frequently used to carry guns or bombs on 
the supposition that the security forces, or anybody else who 
is looking out for terrorist attacks, will be less likely to 
suspect a woman of involvement in terrorist activities, or 
indeed search her. 80 
Large bombs have been carried in vehicles. Putting a 
bomb into a car or another form of vehicle is a common way of 
getting it into the proximity of the target. 81 In March 1985 
an attempt was made, allegedly with the connivance of the CIA 
and the Lebanese intelligence agencies, to kill the spiritual 
leader of the Hizbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, with a massive car 
bomb in Beirut. The attempt failed, but eighty people were 
killed in the explosion. 82 The bombing of the Israeli Embassy 
in London in July 1994 was carried out with a bomb placed in 
the boot of a car which was then parked close to the 
Embassy. 83 Extremely large bombs have been placed in larger 
vehicles. The bombs which devastated the Baltic Exchange in 
the City of London and damaged the A5 flyover at Staples 
Corner in April 1992 were placed in vans, and the bomb which 
78) "New devices used in NI explosions", July 12th 1983. 
"Incendiary devices increasingly used in terror 
attacks", The Independentj December 2nd 1991. 
"Simplicity of incendiary device makes disruption 
easy"l The Guardian, December 24th 1991. 
79) E. MacDonald- Shoot the Women First, 158. 
80) E. MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 73,169. G. Grivas - 
Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare, 66, A. Horne. A Savage War 
of Peace, 184-186. 
81) B. A. Salamanca. "Vehicle Bombs: Death on Wheels"s 
N. C. Livingstone & T-E. Arnold (eds). Fighting Back: 
Winning the War Against Terrorism, (Lexingtong 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986)9 40-42. 
82) D. C. Martin & J. Walcott. Best Laid Plans., 219-220. 
B. Woodward. Veil: The Secret Wars-of the CIA, 1981- 
1987, (London: Simon Schuster, 1987), 395-398. 
83) "Iran blamed for embassy car bomb", The Times, July 27th 
1994. "Hunt for woman car bomber", The Daily Telegraph, 
July 27th 1994. 
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wrecked buildings around Bishopsgate, again in the City, in 
April 1993 was placed in a truck. 84 
At an extreme there are those bombs which are brought 
to the area of the operation by what can be termed 'suicide' 
bombers, that is people who will carry the bomb to the target 
and detonate it whilst so close to the explosion that they 
are likely to be killed themselves. This method is neither 
new nor necessarily confined to religious groups. In 1881, an 
assassin from the Peopýe's Will was killed by the powerful 
bomb which he threw at the carriage of Tsar Alexander II, 
whilst Savinkov describes how Social Revolutionaries carried 
bombs to the vicinity of their intended targets and detonated 
them in the expectation, not necessarily realised, that they 
too would be killed in the explosion. 85 
Suicide bomb attacks are commonly used by the Sri 
Lankan LTTE, as noted regarding the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi at Madras in April 1991.86 A similar method was used 
to kill Sri Lanka's President Premadasa in May 1993, whilst 
suicide bombers have killed several members of the Indian and 
Sri Lankan military by running into troop emplacements and 
convoys with explosives strapped to their bodies. 87 Islamic 
groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas have also used suicide 
bombers, usually driving vehicle bombs into protected targets 
such as the Hizbollah attacks on the US Embassies in Beirut 
and Kuwait in 1983. However, unprotected targets have also 
been attacked. In April 1994 a Hamas suicide car bomb attack 
was made on a school bus at Afula in Israel, killing eight 
84) "IRA bombs were biggest ever", The Independent on Sunday) 
April 12th 1992. "London counts the cost of IRA bombs"i 
The Independentq April 13th 1992. "Back-to-work City 
defies the IRA", The Times, April 13th 1992. "Security 
to be stepped up in City after blast", The Independenti 
April 26th 1993. "Taxpayers foot IRA bomb bill", The 
Times, April 26th 1993. B. O'Brien. The Long War, 272- 
273. 
85) E. Crankshaw. The Shadow of the Winter Palace, 315-318. 
B. Savinkov. Memoirs'of a Terroris_tl 48,58-70. 
86) "Rajiv Gandhi assassinated in bomb blast", The Times, May 
22nd 1991. "Rajiv Gandhi murdered by bombers at 
election rally", The Independent, May 22nd 1991. "What 
One-Eyed Jack knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991. 
87) "Suicide bomber murders president of Sri Lanka", The 
Independent on-Sunday, May 2nd 1993. "Tamil Tigers 
blamed as bomb kills president", The Times, May 2nd 
1993. "Dignity and death with the-Freedom Birds", The 
Independent on-Sunday, May 26th 1991. 
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people including the bomber, in revenge for the above- 
mentioned massacre of twenty-nine Muslims in the Hebron 
mosque by Baruch Goldstein. 88 
There are also cases where people are forced or tricked 
into planting bombs by terrorists. The use of such 'proxy' 
bombs by the Provisional IRA became fairly common in Northern 
Ireland, and more recently in England. In such cases a person 
is held by members of the group and told that friends or 
members of his family, -who are also being held by the 
terrorists, will be harmed if he does not drive a vehicle 
containing a bomb to the location of the target. Usually the 
person has enough time to get away from the vehicle before it 
explodes-89 However, in a refinement of that tactics on 
October 24th 1990, PIRA groups held the families of three 
men, and tied the men into vehicles which they were told to 
drive into British Army checkpoints. Two of the bombs 
detonated, killing six soldiers and one of the 'proxy' 
bombers and injuring another thirty-five people. 
90 In all 
three cases the Provisionals claimed that the men concerned 
were 'collaborators', people carrying out work which the PIRA 
deemed to be helping the security forces. Thus the dead 
civilian 'proxy' bomber was a kitchen assistant for the 
Ministry of Defence. 91 However, it appears that the 
Provisionals have stopped using a method which resulted in 
the death of the proxy due to the revulsion which this caused 
amongst people who were normally their supporters. 92 
88) "Hamas takes revenge for Hebron", The Independent, April 
7th 1994. "Nine die in suicide attack on school bus"i 
The Times, April 7th 1994. "Rabin dubbed traitor as 
Afula buries its dead", The Times, April 8th 1994. 
89) "IRA 'Proxy Bombs' Blast Belfast", The Times, July 26th 
1974. "'Human-bomb' attack fails", The Independent, 
December 21st 1990. "'Human bomb' attack denounced"i 
The Independent, February 5th 1991. "Taxi forced to 
cruise West End with IRA bomb", The Independent, June 
17th 1992. "Mini-cab drivers 'in deep shock' after 
hijacking", The Independents April 26th 1993. "IRA's 
new tactic breaches security forces' defences", The 
Independent, October 25th 1990. 
90) "IRA uses human bombs", The Independent, October 25th 
1990. "Seven dead in IRA 'human bomb' attacks", The 
Times, October 25th 1990. "Sitting ducks for the IRA 
killers", The Sunday Correspondent, October 28th 1990. 
91) "IRA uses human bombs"t The Independents October 25th 
1990. "Hume denounces IRA 'cowards"', The Independent, 
October 26th 1990. 
92) B. O'Brien. The Long War, 52,56. 
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Proxies can also be tricked into carrying bombs. In 
April 1986 Nizar Hindawi, reportedly a Jordanian working for 
Syrian military intelligence rather than a non-state groupt 
packed a hold-all for his girlfriend who was due to fly on an 
El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv. He had promised that he 
would follow her out, and that they would be married there. 
In fact Hindawi had placed a bomb in the hold-all without his 
girlfriend's knowledge; The bomb, which was found by El Al 
security staff at Heathrow, was timed to explode while the 
aeroplane was in flight. 93 
The insertion of the operator or operational team. 
The successful execution of a terrorist operation 
demands that the relevant operational member or members of 
the terrorist group are able to get into a position where 
they can attack the target. In some cases this means getting 
physically close to the target and staying close to the 
target when the attack takes place. At other times this is 
not necessary. 
Where there is little protection for a human target 
whom the terrorists have decided to kill, a close quarter 
assassination is a simple option. This merely requires that 
the assassin gets close to the target, kills him or her, and 
gets away. In an interview in 1983, the then INLA leader 
Dominic McGlinchey pointed out the importance of getting 
close to the target for attacks with a gun. 
** I usually like to get in close, to minimise the risk ior 
myself. It's usually just a matter of who gets in 
first and by getting in close you put your man down 
first. ... I wouldn't be as good as they are at shooting 
it out over distances because I don't get the opportunity 
for weapons and target train ng like they do. So I 
believe in getting in close. 
ý4 
Of course access to the target is much easier if one of the 
terrorists is a relation or friends as was noted above in the 
case of Jurgen Ponto, the chairman of the Dresdner Bank who 
was shot dead during a kidnapping attempt in July 1977. 
93) E. F. Mickolus, T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. International 
Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987,376-378. S. Emerson & 
B. Duffy. The Fall of Pan Am 103,199-200. 
94) K. Heskin. "The Terrorists' Terrorist: Vincent Browne's 
interview with Dominic McGlinchey", Y. Alexander & 
A. O'Day (eds). Ireland's Terrorist Dilemma, (Dordrecht, 
The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 100. 
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Gun attacks can also take place from a longer range, 
obviating the need to overcome close protection around the 
target as long as the gun and ammunition are powerful enough. 
In April 1991 the Red Army Faction assassinated Detlev 
Rohwedder, the head of the Treuhand, an agency responsible 
for privatising or liquidating companies in the former East 
Germany. Rohwedder was shot dead as he worked in the study of 
his Dusseldorf villa by a sniper from across the street using 
a precision made rifle. 
95 In August 1993 a police raid in 
Belfast found, amongst other weapons, a Tejas -50 calibre 
rifle, reported to be capable of firing armour-piercing 
rounds up to a range of between one and three miles. At about 
the same time a similar rifle was being used to kill soldiers 
and police officers in the border areas of Northern 
Ireland-96 
Terrorists can often plant bombs quite openly. An 
indiscriminate bombing can be carried out by leaving down an 
innocuous bag or package - which in fact contains a bomb - in 
a public place. To do this it is not necessary to overcome 
any security arrangements or inspections, although in some 
cases bombers have been detected, usually on recordings 
examined after the event, on closed circuit television 
(CCTV). Thus in March 1993 two English-born members of the 
Provisional IRA were recognised and arrested after the police 
released still pictures from a security camera which showed 
them planting a bomb outside Harrods department store in 
London. 97 In the case of the explosion in the Grand Hotel at 
Brighton in October 1984, which killed five people and nearly 
killed members of the British Cabinet, the bomb was placed 
95) "German terror group admits assassination", The 
Independent, April 3rd 1991. "East German reforms hit 
by murder of privatisation chief", The Times, April 3rd 
1991. "The gap left by Rohwedder", The Economist, April 
6th 1991. B. Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tacticss 
Trends, and Potentialities", Terrorism and Political 
to 
Violence, 5, no. 2, (Summer 1993), 16. 
96) Long-range rifle in Ulster haul", The Independents 
August 18th 1993. "American sniper rifle found in arms 
cache", The Times, August 18th 1993. "One-mile range 
rifle found", The Daily Telegraph, August 18th 1993. 
97) "Video 'filmed IRA bombers at Harrods"q The Independents 
April 14th 1994. "English-born bombers get 30 years for 
IRA blasts", The Guardian, May 14th 1994. "'Proud' IRA 
bombers jailed for 30 years", The Independents May 14th 
1994. 
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nearly a month beforehand, being detonated by an adaptation 
of the timer device from a video recorder. The bomber had 
booked a room in the hotel, and when a colleague arrived, 
assembled and planted the bomb almost at leisure. The bomber 
and his accomplice left the hotel weeks before the bomb 
exploded. 
98 
In other cases getting the assailants close to the 
target can involve rather more effort. The problems which the 
terrorists can face are avoiding recognition before the 
attack is carried out, thus alerting the target or those 
protecting the target, and overcoming the physical security 
protecting the target. An example of how both were achieved 
in one operation is provided by the abduction of Aldo Moro, 
the President of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and a 
former Prime Minister who was kidnapped in Rome on March 16th 
1978, and held for fifty-five days before being killed. 
When the Red Brigades were planning to kidnap Aldo Moro 
one of the problems they had to overcome was the physical 
security provided by five armed bodyguards, two in the car 
containing Moro, and three in an escort car which followed. 
They decided to overcome this by killing all of the 
bodyguards with overwhelming firepower. This involved a 
number of terrorists armed with automatic weapons. The 
problem was how to place a number of people with sub-machine 
guns in the proximity of the ambush site in Via Fani in such 
a way as not to arouse suspicion. The kidnappers had noticed 
that the area around the Via Fani was popular with staff from 
the Italian airline Alitalia. Consequently they bought caps 
and stole material similar to that used by Alitalia, and made 
uniforms from it. Each terrorist in the firing team carried a 
leather bag similar to those used by Alitalia staff to carry 
clothes, toiletries and so forth necessary when flying 
abroad; except in this case they carried sub-machine guns. 
The firing team was able to shelter by a bar which had gone 
out of business. On the morning of the ambush, a white Fiat 
128 estate car with diplomatic licence plates overtook Moro's 
convoy and deliberately reversed into Moro's car. The escort 
car was unable to stop and hit Moro's car from behind. The 
driver and passenger in the Fiat 128 got out and shot the 
98) P. Bishop & E. Mallie - The Provisional IRA, 423-424. 
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bodyguards in Moro's car whilst the men in Alitalia uniforms 
took their guns from the bags, stepped out from the cover 
afforded by the bar, and raked the escort vehicle with 
gunfire. The wounded bodyguards were finished off with shots 
to the head whilst Moro, who had not been wounded, was 
dragged from his car and bundled into a Fiat 132. Thus the 
abductors succeeded in neutralising Moro's security, by 
disguising some of the abductors, by the use of overwhelming 
firepower, and by the 9peed of the operation. " 
The execution of a terrorist operation. 
The previous example demonstrates that, with the 
exception of the latter stages of sieges or hijacks, the main 
characteristic of a terrorist operation is speed. According 
to Scotti the Moro abduction took only forty-five seconds 
from the moment when Moro's car was stopped to the bundling 
of Moro into a van brought for the purpose. 
100 George Grivas 
recommended in the 1950s that ambushes of military patrols or 
convoys should not be allowed to last for more than five 
minutes. 
101 The aim is to carry out the operation in such a 
way that the active part of the operation has been concluded 
before the target or any possible reinforcements have had the 
time to react effectively. 
Bombings or attacks with guns should only take as long 
to execute as is needed to fire a shot or detonate a bomb. 
Indeed, as with the Brighton explosion, the person placing 
the bomb need not necessarily be in the vicinity when the 
bomb explodes if it has a timerg anti-handling device, or any 
mechanism which is capable of triggering an explosion without 
needing the bomber to positively set the device off himself. 
The main condition is that the job is done properly. Apart 
from the publicity, and possibly the shock to the 
psychological target, there is little point in attempting to 
kill somebody or destroy something and then failing to do it. 
It represents a waste of resources and provides the enemy 
with the opportunity to protect that target against future 
99) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 113,117. P. Willan. 
Puppet Masters, 214-215. P-W-Little. "Abduction and 
Assassination Reconsidered"s TVI Report, 8, no. 3$ 
(1989), 17-18. 
100) A. J. Scotti. "Transportation Security", 354. 




attacks. For this reason an effective terrorist operation 
should be conducted in such a way as to minimise the chance 
of failure. Thus Rajiv Gandhi's assassin, a suicide bomber, 
walked right up to him before setting off her explosives. 
102 
Likewise, various accounts of gun attacks at close-quarters 
show that the assailants frequently shoot the victim a number 
of times - once or twice to get them on the ground, and then 
a few shots into the head to make sure they are dead. 103 
Close quarter bomb attacks are obviously dangerous for 
the perpetratorl although obviously this is not a problem for 
suicide bombers the terrorists because the perpetrator is not 
expected to survive. An example of this would be the occasion 
in April 1983 when a member of Hizbollah drove a vehicle-bomb 
into the US Embassy in Beirut and detonated it, killing 63 
people. 104 However, small explosive devices such as hand 
grenades or small bombs can be thrown at either human 
targets, or at material targets such as vehicles or 
buildings, sometimes with lethal effect. 105 Once the 
operation has been executed the most important factor for the 
terrorist is the ability to escape. 
The withdrawal of the operational team. 
Except in the case of suicide bombers, proxy bombers, 
hijackings, and sieges, terrorist groups plan their 
operations on the assumption that the attackers must get away 
immediately after the operation has been carried out. Even 
when the terrorists do remain in the public eye for a while, 
they usually have some idea as to escape plans. Thus in 
102) "Rajiv Gandhi murdered by bombers at election rally"t 
The Independentq May 22nd 1991. "What One-Eyed Jack 
knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991. 
103) "IRA kills leading Ulster politician"t The Times, 
December 8th 1983. "Attacks on perjury personnel", 
AP/RN, December 8th 1983. T. P. Coogan. Michael Collinst 
116. T. P. Coogan. On the Blanket: The H-Block Storyl 
(Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980), 205,232. P. Taylor. 
States of Terror, 106. 
104) R. Fisk. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at Warl (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1990; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)9 
478-480. D. C. Martin & J. Walcott. Best Laid Plans, 104- 
105. 
105) "Soldier and boy hurt in IRA 'coffee jar' bomb attack", 
The Independent, April 28th 1992. "Limpet mine raid on 
police car wounds 21 people"i The Independent on 
Sunday, June 28th 1992. D. McKittrick. Despatches from 
Belfast, 195. B. O'Brien. The Long War, 154-155. 
Tactics 153 
December 1975 a terrorist group led by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, 
widely known as 'Carlos', stormed the Vienna conference of 
OPEC (Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries), and took the 
various government ministers there hostage. 106 Carlos 
mentioned to one of the ministers his plan to demand that the 
kidnappers and their hostages be flown safely out of Austria. 
According to Dobson and Payne they were originally to be 
flown to Tripoli, but ended up in Algiers. 107 
Where the operation involves leaving a bomb to explode 
some time afterwards, the withdrawal of the terrorists is not 
really a problem. In other cases someone has to remain in the 
vicinity of the target until the operation is concluded. 
Examples of this include a shooting, or a bomb which requires 
that the terrorist can see the target when detonating the 
device - for example a remore-controlled land-mine. 
108 In 
these cases the terrorist group must plan some form of 
getaway before carrying out the operation. 
The most obvious example of the need for a getaway plan 
is when an abduction takes place. For the Moro kidnapping the 
escape route was well planned. After the bodyguards had been 
eliminated, Moro was bundled out of his car into a waiting 
Fiat 132 and driven off. One of the abductors left on a 
motor-cycle whilst the others left in a Fiat 128. The Fiat 
132 was only driven for a relatively short distance, before 
Moro was transferred to a Fiat van. This was driven to an 
underground car park, where Moro was put into a packing case 
which was loaded into another Fiat van. From there Moro was 
taken to a safe flat which had been prepared in the Via 
Montalcani. 109 
106) There is some dispute as to who sponsored this 
operation. Dobson and Payne mention Iraq, Algeria, 
Libya, and the PFLP as'more obviously interested 
parties', with the USSR as having an interest in seeing 
the kidnapping succeed in weakening OPEC. Yallop on the 
other hand points the finger more directly at Iraq 
acting through the PFLP. C. Dobson & R. Payne. The Carlos 
Complex,, 126-127. D. Yallop. To the Ends of the Earth: 
The Hunt for the Jackal, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993)9 
375-376,378-379. 
107) C. Dobson & R-Payne. The Carlos Complex, 999 119. 
D. Yallop. To the Ends of the Earth, 396-397. 
108) "IRA land-mines hard to detect", The Guardiang April 
10th 1990. 
109) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 110-118. P. Willan. 
Puppet Masters, 238. 
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Even less sophisticated operations require an escape 
route. When carrying out sniper attacks, the Provisional IRA 
and the INLA place a premium on 'runbacks', that is a secure, 
shortj escape route from the vicinity of the attack to either 
a safe house, or to a car which will get them away from the 
area. 110 Dillon's account of planned PIRA attacks on British 
Army patrols emphasises that a great deal of attention was 
placed on the terrorists knowing beforehand where to run to 
after the shooting had ended. 
"' 
When the escape route is not planned or reconnoitred 
sufficiently the results can be fatal for the terrorists 
concerned. In February 1992 a Provisional IRA unit, 
consisting of at least four meng attacked an RUC station with 
a truck-mounted heavy machine-gun and automatic rifle fire. 
After the attack the PIRA unit drove the truck to the car 
park of a church a mile or so away, where they planned to 
dump the truck and transfer into cars that they had left 
there. A British Army unit, probably Special Air Service, was 
waiting there and killed four Provisionals. 112 The amount of 
time spent getting from the attack site to the change-over 
point was excessive, and the terrorists appear to have made 
no attempt to secure the change-over site before the truck 
returned. They were sitting ducks for the Army ambush and 
suffered the consequences of not planning a withdrawal 
properly. 
The issue of communiques. 
Usually, though not always, the terrorist group will 
issue a communique after an operation in order to justify the 
attack, and often to propagate their political beliefs. On 
the other hand some groups do not claim responsibility for 
operations. After the assassination of the Sri Lankan 
Minister of State for Defence General Wijeratne in March 
1991, the new Defence Secretary brushed aside denials of 
110) A. Feldman. Formations Of Violence, 42-45. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 247-248. 
111) M. Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 85 
112) "Four shot dead as army traps IRA gang", The Times, 
February 17th 1992. "Army jubilant at killing of IRA 
men"s "Soldiers lay in wait for IRA gang to return", 
both in The Independenti February 18th 1992. "Cleared 
IRA man shot by SAS9 The Times, February 18th 1992. 
B-O'Brien. The Long Wa-, 232-234. 
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responsibility by the Tamil Tigers on the basis that they 
never claim responsibility for operations. 113 Indeed the LTTE 
strenuously denied responsibility for the assassination of 
Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, despite the fact that following the 
killing the Indian police unearthed an extensive LTTE network 
which was almost certainly involved. 114 An illustration of 
this element of terrorist tactics, and of the way in which a 
terrorist operation takes place, can be seen in the 
assassination of the Northern Irish unionist politician, 
Edgar Graham. 
Case study. The assassination of Edgar Graham: Belfast, 
December 7th 1983. 
Edgar Graham's killing was an example of a typical 
close quarters assassination of a relatively unprotected 
target. Graham, a twenty-nine year old law lecturer, and by 
all accounts a young 'rising star' in the politics of the 
Ulster Unionist Party, was shot dead outside Queen's 
University, Belfastj on December 7th 1983.115 Coogan states 
that Graham was involved in advising the Northern Irish 
prison service, and Kelley believes that he had written a 
report recommending a ban on Sinn Fein, the internment of 
Sinn Fein's leaders, and the expulsion of republicans from 
public bodies in Northern Ireland. 
116 Most notably, as is 
shown in a letter which Graham wrote to The Times, he had 
strongly and publicly supported the use of 'supergrasses't 
that is the acceptance of the uncorroborated statements of 
informers as evidence in the trials of suspected terrorists 
in the juryless 'Diplock' courts. 117 This was at a time when 
113) "LTTE denies hand in killing of Wijeratne", The Hindu: 
International Edition, March 16th 1991. "LTTE blamed 
for Wijeratne's killing"l The Hindu: International 
Edition, March 23rd 1991. 
114) "Plotting Eelam's future", The Independent, June 15th 
1991. "Head of Gandhi murder squad dies after siege"t 
The Independent, August 21st 1991. "Enough evidence to 
implicate LTTE chief", The Hindu; International 
Edition, February 8th 1992. 
115) "IRA kills leading Ulster Politician", The Times, 
December Sth 1983. 
116) T. P. Coogan. The IRA (Glasgow: Fontana/Collinsg 1987), 
690. K. J. Kelley. The Longes. t War, 357-358. 
117) "Letters: Use of supergrasses in N Ireland", The Times, 
September 17th 1983. For details of the use of 
supergrasses see S. C. Greer. "The Supergrass System in 
Northern Ireland", P-Wilkinson & A. M. Stewart (eds). 
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both republican and loyalist terrorist groups in Northern 
Ireland found themselves coming under increasing pressure 
because of the use of the supergrasses by the authorities. 
Thus he was a potential terrorist target. 
The assassination of Edgar Graham was described in some 
detail in a report in The Times. 
The terrorists struck soon after Mr Graham ... had walked from his car and was talking with a colleague on the 
pavement near the finiversity's law library. 
Two men in casual dress came out of the university 
buildings. One of them pulled a high velocity pistol from 
a folder of papers and shot Mr Graham in the back of the 
head at point blank range. 
As he fell to the ground, blood pouring from the 
wound, the gunman fired three more shots before running 
off and passing the pistol to his colleague. 
... As a lecturer on his way to a regular tutorial, 
Mr Graham's movements would have known within the 
university. 118 
Although Graham had a pistol for personal protection, the 
account in The Times noted that he had no opportunity to use 
it. 
The following day the Sinn Fein publication An 
Phoblacht/Republican News carried their account of the 
killing, provided the PIRA's rationale for it, and concluded 
with a threat to those who opposed them. 
Today's execution of Edgar Graham by the IRA should be a 
salutary lesson to those loyalists who stand full-square 
behind the laws and forces of the repression of the 
nationalist people. 
Edgar Graham and his colleagues rejoiced in the 
assassinations of republicans whether or not they were 
IRA volunteers or unarmed political activists. And Mr 
Graham himself supported the corruption of even British 
law on the use of show trials and paid perjurers. 
Let the loyalist politicians, who make the ammunition 
for the British army, UDR and RUC to fire, understand 
that they cannot escape the repercus Ti? ns of their 
incitement to murder and repression. 
This last comment was clearly meant to intimidate those who 
had publicly supported the use of supergrasses. The Sinn Fein 
Contemporary Research on Terrorism. T. Gifford. 
Supergrasses: The use of accomplice evidence in 
Northern Ireland, (London: The Cobden Trustj 1984). 
"How the informer casts a shadow over justice in 
Ulster", The Guardian, July 29th 1983. 
118) "IRA kills leading Ulster Politician", The Times, 
December 8th 1983. For the PIRA account see "Attacks on 
perjury personnel", AP/RN, December Sth 1983. 
119) "Incitement answered", AP/RN, December 8th 1983. 
Tactics 157 
President 9 Gerry Adams, was subsequently reported to have 
said that the PIRA contention was that Graham was "... trying 
to heap on further repression". 120 
This example demonstrates the characteristics of a 
close quarters assassination of a target of medium-level 
importance. As The Times observed, Graham's routine was 
obviously quite well known. The assasssins knew when and 
where to find himg and he was attacked when he was totally 
off-guard. The assassin concealed the weapon until the last 
possible moment, and once Graham was down the assassin 
ensured that he was dead by firing more shots into his head 
at close range. Having killed Graham, the assassin 
transferred the weapon to a courier so as not to be caught in 
possession of it, and made a rapid withdrawal from the scene 
of the attack. Soon after the assassination a communique was 
released seeking to justify the attack by reference to the 
supposed iniquities of the victim, and threatening similar 
attacks upon others who supported the Government. A possible 
result of the death of Edgar Graham was to discourage young 
men and women from becoming involved in constitutional 
politics in Northern Ireland. 121 Thus the terrorists showed 
that they had the motive, means, and opportunity to carry out 
this killing. 
Summary. 
Terrorist operations are not merely concerned with 
killing people or destroying objects. To produce the intended 
political and psychological effects the terrorists must 
attack the right people or objects and preferably achieve 
their intended result without being killed or captured 
themselves. Attacks on targets of opportunity are by 
definition relatively unplanned except insofar as the 
assailants have their weapons available at the time. 
Therefore some of the points in this chapter do not apply. 
However, where a degree of planning has gone into an attack 
one will normally find that the terrorists have carried out a 
number of steps which will make a successful result more 
likely. 
120) "We've Got the Spectators Involved", Newsweek, January 
16th 1984. 
121) Conversation in Belfast, September 1993. 
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These steps include choosing suitable targets, 
gathering information on these targets, planning the 
operation, and then, where appropriate, ensuring that the 
terrorists get away after the operation. The easier it 
appears to be for the terrorists to carry out these actions 
with regard to a potential target - for example the ease with 
which they can find out where a human target lives or works - 
the more likely it is that that target will be attacked. This 
is an important factor-in determining the element of 
opportunity available to the terrorists, and may determine 
whether they attack one target rather than another. However, 
in order to carry out an attack, the terrorists must have the 
necessary resources. 
159 
The Capabilities of Terrorist Groups 
Introduction. 
The capability of a terrorist group can be defined as 
its ability to carry out terrorist operations. Some groups 
may be capable of carrying out operations against hard 
targets which are protected by sophisticated security 
measures, whilst others may only be capable of carrying out 
attacks against relati-ýely soft targets. Three factors can be 
said to determine the capabilities of a terrorist group: the 
quality of the group's leadership, the membership of the 
group, and the material resources available. 
The quality of leadership. 
Terrorist groups are usually created by a leader or 
nucleus of leaders who formulate and explain an ideology 
which has the capacity to attract adherents and spur them on 
to action. The leaders then have to devise ways of 
translating the ideology and the desire for action into 
concrete terrorist operations. Having done this they must be 
able to justify their actions in the terms of their ideology. 
The ability of the leaders to fulfil these functions 
adequately. 
With the Red Brigades for example, this nucleus was 
formed in 1969-1970 by Renato Curcio and Mara Cagol of the 
Metropolitan Political Collective in Milan, and ex-members of 
the Federation of Young Italian Communists (FGCI - 
Federazione Giovanile Comunista Italiana) such as Alberto 
Franceschini. 1 Similarly, Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalef (later 
known as Abu Iyad), and other Palestinian students studying 
in Cairo in the early 1950s, mobilised support within the 
Palestinian Student's Union and formed al-Fatah9 which became 
the core of the Palestine Liberation Organisation when it was 
founded in 1964.2 In other cases the formation of the group 
can be more diffuse. The June 2nd Movement in West Germany 
1) D. Salvioni & A. Stephanson. "Reflections on the Red 
Brigades", Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 29, no. 3, 
(Fall 1985), 491-492. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 
70-76. G. C. Caselli & D. della Porta. "The history of the 
Red Brigades", 72. 
2) H. Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 21-31. 
A. Frangi. The PLO and Palestinep 95-102. 
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consisted of a number of groups, what Scharlau terms cliques, 
which clustered around a common leadership. In fact B2J was a 
relatively small organisation whose estimated membership 
varied between thirteen people in 1971 and forty in 1976.3 
Likewise, the Ulster Defence Association originated in the 
formation of several separate Protestant vigilante groups in 
urban areas of Northern Ireland in 1970, and these only 
adopted the loose confederal structure of the UDA in the 
early summer of 1971.4. 
Where a group has a pre-history of sorts - such as the 
PIRA, or has an institutional base - such as MAS in Colombia, 
there may be a tradition or a skeletal framework to fall back 
upon. With the Provisional IRA in 1970 and ETA in the late 
1960s, a skeleton structure and historical tradition were 
already in place, and a core of people existed to keep these 
almost defunct organisations from going out of existence. 
Thus the leaders did not have to start from scratch. 
Likewise, with MAS in Colombia, a nucleus of leaders existed 
in the drug-trafficking groups, the military, and other 
governmental and business institutions. Howeverg with the 
communist and fascist groups in Italy and Germany, and larger 
groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Shining 
Path in Peru, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, although shaky 
foundations for the cause may have existed in the shape of a 
conventional political party or faction, the terrorist groups 
had to be created virtually from scratch. 5 
In some cases a nucleus may fail to attract adherents 
or supporters to the cause and the group will fail to 
maintain sufficient momentum to stay in existence. This 
appears to have been the case with many of the small Italian 
communist and fascist groups, but it might equally be applied 
to a group such as the Angry Brigade in Britain, which was 
very active for a short period but did not long survive the 
arrest of the leading members of the group. Alternativelyq 
when several members of the PIRA leadership were imprisoned 
3) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 179. 
4) S. Bruce. 
, 
The Red Hand, 46-50. D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster 
Defence Associations 10,25,42-439 336-337. 
5) See the special issue on "Political Parties and Terrorist 
Groups", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 2, 
(Summer 1992). 
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or interned in the early 1970s, the group merely continued to 
operate in an uncoordinated and more violent fashion under 
the decentralised control of less experienced and less 
politically conscious young activists. 
6 Some smaller groups - 
for example the Revolutionary Organisation November 17th 
(Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri - 17N), a highly 
nationalistic Greek communist terrorist group, have only ever 
consisted of a small core and have concentrated upon carrying 
out meticulously-plannC-d high-profile operations. 
7 Thus there 
has been no need for them to expand much beyond the original 
small nucleus. 
The ability of the terrorist leadership is important. A 
degree of intelligence is obviously an advantage in a 
terrorist leader, but this should not be confused with formal 
academic ability. The fact that terrorists tend to start 
their activities at an early age may mitigate against them 
being in a position to enter further or higher education. 
Furthermore, the material success which further education can 
bring may divert such people from the risks inherent in 
terrorism. However, the leaders must be capable of 
translating their political ideology into a set of beliefs 
which are attractive and comprehensible to the other members 
at the very least, and ideally to supporters and potential 
sympathisers as well. A former PIRA member notes that one 
reason why a particular Derry Provisional rose in the 
organisation in the 1970s was that: 
He was articulate and could explain publicly where we 
were at. That was unusual in the IRA and it secured his 
place very early on and kept him there because he is 
still able to think. 8 
Similarly, one of the reasons why Gudrun Ensslin was able to 
lead the first generation of the RAF, in combination with the 
6) "Defector who finds life too quiet", The Timesj February 
22nd 1973. "Internment: the big gamble for both sides", 
The Independent on Sunday, November 17th 1991. M. Dillon 
& D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 247, 
257-258. 
7) G. Kassimeris. "Greece: Twenty Years of Political 
Terrorism"i Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 2, 
(Summer 1995), 80. A. Corsun. "Group Profile: The 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November in Greece (1975- 
91)", Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). European 
Terrorism Today & Tomorrow, 93-94. Y. Alexander & 
D. Pluchinsky. Europe's--Red Terrorists, 90. 
8) K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 308. 
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forceful Baader, was her ability to translate the groups 
actions and beliefs into the pseudo-Marxist jargon which 
appealed to other members of the group. 9 
Another notable factor amongst terrorist leaders is a 
high degree of dedication and single-mindedness with regard 
to the political cause involved. Bowyer Bell, who has met 
various terrorist and insurgent leaders over the years. has 
referred to their: 
** very deep and very narrow political beliefs ... they ýave 
a tunnel vision as far as alternatives in political 
action are concerned. Having chosen a particular way, 
which however translated means arms [sic] struggle, they 
can see no other alternative and that seems to be true 
with all of them. 10 
When reading the biographies or autobiographies of 
terrorist leaders such as Savinkov, Collins, Begin, Grivasy 
or MacStiofain, one is struck by the driven and dedicated 
nature of these men. " The willingness to subordinate all 
other concerns to the demands of the organisation, and the 
perspective that this is morally correct, means that whilst 
the terrorist leaders might have a strong sense of moral 
values, they are also capable of rationalising acts of great 
ruthlessness. Thus, following the execution of two Jewish 
terrorists in Palestine in 1946, Menachim Begin - then head 
of the Irgun - ordered that two British soldiers should be 
abducted and hanged, and in addition had their bodies booby- 
trapped with explosives, in order to dissuade the British 
from carrying out any more executions. 12 
9) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 92-93. J. Becker- 
Hitler's Children, 94,110-111. 
10) I. Salan, chairperson, "Psychology of leaders of terrorist 
groups", International Journal of Group Tensionsp Vol 
12,88. 
11) B. Savinkov. Memoirs of a Terrorist. T. P. Coogan. Michael 
Collins. M. Begin. The Revolt, revised edition, (1952; 
London: W. H. Allen, 1979). G. Grivas - Dighenis. 
Guerrilla Warfare. D. Barker. Grivas: Portrait of a 
Terrorist, (London: Cresset, 1959). S. MacStiofain. 
Revolutionary in Irelando (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 
1975). 
12) M. Begin. The Revolt, 288-290. R. D. Wilson. Cordon and 
Search: With 6th Airborne Division in Palestine, 
(Aldershot, England: Gale & Polden, 1949), 132-134. 
E. Tavin & Y. Alexander (eds). Psychological Warfare and 
Propaganda: Irgun Documentation, (Wilmingtong Delaware: 
Scholarly Resources Inc, 1982), 229-230. L. Collins & 
D. Lapierre. 0 Jerusalem!, (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1972; Pan, 1973), 95. 
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One of the most important qualities of terrorist 
leaders is the ability to learn from their own experience, 
and from that of others. In February 1991 a PIRA spokesman 
describing operational aspects of PIRA's strategy stated: 
New tactics are discussed beforehand and then analysed 
afterwards on the basis of their effectiveness. 13 
The PIRA's former chief of staff noted that by 1972 the 
Provisionals had built up a fund of experience which the 
British authorities woald be unable to remove. 14 A practical 
example of the use of such experience can be seen in the 
development of the 'one-shot sniper'. Essentially, rather 
than getting caught up in a gun-battle with the better-armed, 
better-trained, and more numerous British troops, from late 
1972 the PIRA used snipers who would fire one shot and then 
retreat to a safe place before they could be located and 
caught or killed. 15 An earlier example of the ability of an 
Irish republican leader to learn was shown by Michael Collins 
in 1920 following the IRA ambush of a police detective in 
Dublin. Although mortally wounded, he was able to run to his 
house after being hit several times. Collins analysed what 
had happened and ensured that in future members of his 
assassination squad would carry heavier calibre -45 pistols 
instead of -38s. 
16 
However, it would be over-stating the case to say that 
terrorists necessarily learn from their experiences. For 
instance the Red Brigades knew that whilst the public reacted 
ambivalently to attacks on politicians and business managers, 
attacks which killed ordinary people, such as uniformed 
police officers, were widely unpopular and damaged support 
for the group to the extent that they issued statements 
defending their actions. 17 Nevertheless, in January 1979 they 
caused mass protests - and vast damage to their cause - when 
they shot dead a popular worker who had-denounced a work 
colleague for distributing BR literature. 18 Furthermore, one 
13) "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' - 
Oglaigh na hEireann", AP/RN9 February 14th 1991. 
14) S. Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 246. 
15) S. Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 301-302. 
P. Bishop & E. Rallie. The Provisional IRAj 247-248. 
16) T. P. Coogan. Michael Collins, 117. 
17) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked 
,, 
92,1239 126,186. 
18) "Italian Terrorists Kill a Union Aide"i Washington Posts 
January 25th 1979. "Italian labour protest over 
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could argue with some degree of justification that if the the 
communist terrorists in Europe in the 1980s had any great 
capacity to learn, they would have realised that whilst 
individual operations may have been tactically succesful 
their campaigns were largely futile in strategic terms. 
Terrorist leaders can also learn from the experience of 
other groups. During the 1950s, some members of the IRA who 
were destined to form the core of the Provisional IRA in the 
1970s, were imprisoned'in England with members of the Greek- 
Cypriot terrorist group EOKA, and from their own account 
learned from them. 19 According to various sources PIRA 
members have also consulted books on guerrilla warfare and 
insurgency by the likes of Barry, Begin, Guevara, Mao, and 
Taber. 20 Similarly, the Italian publication in 1970 of 
Marighela's "Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare" or 
f1minimanual" by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli -a publisher who set 
up the a forerunner to BRI the Partisan's Action Group (Gruup 
di Azione Partigiani - GAP) in 1969 - provided the Red 
Brigade leadership with a blueprint for organising a 
revolutionary communist group and for its subsequent 
strategy. 21 
Other groups have drawn direct lessons from the 
experiences of others. As will be seen later, some West 
German terrorists received training from Palestinian 
terrorists in the 1970s. Similarly, following a suicide 
bombing by Hamas in Tel Aviv on October 19th 1994 which 
killed twenty-two people and injured forty-five, a spokesman 
for the group claimed that Hamas leaders had learned how to 
killing", Financial Timesq January 26th 1979. "Hero's 
funeral for party victim"l Financial Times, January 
29th 1979. C. Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy"i 110. 
A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 100,175-176. D. Moss. 
The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 227,285 
n42. 
19) S. Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 74-79. 
20) S. Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 43-449 47. 
L. Clarke. Broadening the Battlefie ldq 30. M. Dillon. 
Killer in Clowntown, 261. R. Taber. The War of the Flea: 
Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, (St Albans, 
England: Paladins 1970). M. McGuire. To Take Arms, 69. 
T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 693. 
21) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 49. A. Jamieson. "Entry, 
Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades", 
Terrorism and Political Violence,, 2, no-1, (Spring 
1990), 1,3-4. 
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carry out such operations from the Lebanese Islamist group 
Hizbollah when Hamas leaders were exiled to southern 
Lebanon. 22 
Leadership within terrorist groups can operate at a 
number of levels. Where the operational group is part of a 
larger organisation - such as the Shining Path, the LTTE, or 
Hizbollah -a fairly rigid hierarchy is formed with fixed 
lines of command delegating some powers of decision to the 
23 lower levels. With smaller terrorist groups which still 
cover a wide geographical area, for example the Provisional 
IRA and the Red Brigades, organisational structures generally 
have some form of hierarchy, with an overall leadership cadre 
and a chain of command over the various sub-groups below. 
Within these sub-groups there are also likely to be 
leadership structures - whether formal or informal - with 
certain people making operational decisions. Where the 
members of these sub-groups also try to develop ideological 
policies independent of the overall leadership, there is a 
possibility of splits developing within the organisation, 
examples being the split between the Official IRA and the 
INLA, and between the Red Brigades and the Walter Alasia 
Column of BR. 24 
In a very small group whose members live in the same 
area, it is unlikely that a formal bureaucratic pattern of 
organisation will evolve. Group structures are normally 
informal, and leadership roles tend to devolve upon those 
with the most forceful or persuasive character. As mentionedl 
Andreas Baader was able to exercise leadership of the 
original Baader-Meinhof group by his rude and forceful 
behaviour. Similarly Lenny Murphy, who led a UVF group in the 
22) "Hamas has learnt the lessons of Lebanon", The 
Independent, October 20th 1994. B. Hoffman & 
D. K. Hoffmans "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of 
International Terrorism, 1994"1 Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 7, no. 4, (Winter 1995), 219. 
23) S. Strong. Shining Path, 99-101. S. V. D. Samaranayake. 
Political Violence in the Third World: A Case Study of 
Sri Lanka, 1971-1987, Ph. Dj University of St Andrewso 
19909 238-241. M. Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command 
Leadership: Its Structurej Decision Making and 
Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 31 (Autumn 
1994), 304-316. 
24) J. Holland & H. McDonald. INLA, 17-118. A. Jamieson. The 
Heart Attacked, 173,182-183. 
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Shankill district of Belfast, appears to have commanded his 
group through a combination of charisma, audacity, and 
fear. 25 According to Hearst, Donald DeFreeze, who called 
himself Cinque Mtume, appears to have controlled the other 
eight members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in 
California through a combination of bombast, constant 
criticism, and occasional violence. 26 In such cases the 
groups effectiveness - or at least its levels of activity - 
may be enhanced by a determined and forceful leader. 
Obviously, one of the main determinants of the 
effectiveness of a terrorist leader is his ability to plan 
operations and to link them to the political objectives of 
the group. Whilst terrorist leaders like Baader and Murphy 
ruled through force of character - and it should be noted 
that Murphy was very effective at terrorising the Catholics 
of Belfast - other terrorist leaders attain their position 
through a generally acknowledged respect for their 
operational or political abilities. George Grivas, who led 
the Greek-Cypriot EOKA against the British in Cyprus in the 
1950s, was a staff officer in the Greek Army before the 
Second World War, and he meticulously laid down both the 
organisation of EOKA and gave personal consent to many of the 
operations carried out by EOKA members. 
27 Likewise, the 
leading Derry member of the Provisional IRA mentioned above 
receives a great deal of respect because of his operational 
abilities and his willingness to assume the same risks as his 
subordinates. 28 According to one republican source he 
has the respect and confidence of the volunteers. He's seen 
as their man. They trust him". 29 
Although a degree of political astuteness - the ability 
to match violent methods to political objectives and explain 
the connection between the two - appears to be a prerequisite 
for the overall leadership, this is not necessarily the case 
25) M. Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 8,129 49,59. S. Bruce. 
The Red Hand, 173. 
26) P. C. Hearst & A. Moscow., Every Secret Thing, 139-140v 1549 
1619 1989 201. 
27) G. Grivas. Guerrilla Warfare, 25,47-48. D. Barker. Grivas, 
25-29,51-52,79-80,119,139-140. 
28) K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 294-296,308,309-310. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 197-198. 
29) "Bogside fighter turned to politics", The Independents 
August 26th 1993. 
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for local leaders. 30 Whilst PIRA leaders such as Francis 
Hughes and Jim Lynagh were very effective operationally, 
their reported lack of political sophistication means they 
would not necessarily have made effective leaders of the 
overall republican movement. 
31 
Bruce notes that amongst the Scottish supporters of the 
loyalists in Northern Ireland, it was accepted that a man 
could be a good organiser, but "just not cut out for the 
rough stuff,,. 32 However, most groups appear to want at least 
a degree of demonstrated operational competence. Thus, the 
rise of the criminologist Giovanni Senzani, to the leadership 
of the Naples column of the Red Brigades in the early 1980s 
is only partially explicable by his ability to link the 
operations of the BR to wider theoretical precepts. Like his 
rival BR leader Mario Moretti - who was presented as being 
more straightforwardly 'militarist' - Senzani also planned 
operations. 33 
A final characteristic which can determine the 
effectiveness of a terrorist group's leadership is 
experience. The psychologist David Canter has noted that non- 
political criminals become more competent with experience, 
and there is little reason to suspect that the same does not 
apply to terrorists. 34 Although the stresses of a prolonged 
clandestine or semi-clandestine life may lead to exhaustion 
or disillusion, the more experienced the group leaders are 
the more likely it is that their competence will improve. The 
existence of a high degree of continuity amongst the PIRA 
30) K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 247. P. Bishop & E. Mallie.. The 
Provisional IRA, 13,318-320. 
31) D. Beresford. Ten Men Dead: The story of the 1981 Irish 
hunger strike, (London: Grafton, 1987), 152-157. 
L. Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 162-163. 
D. Hammill. Pig in the Middle, 268-269. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 456. M. Urban. Big Boy's 
Rules, 223-224. B-O'Brien. The Long War, 142. 
32) S. Bruce. "Criminality and Vigilante Politics; The 
Scottish Protestant Case"s Conflict Quarterly, Spring 
1986,20. 
33) Corriere dela Sera, January 10th 1982. "Red Brigades key 
planner is betrayed", The Daily Telegraph, January 11th 
1982. D. Salvioni & A-Stephanson. "Reflections on the 
Red Brigades", 501. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 
183-184. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 326. 
34) D. Canter. Criminal Shadows: In ide--the Mind of the Serial 
Killer, (London: Harper Collins, 1994; 1995), 214,220, 
294,297-298. 
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leadership has been noted. 35 According to a security force 
source in November 1991: 
The fact is that the IRA are very, very good. When you're 
a terrorist and a good one you don't make many mistakes. 
They've had 22 years experience, Most soldiers are here 
for 18 months then away again. it) 
Another security force source noted: 
The essential attributes of their leaders are better than 
ever before. Som 970 f their operations are brilliant, in 
terrorist terms. 
For groups which lose their leadership cadre early in the 
campaign, acquiring such a degree of competence would be more 
difficult. 
Ultimately a terrorist group is dependent upon its 
leadership - whether formally or informally designated - to 
provide it with the impetus for action, and to maintain the 
momentum once it has started. The leaders of a terrorist 
group at the overall command level have to be able to 
articulate the ideology of the group in such a way as to 
attract and retain enough support to keep the group in 
existence, and to translate the ideology into a strategy. 
Leaders at the operational level have to be able to translate 
this strategy into operations. Ideally these leaders must be 
capable of thinking beyond the next operation. The greater 
the ability of the terrorist leaders, the more likely it is 
that the group will select targets which serve their 
political and ideological purposes. 
The membership of the group. 
For the purposes of this study a member of a terrorist 
group is somebody who plays an active role in tei-rorist 
operations or in actively maintaining support and logistical 
elements such as the collection and analysis of information, 
weapons procurement, the maintenance of arms dumps and safe 
houses, and the movement of weapons. It does not include 
sympathisers or even supporters if their role does not go 
beyond providing passive support or taking part in legal 
35) J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 14. 
36) "Internment: the big gamble for both sides", The 
Independent, November 17th 1991. 
37) "Internment 'only way to beat IRA"', The Independents 
November 17th 1991. 
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activities such as overt fund-raising or political 
activities. 
An aspect of a terrorist group which contributes to its 
ability to carry out operations is the number of members 
which it has. It is a fairly obvious point that the more 
members which a group has the more operations it can carry 
out. In addition a larger terrorist group can obtain more 
information in relation to possible targets because it has a 
greater number of people who can acquire or simply overhear 
potentially useful information. Of course it may be the case 
that a smaller group has better targeting information on 
specific individuals because it has members who have a 
suitable professional or social standing. The People's Will 
in 1880s Russia was fortunate to possess members who had 
access to members of the Tsarist court. One member, a skilled 
workman in the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, planted a bomb 
below the Tsar's dining room in February 1880, killing ten 
people and narrowly failing to kill the Tsar himself. 38 In 
general however, a larger group such as the PIRA will have 
more members in potentially useful areas such as the civil 
service, as well as simply having more members who are likely 
to pick up casual gossip. 39 
The size of the terrorist group will also determine, to 
a degree, the complexity of the operations which they can 
carry out. Relatively simple operations such as 
assassinations, mass-casualty bombings, and similar attacks 
do not require the participation of many terrorists. However, 
an operation such as the abduction of a high-profile person 
is more complex and requires an assault team, somebody to 
sort out the logistics such as transport, safe houses, and 
possibly any subsequent communications with the authorities 
or any other interested parties. The Moro kidnapping of 1978 
involved an assault team of at least six or seven people, 
with another two to four acting as drivers or blocking off 
the Via Fani as Moro was dragged from his car and the 
bodyguards were killed. Ten BR members were found guilty of 
38) E. Crankshaw. The Shadow of the Winter Palace, 297. 
R. Hingley. The Russian Secret Police, 64. 
39) "Teenagers who enlist for terror", The Independent on 
Sunday, August 5th 1990. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRAq 287-288. 
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involvement with the abduction and murder of Moro, and arrest 
warrants were issued for two more. 40 An alternative route was 
taken by ETA in 1973, when they decided to kill rather than 
kidnap the Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco because 
killing him was easier and required fewer resources. 41 Thus, 
to an extent, the size of the group can determine the types 
of operation which it can carry out. 
The individual calibre of terrorists can be defined as 
their ability to carry. out terrorist operations effectively. 
Generally terrorists have to carry out operations which are 
deemed to be illegal by the state in which they conducted, 
all the time trying to avoid the attentions of the security 
forces or other enemies. The better they are at planning and 
carrying out operations, and at evading death or capture in 
the process, the more effective they are as terrorists. Thus 
their calibre is a mixture of intelligence, nerve, and an 
ability to carry out technical tasks such as bomb-making and 
the use of firearms. 
Terrorist groups often consist of people who knew other 
members of the group socially before they became group 
members. In some cases the connections are based around 
family networks. Provisional IRA members frequently have 
other members of their family - fathers, uncles, brothers, 
and so forth - in the organisation. 
42 Likewise, Islamic 
paramilitary groups in the Near East, for example Hizbollah 
and Hamas, appear to be frequently organised around family 
ties. 43 In the Lebanon one result of this has been that some 
terrorist operations - including the taking of western 
hostages in the Lebanon - have been partially aimed at 
gaining the freedom of imprisoned family members. 44 
40) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 113,1179 122. P. Willan. 
Puppet Masterst 215. 
41) J. Agirre. Operation Ogro,, 2-3,57-589 72. 
42) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern 
Ireland, 144. F. Burton. The politics of legitimacy: 
Struggles in a Belfast community, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978), 109,22,23. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. 
The Provisional IRA, 290-291. 
43) "Spirit of hope confronts a deadlier terror", The Daily 
Telegraph, October 20th 1994. A. Ashkenasi. "Social- 
Ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organization in the 
Near East", P. H. Merkl (ed). Political Violence and 
Terror, 317. 
44) C. Coughlin. Hostage: the complete story of the Lebanon 
captives, (London: Little, Brown & Co, 1992), 79,929 
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In other cases the links within the group are between 
friends and acquaintances. According to Marnham, nine members 
of a Lyons-based cell of the French communist group Direct 
Action (AD - Action Directe) seem to have been recruited by 
their former schoolteacher. 45 Communist terrorists in Italy 
and West Germany also seem to have recruited people who were 
already in the circle of friends or acquaintances of people 
who were members of the group. 46 In ETA, cells have often 
consisted of people who were members of the same cuadrilla - 
the term for the groups of young people who socialise 
together in the towns and villages of the Basque country - or 
were recruited by older fellow members of one of the semi- 
political hill-climbing clubs which proliferate in the 
area. 47 
The Provisional IRA provides examples of various 
relationships existing between group members before they 
joined the group. According to Bishop and Mallie, about 80% 
of Provisional IRA members in the late 1980s had a father, 
brother, or uncle who had been involved in the republican 
movement. 48 In some cases a number of family members have 
been active members of a republican terrorist group at the 
same time. The Grew brothers from county Armagh, Seamus and 
Dessie, were both in the INLA at about the same time, Seamus 
being killed by the RUC in 1982 and Dessie in a British Army 
ambush in 1990 - six years after he had left the INLA to join 
the PIRA. 49 Similarly, of the three PIRA men killed in an 
ambush by the SAS near Carrickmore, county Tyrone in August 
104. E. F. Mickolus, T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. 
International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1980-1983,468- 
469. E. F. Mickolus, T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. 
International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987,139- 
142. G. Rosie. The Directorv of International Terrorism, 
168-169 
45) P. Marnham: Crime and the Academie Francaise: Dispatches 
from Paris, (Harmondsworth, England, 1993), 91 16. 
46) C. Novaro. "Social networks and terrorism: the case of 
Prima Linea"s R. Catanzaro (ed). The Red Brigades & 
Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy. A. Jamieson. The Heart 
Attacked, 103-107. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in 
the Federal ReDublic of-Germany, 163-170. 
47) R. P. Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 298- 299,304-305. P. Taylor. States of Terrorg 88-93. 48) P. Bishop & E-Mallie. The ProvisConal IRAp 13. 
49) J. Holland & H-McDonald. INLA, 83,217-2189 258,280 n. 1. 
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1988, two - Gerard and Martin Harte - were brothers. 
50 In 
rural areas in particular, units often appear to have been 
based around the strong personal relationships between 
members rather than any formal organisation. Urban states 
that Jim Lynagh's unit in east Tyrone and north Armagh was 
run largely on the strength of his character and the personal 
loyalty of other members to him, and that this was typical of 
units in the area. 51 
When considering-the rationality of terrorist 
behaviour, it is important to note that terrorist group 
members are, in general, psychologically normal. The fact 
that terrorists are frequently killers or the accomplices of 
killers may make them seem abnormal to an observer for whom 
lethal violence is largely an abstract concept. Howeverp the 
ability to kill or injure people against whom one has no 
personal animosity is not confined to terrorists. Members of 
the armed forces are trained to kill and may often have to 
kill other combatants in wartime but, as Ellis showsp Allied 
soldiers were also capable of killing unarmed German soldiers 
in certain circumstances. 52 Ordinary people are also 
sometimes capable of deliberately killing unarmed civilians. 
In March 1968 ordinary American troops massacred between 200 
and 700 Vietnamese villagers in the village of My Lai. 
53 
Similarly, in the aptly-titled Ordinary Men, concerning a 
German field police unit during the Second World Warp 
Browning shows how working and middle-class, middle-aged 
conscripts from Hamburg followed orders to shoot dead Jewish 
men, women, and children in cold-blood. Over time they became 
calloused to such behaviour and more willing. to kill. 
54 
50) "Ambushes feared linked to shoot-to-kill policy", June 
4th 1991, The Guardian. M-Sutton. Bear in mind these 
dead ... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in 
Ireland, 1969-19939 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale 
Publications, 1994), 165. 
51) M. Urban. Big Boy's Rules, 223-224. 
52) "Taught to kill, not to pity"t The Independent on Sundayq 
March 21st 1993. R-Holmes. Firing-Lineq 366. J-Ellis- 
The Sharp End of War, 318-320. 
53) M. Maclear. Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War, (London: 
Thames/Methuen, 1981; 1982), 373-378. M. Walzer. Just 
and Unjust Wars, 309-315. 
54) C. R. Browning. Ordinarv Men: Reserve Police-Battallion 10 
and the Final Solution in Poland, (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1992; 1993), 1-2,55-70,77,102,191. 
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Research concerning non-terrorists confirms the ability 
of ordinary people to inflict pain in appropriate 
circumstances. In the 1960s the psychologist Stanley Milgram 
carried out a series of experiments which demonstrated that 
subjects were willing to inflict powerful electric shocks 
upon other people if ordered to do so by a person in 
authority. 55 Likewise, an examination of torturers employed 
by military governments in Greece and Argentina found that: 
''0 apart from traits of authoritarianism and obedience, 
and ideological sympathy for the government, there is 
little evidence that torturers are markedly different 
from their peers - at least, until the Rgint where they 
are recruited and trained as torturers. 
Although the experience of killing may, over time, lead to 
the individual becoming callousedl there is little reason to 
assume that people who kill or torture as part of their 
profession are psychologically different to ordinary people. 
Research concerning terrorists generally confirms this 
view. Studies by Lyon and Harbinson, and Heskin in Northern 
Ireland, and by Ferracuti and Bruno in Italy, suggest that 
insurgent terrorists are at least as intelligent and 
emotionally stable as normal people. 57 on the other hand 
fascist terrorists in Italy do seem to exhibit signs of 
emotional instability and aggression whilst those in Germany 
55) H. Brown. People, Groups, and Society, (Milton Keynes, 
England: Open University Press, 1985),. 16-19. K. Heskin. 
Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis, (Dublin: 
Gill & Macmillan, 1980), 87-88. 
56) L. Williams. "Through the eyes of a torturer", Amnesty. 
Campaign Journal for Amnesty International British 
Section, (London)p May/June 1995, (issue 73). 
57) H. A. Lyons & H. J. Harbinson. "A Comparison of Political and 
Non-Political Murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974-84". 
K. Heskin. "The psychology of terrorism in Northern 
Ireland", Y. Alexander & A. O'Day (eds). Terrorism in 
Ireland, (London: Croom Helm, 1984). K. Heskin. Northern 
Ireland: A Psychological Analysis, 74-93. F. Ferracuti. 
"A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism", 
Annals of the American Academy, 463, (September 1982), 
130. F. Ferracuti & F. Bruno. "Psychiatric Aspects of 
Terrorism in Italy", I. L. Barak-Glantz & C. R. Huff (eds). 
The Mad, the Bad, and the Different: 
-Essays 
in Honor of 
Simon Dinitzi (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Booksv 1981), 
207. 
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were less well qualified and had jobs of lower status than 
their left-wing counterparts. 58 
An exception to the view of the terrorist as a 
psychologically normal person is Jerrold Post who, largely 
but not wholly on the basis of studies carried out by the 
German government, has speculated that terrorists are 
marginal, isolated, and inadequate individuals from troubled 
family backgrounds". 59 Post, and the German psychiatrist 
Lorenz Bollinger, do believe that terrorists frequently 
display the characteristics of a process termed splitting, 
whereby one's strengths are attributed to oneself, but 
weaknesses and failings are projected outwards and blamed 
upon others. This process is reinforced by the ideology of 
the group. 60 However, Post also notes elsewhere that there is 
no evidence to suggest that terrorists are psychopaths, and 
that on the contrary, evidence suggests that they are in most 
respects normal. 
61 The problem with Post's approach is not 
that it is necessarily wrong with regard to the experience of 
terrorism in Germany, but that it is not necessarily 
applicable elsewhere. 
One notable difference which Post notes is that people 
who join terrorist groups which have a degree of support from 
their host community are more likely to have well-adjusted 
characters then people who join groups which appear to be 
divorced from the community. Thus members of the Basque group 
ETA or the communist Red Brigades in Italy have received 
support in the past because of their identification with 
causes which were felt to have some historical justification 
58) F. Ferracuti & F. Bruno. "Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism 
in Italy", 209. E. Kolinsky. "Terrorism in West 
Germany", J. Lodge (ed). The Threat of Terrorism, 75-76. 
59) J. M. Post. "Notes on a PsYchodynamic Theory of Terrorist 
Behaviour", Terrorism: An International Journal, 7, no 
3, (1984), 241. 
60) J. M. Post. "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as 
a product of psychological forces", W. Reich (ed) 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 27. L. Bollinger. "Terrorist 
conduct as a result of a psychosocial process"q 
P. Pichotj P. Berner, & K-Thau (eds). Psychiatry: The 
State of the Art. Volume 6: Drug Dependence and 
Alcoholism, Forensic-Psychiatry, Military PsychiatrX, 
(New York: Plenum Press, 1985), 388. 
61) J. M. Post. "Terrorist psycho-logic", 26. 
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- the Basque struggle in the first instance, and the anti- 
fascist partisan war between 1943 and 1945 in the second. 
However the Red Army Faction had relatively little popular 
support and consequently the group members became more 
isolated from the world outside the group. 62 This view of 
terrorists having a more stable outlook because they can 
relate to an ordinary community life is borne out by Clark's 
study of ETA, and also by White and White's study of the 
Provisional IRA. 63 The. effect of living in an enclosed circle 
of people - with only other terrorists for company - is 
examined later, but the inward-looking nature of the group 
seems to be reinforced in groups which have few supporters or 
sympathisers amongst whom they can relax and obtain moral 
support. 
Some general observations can be made about terrorists. 
First, they tend to be recruited when they are young. From a 
study of eighteen terrorist groups, Russell and Miller 
suggest that the average urban terrorist is between twenty- 
two and twenty-five. 64 Studies of individual groups tend to 
bear this out. From an analysis of sixty-seven PIRA members 
killed in Belfast between 1969 and 1988, White and White 
found that the average age at recruitment into the 
organisation was nineteen years and four months. 65 Clark 
found that ETA recruits tended to be in their mid-twenties 
when recruited or first arrested, and Weinberg and Eubank 
found that in Italy the majority of members of left-wing 
groups (72.8%) and right-wing groups (80.1%) were under 
twenty-nine years old when first identified as terrorists. 66 
There is some differentiation between the ordinary members 
62) J. M. Post. "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist 
Behaviour", 246,247,250. 
63) R. P. Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 283- 
284,293-294. R. W. White & T. F. White. "Revolution in the 
City: On the Resources of Urban Guerrillas", Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 3, no. 4, (Winter 1991). ", 110, 
115-116. 
64) C. A. Russell & B. H. Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist"i 
L. Z. Freedman & Y. Alexander (eds). Perspectives on 
Nuclear Terrorism, (Wilmingtons Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources Inc, 1983), 47. 
65) R. W. White & T. F. White. "Revolution in the City", 111. 
66) R. P. Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 286. L. Weinberg & W. Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in 
Italian Terrorist Groups", Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 1, no. 2, (April 1989), 167,169. 
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who are in their late teens and twenties, and the leaders of 
the groups who tend to be a few years older. 67 other studies 
of specific terrorist groups show this pattern of young 
ordinary members, with leaders who are a few years older, to 
be quite common. 68 
There are exceptions. The average age of the German 
left-wing terrorists surveyed was higher on average than for 
most other groups, but this disguises the fact that members 
of the Red Army Faction in Germany were much older on average 
than members of the contemporaneous June 2nd Movement. 69 
Italian right-wing leaders tend to be quite a bit older than 
the average, and their ordinary members are somewhat 
younger. 70 
A possible consequence of the nature of terrorist 
leaders and the youth of their followers is that they tend to 
be impatient by nature. In an article on the importance of 
organisational factors in analysing political terrorism, 
Crenshaw has noted that "Terrorists are often individuals who 
are impatient for action", and that they give action priority 
over talk. 71 The comments of some terrorists seem to bear 
67) C. A. Russell & B. H. Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist", 47- 
48. K. L. Oots. "Organizational Perspectives on the 
Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups"I 
Terrorism, 12, no. 3, (1989), 144. L. Weinberg & 
W. Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist 
Groups", 169. 
68) I. Salan, chairperson. "Psychology of leaders of terrorist 
groups", 96. L. Weinberg & W. Eubank. "Leaders and 
Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups", 167,169. 
B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 129. "Teenagers who enlist for 
terror", The Independent on Sunday, August 5th 1990. 
J. Bowyer Bell. "Career Moves: Reflections on the Irish 
Gunman"l Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15, no. 1, 
(January-March 1992)9 74. T. P. Coogan, The IRA, 668-671 
lists the ages of thirty-eight IRA prisoners who 
escaped from the Maze Prison in Northern Ireland in 
March 1983. The vast majority were in their mid to 
late-twenties, and appear to have been in their late- 
teens to mid-twenties when first imprisoned. 
69) C. A. Russell & B. H. Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist", 47. 
B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 129. 
70) L. Weinberg & W. Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in Italian 
Terrorist Groups", 167. 
71) M. Crenshaw "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of 
Political Terrorism", Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 
29, no. 3, (Fall 1985), 474-475. 
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this out. In a letter in 1971, Michael Baumann - who was 
later to join the June 2nd Movement in Germany - wrote: 
WORDS CANNOT SAVE US! WORDS DON'T BREAK CHAINS! 
7 
JHE DEED 
ALONE MAKES US FREE! DESTROY WHAT DESTROYS YOU! 
Similarly, Hall notes a loyalist group terming itself the 
'Ulster Militants' stating: 
We do not believe in defence but attack ... but we got 
sick and tired of training with only a general idea of 
what we were supposed to be training for 13 We wanted 
action and were not allowed to have any. 
Other statements by loyalist terrorists reinforce this view 
of the primacy of action. 74 
Irish republicans have historically had a low opinion 
of those whom they deem to be compromising 'politicians' 
rather than 'soldiers'. 75 In west Belfast in the early 1970st 
Burton observed that, of the young men of the neighbourhood, 
the PIRA members were the ones who appeared to have an aura 
of "urgent activity" about them. 76 As one former PIRA 
activist said of his youthful actions in retrospect$ "You 
can't let politics ruin a fuckin' war". 77 
This is not to say that terrorists are necessarily 
impulsive. Guzman spent ten years laying down the foundations 
for the violent campaign of the Shining Path in Peru, whilst 
the amount of time which some groups will spend in planning a 
single operation is testament to their patience. 78 
A characteristic of some terrorists is their 
persistence in the face of adversity and the ultimate 
possibility of death. To take three PIRA members for examples 
Jim Lynagh was imprisoned for four years in Northern Ireland 
and for four years in the Republics Dessie Grew was 
imprisoned four times, whilst Mairead Farrell spent nearly 
ten years in prison. All three were subsequently killed on 
72) B. Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 72. 
73) D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 82. 
74) D. L. G. Hall. The Ulster Defence A- ssociation, 75,77. 
75) C. Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 366. P. Bishop 
& E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 2769 285. B. O'Brien. 
The Long War, 34. K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 294-295. 
76) F. Burton. The Politics of legitimacy, 111. 
77) B. O'Brien.. The Long War, 34,40. 
78) S. Strong. Shining Path, 36-39. W. A. Hazleton & S-Woy- 
Hazleton. "Sendero Luminoso", 66-68. 
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operations. 
79 In summing up Irish republicans whom he had 
met, Padraig O'Malley notes: 
Members of the Republican movement whom I have spoken 
with in the course of this inquiry were highly 
intelligent, extraordinarily motivated, relentlessly 
committed to their course of action, imbued with a 
puritanical obsession - you might even say a tyrannical 
obsession - with wanting to do right and to be seen to do 
right, which makes their actions all the more 
frightening. " 
Likewise, with Inge Viett, who was a member of first the B2J 
and then the RAF, twice escaped from prison, in 1973 and 
1976. She shot a policeman who tried to arrest her in Paris 
in 1981, before 'retiring' to East Germany in 1983. She 
appears to have simultaneously been an agent for the East 
German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fur 
Staatssicherheit or Staatssicherheitsdienstt known as the MfS 
or Stasi) and was arrested in 1990 after German 
reunification. 
81 
Another characteristic of terrorists which is not often 
remarked upon is the degree of courage which is sometimes 
necessary in the commission of their actions. Several 
terrorists have been willing to die in pursuit of their aims. 
Between 1969 and 1993,256 members of the Provisional IRA 
were killed by the security forces, by rival terrorist 
groups, or by the premature detonation of their own bombs. 
82 
Their determination is well illustrated by the willingness of 
prisoners to fast to death in pursuit of political status or 
other changes in prison conditions. Between 1974 and 1981 
twelve Irish republicans died on hunger strike - two in 
England in 1974 and 1976, and ten during the H-Block hunger 
strikes of 1981.83 Similarly, in West Germany two RAF members 
79) "Key figures allegedly behind attacks on the Continent", 
and "Web of terror that spread across Europe", both in 
The Independent, April 3rd 1991. B. O'Brien. The Long 
War, 142. J. Adams, R. Morgan, & A. Bambridge. Ambush: The 
War Between the SAS and the IRA, (London: Pan, 1988), 
136-140. 
80) P. O'Malley. Bitingat the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes 
and the Politics of Despair, (Belfast: Blackstaff 
Press, 1990), 285. 
81) J. Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 64-66. B. A. Scharlau. 
Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germanyy 
299y 301. E. MacDonald. Shoot the Women Firsty 227-228. 
82) M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 195-205. 
83) See D. Beresford. Ten Men Dead. L. Clarke. Broadening the 
Battlefield. 
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starved themselves to death in order to change their prison 
conditions - Holger Meins in November 1974 and Sigurd Debus 
in April 1981.84 In addition, there is the previously 
mentioned example of the members of groups such as Hamas, 
Hizbollah, and the LTTE who carry out suicide attacks. Whilst 
terrorists generally use methods which minimise the risks to 
themselves, and often carry out attacks which are perceived 
as callous, it is wrong to assume that they lack courageO85 
The technical ability of terrorists varies 
considerably. It is not necessary for somebody to be well- 
trained in military techniques for them to be able to carry 
out certain types of terrorist operation. Uncomplicated 
attacks against relatively undefended targets do not require 
much in the way of training. Thus in the late-1960s and early 
1970s many of the attacks carried out by the Naxalites in 
India - were stabbings against relatively soft targets such 
as traffic policemen, wealthier peasants, and lower-ranking 
members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). 86 Such 
attacks were suitable for the relatively primitively-armed 
Naxalites, suited the Santal tribals who were initially 
heavily-involved with the rural aspects of the Naxalite 
campaign, and had a greater psychological impact than attacks 
with guns or explosives would have done. 
However, for terrorists wishing to carry out more 
complex operations, competence in the use and construction of 
weapons, and the ability to plan operations is extremely 
useful and generally comes with experiences Some terrorists 
have had training in the handling of weapons and planning of 
operations. Such training might be provided by an 
organisation or a government which supports the cause of the 
terrorist group, or which merely wishes to support the group 
84) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 93-999 300,304. 
85) Merari argues that some of the suicide bombers in Lebanon 
were either coerced or duped into taking part in such 
operations. A. Merari. "The readiness to kill and die: 
Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East", W. Reich (ed) 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, 
Theologies, States of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Pressp 1990), 194-196. 
86) B. Dasgupta. The Naxalite Movement, 44-451 83,87. 
E. Duyker. Tribal Guerrillas: The Santals of West Bengal 
and the Naxalite Movement (pub Delhi: oxford University 
Press, 1987), 84,127. 
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in causing damage and destruction to a perceived enemy. In 
some cases the training is provided by other terrorist groups 
due to some feeling of solidarity or mutual advantage. For 
example, from the late 1960s the PLO helped to train members 
of the June 2nd Movement and the Red Army Faction, whilst 
reports suggest that in the 1980s members of Italian and 
German fascist groups received training from Christian 
Falangists in the Lebanon and from Palestinian groups. 87 In 
these cases the trainers felt they had a common enemy to 
those whom they trained - western imperialism in the case of 
the Palestinians and communism in the case of the Falangists. 
Some governments have also provided terrorists with 
training. Such training has either been provided directly to 
the terrorist groups, or indirectly when members of the armed 
forces have joined terrorist groups during or after their 
military service. An example of the former was demonstrated 
in the mid-1980s when members of the LTTE received training 
from the Indian armed forces at training camps in the 
province of Tamil Nadu. 88 This was before the ill-fated 
intervention of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri 
Lanka between 1987 and 1990. Similarly, the East German Stasi 
provided training and a safe haven for members of the RAF and 
B2J, apparently because aiding the activities of these groups 
was seen as a way of destabilising the western alliance 
system. 89 
Members of the armed services or other security force 
members who become involved with terrorist groups can be 
divided between those who are still in the security forces 
when their terrorist involvement occurs, and'those who have 
already left. The former case includes the already-mentioned 
involvement of fifty-nine military officers in the MAS 
conservative death squads in Colombia, where although the 
definite involvement of the authorities is not proven, there 
87) B-Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 49-50. S. Aust. The Baader- 
Meinhof Group, 89-101. P-Willan. Puppet Masters, 165- 
166. C. di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars, 98, 
104. H. J. Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, 10-11,12- 
14. 
88) B. Vaughn. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence Services in 
India", 11-12. 
89) J. Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 66-67. B. A. Scharlau. 
Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic-of Germany, 
56-61. 
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is a strong suspicion that the officers were acting with at 
least tacit support from some governing elements. 90 In the 
early 1990s members of Colombian police units are also 
alleged to have carried out the killings of suspected left- 
wing terrorists, political activists and human rights 
campaigners, as well as killing vagrantss petty thieves and 
other people deemed 'undesirable' by traders and other 
commercial elements. 91 Similarly, in Northern Ireland serving 
members of the UDR/RIR'have been involved in loyalist 
terrorist activities including attacks on Catholic targets. 
According to Ryder, between the regiment's formation in 1970 
and March 1979, over thirty UDR members were convicted of 
serious terrorist offences. This included five UDR members 
convicted of murder, five of manslaughter, ten for arms and 
explosives offences, and four for serious assaults. 92 
Former members of the military or other security forces 
can also provide a degree of expertise for terrorist groups. 
In his account of the Direct Action group based around Lyons. 
Marnham points out that the bomb-maker in the group - Maxime 
Frerot - had been trained in the use of explosives when 
carrying out his national service as a paratrooper in the 
French Army. 93 Similarly, Bruce mentions that the expertise 
of ex-servicemen made a contribution to the activities of 
loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland, and that some 
UDA and UVF members joined the UDR in order to receive 
training and to gain access to weapons and intelligence. 
However, he also notes that the existence of locally- 
recruited security forces also provides a form of safety- 
valve as a way of defending the existing political order for 
those who might otherwise join the loyalist groups. He 
speculates that this drain of talented recruits left the 
loyalists with a poorer talent pool to recruit from. 
94 
A good bomb-maker does not necessarily require military 
training as expertise can come from elsewhere. Joseph 
90) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177. Amnesty 
International. Getting away with murder, 36. 
91) Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia) 
21,24-28. 
92) C. Ryder. The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of 
Peace? (London, Methuen, 1991)., 182-183. 
93) P. Marnham. Crime and the Academie Francaise, 9,11-12. 
94) S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 216-218,225,271-273. 
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O'Connell, who constructed the detonator devices for the 
bombs used by a PIRA unit active in London and south-eastern 
England in the mid-1970s, had previously worked as a radio 
operator and electronics trainee for the Marconi electronics 
company in Cork. 95 In practice a terrorist bombing campaign 
does not need many bomb-makers. As long as the method of 
priming the bomb is simple enough to be carried out by 
untrained people, and there are sufficient people prepared to 
carry the bombs to their targets the bombs themselves can be 
constructed by a small number of bomb-makers. 96 However, 
failure in this respect can be costly. Between 1969 and 1993 
over 100 PIRA members were killed by the premature explosion 
of their own bombs, just over one-third of the total number 
of PIRA members killed. 97 
The capability of ordinary terrorists can be seen as an 
amalgam of the skills and abilities which they possess. These 
in turn can determine the types of operations which they are 
capable of carrying out. To take an extreme example, there 
would be little purpose in entrusting somebody who had little 
training or technical sense with firing a complex portable 
anti-aircraft system. Thus, to an extent, a terrorist's 
ability may be measured according to his technical ability 
with weapons. In addition, personal abilities such as 
intelligence and courage are also useful, because it is more 
likely that someone possessing these attributes will carry 
out an operation successfully. Lastly, as a rule, the more 
terrorists which a group possesses the greater the number and 
complexity of the operations which they can carry out. 
However, in order for their capabilities to be put to the 
best use, they need suitable weapons. 
The weapons available. 
Even if a terrorist group has extremely talented 
leaders and highly trained and committed members, without 
suitable weapons the capability of the group is extremely 
limited. This does not mean that every group needs masses of 
95) G. McKee & R. Franey. Time Bomb, 9,61,63,337. M. Dillon. 
The Enemy Within, (London: Doubleday, 1994)9 137. 
96) For accounts of such terrorist bombing operations see 
L. Collins & D. Lapierre. 0 Jerusalem!, 116-120,179-182. 
S. O'Doherty. The Volunteer, 69-71. ' 
97) M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 197. 
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the latest and most sophisticated weaponry. The use of knives 
and axes by the Naxalites has already been noted, and as a 
UDA gunman has noted: 
You can go in and terrorize you E8 next-door neighbour if 
you have a hammer in your hand. 
However, it is undoubtedly true that, provided members have 
the technical competence, the availability of powerful 
weapons can greatly extend the capability of a terrorist 
group to attack targets possessing various levels of 
protection. 
The means by which a terrorist group can obtain weapons 
are many and varied. During the Second World War a communist 
group adopted the slogan: 
Any household has a knife; if you have a knife, you can 
get a pistol; if you have a pistol, you can get a rifle; 
if you have a rifle, you can9get a machine-gun. Get on 
with it comrades: get armed! 
Whilst this may seem somewhat ambitious, some groups have 
undoubtedly gained their initial armaments at least by 
raiding the resources of the police and military. Throughout 
1970 members of Japanese communist terrorist groups raided a 
number of the small two to three man urban police huts - 
known as a koban - in order to obtain weapons. 
100 Similarly, 
in May 1979 Corriere della Serra reported that five members 
of a group calling themselves the Proletarian Combat Squad 
(Squadre Proleterie di Combattimento) had raided a police 
section house in Turin, taking the uniforms, weapons, and 
identity cards from two policemen. 101 Weapons can also be 
obtained by chance. Dillon notes an occasion. in 1989 when two 
members of a plain-clothes military surveillance team had to 
be swiftly evacuated from the Falls area of west Belfast 
after being confronted by a group of young PIRA members. In 
their car they left behind a Heckler and Koch sub-machine gun 
which the Provisionals gratefully appropriated. 102 
98) A. Feldman. Formations of Viole_nce, 48. 
99) M. R. D. Foot. Resistance, (Eyre Methuen, 1976; London: 
Granada, 1978), 55. 
100) Y. Katayama. Terrorism-in Japan since 1969,49. 
W. R. Farrell. Blood and- age, 96-97. 
101) "Terroristi denudino due vigili rubando le lore divise 
armi a tesserini", Corriere della Serra, May 1st 1979. 
102) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 478. 
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Some terrorist groups - mainly espousing conservative 
or fascist ideologies - have been supplied with weapons by 
sympathisers within the security forces. Groups which have 
members serving in the security forces will generally have 
little difficulty in obtaining at least some weapons. In 
Colombia and other parts of Latin America, it seems likely 
that terrorist groups which are linked to the police, 
military or military-approved paramilitary groups have either 
used their ordinary service weapons when carrying out 
attacks, or have obtained buckshee weapons and ammunition. 
103 
During the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, loyalist 
terrorists have raided UDR depots using inside information to 
obtain weapons, and on occasion have also been directly 
supplied with weapons by sympathisers or members within the 
regiment. 
104 
Terrorists can also obtain weapons on the legal and 
illegal arms markets. The relatively unrestricted gun laws in 
the USA have made it possible to openly purchase small arms 
up to the level of automatic and semi-automatic rifles in gun 
shops. 105 In the early 1970s many of the Armalites obtained 
by the PIRA were bought in the USA in small consignments and 
then smuggled over to Ireland in suitcases or hidden in 
normal cargoes. 106 The Red Brigades also appear to have 
bought a few of their weapons from gun shops in Italy, using 
false identity papers to make their purchases. 107 
With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
bloc, weapons formerly held by the Soviet Army and newly 
developed weapons appear to have come onto the market in the 
West. 108 Furthermore, the low costs of arms manufacturers in 
103) Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 
42,52,94-95. Amnesty International. Getting away with 
murder, 34-36. 
104) S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 218. C-Ryder. The Ulster Defence 
Regiments 152,158-161,175,179-181. M. Dillon. The 
Dirty War, 219-220. 
105) F. S. Pearson. The Global Spread of Arms: Political 
Economy of International Security, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1994), 61. 
106) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 295-296. 
J. Holland. The American Connection, (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 1987; Dublin: Poolbeg, 1989), 81-83. J. Bowyer 
Bell. The Secret Army, 439. 
107) R. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 53. 
108) "Assassins guns seized in raids on arms ring", The 
Independents May 25th 1995. F. S. Pearson. The Global 
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the former Soviet bloc and Far East allow them to develop 
cheap small arms which would be suitable for a terrorist 
group. According to a report in September 1994 whereas a 
standard European-made hand-grenade, costs about 98, one made 
in China costs 13, and whilst a sophisticated European rifle 
costs about L400, a Russian-made AK47 costs about 160.109 In 
addition, recent Russian weapons are extremely well-suited 
for use by both security forces and terrorists alike. They 
include a small silenced pistol, a silenced assault rifle 
based upon the AK47 which is capable of penetrating body 
armour, and a silenced sniper rifle. In addition a new 350mm 
long handgun has been developed which is capable of firing 
automatic bursts, has an extending stock so that it can be 
fired from the shoulder, and is reportedly capable of 
penetrating all types of military body armour. 110 Such 
weapons would be extremely useful to a terrorist group. A 
recent television programme concerning weapons exports from 
Bulgaria indicates that arms dealers there would not enquire 
too closely as to the final destination of weapons which they 
supplyelli 
As well as buying weapons on the open market, 
terrorists can also obtain them from foreign supporters or 
sponsors who are not directly involved with the group 
concerned, but who for one reason or another wish to either 
help the group or harm the enemies of the group. Governments 
can be extremely useful suppliers of weapons and other 
resources to a terrorist group as they have access to money 
and the arms market, and can obtain weapons without too many 
questions being asked. If necessaryg governments can move 
weapons around the world using the diplomatic bag, and store 
them in embassies if necessary. 112 Examples of governments 
supplying weapons and other forms of aid to terrorist groups, 
Spread of Arms, 61. R. Fleming & H. Miller. Scotland 
Yard, (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 5. 
109) "The arms suppliers go to war"q The Independent on 
Sunday, business supplement, September 4th 1994. 
110) P. Paganacci. "Weapons of the Russian Special Forces"q 
RAIDS9 UK editiong (January 1995). 
111) "The Cook Report", ITV, television, June 13th 1995. 
112) U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
Libya under Qadhafi, 1. P-Seale. Abu Nidal: A Gun for 
Hireq (New York: Random House, 1992), 1059 1499 242- 
243. 
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include Iranian aid to the Lebanese Shia Islamic group 
Hizbollah, and American aid to the conservative Nicaraguan 
Counter-revolutionaries (contrarevolucionarios - Contras) who 
fought the Sandanista Government of Nicaragua in the 
1980s. 113 
The greatest material boost which the Provisional IRA 
received in recent years was the shipments of arms from the 
Libyan Government of Colonel Gaddafi. Gaddafi had supplied 
some weapons to the Provisionals in the early 1970s as part 
of his general opposition to 'imperialism', but in the mid- 
1980s he appears to have chosen to supply the PIRA because of 
the police siege of the Libyan Embassy in London in April 
1984 following the fatal shooting of a policewoman and the 
subsequent expulsion of Libyan diplomats. 
114 According to The 
Economist the RUC has estimated that by November 1987 the 
Libyans had given the IRA six tons of Semtex plastic 
explosive, twenty SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, about 1,500 
Kalashnikov AK47 automatic rifles, 11 million rounds of 
ammunition, fifty RPG7 rocket launchers, ten flame throwers, 
and a number of medium and heavy machine-guns, 12.7mm DSKH 
heavy machine guns. 115 According to McKittrick, the Libyan 
113) R. H. Shultz. "Iranian Covert Aggression: Support for 
Radical Political Islamists Conducting Internal 
Subversion Against States in the Middle East/Southwest 
Asia Region", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 
3, (Autumn 1994), 2859 286,290. M. Ranstorp. 
"Hizbollah's Command Leadership", 307,310. B. Woodward- 
Veil, 177,225-228,275j 355-356,388-392,465-467, 
481-483. C. Dickey. With the Contras: A Reporter in the 
Wilds of Nicaragua, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985; 
London: Faber & Faber, 1986), 143,161-162,166-171, 
180-181,211. H. E. Vanden. "State Policy and the Cult of 
Terror in Central America", P-Wilkinson & A. M. Stewart 
(eds). Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 265-267. 
O. North & W. Novak. Under Fire, 249-250. 
114) "Voyage into business of terror", The Independent, 
January 12th 1991. P-Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional, 
IRA, 246,305-306. J. Adams. Trading in Death: The 
Modern Arms Race, (London: Hutchinson, 1990; Pang 
1991), 17-30. 
115) "Arming the IRA: The Libyan Connection, The Economist, 
(London), March 31st, 1990. "Gadaffi admits training 
IRA elite", The Sunday Timess June 21st 1992. "RUC 
chief proposes national Police units", The Independent, 
July 22nd 1992. B. O'Brien. The Lo-ng War, 144. 
Statistics vary from one source to another. 
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shipments provided the Provisionals with enough weaponry to 
continue their campaign for at least another decade. 116 
An interesting case of terrorists receiving indirect 
help from a government may be found in the case of Afghan 
mujahedeen who were supplied by the US government with 
various weapons including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and 
were trained in their use by the Americans. 117 Subsequently, 
a report in The Independent suggested that Algerians who 
fought alongside the mujahedeen in Afghanistan have turned up 
in the current civil war in Algeria, whilst the possible use 
of anti-aircraft missiles in terrorist attacks against 
aircraft has become a major concern of the US Department of 
State. 118 The concern is particularly acute as reports 
suggest that some of the Stingers were diverted to Iran, a 
state which the US Government has long regarded as being a 
sponsor of terrorist groups and activities*119 
The influence of foreign sponsors on the selection of 
terrorist targets has varied. For instance as well as 
providing safe haven and training, the East German Stasi 
appears to have recruited West German communist terrorists as 
agents. However, the extent to which this affected target 
selection is not clear. 120 On the other hand, although James 
Adams claims that the PIRA plan to bomb a military parade in 
Gibraltar in 1988 was a form of payoff to Gadaffi by 
humiliating Britain on the international stage, there is 
116) "Libyan arms fuel surge in terrorism", The Independent, 
May 8th 1990. "IRA has enough Semtex for 15 years", The 
Independent on Sunday, March 19th 1995. 
117) J. Adams. Trading in Death, 58-64. J. Salata. "MANPADs: 
The Potential for Use as a Terrorist Tactic", U. S. 
Department of States Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 
Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices, 90-94. The 
acronym MANPAD stands for Man Portable Air Defence 
System. Another frequently used term for portable and 
non-portable ground to air missiles is SAM (Surface to 
Air Missile). 
118) "Algerian extremists murder 12 foreigners", The 
Independent, December 16th 1993. J. Salata. "MANPADs", 
102. 
119) J. Salata. "MANPADs", 93-94. J. Adams. Trading in Death, 
70-71. F. S. Pearson. The Global Spread of Arms, 55. 
R. H. Schultz. "Iranian Covert Aggression"q 283. 
120) J. Schmeidel- "My Enemy9s Enemy", 64-66. H. Horchem. "The 
Decline of the Red Army Faction", 619 63-65. 
B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 58-59. 
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little evidence to suggest that the Provisionals have allowed 
outside actors to influence their operations. 121 
In other cases this type of relationship has greatly 
influenced the types of target selected by a terrorist group. 
The Palestinian group Fatah Revolutionary Command (FRC) run 
by Sabri al-Banna - otherwise known as Abu Nidal, has had a 
number of sponsors throughout the years. The FRC has been 
provided with shelter and training facilities as well as 
weapons and logistical support by, respectively, the Iraqiq 
Syrian, and Libyan Governments over a number of years since 
the mid 1970s. As a result, the relationship between the FRC 
and the sponsoring governments has resembled that of a 
mercenary group and its paymasters, with the terrorists 
carrying out attacks to suit the political interests of their 
sponsors as well as attacking their own favoured targets*122 
Terrorists can also make weapons themselves. The 
manufacture of home-made guns is not particularly common 
because of the relative availability of guns on the open 
market or from sponsors. However, primitive home-made pistols 
were used by the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s, and in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s the Naxalites of West Bengal used 
pipe-guns triggered by pulling a string. 
123 Even in 
sophisticated western states, there have been cases of home- 
made guns being manufactured. In October 1990 a former member 
of the British Army was jailed in Northern Ireland for making 
sub-machine guns for the UDA. The components were 
manufactured at Shorts aircraft factory in Belfast and 
supplied to the man, who assembled the guns at a workshop in 
county Down. 
124 Similarly, in February 1992-French police 
arrested Pedro Gorospe Lertxundi, thought to be ETA's 
quartermasters in a villa near Bayonne. Police found home- 
made pistols, and sub-machine guns based upon the Israeli 
121) J. Adams. Trading in Death, 29. M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 
431. "IRA hunts for top-level mole", The Observer, 
March 13th 1988. 
122) P. Seale. Abu Nidal, 109-151. H. Cobban. The Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation, 55,96-97,165. 
123) H. Willmott. "Kenya in Revolt"i R-Thompson & J. Keegan 
(eds). War in Peace: An Analysis of Warfare since 1945, 
(London: Orbis, 1981), 111. B. Dasgupta. the Naxalite 
Movement, 83. 
124) "Ex-soldier made guns for loyalists", The Independent, 
October 6th 1990. 
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Uzi. Reportedly many of the guns were manufactured for sale 
to eastern European and middle eastern customers. 125 However, 
most terrorist groups use mass-manufactured guns. 
A home-made weapon which the Provisional IRA has been 
using since 1972 with a moderate degree of success has been 
the home-made mortar using cut-down oxyacetylene canisters as 
the tube, and with home-made projectiles. Although there is 
some dispute over their accuracy of these mortars, with 
several civilians having been injured by stray projectilesq 
the mortars have been used with some effect since 1979-126 
The development of mortars has allowed the PIRA to carry out 
several attacks against security force targets in Northern 
Ireland which had been protected against attack from bombs, 
guns and rockets by the use of reinforced barriers. In 
February 1985 a mortar attack on an RUC station in Newry, 
county Down, killed nine police officers. 127 However, a 
subsequent mortar attack in Newry in November 1986 injured 
thirty-five civilians. 128 Since 1990 at the latest, the 
reliability of the mortar detonators has been improved by a 
gyroscopic device which ensures that the detonator is always 
at 90* from the point of impact and is therefore more likely 
to detonate successfully. 129 Mortars have since been used in 
England to attack the British Cabinet at 10 Downing Street in 
February 1991, and to carry out two attacks on Heathrow 
Airport in London in March 1994.130 
Bombs are commonly assembled by the terrorists 
themselves. Guidebooks such as The Anarchist Cookbook give 
125) "Spain hails arrest of ETA chief"l The Independentq 
February 22nd 1993. 
126) "Terrorists keep faith with a weapon that rarely kills" 
The Independentq February 8th 1991. "The day John Major 
missed his lunch", The Sunday Times,, February 10th 
1991. 
127) C. Ryder. The RUC, 310-312. 
128) D. McKittrick.. Despatches from Belfast,, 206. 
129) "IRA's deadly new weapon"q The Sunday Correspondent, May 
20th 1990. 
130) "IRA bombers attack No 10 War Cabinet", The Independent 
February Sth 1991. "Mortar bombs realise worst fears of 
police", The Daily Telegraph, February Sth 1991- "Yard 
tpowerless9 to avert new attack", The Guardian, 
February 8th 1991. "Police comb Heathrow for more 
mortars", The Independentq March 12th 1994. "Tanks 
threat turns the screw on airport bombers"q The Sunday 
Times, March 13th 1994. "Flight chaos as bomb warnings 
close airports"q The Independent, March 14th 1994. 
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directions for the construction of relatively simple devices 
and recently bomb-making information has become available on 
the Internet. 131 Quite powerful and sophisticated weapons can 
be constructed using components readily available in 
electronics and other shops. After the arrest of a Japanese 
Red Army member near New York in April 1988, police officers 
found that many of the components of his bombs had been 
bought from ordinary electronics and department stores-132 
Likewise, in June 1990 a bomb-expert in the RUC told an 
American court that the PIRA had detonated bombs from a 
distance by using rewired radar detectors readily available 
in the electronics chain store Radio Shack. 133 More recent 
reports suggest that the Provisionals have also used a 
photoflash slave unit as a detonator, attaching it to a bomb 
and setting it off from up to 800 metres with a flashgun#134 
Other examples of the use of everyday merchandise in bombs 
includes the use of the timers in video-recorders to detonate 
time-delayed or sleeper bombs weeks or even months after they 
have been primed, and the use of small electronic timers in 
incendiary devices. 135 The availability of electronic goods 
is unavoidable in a mass consumer society, but it does make 
it easier for terrorists to obtain the components necessary 
to construct sophisticated explosive devices, and thus 
extends their range of possible targets. 
In some cases home-made bombs are relatively low- 
powered anti-personnel devices such as the low-powered 
grenades used by the Naxalites in Calcutta in 1970-1971, and 
131) W. Powell. The Anarchist Cookbook, (Lyle. Stuart Inc, 
1971; Secaucus, New Jersey: Barricade Books, 1989). 
"Over-taxed and under siege", The Independent, April 
24th 1995. "America wakes up to its paranoid army", The 
Independent, April 25th 1995. 
132) W. R. Farrell. Blood and-Rage, xvii-xix. 
133) "IRA 'using rewired US radar detectors as bomb 
detonators"', The Independent, June 7th 1990. 
134) "Photoflash bomb threat to the public", The Scotsmang 
March 16th 1994. "IRA's 'Russian roulette' detonator", 
The Times, March 16th 1994. 
135) "Security alert sent to police before bombing in 
Brighton", The Times, October 15th 1984. "Long delay 
IRA fuses not new", The Guardian, October 15th 1984. 
"RUC irked by claims of long-delay IRA bombs"i The 
Daily Telegraph, October 16th 1984. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 423-426. "Simplicity of 
incendiary device makes disruption easy", The Guardian, 
December 24th 1991. 
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PIRA's nail-bombs consisting of cans packed with explosive 
and nails or other shrapnel. 
136 Similar hand-thrown grenades, 
such as the 'drogue' bombs used by the Provisionals from the 
late 1980s onwards, have proved capable of penetrating 
lightly-armoured vehicles because although the outer shell of 
the bomb was made from household items such as baked bean 
tins, they contained Semtex -a relatively-powerful plastic 
explosive. 137 Booby-trapped home-made bombs have also been 
used by the Provisionals including a bomb inside a football 
which was placed inside the perimeter of an RUC station in 
county Antrim - doubtless in the hope that a police officer 
would move the ball or even kick it, and a bomb inside a tin 
of chocolates which was given to a soldier manning a 
checkpoint in county Tyrone as a 'Christmas present'. 138 
The explosive components of a bomb can also be home- 
made. The IRA has used home-made explosives since the bombing 
campaign in England in 1939-1940, and since the early 1970s 
the Provisionals have used various mixtures of ammonium 
nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO), of sodium chlorate and nitro- 
benzene (COOP), and later of ammonium nitrate and nitro- 
benzene (ANNI). 139 Whilst these bombs could sometimes be 
quite destructive, more recently large PIRA bombs based on 
similar components and weighing well over 1,000 pounds caused 
massive destruction in the centre of Northern Irish towns and 
in the City of London in the early 1990s, and were also used 
to attack military and police facilities. 140 A similar bomb, 
136) B. Dasgupta. The Naxalite Movement, 79-80,83. P. Gurney. 
Braver Men Walk Away, 116-117. D. Barzilay. The British 
Army in Ulster, volume 2, (Belfast: Century Services 
Ltd, 1975), 129. 
137) B. O'Brien. The Long War, 154-155. D. McKittrick. 
Despatches from Belfast, 195. D. McKittrick. Endgame, 
85. 
138) "Ball bomb", The Independent, March 31st 1992. "Soldier 
given IRA bomb in chocolates tin", The Independent, 
December 24th 1992. 
139) M. Dillon. The Enemy Within, 27-28. J. Bowyer Bell. The 
Secret Army, 150,153. J*Adams- Trading in Death, 9-10. 
140) "Biggest IRA bomb defused", The Independent$ September 
6th 1991. "IRA City bomb was fertiliser", The 
Independent, May 28th 1992. "Damage in huge blast put 
at 920m", The Independent, September 25th 1992. "Shock 
wave of destruction was created by a dealy mixture", 
The Independent, April 27th 1993. "Explosion could have 
wrecked city centre", The Daily Telegraphl August 13th 
1993. B. O'Brien. The Long War, 214,238-239. 
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thought to consist of about 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate- 
based fertiliser and fuel oil, destroyed a federal government 
building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 and killed 168 
people. 141 These bombings demonstrate that the lack of a 
powerful pre-manufactured explosive need not prevent 
terrorists from seeking to carry out mass-casualty attacks or 
a mass-destruction attack. 
A recent development in the use of home-made weapons 
was the manufacture of the nerve gas sarin by a Japanese 
religious group the Supreme Truth Sect (Aum Shinri Kyo). The 
release of sarin on the Tokyo underground in March 1995 
killed twelve people and injured up to 5,500, and Japanese 
police reportedly believe the group were also responsible for 
the death of seven people from similar nerve gas poisoning in 
Matsumoto, Nagano Prefecture in June 1993. Whilst a definite 
motive for the attack has not been conclusively established$ 
at the time of the attack in March 1995 the cult was coming 
under increased surveillance and pressure from the police due 
to suspected abductions by the cult. 142 Later reports suggest 
that the Tokyo attacks were concentrated on parts of the 
underground network close to police headquarters. 143 
The types of weapon available to a terrorist group is 
exceptionally important in determining the types of target 
which it can hope to attack successfully. For instance, the 
possession of silencers for firearms means an attack can be 
carried out without guards or bystanders being aroused. 
According to Ryder a PIRA assassin used a silenced pistol to 
141) "Bomb built for damage, not slaughter", The Independents 
April 22nd 1995. "FBI widens hunt as Republicans race 
to back Clinton's tough line", The Guardian, April 25th 
1995. "FBI piles up evidence against McVeigh"q The 
Independents April 28th 1995. "FBI tclose' to arresting 
bombers", The Independent, May 22nd 1995. 
142) "Poison terror in the subway"s The Independent, March 
21st 1995. "Religious cult suspected of gas attacks"i 
The Times, March 21st 1995. "Doom-cult linked with 
tsarin affair' a year ago", The Independent, March 22nd 
1995. "Strange Aum life for cult children", The 
Guardian, April 20th 1995. "Tokyo gas attack cult 
leader held", The Guardian, May 16th 1995. "Aum 
cultists admit making nerve gas", The Independents May 
18th 1995. "Aum sect guru faces trial for murder", The 
Independent, June 7th 1995. 
143) "Aum cult doctor admits making sarin nerve gas", The 
Independent, October 25th 1995. 
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kill a police officer in a pub in Newry, county Down, in June 
1981.144 
The clandestine nature of terrorist operations means 
that smaller firearms are generally more suitable because 
they can be easily concealed when being moved and when 
approaching the target. The tendency towards the 
miniaturisation of guns demonstrated in Table 6.1 has aided 
terrorists in this respect. 145 Unlike the other guns the 
Ingrams can be fitted with a silencer. Both ETA and the 
Ulster Volunteer Force are reported to have taken delivery of 
Ingrams'. 146 
TABLE 6.1 
RELATIVE SIZE AND RATE OF FIRE OF MACHINE-GUNS: 1884-1970 
Model and Length Weight Rate of fire 
Year (Inches) (Pounds) (Rounds/minute) 
Maxim (1884) 46.50 40.00 600 
Thompson (1928) 33.75 10.75 800 
Ingrams MAC 10 10.50 6.25 1,145 
(1970) 
Source: I. V. Hogg & J. Weeks. Military Small Arms of the 20th 
century, (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1977), 98,101- 
102,220. 
The trend towards. miniaturisation can be most clearly 
seen in the reduction of size of different versions of the 
highly successful Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun of the 1950s. 
Whereas the original Uzi weighed 8.9 lbs and was 18.9" long, 
the newer mini-Uzi weighs 6.3 lbs and is 14.7" long-147 More 
recently a semi-automatic pistol version has been developed 
with a length of 9.5" and weighing 4.7 lbs. 148 Longer-range 
firearms are also relatively small. The American Armalite$ 
which the PIRA used from the early 1970s onwards, was easily 
144) C. Ryder. The RUC, 253-254. 
145) R. Clutterbuck. "Trends in Terrorist Weaponry", Terrorism 
and Political Violence, 5, no. 2, (Summer 1993), 130, 
132. 
146) R. P. Clark. The Basques, 155. S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 169. 
147) E. C. Ezell. Small Arms of the World: a basic manual of 
small arms, twelfth edition, (New York: Barnes & Nobleg 
1993), 131. 
148) T. Gander. Combat Pistols: A manual of modern handguns. 
(Wellingborough, England: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1 
77-80. R. Adam. Modern Handguns, (London: Quintet, 
1989), ill. 
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folded-up for the purposes of storage and concealment. 
149 
Thus the trend towards smaller weapons, whilst being of use 
to law enforcement officers who also need concealed weapons, 
has undoubtedly aided terrorists. 
Explosives have also become more powerful and more 
stable over the years. When Guy Fawkes and other Catholic 
conspirators conspired to blow up King James I of England - 
together with the Houses of Parliament - in Westminster on 
November 5th 1605, they planted several barrels of gunpowder 
in the cellars beneath. Likewise in December 1800 a group of 
French royalists attempted to assassinate Napoleon Bonaparte 
by placing a barrel of gunpowder on a cart along a route 
which he was known to take. Unfortunately for them the 
primitive time fuse failed to function properly and the bomb 
detonated after Napoleon had passed. 150 In both of these 
cases the explosives were bulky and therefore not 
particularly portable and were also dependent upon relatively 
crude methods of detonation. 
In the nineteenth century developments in the 
manufacture of explosives transformed their role as a weapon 
of political protest and rebellion. 151 The invention of 
dynamite provided revolutionaries with a much more powerful 
explosive than had been hitherto available. 152 The invention 
of nitroglycerine, and its stabilisation with gelatine, 
provided a stable, powerful, and portable explosive - 
gelignite. 153 Tests at the time of the Fenian bombings in 
London in the 1880s showed that relatively small bombs of 41" 
x 212. " with a nitroglycerine base were capable of causing a 
great deal of damage to anybody in the immediate vicinity-154 
149) J. Holland. The American Connection, 82. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 169. 
150) F. L. Ford. Political Murder, 216-217. W. Laqueur. The Age 
0f Terrorism, 101. 
151) J. Most. 
, 
Revolutionare Kriegswissenschaft, (New York: 
Drud und Berlag des Internationalen Zeitungs=Beireins, 
1885). Published with The Beast of Property, (New 
Haven: International Workingmen's Ass'n, 1884)t in one 
volume, (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1983). 
152) W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorismj 104. 
153) K. R. M. Short. The Dynamite War: Irish-American Bombers in 
Victorian Britain, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1979)9 1- 
2,55,64-65,105,128-129,181,205. W. Laqueur. The 
Age of Terrorism, 104. 
154) K. R. M. Short. The Dynamite War, 181. 
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More recently the development of stable, durable, and 
powerful plastic explosives has given terrorists a greater 
degree of flexibility in their use of bombs. The Libyan 
shipments of the plastic explosive Semtex made a great 
difference to the PIRA's capabilities. It is a stable, 
malleable, and powerful explosive. Its great advantage over 
other types of explosive is that only a relatively small 
amount is necessary to produce a powerful explosion from, for 
example, a two pound under-car bomb. 155 However, it is worth 
noting that a former Metropolitan Police explosives expert, 
Peter Gurney, maintains that Semtex is about 1.3 times as 
powerful as TNT, and thus whilst powerful, it is not the 
tsuper-weapon' which some accounts make it out to be. 156 
The chapter concerning security measures shows how 
protective barriers, armour-plated vehicles, and other forms 
of security can protect a target, and how the possession of 
suitably powerful weapons can make it possible to attack such 
targets. Terrorists' possession of a variety of weapons makes 
it costly for all possible targets to be adequately 
protected. However, in order to obtain suitable weapons and 
carry out other aspects of terrorist operations, it is 
generally necessary for a terrorist group to have money 
The financial base. 
Terrorist groups need money in order to buy weapons and 
their components, to rent or buy transport and accommodation, 
acquire or forge documents, and provide for the living 
expenses of their members. Conceivably, a group such as the 
Animal Liberation Front in Britain or the Revolutionary Cells 
in Germany, can get by without large funds because most of 
their members are part-time terrorists who have jobs or other 
means of sustenance, and who do not use particularly 
sophisticated weaponry for their operations. However a group 
with a substantial number of full-time members, has to 
maintain an infrastructure of safe houses, courier links, and 
weapons dumps. Whilst some of these resources can be provided 
free by sympathiserst they generally require money. 
155) "IRA 'transformed' by Libyan arms donation", The 
Independentq March 7th 1991. 
156) P. Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, 151,214. 
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As noted, several terrorist groups gain such funding by 
carrying out bank robberies, kidnappings, and by extorting 
money from businesses, private citizens, and even governments 
with the threat that refusal to pay will result in violent 
retribution. Groups have also obtained money through legal 
and semi-legal methods. In addition to methods which rely on 
violence or the threat of violence, the Provisional IRA is 
also reported to have obtained money through illegal methods 
such as tax fraud, smuggling, the operation of unlicensed 
gaming machines, and from legitimate methods such as public 
collections, pubs, drinking clubs, taxi firms, shops and 
other legitimate businesses which both raise money, and allow 
the Provisionals to launder illegally obtained money. 157 
Another lucrative source of funds for some terrorist 
groups has been the drugs trade. In Peru the Shining Path has 
raised much of its income through 'taxes' on traffickers, 
whilst also taking steps to prevent the major traffickers 
from forcing down the prices charged by peasant coca growers. 
According to Rummrill the Shining Path raised $25-30 million 
when coca prices were at their height in August 1989.158 In 
Colombia communist, conservative, and criminal terrorist 
groups have raised money from drugs trafficking. When, in the 
early 1980s, the communist Colombian Armed Revolutionary 
Force (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombias - FARC) 
raised money by extorting protection money from narcotics 
traffickers, death squads were set up and financially 
supported by narcotics traffickers and other wealthy groups 
in order to kill and intimidate suspected communists and 
other threats to the traffickers and the Colombian economic 
157) "IRA fund-raising blamed for surge in Irish robberies", 
The Independent, May 22nd 1990. "Dealing in the 
business of fear", Financial Times, January 7th 1992. 
"IRA suspected as raiders get away with 92m", The 
Independent, January 8th 1992. "Inquiry into IRA city 
pub links", The Irish Times, September 9th 1992. "Irish 
pubs suspected of laundering IRA funds", The 
Independent, September 28th 1992. "The IRA", The 
Independent on Sunday, November 22nd 1992. J. Adams. The 
Financing of Terror, 197-228. D. McKittrick. Despatches 
from Belfast, 146-151. 
158) S. Strong. Shining Path, 114,122,125. J. E. Gonzales. 
"Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley", 
D. S. Palmer (ed). Shiiing Path of Peru, 108,121-122. 
R. Rumrrill. "The highs and lows of a cocaine economyll, 
M. L. Smith (ed). Why Peoi)le 9. row drugs, 86,89. 
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elites. 159 Whilst the RUC has conceded that the Provisional 
IRA is not involved in the drugs trade, members of the 
loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force and of the republican Irish 
People's Liberation Organisation have been active in 
importing and distributing drugs in the province. 160 
Some terrorist groups have been financially supported 
by governments. In some cases this has been done willingly. 
According to Ranstorp, Hizbollah received an estimated $30 
million from the Iranian government in 1985, rising to $64 
million in 1988 and possibly over $100 million by the 1990s - 
although much of this went to support Hizbollah's social and 
political activities - whilst Shultz reports that Iran gave 
the Palestinian group Hamas $30 million in 1992 and $20 
million in 1993.161 Likewise, in 1983 the US Congress 
approved an allocation of $24 million for the CIA to spend on 
the Nicaraguan Contras, before the Boland Amendments 
technically restricted the uses to which US aid to the 
Contras could be put, and approved a further $100 million in 
October 1986. This was in addition to moneys diverted to the 
Contras from the covert sale of American weapons to Iran in 
the mid 1980s. 162 
In other cases governments have provided money as the 
price of preventing terrorist attacks. Seale claims that the 
Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Command raised $50 million 
from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. If they failed to 
pay when Nidal demanded his organisation attacked targets 
159) C. Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia", 88-89,94-96. 
A. M. Bravo. "Frontier culture takes to cocaine", 73,75. 
J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 1,177-178, 
247. Amnesty International. Political violence in 
Colombial 52. J. Adams. The Financing of Terror, 269. 
160) "Terrorists 'run Ulster drugs trade"', The Independent, 
February 7th 1992. "Action against drugs puts gunmen in 
tpolicing' role", The Independent, November 3rd 1992. 
"IRA looks set for victory over terrorist faction", The 
Independent, November 4th 1992. J. Holland & H. McDonald. 
INLA, 311-313,319-320. S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 194. 
J. Adams. The Financing-of Terror, 289. 
161) M. Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership", 321. 
R. H. Shultz. "Iranian Covert Aggression", 290,297. 
162) O. North & W. Novak. Undýr Fire, 21-22,234-238. 
B. Woodward. Veils 301,470,481-485,488,509. 
J. Ranelagh- The Agency: The Rise & Decline of the CIA, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986; Sceptre, 1988), 
718-719. 
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such as diplomats and civil aircraft belonging to that state, 
as well as bombing civilian targets within the state. 163 
The importance of documentation. 
Terrorists frequently need documents in order to obtain 
access to target areas, to pass security checks at ports, 
airports and other international crossing points, and to 
maintain a clandestine existence. Some groups, such as the 
Fatah Revolutionary Command, have the ability to forge 
documents. 164 Likewise, A police raid on a PIRA safe house in 
Luton in 1990 found, amongst other things, a number of forged 
Home Office passes. 165 
In other cases documents have been obtained by force. 
When the Proletarian Combat Squad raided the Turin police 
section house in April 1979, as well as taking the weapons of 
two police officers they also took their identity cards. 
166 
Some of the earliest actions of the Red Army Faction in 
Germany involved raids on town halls in order to obtain 
official stamps, blank passports, and blank identity 
cards. 
167 In August 1985 an RAF group shot dead an American 
soldier - Edward Pimental - outside a Wiesbaden nightclub and 
stole his identity card, which they used the following day to 
gain access to the US Air Force base at Rhein-Main. The bomb 
which they planted there killed two Americans. 168 
Lastly, terrorist groups can be supplied with documents 
by sympathetic or sponsoring governments. According to Seale 
Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Command has in the past been 
supplied with documents - particularly passports - by both 
Iraq and Libya. Real passports are of much more value than 
forged ones, giving terrorists a false but verifiable 
163) P. Seale. Abu Nidal, 28,129-130,204. 
164) P. Seale. Abu Nidal, 125,206. 
165) "Arrests failed to stop attacks", The Independents 
December 7th 1990. "IRA arms cache men sentenced to 30 
years in prison", "A 42-day watch that netted top 
police targets", both in The Timesq December 7th 1990. 
166) "Terroristi denudino due vigili rubando le lore divise 
armi a tesserini", Corriere della Serra, May 1st 1979. 
167) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 115,116. J. Becker. 
Hitler's Children, 234-236. 
168) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist 
Group", 68-69. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, . 1991,62. 
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identity and the scope to travel across borders and within 
countries with little hindrance. 169 
Summary. 
If the terrorist's ideology and strategy supply them 
with much of their motive, the tactics and capabilities 
supply them with their means. When selecting its targets, a 
terrorist group's options are circumscribed by its 
capabilities. Although the weapons possessed by the group are 
one of the more obvious determinants of what can be attacked, 
the ability of its leaders to motivate ordinary members and 
plan operations is crucial to its success, whilst the quality 
of its ordinary members determines whether those weapons and 
other resources are used effectively. The financial base of 
the group determines whether the group has the wherewithal to 
function over a long period, and the need to maintain this 
base can dictate that the terrorists attack certain targets 
in order to obtain money or to eliminate threats to the 
group's finances. Although groups with few full-time members 
and relatively primitive weapons can function without a large 
financial base, more sophisticated groups need the money to 
pay for weapons, safe houses, transport, and the living costs 
of their clandestine, members. Lastly, in order for members 
of a clandestine group to stay at liberty, it is useful for 
them to be able to obtain documents such as passports, ID 
cards, and any other documentation which will enable them to 
move from one place to another without arousing suspicion and 
risking arrest. Whilst these factors may influence the 
ability of a terrorist group to attack particular targets, 
the opportunity to do so is limited by the protection given 
to those targets. 




A practical problem which confronts a terrorist group 
wishing to carry out an attack is the extent to which the 
target is protected. Some targets, such as an unarmed 
civilian and unguarded buildings, are totally unprotected. 
Others, such as senior politicians and officials, or 
government ministries and embassies have elaborate and 
expensive forms of protection in order to preempt attacks or 
to protect the targets if an attack takes place. This chapter 
examines the ways in which targets are protected, to see the 
effect which this can have upon terrorist target selection. 
A distinction can be made between static targets - 
which remain in the same place for a relatively long periodi 
and mobile targets, which are generally moving. An obvious 
example of a static target would be a building, but human 
targets - such as a person in their home or giving a speech 
at a podium - would also fall into this category. The most 
obvious mobile target would be a moving car, or more 
pertinently the occupant or occupants of the car. However it 
could also include a walking person, or a material target 
such as a moving train. For the purposes of this study, a 
temporarily immobile target, such as an aeroplane at an 
airport, a train in a station, or a parked car, counts as a 
static target because it is deliberately immobile at the time 
when it is attacked or has a bomb affixed to it. It follows 
from this that the same person can be a mobile target when he 
is in a moving car and a static target when he is in one 
limited area for a length of time. 
The protection of static targets 
The protection of static targets differs from those of 
mobile targets. With static targets, reliance is placed on 
controlling access to the area where a potential target is 
located, setting up detectors and barriers to deter, detect, 
and deflect an attacks and to provide the means of reacting 
if an attack takes place. The amount of protection afforded 
to a static target will vary according to its perceived 
importance, the resources available, and the risk of an 
attack taking place. 
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One rule which can be applied to the protection of both 
static and mobile targets is that the less public knowledge 
there is about the target the better. If the terrorists do 
not know where the target is they cannot attack it. The aim 
of a potential target must therefore be to assume as low a 
profile as is commensurate with their responsibilities and a 
tolerable lifestyle. In its' guidelines to American families 
living abroad the State Department advises: 
A single concept, more than any other, should permeate 
all planning activities, namely "LOW PROFILE". In other 
words, DO NOT draw attention to yourself as an American 
by driving a big American car, subscribing jo U. S. 
magazines, etc; blend in to local environs. 
Business executives who are felt to be potential targets are 
advised to remove their names and addresses from telephone 
2 books and company directories. The practice of minimising 
knowledge concerning the movement of potential targets can 
reach to the very top. Geraghty quotes a 1987 article in The 
Mail on Sunday which noted that although the then Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was to begin a high-profile 
campaign concerning the future of Britain's inner-cities, the 
details of the places she was to visit and the times when she 
was to visit them were withheld for security reasons. 
3 
Often the necessary information can be gleaned from 
publicly available sources. As mentioned in the last chapter, 
for their campaign of high-profile assassination attempts in 
the early 1990s the Provisional IRA used various open sources 
to identify the home addresses of prominent individuals. 
4 
Similarly West German terrorist groups such as the Red Army 
Faction (RAF) and the Berlin based June 2nd Movement are 
known to have used library sources, newspaper clippingsl and 
1) U. S. Department of State, Overseas Security A visory 
Council (OSAC). Security Guidelines for American 
Families Living Abroad, (Washington DC: U. S. Dept of 
State, n. d), 2. 
2) D. E. Wurth. "The Proper Function and use of the Private 
Sector Bodyguard"t B-M-Jenkins (ed)9 Terrorism and 
Personal Protection, 314. 
3) T. Geraghty. The Bullet-Catchers: Bodyguards and the World 
of Close Protection, (London: Grafton, 1988; 1989), 18- 
19. 
4) "Bookworms who burrow for IRA"j The Sunday Correspondentt 
August 12th 1990. 
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books such as The Rich and Super-Rich in Austria when 
selecting targets for abduction or assassination. 
5 
Whilst a normal person or building will not usually 
have much in the way of protection, with more heavily guarded 
static targets the protective measures are more sophisticated 
and also exert control over an area. In these cases 
protection is not dependent upon one particular measure, but 
upon several 'layers' or trings' of defensive measures and 
barriers which make up an integrated system of physical 
protection. The aim of the system is to detect threats, 
assess the nature of intrusions, and delay intruders long 
enough for sufficient response forces to either neutralise 
the threat or, if necessary, evacuate the target. 
If the static target concerned is a high-profile 
person, there is a fair chance that the target, and possibly 
any bodyguards, will be protected by some form of body 
armour. 6 As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was frequently 
accompanied by uniformed armed police officers wearing 
bullet-proof vests whilst a reporter who accompanied the Sinn 
Fein President Gerry Adams for a few days in late 1993 
7 
reported that Adams wore a light bullet-proof jacket. 
With a high-profile human target out of doors the 
terrorists will almost certainly encounter armed bodyguards. 
A heavily-guarded human target will be protected by 
establishing an outer ring of bodyguards to control access, 
keep an eye on incomers, and detect any possible dangers. 
These bodyguards will ideally be able to observe anybody 
coming close to the target. Those bodyguards closer to the 
target deal with any immediate threat, if necessary by 
placing themselves between the target and the attacker. 
8 
Although bodyguards may not be able to stop a 
determined attacker, part of their deterrent effect is that 
5) D. T. Schiller. "The European Experience", 51,57. 
6) M. Dewar., Weapons & Equipment of Counter-Terrorismi (Poolet 
England: Arms & Armour Press, 1987), 138-175 passim. 
7) "Local Hero", Esquirej (London), December 1993/January 
1994. T. Geraghty. The Bullet-Catchers, 206. 
8) "SAS shield for Mrs Thatcher"i The Daily Telegraph, May 
17th 1987. "Scotland Yard: Terror", ITVj televisiong 
February 3rd 1994. D. E. Wurth. "The Proper Function and 
use of the Private Sector Bodyguard", 323. R. Fleming & 
H. Miller. Scotland Yard, 146. T. Geraghty. The Bullet- 
Catchers, 204-211. 
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an attacker would not escape, and would quite probably die, 
after an attack. 
9 For example at a parade held in Donegall 
Place, Belfast in September 1993 to commemorate the seventy- 
fifth anniversary of the founding of the Royal Air Forces it 
was possible to get within about five yards of the Northern 
Ireland Secretaryl the Commander in Chief of British Forces 
in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Mayor of Belfast. The first 
two at least would have been prime targets for the 
Provisional IRA. Around these people were a number of what 
appeared to be plain-clothes bodyguards. In the vicinity 
there were several armed police officers and soldiers in 
uniform patrolling, stopping vehicles from entering the area, 
and checking the bags of pedestrians though not searching the 
pedestrians themselves. A surveillance helicopter hovered 
constantly overhead. Given the security precautions an 
attacker with a grenade or concealed weapon could have 
launched a brief attack. but it is highly unlikely that they 
would have escaped or indeed survived. 10 
Protecting buildings or people within the buildings is 
different in that permanent physical barriers and other 
protective devices can be installed. At the most basic level 
the physical protection of buildings consists of little more 
than reinforcing the usual access points through which an 
assailant may gain access, such as doors and windows. For 
example in Northern Ireland in July 1994, a group of armed 
UFF members attempted to gain entry to a mainly Catholic pub 
in Annaclone, county Downg on a day when the pub contained 
forty people watching the football World Cup Final on the 
television. Their intention was to spray the people in the 
pub with gunfire, a so-called 'spray job', designed to cause 
the maximum number of casualties. A similar attack on a west 
Belfast betting shop in February 1992 had killed five peoplet 
whilst attacks on rural pubs in October 1993 and June 1994 
had killed eight and six people respectively. " However, the 
9) "SAS shield for Mrs Thatcher", The Daily Telegraph, May 
17th 1987. 
10) Personal observationt Belfast, September 12th 1993. 
11) "Loyalist gunmen kill five in new Belfast bloodbath", The 
Independent, February 6th 1992. "Loyalist avengers 
slaughter five", The Timest February 6th 1992. "'The 
gunmen are savage, sinfull wicked, depraved"'i The 
Independentg November 1st 1993. "Major set to invite 
Hume to Ulster talks"s The Times, November 1st 1993. 
Target protection 204 
Annaclone attack was foiled because the landlord, fearing a 
similar attack on his pub, had locked the heavy outer doors 
to the pub when the football match started. Unable to get 
through the doors the UFF members fired through the windows, 
but only succeeded in injuring people with the flying 
glass. 12 
In a similar fashion, after Sinn Fein members were 
increasingly targeted by loyalist groups in the late 1980s 
and early 1990sq some protected their homes with front doors 
toughened with Macrolan perspex on the back, and with steel 
internal doors beyond these to prevent anybody from gaining 
access to the rest of the house. 13 The upgrading of 
protective measures by Sinn Fein members was specifically 
recognised by the UFF. In a statement in October 1993 they 
specifically referred to "... the provos behind steel 
security doors" when justifying their attacks on ordinary 
Catholics. 14 
Terrorists attempting to gain access to a more heavily 
protected building would encounter a greater number of 
obstacles. Where a building, such as the police stations in 
Northern Ireland, is at risk of attack from gunfire, bombs, 
and mortars or rockets, they may be protected by concrete 
blast-wallsl high wire-fencing, metal-sheetingg and other 
forms of barrier, as well as having watch-towers, lighting, 
and closed circuit TV (CCTV) aimed at detecting attacks as 
soon as possible. 15 Entry to restricted areas is generally 
limited to certain people entering through a few access 
"New wave of Ulster violence feared", The Independent, 
June 20th 1994. "Reprisal fear after Catholic pub 
killings", the Times, June 20th 1994. "Loyalists get 
life terms for pub atrocity"i The Guardian, February 
25th 1995. "UFF four get life for pub massacre"q The 
Independent, February 25th 1995. 
12) "Publican's fear averted massacre", The Independentq July 
19th 1994. 
_"Bar's 
locked doors foiled UFF gunmen", The 
Guardiang July 19th 1994. 
13) "The price of survival in a divided land", The 
Independent on Sunday, October 18th 1992. "Local Hero", 
Esquire, (London)l December 1993/January 1994. 
"Victimised"i Fortnight, no. 320, (September 1993)l 9. 
"Sinn Fein death part of sustained assault", The 
Independentg August 10th 1993. 
14) "For Queen and Country"i The Guardian , supplement, October 19th 1993. 
15) "State-of-the-art building for a state of siege", The 
Times, supplementj November 21st 1992. 
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points - normally doors or gates with security barriers. 
Terrorists seeking to gain access through these points would 
have to get past guards checking identity (ID) cards, or 
alternatively open locked doors which only open on the 
production of an electronic card or 'key' which is read by a 
sensor. The security system automatically unlocks the door if 
the correct card is presented, but the terrorist would need 
such a card - or would need to be able to get hold of one. 
Sensor systems are often supplemented by entry-phones or the 
need to type in a Personal Identification Number (PIN) on a 
key pad at the door - rather like the codes used by cash 
dispensers outside banks. 16 Thus to gain entry through 
conventional access points without causing a disturbance the 
terrorists would probably need a convincing ID card, possibly 
an electronic card which matched the records on a 
computerised record, and would have to know the appropriate 
PIN. 
For more easily accessible targets such as sports 
events and airports, barriers such as walls and barbed wire 
fences - possibly reinforced by patrols - restrict entry to 
certain access points where some controls can be applied-17 
In the best-protected complexes terrorists would encounter 
barriers designed to make it physically difficult to enter 
the protected area, except through guarded access points. 
These barriers may include walls, fences, and ditches, 
possibly reinforced with barbed wire, razor wire, or other 
edged materials. They will be illuminated by powerful lightst 
thus ensuring that the dark of night would offer no cover. 
18 
Even if the terrorists surmounted the first set of barriers 
16) PAC International. Access Control Equipment: Data Sheetq 
(Stockportj England: PAC International Ltd, July 1993). 
Bel-Tech Security Products. 
, 
Bel-Pac 1000 1-2 door 
access control: BT10009 (Ilfords England: Bell Security 
Ltd). Visonic. Company-profile & Product Cataloguej 
(Biggleswade, England: Visonic Ltd, n. d). R. J. Healy. 
"Protecting the Office"t B. M. Jenkins (ed). Terrorism 
and Personal Protection, 348. 
17) R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortionj 76. E. Best. 
"An Interview with Ed Best, Director of Security at the 
Los Angeles Olympics", TVI Jo_urnal, 5, no. 2, (Fall 
1984), 5. 
18) "Anti-IRA security costs must rise, police say"s The 
Independent on Sunday, September 23rd 1990. 
R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap. Hijack and Extortion, 73,84. 
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they may encounter guard dogs and patrolling security 
guards. 19 
In addition they would quite probably be detected by 
intruder detection systems (IDS) such as acoustic cables - 
which detect sound or vibration, and passive infra-red 
detectors which detect body-heat and movement. 
20 Whilst few 
physical barriers are totally impregnable, if proper alarms 
are in place they can give a warning to the defenders of the 
target and impose a delay upon an intruder which gives the 
defenders time to assess the nature of the threat and to 
react to it with the resources at their disposal. If closed 
circuit TV is installed the intruders might be seen by 
security staff in a central control room, thus allowing the 
guards or their supervisors to determine the scale of the 
intrusion. Even if the terrorists are not caught immediately, 
video recordings attached to the CCTV system can allow them 
to be identified after the event, and provide evidence of 
their presence. 21 
Unless the terrorist's aim is simply to plant a bomb 
inconspicuously they will have to neutralise whatever 
resistance they encounter there. Whatever the terrorists are 
seeking to do, there is a good chance that an important 
target will be protected by armed guards of one form or 
19) "Israel to deploy dogs on borders in attempt to curb 
Islamic suicide bombers", The Guardian, January 30th 
1995. "Israel brings in dogs", The Independent, January 
30th 1995. M. Dewar. The British Army in Northern 
Ireland, 131. D. Barzilay. The British Army in Ulster, 
volume 2,185-187. 
20) Advanced Design Electronics & the Home Office. The simple 
guide to choosing an alarm system, (Advanced Design 
Electronics Ltd). Modern Security Systems. Detection 
Devices: Passive Infra-Red Movement Detectorsp (Hemel 
Hempsteadl England: Modern Security Systems Ltd, 
November 1992). R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and 
Extortion, 74. Private Information. 
21) "Video 'filmed IRA bombers at Harrods", The Independent, 
April 14th 1994. "English-born bombers get 30 years for 
IRA blasts", The Guardiang May 14th 1994. "'Proud' IRA 
bombers jailed for 30 years"i The Independent, May 14th 
1994. "Framing the Villains"l New Statesman & Society, 
January 28th 1994. "Long lens of the law", The 
Independent, July 6th 1994. Sensormatic CamEra. 
Sensormatic CamEra: The World Leader in Loss 
Preventiong (Warringtong England: Sesormatic CamEra 
Ltd, n. d). Modern Security Systems. Could YOU use an 
extra pair of eyes?, (Hemel Hempstead, England: Modern 
Security Systems Ltdq November 1992). 
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another. Most airports have armed guards on the premises, and 
the same applies for many of the premises which terrorists 
may wish to attack. 
Having accomplished their task, the terrorists still 
have to get away. First they have to evade or neutralise any 
guards who are still present. They then need to get clear of 
the target area before reinforcements arrive. Due to the 
risk of such interventions the greater the delay or likely 
delay which the terrorists encounter in penetrating the 
defences of the protected area, the less likely it is that 
terrorists wishing to survive will try an attacks or persist 
with it once it has started to slow down. 22 
Although an individual or a small group faced by 
terrorist intruders may have to rely on the resources they 
have on site to combat them, larger organisations or 
government installations can hope for a quicker response. A 
PIRA member in Belfast reckoned that the British Army could 
seal off an area within two to three minutes of an incident 
taking place. 23 It is also estimated that armed police 
officers could be sent to any of the foreign embassies in 
London within a similar period, whilst the helicopters 
operated by the Metropolitan Police can reach any spot in 
London within fifteen minutes. 24 Incidents at targets with a 
lower priority may not receive such a rapid response. In 1990 
a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defence estimated 
that an unarmed police presence was able to reach a Royal 
Ordnance factory in the Thames Valley area within three 
minutes of the alarm being given, but conceded that an armed 
presence would take rather longer. 25 
Terrorists may wish to plant a bomb which will explode 
after they have gone. In areas open to the public, such as 
shops or railway stations, the risk of detection is not such 
a problem as there is generally little in the way of 
protective measures. It is possible that somebody might 
22) R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 73-74,82. 
G. Wardlaw. Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and 
counter-measures, revised edition, (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 169-170. 
23) K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 125. 
24) R. Fleming & H. Miller. Scotland Yards 207,296. 
25) U. K. House of Commons. The Physical'Security of Military 
Installations in the United Kingdom, (HC-171), (London: 
HMS09 1990)9 par. 358-359 p. 27-28, par. 745-747 p. 58. 
Target protection 208 
notice a suspicious package and notify the authorities, or in 
the case of an attack on a specific person or object, a 
search may find the bomb before it is due to explode. 
26 
However, the main risk to the terrorist is that he may be 
seen on CCTV and either captured or have his movements 
recorded, allowing the authorities to identify him. 
Explosives may be also be smuggled into a buildingy as 
happened when a vehicle-bomb exploded in an underground car 
park beneath the World Trade Centre in New York in February 
1993, killing six and injuring 1,000.27 Similarly, a bomb 
with a long-delay timing device was smuggled into a room in 
the Grand Hotel in Brighton, and concealed behind the bath 
panels about three weeks before the Conservative Party 
Conference in October 1984. The resulting explosion killed 
five people and nearly killed the Prime Minister and several 
members of her Cabinet. 28 Since the Brighton bombing, events 
such as political party conferences have required extremely 
costly and overt security measures with room-sweeps, baggage 
checks, and the presence of armed policemen. 29 
Smuggling guns or bombs onto an aeroplane is more 
difficult as precautions are generally taken to prevent 
hijacks or bomb-attacks. At airports dogs may be used to 
sniff for concealed weapons or explosives, but various forms 
of manufactured detectors are more commonly used. 
30 In 
addition, whereas previously a terrorist was able to check in 
baggage containing a bomb and then not board the aeroplane, 
many airlines now have baggage reconciliation systems which 
26) R. Fleming & H. Miller. Scotland Yard, 145. T. Geraghty. The 
Bullet-Catchersj 199-200. 
27) "Death in the afternoon: bombers hit New York", The 
Times, February 27th 1993. "New York bomb to be 
rebuilt", The Times, February 29th 1993. "Tapes reveal 
role of FBI in bombing", The Independentl November 9th 
1993. 
28) "Security alert sent to police before bombing in 
Brighton", The Times, October 15th 1984. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 423-426. 
29) "Bournemouth 'under siege' in ; E2m security operation"I 
The Independent, October 9th 1990. "Threat to 
conference 'extremely high"'s The Times, October 9th 
1990. 
30) J. D. Baldeschwieler. "Explosive Detection for Commercial 
Aircraft Security"i Terrorism and Political Violenceq 
5, no. 2, (Summer 1993). 
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should ensure that baggage which is not attributable to a 
boarded passenger will be removed and will not fly. 31 
Finally, it is possible that the targets which a 
terrorist group may wish to attack are spread around an even 
larger open area, like a city. In January 1991, the head of 
the London Emergency Planning Information Centre conceded: 
Frankly, if a terrorist group really wanted to make a 
mess of London, they could. ... We would not be able to 
cope. By that I mean we wofid be limited to chasing after 
the effects of a disaster. 
The very size of a major city makes it difficult to protect 
all of the possible targets, particularly if the range of 
targets is broad. During the PIRA bombing campaign in England 
- and particularly London - in the early 1990s, Terry Kirby 
pointed out "... a guard cannot be mounted over every railway 
line and shop doorway". 33 As long as a hostile terrorist 
group is operating effectively, it is simply impossible to 
provide absolute physical protection to the transport and 
commercial structure of a major city. Attempts to do so over 
the long-term would be prohibitively costly and would deplete 
the resources available to protect specific potential 
targets. 
The French Government discovered this during the series 
of bomb attacks carried out in Paris between December 1985 
and September 1986 by a pro-Iranian group. The attacks killed 
thirteen and injured 250. Although suspects were finally 
convicted for the attacks, it was investigative action taken 
after the attacks which achieved this. During the attacks the 
Government was almost helpless. 34 
31) P. Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective International 
Aviation Security System", 109,111. 
J. D. Baldeschwieler. "Explosive Detection for Commercial 
Aircraft Security"l 100. 
32) "Eve of destruction"q Time out, January 16th-23rd 1991. 
33) "IRA moves to strike economic targets", The Indep endentl 
December 24th 1991. 
34) "Terrorism's other target"l The Timess September 18th 
1986. "Paris holds 8, says terrorist ring is br oken"i 
International Herald Tribune, March 27th 1987. "How 
Iran's mullahs held Paris to ransom", The Indep endent 
on Sunday, January 28th 1990. "Politics and the bombers 
of Paris", The Ind"endent, February 3rd 1990. "20 
years for Paris bomber"l The Independenty March 10th 
1990. "Tunisian sentenced to 20 years in prison 't, 
Associated Press q March 10th 1990. Y. Bodansky. Target 
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A degree of protection can be afforded by the 
deployment of large numbers of soldiers. This is considered 
in more detail later, but it should be noted that such 
measures can make it difficult for terrorists to operate in 
the areas where these measures are implemented because of the 
danger of interception on the way to or from an attack. A 
similar reasoning appears to have been behind the decision of 
the security organiser for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los 
Angeles to deploy 12,000 uniformed - though unarmed - 
security guards in addition to the normal law-enforcement 
agencies. 35 (This is assuming that the terrorists do not have 
the backing of sympathetic elements of the security forces, 
or indeed have members within the security forces. If they do 
then the terrorists may find their path is smoothed quite 
considerably. ) 
Intense surveillance of an area can also make it 
difficult for terrorists to carry out their operations 
undetected. For a long time in West Belfast, an observation 
post on the top of Divis Flats allowed the British Army to 
observe much of the area, whilst covert observation posts in 
the roofs of houses or in abandoned buildings supplied 
information over the radio concerning suspicious 
activities. 36 This was supplemented by up to three 
helicopters equipped with surveillance equipment constantly 
hovering over the district. 37 Helicopter surveillance is also 
used by the Metropolitan Police in London during public 
events such as the Trooping of the Colour as a way of trying 
to spot any suspicious activities. 38 As noted above, the 
installation of CCTV can afford blanket coverage of a defined 
area to the police in a central control room, and if 
America: Terrorism in the US Today, (New York: SPI 
Books, 1993), 226-246. 
35) E. Best. "An Interview with Ed Best", 4-5. 
36) D. Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 238. M. Urban. Big Boys' 
Rules, 41-42. M. Dewar. The British Army in Northern 
Ireland, 185-186. 
37) Personal observation: Belfast, September 1991. D. Hamill. 
Pig in the Middle, 238. M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 117- 
118. 
38) "Scotland Yard: Trooping the Colour", ITVt televisiong 
February 10th 1994. R. Fleming & H. Miller. Scotland 
Yard, 297. 
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necessary the recordings can provide evidence in any 
subsequent trial. 
39 
The setting up of checkpoints can disrupt terrorist 
operations by making it difficult for them to move or carry 
out operations undetected. Following a number of PIRA 
bombings in London and Manchester a series of checkpoints 
were set up in both cities. 
40 A police superintendent in 
London commented at the time: 
Terrorists have to move about and transfer their weapons 
from location to location. The presence of this type of 
road-block should have a deterrent effect as they run a 
risk of being detected. 41 
Such methods have been common in the Catholic urban areas in 
Northern Ireland throughout the recent troubles, with west 
Belfast being ringed by checkpoints. 42 
The deployment of checkpoints can be reinforced by 
restricting the number of access points open to traffic in a 
defined part of an urban area. Following the damage caused by 
two massive bombs in the City of London in 1992 and 1993, 
vehicle access to the City was closed-off at eighteen points 
and restricted to seven entry points which had police check- 
points. 43 Such measures were common in Belfast from the 1970s 
up to the mid 1990S. 44 In his study of a Catholic enclave of 
Belfast in the early 1970s, Burton reports that of the 
sixteen possible ways to drive into 'Anro', only three were 
open, and these were frequently manned by soldiers at 
checkpoints. The others were either barricaded with dragons 
39) "Framing the Villains", New Statesman & Societyl January 
28th 1994. "Long lens of the law", The Independents 
July 6th 1994. 
40) "Police set road-blocks in effort to deter IRA"q The 
Independents December 7th 1992. "Police introduce IRA 
road-blocks in Manchester", The Independent, December 
8th 1992. 
41) "Police set IRA road traps", The Independent, December 
6th 1992. 
42) "One-dimensional policing", Fortnight, May 1993. 
43) "A bombshell for London's drivers", The Independent, June 
22nd 1993. "Police to cordon off City from bombers"i 
The Independent, July 1st 1993. "Gridlock fears over 
City road blocks"l The Independent, July 2nd 1993. "The 
Scared Mile"s The Guardians supplements August 3rd 
1993. "Checkpoints security in City to be scaled down", 
The Guardians January 30th 1995. 
44) "Belfast goes to works London goes to pieces", The 
Independent on Sunday, February 24th 1991. 
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teethl sheet metal, or concrete lumps. 45 More recent reports 
concerning west Belfast and PIRA activities in the Markets 
area of Belfast seem to confirm that access points from 
Catholic areas were also limited as a means of restricting 
terrorist activities. 46 
Ultimately the very design of an urban area may be 
affected by the desire to hamper the operations of 
terrorists. Such considerations are not new to town-planning. 
The broad, straight Parisian boulevards planned by Hausmann 
in the 1860s were designed to allow charges by the police, 
infantry, and cavalry to be more effective, and to make it 
difficult for rebels to erect barricades successfully. 
47 More 
recently, town planning in Northern Ireland appears to have 
taken security considerations into account. According to 
Ryan: 
Military considerations influence every aspect of life in 
Northern Ireland. The new motorway system was constructed 
in Belfast in the 1980s with a careful eye on the 
sectarian geography and the need to ensure rapid access 
to potentially troublesome estates. Town planning in 
Northern Ireland is subordinate to the requirements of 
the security forces. Whereas in Britain, pedestrian-only 
zones and restricted parking areas are casually patrolled 
by parklog wardens, in Northern Ireland the Army is in 
control. 
This view is at least partly borne-out by a newspaper report 
in 1983 which stated that in Belfast the security forces were 
involved in aspects of town-planning through a coordinating 
committee in the section of the Northern Ireland office which 
dealt with urban-planning. 49 The main aim appears to have 
been to cut down on the number of 'sectarian interfaces' in 
Belfast, where members of one community came up against the 
other. The segregation was effected by walls and wide roads 
with access points controlled by the security forces. 
Subsequent reports on the sectarian geography of Belfast seem 
45) F. Burton. The-politics of legitimacy, 18. 
46) "Family defies IRA wrath over taxi firm clash", The 
Guardian, June 1st 1993. "War News: punishment 
shooting"$ AP/RN, April 1st 1993. "One-dimensional 
policing", Fortnights May 1993. 
47) D. Thomson. Europe Since Napoleons revised edition, (Harmondsworthl England: Penguin, 1966)9 270. 
48) M. Ryan. War & Peace in Ireland: Britain and the IRA i-n 
the New World Order, (London: Plutog 1994)9 124. 
49) "Checkpoint Paddys Checkpoint Billy", The Irish Times, j May 5th 1983. 
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to confirm that the move towards greater segregation was 
grounded in people's desire for safety within their own 
religious community, but also confirmed that the trend was 
desirable from the perspective of immediate security 
concerns. 
50 
Thus a terrorist in a heavily-protected urban area who 
seeks to transport weapons or carry out an operation, will 
encounter a number of problems. Gaining access to a protected 
area in a vehicle is only possible through certain access 
points. If the terrorist is already wanted for an offence and 
is recognised, or merely lacks sufficient proof of 
identification, he could be detained at a check-point. 
Similarly, such a search could find weapons or other 
incriminating materials. Even if he avoids this, once he 
carries out an operation there is a strong possibility that 
he will be located within minutes and, if under observation 
from the air or on CCTV1 he will find it difficult to evade 
detection, interception by the security forces, and either 
detention or death. 
When examining the use of protective measures against 
terrorist or other attacks, it should be borne in mind that 
the systems put in place may not function properly. Skimping 
on costs by paying low wages to security guards can lead to 
either poor quality guards or guards working long hours or 
moonlighting to make up their income and ending up tired. 
51 
Whilst dogs can also be used to detect intruders and to 
detect explosives concealed within vehicles or within other 
objects, like humans they can also become tired and lose 
concentration if used for overly-long periods. 
52 In practice 
50) "Troubles prompt moves to fortresses"'l The Independent 
on Sunday, November 1st 1992. "Apartheid deepens on 
streets of Ulster", The Independent on Sunday, March 
21st 1993. "Concern grows in Ulster as divisions 
continue", The Independent, March 22nd 1993. 
51) U. K. House of Commons. The Physical Security of Military 
Installations in the United Kingdom, par. 56-57 pp. 
xix-xxl par. 602 p. 47, par. 625-627 p. 49, par. 852- 
856 pp. 66-67. P. Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective 
International Aviation Security System", 112. 
52) "Israel to deploy dogs on borders in attempt to curb 
Islamic suicide bombers"q The Guardian, January 30th 
1995. "Israel brings in dogs"t The Independents January 
30th 1995. P. Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective 
International Aviation Security System", 110. M. Dewar- 
The British Army in Northern Ireland, 131. 
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some CCTV systems are badly maintained and do not operatel or 
even if they do the video facilities do not work. 
53 According 
to a recent report the police have found that in many shops 
the camera surveillance systems ltsee produce pictures of such 
poor quality that identifying suspects on them is nearly 
impossible", although this can sometimes be overcome by 
equipment which enhances unclear video images. 
54 As to 
restricting access, after a protective perimeter had been set 
up around the City of London in late 1993, journalists found 
that it was still possible to drive vehicles in without being 
examined. 
55 Thus there can be, and often are, shortcomings in 
security systems. On the other hand, without careful and 
lengthy observation, or a source on the inside, it would be a 
rash terrorist who took such shortcomings for granted when 
planning an attack on a static target. 
The protection of mobile targets. 
As noted, attacking human targets in transit - whether 
they are in a private car, in a form of public transport, or 
on foot - is a popular method amongst terrorists. 
56 A member 
of the INLA commenting on the PIRA assassination of RUC 
officers noted that: 
The Provies nine times out of ten will bang him as he's 
getting out of his car and bang him when he's getting 
into his car or put a bomb into it. 
57 
If the terrorist knows where the target will start his or her 
journey and where it will end, he has located at least two 
definite points where an attack can take place. If the course 
of the journey is also known then the terrorists' options 
53) "Carlton Club camera had not been switched on", The 
Independent, June 28th 1990. "Faults on 60% of security 
video-cameras"i The Independent on Sunday, July 8th 
1990. "Video camaera failed to record conference on 
terrorism", The Times, September 29th 1990. 
54) "Framing the villains", New Statesman & Society, January 
28th 1994. "Film aids hunt for City killer", The 
Independent, December 19th 1994. 
55) "City cordon fails to cause disruption", Financial Times, 
July 6th 1993. "The Scared Mile", The Guardian, 
supplement, August 3rd 1993. 
56) C. A. Russell & B. H. Miller. "Terrorist Targets and the 
Executive Target", 69. A. J. Scott. "Transportation 
Security", 354. H. A. Lyons & H. J. Harbinson. "A 
Comparison of Political and Non-political Murderers in 
Northern Ireland"s 195. 
57) A. Feldman. Formations of Violence, 75. 
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grow even wider. The target is particularly vulnerable whilst 
in a car because cars are comparatively easy to ambush, 
easily surrounded, and hard to get help top whilst the target 
is trapped in a confined space and can do little to evade the 
terrorist attack. 58 
For the terrorist wishing to attack a specific mobile 
targets the first objective is to determine a definite time 
when the target will be in a particular location, and will be 
vulnerable. 59 Thusq the aim of the target and the people 
responsible for defending it will be to prevent the assailant 
from gaining such information, if possible by adopting a low 
profile, if not by restricting the knowledge which becomes 
availabld. 
Consequently a terrorist might find that the intended 
target makes it difficult to predict where he will be at a 
given time by, for example, varying the routes which he takes 
to and from work and the times at which he takes them. 
60 
During the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, judges have 
frequently changed routes and cars between offices and court 
in an attempt to avoid falling into a recognisable routine. 
61 
This can cause problems for the terrorist, but as Tony Slinn, 
editor of International Security Review, notes: 
You may change your route to work each dayl but when you 
drive out of your front gate, you've got to turn 61 
ither 
right or left, and the terrorist knows this too. 
Clutterbuck states that for this reason most abductions take 
place close to the target's home. 63 
An example of the dangers of attackers gaining 
knowledge regarding the target can be seen in the May 1942 
assassination of Reinhard Heydrich - the Governor of what the 
Nazis termed Bohemia-Moravia - by Czechoslovaks parachuted in 
from Britain. Local members of the Czech resistance obtained 
58) G. Capotorto. "How Terrorists look at Kidnappings", 5. 
59) A. J. Scotti. "Transportation Security", 361 
60) R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 81. 
A. J. Scotti. "Transportation Security", 356-3579 358- 
359. 
61) "Nightmare for the judges on 24-hour vigil", The 
Guardian, January 6th 1988. 
62) "Nightmare for the judges on 24-hour vigil"q The 
Guardian, January 6th 1988. 
63) R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 80. 
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information about Heydrich from the domestic staff who worked 
for him in a castle outside Prague because: 
Despite the SS guard which surrounded the Hradcany 
castle, security within the walls was slack. The Nazis 
employed Czech domestic staff but paid little attention 
to their activities. The servants were treated as part of 
the furnitur 94 and were in an ideal position to supply 
information. 
The watchmaker who repaired the castle's clocks had to enter 
every room of the building, whilst his work repairing the 
watches of the German garrison allowed him to pick up useful 
gossip. He told the assassins that Heydrich was to fly from 
Prague to Berlin on May 27th 1942, confirming that he would 
be driven to his office on the morning of that day before 
leaving. 65 The-Czechs ambushed Heydrich who was mortally 
injured by a bomb thrown at his car in a suburb of Prague. 
66 
Having identified the movements of the target the 
terrorists have to overcome whatever protective measures have 
been taken. The terrorists' approach to these measures will 
depend upon the nature of the operation. If the aim is to 
destroy the target any method will suffice as long as it 
causes the necessary damage without compromising other aims 
the terrorists may have, for example by killing uninvolved 
bystanders. If however the aim is abduction, a more subtle 
use of violence is necessary in order to ensure that the 
intended hostage is not killed prematurely. 
The forms of protection for a mobile human target can 
vary greatly. In the case of an unguarded pedestrian there is 
none, in which case a knife or a heavy blunt instrument would 
suffice for an assassination. This occurred in May 1882 when 
the Chief Secretary for Ireland and his Under-Secretary were 
stabbed to death in Phoenix Park, Dublin, by members of a 
small republican secret society. 67 Several ordinary victims 
64) C. MacDonald. The Killing of s Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard 
Heydrich: 27 May 19429 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 149- 
150. 
65) C. MacDonald. The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard 
Heydrich, 166. 
66) C. MacDonald. The Killing SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard of 
Heydrich, 169-190. The - account of the ambush differs 
slightly i n M. R. D. Foot. Resistanceg 205-206. 
67) C. Townshend. Political-Violence in Ireland, 166. 
J. Waldron. Maamtrasna: The Murders and the Mystery, (Dublin: E dmund Burke, 1992)-, 17. R. Kee. The Green 
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of terrorist attacks have been killed when unarmed and away 
from cover, although guns rather than knives or blunt objects 
tend to be the more common instruments of dispatch in the 
West. 
Alternatively the targets may be wearing some form of 
body-armour. From the 1971 onwards uniformed members of the 
security forces on patrol in Northern Ireland frequently wore 
flak jackets or other forms of body armour as a matter of 
course. 68 A PIRA spokesman acknowledged that as the body 
armour of the security forces was improved, the terrorists 
found it more difficult to kill them whilst they were on 
duty. 69 
Terrorists seeking to attack a heavily protected mobile 
target will encounter rather more in the way of obstacles. 
The terrorists need to have some idea of how well the target 
is protected. There is little point in shooting at a car if 
the car is too heavily armoured for the bullets to penetrate. 
A car which has been protected as much as possible will have 
reinforced body-panels, bullet-proof glass, protection for 
features such as the engine, radiator, and petrol tank, 
'runflat' tyres capable of absorbing hits from high-velocity 
bullets, and a means of communicating with possible 
reinforcements. 70 Such a car may be proof against several 
types of gunfire and relatively small explosions. For 
instance, in January 1981 at Tynan Abbey in county Armaght 
PIRA members encircled an armoured RUC car and poured 
repeated bursts of gunfire into it without physically harming 
the occupants. 71 
However few armoured cars can protect the occupants 
against a very large explosion. When ETA set off a culvert 
bomb under the car of Spanish Prime Ministerl Admiral Carrero 
Blanco in December 1973, the resulting explosion threw his 
Flag: A History of Iris h Nationalism, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1972), 383. 
68) M. Dewar. 
, 
The British Army in Northern Ireland, 196. 
C. Ryder. The RUC, 121. 
69) "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The 
Guardian, May 5th 1987. 
70) "SAS shield for Mrs Thatcher"l The Daily Telegraph, May 
17th 1987. A. J. Scotti. "Transportation Security", 361- 
368. 
71) C. Ryder. The RUC, 245. M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 223. 
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car over a five-storey building killing him and his driver. 
72 
Likewise, the Chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred 
Herrhausen, was killed by an explosion in November 1989 
despite being protected by a 2.8 ton armoured Mercedes. 
Members of the Red Army Faction placed a shaped shrapnel bomb 
on the back of a pedal-cycle which was placed on the side of 
the road where Herrhausen was likely to be sitting and at the 
height where they reckoned that Herrhausen would be sitting 
in the car. The bomb, containing twenty-two to forty pounds 
of TNT as a propellant, blasted an armoured door into 
Herrhausen and threw the car over eighty feet across the 
street. Whilst Herrhausen bled to death his chauffeur only 
received relatively minor injuries. 
73 Against such devices 
there is little defence short of travelling in an armoured 
personnel carrier (APC) or taking to the air in a helicopter. 
Even then the former can be vulnerable to mines or anti-tank 
rockets, and the latter to heavy machine-guns or portable 
surface to air missiles. 
74 
If the terrorist operation is to be an abduction, a 
major problem will be the presence of bodyguards. Not all 
targets have government-supplied bodyguards, but targets 
perceived as important are often heavily protected. 
75 With a 
mobile target the role of a bodyguard is to prevent attacks 
on the target by taking evasive measures, and failing that to 
protect the target once an attack occurs. 
76 Ideally the 
target's car will be accompanied by one or more cars 
containing armed bodyguards ready to react to an attack. If 
necessary the driver of a car containing a mobile target 
72) "How to murder your prime minister", The Economistp June 
29th 1974. 
73) D. Pluchinsky. "RAF Assassination of Alfred Herrhausen"P 
U. S. Department of State. Terrorist Tactics and 
Security Practicess 6. D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational 
and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction 
Terrorist Group", 73. 
74) "IRA claims it shot down army helicopter", The 
Independent, February 12th 1990. J. Salata. "MANPADs". 
P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 246. 
75) "Huge costs force Yard to review VIP security", The 
Independent on Sundayp February 4th 1990. "Top IRA 
target is stripped of his bodyguards"q The Sunday 
Correspondent 
,, 
August 5th 1990. "End of a bullet-proof 
era"l The Independent, June 21st 1991. 
76) D. E. Wurth. "The Proper Function and use of the Private 
Sector Bodyguard", 320,324-328. 
Target protection 219 
should be capable of taking some form of evasive action if an 
attack seems imminent. If the terrorists succeed in stopping 
a car containing a government-protected target they must 
reckon upon the bodyguards having guns and being proficient 
in their use. 77 In such cases time constraints mean that the 
bodyguards have to be neutralised swiftly, probably by 
killing them. 
Target protection and terrorist target selection. 
Terrorists confronted by a target which has been 
protected against their desired means of attack have three 
choices: they can give up altogether, they can seek to attack 
the same target by different means, or they can attack a 
different target. It is difficult to determine the extent to 
which protective measures deter potential terrorists from 
carrying on because one cannot measure events which have not 
happened. Studies concerning ordinary criminal activities 
seem to show that overt protective measures deter criminals 
from carrying out attacks at the site where the measures are 
in place. American studies indicate that the overt presence 
of guards is the one factor which bank robbers take into 
account when deciding whether to rob a particular bank. 
78 
Similarly, since the installation of closed circuit 
television cameras backed up by mobile police units, street 
crime in Newcastle-upon-Tyne's town centre reportedly dropped 
by 20% whilst in Airdrie it dropped by three-quarters. 79 
Although this may hold true for ordinary criminals, it 
may not always be the case for terrorists whose motivation is 
political rather than financial. The existence of protective 
measures may prompt the terrorists to vary the methods used 
to attack a given target. Although this may involve greater 
risks, higher costs, or just the need to spend more time 
working out ways of overcoming the protective measures in 
place, the terrorists may deem this worthwhile. By attacking 
a well-protected target they will have demonstrated their 
77) R. Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortiong 81-82. 
78) A. J. Alexander. "Getting the Most from Scarce Resources", 
TVI Journal, 5, no. 2, (Fall 1984), 28. 
79) "Framing the Villains"i New Statesman & Society, January 
28th 1994. "Long lens of the law"s The Independent, 
July 6th 1994. "They've got an eye on you", The 
Independent, November 2nd 1994. 
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ability to attack whatever targets they wishq intimidating 
other potential targets and possibly securing more attention 
for their cause. 
There are a number of examples. In their first 
telephone communique after the abduction of the former 
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in the Via Caetani in Rome 
in April 1978, the Red Brigades stated: 
This morning our organization brought the attack to the 
heart of the state. You'll hear from gg again as soon as 
possible. Moro is only the beginning. 
Mario Moretti, who is said to have planned the operationg 
subsequently stated: 
In Rome at that moment there were tens of thousands of 
police and carabinieri dispersed throughout the 
metropolitan area, but in Via Caetani, for those few 
minutes, we were superior. 81 
Similarly, after the RAF's assassination of Alfred 
Herrhausen, their communique stated that: 
so* the perpetrators of this [imperialist] system must 
know ... that they will not have any place in the world 
where they can be safe from the attacks of the 
revolutionary guerrilla units. 
82 
By attacking hard targets some terrorists hope to give the 
impression that they can attack whatever targets they wish 
and gain as much publicity as possible. 
The Provisional IRA has always held this attitude. In 
the early 1970s a PIRA member said of bomb attacks in the 
heavily-guarded centre of Derry city: 
Once the security forces decided to put security barriers 
around the town our strategy was then to break through 
them. It was - how many bombs can you get inside their 
net? Every bomb we got inside was looked. upon as a 
victory for us. 83 
Similarly, after the mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in 
February 1991, they stated: 
Today an active service unit of the IRA successfully 
breached the greatly enhanced wartime security 
surrounding 10 Downing Street by launching a mortar 
attack in the heart of the British establishment. 
**, let the British government understand that while 
nationalist people in the Six Counties are forced to live 
80) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 120. 
81) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 15. 
82) Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 68. 
83) K. Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 305. 
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under British rule, then th British cabinet will be 
forced to meet in bunkers. 
This emphasised their demonstrated ability to breach the 
protective measures in place, and their ability to do so 
again, whilst the Sinn Fein newspaper An Phoblacht/Republican 
News pointedly noted the amount of publicity which their 
attack had received from newspapers in Britain, Irelandt and 
the rest of the world. 85 Similarly, in April 1993, after the 
destruction caused by their second large bomb in the City of 
London, the Provisionals again boasted of their ability to 
pierce the increased security measures which had been put in 
place after the first big bomb in April 1992. 
These latest attacks underline both the ability and the 
determination of our volunteers to breach whatever level 
of securiýý the British authorities are capable of 
mounting. 
Thus, in addition to the physical and psychological damage 
caused, the PIRA wished to demonstrate that their attacks 
could not be stopped by protective measures. 
The practical measures which the terrorists use can 
either involve using a method which will overcome the 
protective measures in place, or a method which circumvents 
them. Protective measures can be overcome by using more 
powerful weapons, or by using a method of approach which 
negates their effectiveness. As an example of the former one 
can examine the difficulty which the Provisional IRA found in 
killing British soldiers in the 1980s. This was partly due to 
soldiers being increasingly well-protected by newly-developed 
body armour, and because the Army had adopted patrolling 
methods which made it difficult to attack them and escape 
successfully. In 1989 McKittrick noted that on-duty soldiers 
were protected by flak jackets, armoured vehicles, and 
fortified basesi and tended to go out in patrols of twelve or 
more in particularly dangerous areas. 87 Also, as the Troubles 
84) "British heartland rocked by IRA mortars"q AP/RNj 
February 14th 1991. "Planned for months", The Daily 
Telegraph, February 8th 1991. 
85) "London chaos through the world's eyes"s "IRA 'SCUDS' 
steal Gulf headlines"l "Another mortar for ould 
Ireland", all in AP/RNj February 14th 1991. 
86) "The Flowers and the Tears"q Evening Standard, (London)v 
April 27th 1993. 
87) "Attack intended to mark twenty years of the Troubles"t 
The Independent, September 23rd 1989. 
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progressed the regular British Army made up a lower 
proportion of the security forces in Northern Ireland - the 
balance consisting of an expanded RUC and UDR - and thus 
provided less targets. 
88 As Table 7.1 shows the number of 
soldiers killed dropped greatly both in absolute terms and as 
a proportion of deaths in proportion to deaths amongst the 
local security forces. 
TABLE 7.1 
SECURITY FORCE DEATHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. 
DIVIDED INTO FOUR-YEAR PERIODS: 1970-1993. 
RUCa UDR/RIRb Army Total 
YEAR 
1970-1973 43 39 204 286 
1974-1977 63 42 71 176 
1978-1981 54 39 70 163 
1982-1985 62 31 37 130 
1986-1989 43 30 40 113 
1990-1993 27 20 22 69 
TOTAL 293 201 444 938 
a Includes RUC reserves and part-time RUC 
b Includes part-time UDR/RIR. 
n. b. This table includes nineteen security force members 
killed by loyalists or mistakenly killed by other 
security force members. The vast bulk of security force 
deaths have been caused by republican groups. 
Sources: Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual 
Report 1993,96. M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 
195-205. 
Republican spokesmen repeatedly stated that they would 
prefer to kill British soldiers than members of the locally- 
recruited security forces because they were a better symbol 
of colonial rule, and because dead soldiers had more of an 
impact on British opinion than dead RUC or UDR members. 
89 The 
practical problems were outlined by a PIRA spokesman. 
We would prefer to be hitting Brits than cops because of 
the need to focus on British rule. But because the Brits 
are more sophisticated and because of their body armour 
we have to take considerable risks. The IRA has 
inadequate guns to penetrate the apour BO we have to get 
in close for head or stomach shots 
88) S. Bruce., The Red Hand, 297. 
89) "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The 
Guardian, May 5th 1987. "What's on the agenda now is an 
end to partition"t The Irish Timest December 10th 1986. 
G. Adams. The Politics of Irish Freedoms 121. 
90) "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The 
Guardian, May 5th 1987. 
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As a result of the difficulties encountered, throughout the 
1980s the Provisionals showed a greater tendency to use bombs 
or other explosive devices rather than guns to kill British 
soldiers. This can be seen in Table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 
BRITISH ARMY FATALITIES AND FATAL INCIDENTS 
CAUSED BY IRISH REPUBLICAN GROUPS. 
DIVIDED INTO FOUR-YEAR PERIODS: 1970-1993. 
Deaths 
Shot Explosion 
1970-1973 123 74 
1974-1977 42 29 
1978-1981 27 43 
1982-1985 10 26 
1986-1989 8 31 









N. B. A Fatal Incident is one where at least one member of 
the British Army, excluding the UDR/RIR, has been 
killed. Deaths and fatal incidents classified as being 
caused by explosives include bombs, rockets, and 
mortars. 
Source: Calculated from M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead. 
With bomb attacks on the security forces howeverl there 
was always the possibility of killing or injuring civilians, 
with all the problems which that implied for the image of the 
PIRA amongst its own supporters as well as outsiders. This 
occurred several times, most notably at a Remembrance Day 
Parade in Enniskillen in November 1987. On that occasion 
eleven civilians were killed and sixty-three injured as the 
result of a bomb which was supposed to kill members of the 
Ulster Defence Regiment. 91 
The problem was at least partially overcome in the 
early 1990s when the Provisionals obtained a more powerful 
gun, reported to be the Barrett L82A1 sniper rifle. 
92 A 
similar Tejas . 50 calibre gun was captured by the RUC during 
a house search in Belfast in August 1993.93 The five-foot 
91) "11 die in Cenotaph blast"i The Independentj November 9th 
1987. "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, 
November 11th 1987. "IRA's toll of civilian death grows 
despite public stance", The Independent, April 13th 
1989. P. Bishop & E. Malliee The Provisional IRA, 459. 
92) "Provos now using deadly US rifle", The Sunday 
Independent, (Dublin) September 6th 1992. 
93) "American sniper rifle found in arms cache"q The Times, 
August 18th 1993. 
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long Barrett 'light-fifty' fires a heavy . 50 calibre armour- 
piercing shell at a speed of 2,800 feet per second. It can 
penetrate steel-plate at a range of over one mile and a 
TABLE 7.3 
BRITISH ARMY FATALITIES AND FATAL INCIDENTS 
CAUSED BY IRISH REPUBLICAN GROUPS: 1980-1993 
Deaths Fatal Incidents 
Shot Explosion Shot Explosion 
1980 53 5 3 
1981 46 4 2 
1982 5 15 2 5 
1983 05 0 5 
1984 45 4 3 
1985 11 1 1 
1986 04 0 3 
1987 21 2 1 
1988 3 18 2 6 
1989 38 3 5 
1990 16 1 2 
1991 14 1 3 
1992 21 2 1 
1993 51 5 1 
N. B. Excludes a Royal Navy recruiter killed by a bomb in 
1988. 
Source: Calculated from M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead. 
Barrett reportedly killed Iraqi soldiers at a range of 1,800 
metres during the 1991 Gulf War. 94 It was easily capable of 
smashing through the flak jackets worn by the police and 
military in Northern Ireland and could be fired from a long 
distance from the patrol, thus making it easier to escape 
after the attack. Between September 1992 and August 1993 such 
a gun killed six security force members in the border areas 
of south Armagh and south Fermanagh. " The resulting increase 
in deaths from gunshots can be seen in Table 7.3. The problem 
94) "American sniper rifle found in arms cache"l The Timess 
August 18th 1993. "Hidden Deaths", The Independent, 
magazine supplements August 20th 1994. Y. Debay. "The 
Legion tests new weapons"q RAIDS, August 1993. R. Adam. 
The World's Most Powerful Rifles & Handgunss (London: 
Quintet, 1991), 118. 
95) "Policeman becomes third victim of IRA sniper"s The 
Independent, February 26th 1993. "RUC men killed by 
sniper and bomb", The Timess February 26th 1993. 
"Sniper kills soldier in border attack", The 
Independent, July 18th 1993. "Victim of sniper was 
'dedicated soldier"'t The Times, July 19th 1993. 
"Sniper attack leads to security search"q The 
Independent 
,, 
August 2nd 1993. "Army searches for cover 
against IRA's deadly sniper"i The Times, August 2nd 
1993. 
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presented by body armour was overcome by a more powerful 
weapon, albeit one which was awkward to transport and which 
was only available in small numbers. 
Protective measures can also be overcome by terrorists 
who merely crash through them. The deterrent effect of 
protective measures is partly based on the assumption that a 
terrorist will not survive after carrying out an attack, and 
consequently does not apply to terrorists who expect to die 
as an integral part of the operation. This was demonstrated 
in the mid 1990s when the Islamic Palestinian groups Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad carried out a series of suicide bombings in 
the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-occupied west bank of the 
Jordan, and within Israel itself. The terrorists simply 
walked or drove up to the target concerned, and then 
detonated the bomb, killing themselv es in the process-96 In 
October 1994 one of the bombers recorded a message on video 
before carrying out an attack on a bus in Tel Aviv, killing 
twenty-two people. 
We will continue our brave suicide operations. ... Ther 97 
are many young men who long to die for the sake of God. 
Such people are not likely to be deterred by security 
measures which threaten their lives once they have carried 
out the attack. 
The circumvention of defences is achieved by carrying 
out an attack which does not rely on penetrating through the 
defences so much as go around them. For instance, bombs can 
be sent directly to their target as occurs when letter-bombs 
are sent to targeted individuals through the post. 
98 However, 
small x-ray devices in the office or home can be installed to 
96) "Gaza in grip of suicide bombers", The Independent, 
December 17th 1993. "Hamas has learnt the lessons of 
Lebanon"l The Independents October 20th 1994. "Suicide 
bus bomber kills 22", The Daily Telegraph, October 20th 
1994. "Gaza suicide bomber kills 3 Israeli troops", The 
Independent, November 12th 1994. "Bus stop bombers kill 
19 in Israel", The Independent, January 23rd 1995. 
"Suicide bombers rock Middle East peace", The Guardian, 
January 23rd 1995. 
97) "Israel steps up war on Hamas", The Daily Telegraph, 
October 21st 1994. "Arab village stunned by martyrdom", 
The Daily Telegraph, October 22nd 1994. 
98) "Ministers are targeted by letter bombs", The 
Independent, April 26th 1995. "Death in the post", The 
Guardian, May 15th 1995. 
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detect letter-bombs for people who are thought to be at 
risk. 99 
Where the identity of the target is generic rather than 
specific, this may involve attacking similar targets in a 
setting where they are less secure. For examples due to the 
increasing difficulties in killing British soldiers in 
Northern Irelandl PIRA attacked them in England and on*the 
Continent. Between January 1st 1988 and December 31st 1990 
they killed fourteen soldiers in England and seven soldiers 
and air force members on the Continent, compared to thirty- 
nine soldiers and one naval recruiting officer in Northern 
Ireland over the same period. 100 
Where the target is a specific person or thing, the 
method of attack may be changed. Again ordinary criminals 
show how this occurs. Due to improved bank security in 
Britain in recent years, bank robbers have circumvented 
protective measures by kidnapping the families of key 
holders, thus forcing them to open the bank without raising 
the alarm. Although the Home Office does not specifically 
link these statistics, it is notable that whilst robberies 
against building societies dropped from 1,086 in 1991 to 770 
in 1993, with only 262 in the first seven months of 1994, the 
total number of kidnappings in Britain increased 70% over the 
two year period to the end of 1992, bringing the yearly 
figure to 929.101 
An example of a terrorist attack circumventing 
protective measures is provided by the PIRA attack on the 
British Cabinet when it met in the Prime Minister's residence 
at 10 Downing Street in February 1991. Security in Downing 
Street was increased in the 1980s by various measures 
designed to strengthen the structure of the building which is 
essentially a large house, albeit greatly modified, in a 
terrace of houses. This had been supplemented by the 
99) "Anti-IRA security costs must rise, police say", The 
Independent on Sunday, September 23rd 1990. 
100) M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 161-176. Royal Ulster 
Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994, 
(London: HMSO, 1995), 102. 
101) "Family held hostage in bank raid", The Independentý 
January 9th 1991. "He was almost home when the 
nightmare began", The Independent, May 13th 1993. 
"Gangs target families as tsoft option"', The 
IndeRendent, September 14th 1994. 
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installation of CCTV cameras and electronic sensors in the 
immediate area and culminated in 1989 with the erection of 10 
foot-high gates at the Whitehall end of Downing Street and 
barriers at the other end, thus cutting the street off to 
public traffic. Due to the 1991 Gulf War, the threat of 
Iraqi-sponsored attacks meant that protective measures had 
been increased beyond those normally in place. 
102 The PIRA 
unit circumvented the gates and other protective measures by 
using a home-made mortar placed in the back of a van. The van 
was parked at an angle on Whitehall, about 200 yards from 10 
Downing Street, and whilst the van-driver escaped on the 
pillion of a motor-cycle, the mortars fired three 
projectiles. One exploded when it hit a cherry tree in the 
garden of 10 Downing Street, about 40 feet short of the 
Cabinet Room, whilst the other two overshot and landed in 
some public gardens just beyond. Had one of the projectiles 
been on target it seems likely that several members of the 
Cabinet would have been killed, but in the event nobody was 
103 seriously hurt. Thus the PIRA largely negated the measures 
designed to stop attackers from gaining access to Downing 
Street by firing mortar projectiles over them. 
As well as changing their methods of attack, increased 
protective measures may also lead terrorists to choose 
different targets. This has been borne out by a group of 
American economists using economic assumptions to explain 
patterns in international terrorism. 104 Their theory seeks to 
102) "Breaching the core of Whitehall's defences", The 
Scotsman, February 8th 1991. 
103) "IRA bombers attack No 10 War Cabinet"s The Independents 
February 8th 1991. "War cabinet escapes IRA mortars"s 
The Times, February 8th 1991. "The day John Major 
missed his lunch"s The Sunday Times, February 10th 
1991. 
-P. 
Gurney. Braver-Men Walk Away, 1-8. 
104) W. Enders, T. Sandler & J. Cauley. "UN Conventions, 
Technology and Retaliation in the Fight Against 
Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation"g Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 21 no 1 (Spring 1990). W. Endersq 
T. Sandler & G. F. Parise. "An Econometric Analysis of the 
Impact of Terrorism on Tourism", (unpublished 
manuscript). W. Enders & T. Sandler. "Evaluating Policies 
Aimed at Thwarting Terrorism: A VAR-Intervention 
Approach", (unpublished manuscript, July 1990). 
W. Enders & T. Sandler. "The Causality between 
Transnational Terrorism and Tourism: The Case of 
Spain", (unpublished manuscript, November 1990). E. I. Im 
& J. Cauley. "Cycles and Substitutions in Terrorist 
Activities: A Spectral Approach", Kyklos, 40, no 2 
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explain how individuals or groups allocate finite resources 
between different activities. 
105 Underlying this model is the 
assumption that in their deployment of resourcesp terrorists 
will act like: 
... a rational being who maximises beneficial ret 
minimises costsl while responding to restraints. 
mos and 
However, the writers acknowledge: 
No economic theory is meant to explain all forms of 
terrorism or to apply to all incidents. Since an economic 
theory is necessarily an abstraction, based on 
simplifying assumptions, the theory applies only to those 
cases which satisfy the assumpý6? ns under which the 
generalization has been drawn. 
The economists conclude that the terrorists will almost 
always pick the softest possible targets commensurate with 
the desired gain, on the grounds that the 'price' to be paid 
in overcoming counter-measures - in terms of risk, time and 
resources - is significantly lower. 
108 
The economists examine cases of target hardening, such 
as the fortification of American embassies from 1976 onwards, 
and the installation of metal detectors at American and other 
airports from 1973 onwards. These couhter-measures led to a 
decrease in attacks on the targets thus protected because the 
tprice' of operations against them was increased by the 
counter measures. On the other hand it was found that 
measures which protected certain targets, without positively 
reducing the resources of the terrorist groups concernedq 
merely diverted attacks onto less well protected targets or 
(1987)). T. Sandler, W. Enders & H. E Lapan. "Economic 
Analysis Can Help Fight International Terrorism"i 
Challenge (January/February 1991). T. Sandler, 
J. T. Tschirhart & J. Cauley. "A Theoretical Analysis of 
Transnational Terrorism", American Political Science 
Review, 77 no 1 (March 1983). T. Sandler et al. 
"Economic Methods and the Study of Terrorism", 
P. Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds). Contemporary 
Research on Terrorism, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 
Press, 1987). 
105) E. I. Im & J. Cauley "Cycles & Substitutions", 6; 
T. Sandler, W. Enders & H. E. Lapan "Economic Analysis" 12- 
13. 
106) T. Sandler et al. "Economic Methods", 178. 
107) T. Sandler, W. Enders & H. E. Lapan "Economic Analysis", 11. 
108) W. Enders & T. Sandler. "Terrorism & Tourism: Spain", 1. 
W. Enders & T. Sandler. "Evaluating Policies Aimed at 
Thwarting Terrorism", 1,5. W. Enders, T. Sandler & 
J. Cauley. "UN Conventions, Technology & Retaliation"o 
86. 
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led to different means being used to attack the same target. 
This is particularly the case when a similar target to the 
protected one could be attacked by a different 'cheaper' 
method. 109 
The economists have termed this shift in targets 
substitution, meaning that the terrorists substituted a 
tcheaper' target or method in place of a more 'expensive' 
one. Thus the fortification of American embassies led to a 
decrease in terrorist attempts to occupy or otherwise attack 
them, but led to an increase in attacks upon Americans 
outside the security of the embassy compounds. 110 Initially 
the economists also thought that there may be a substitution 
from aircraft hijacking into kidnappings but say that a 
refinement of the methods of verification used shows that 
there was no significant substitution from aircraft hijacking 
into other non-aircraft hostage incidents. 111 Thus 
substitution means that rather than attack hard targetsi 
terrorists switch their attacks to less well-protected or 
softer targets. 
Some of the attacks carried out by terrorist groups 
suggest that they commonly substitute targets. Attacks by 
Palestinian groups against Israeli or Jewish targets in third 
countries seem to be prompted, at least partly, by the fact 
that they are not as well protected as targets within Israel. 
Since 1968 Palestinian groups have attacked Israeli or Jewish 
targets outside Israell with incidents such as the kidnapping 
and killing of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics 
in September 1972, and the seizure of the Italian cruise ship 
Achille Lauro in 1985 being merely some of the most 
prominent. 112 
Hizbollah has acted in a similar fashion in the 1990s. 
Following the Israeli assassination of the Hizbollah 
Secretary-Generall Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi - together with his 
wife and infant son - in February 1992, the Hizbollah did not 
109) W. Enders & T. Sandler. "Evaluating Policies Aimed at 
Thwarting Terrorism", 4. 
110) T. Sandler, W. Enders & H. E. Lapan. "Economic Analysis" 15. 
111) W. Enders, T-Sandler & J-Cauley. "UN Conventions, 
Technology & Retaliation, " 96. W. Enders & T. Sandler. 
"Evaluating Policies Aimed at Thwarting Terrorism", 21. 
112) S. M. Katz. Guards Without Fro_ntiers: Israel's War Against 
Terrorism, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990), 23- 
31. D. C. Martin & J-Walcott. Best Laid Plans, 235-257. 
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retaliate by attacking a target in Israel, but instead 
destroyed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Airess Argentina, 
with a car bomb the following month, killing about thirty 
people. 113 Likewise, after an Israeli helicopter-gunship 
assault on a Hizbollah base in the Lebanon killed up to fifty 
recruits in June 1994, a bomb destroyed the Delegation of 
Argentine-Israeli Associations the following monthq killing 
ninety-six. Although Hizbollah did not claim responsibility 
for the attackq reports suggest that they were 
responsible. 114 
An examination of security force and related deaths in 
Northern Ireland during the recent Troubles also indicates a 
shift from harder to softer targets within the context of a 
declining number of deaths overall. As Table 7.1 above showss 
whilst the rate of regular British Army soldiers killed 
declined quite steeply between 1970 and 1993, the rate of RUC 
and UDR deaths remained fairly constant until the mid 1980s, 
and declined less rapidly than that of the Army thereafter. 
This tendency becomes even more pronounced if one bears in 
mind that the figures for the Army are partly inflated by 
incidents where more than five soldiers have been killed in a 
single attackj (Warrenpoint, August 27th 1979 - eighteen 
dead; Ballykelly, December 6th 1982 - eleven dead; Lisburn, 
June 15th 1988 - six dead; Ballygawley, August 20th 1988 - 
eight dead), whereas only one single attack has inflicted 
similar casualties upon the local security forces (Newry, 
February 28th 1985 - nine RUC dead). 115 
113) "Hezbollah chief dies in gunship attack. on car", The 
Times, February 17th 1992. "Lebanon's pain, but whose 
gain? ", The Independent, February 18th 1992. "Suicide 
bomber blew up embassy", The Times, February 19th 1992. 
"16 killed in bomb attack on Jewish groups in 
Argentina", The Independent, July 19th 1994. "Bomb 
kills 22 at Jewish Centre", The Times, July 19th 1994. 
M. Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership", 314, 
339n. 
114) "Israel wreaks vengeance on Hizbollah camp", The 
Independent, June 3rd 1994. "Hizbollah bury their 
unseen dead", The Independent, June 4th 1994. "Israel 
moves troops to Lebanese border", The Guardian, June 
4th 1994. "Explosion levels building housing Jewich 
groups", The Guardian, July 19th 1994. "Hizbollah 
adopts an 'eye for an eye' tactic", The Independent 
July 20th 1994. "Bomb alarm Britain ignored"t The 
Independent on Sunday, July 31st 1994. 
115) M. Sutton. Bear in mindthese dead, passim. 
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The reduced number of soldiers killed relative to total 
security force casualties can be partly explained by the 
reduction of regular troops as a proportion of the security 
forces deployed in Northern Ireland - from about 17,200 out 
of a total of 32,400 in 1973 to about 9,700 out of 28,900 in 
1989.116 However, as Bowyer Bell and McKeown point outt it is 
also due to the fact that whilst British Army members in 
Northern Ireland are on more or less constant alertj members 
of the RUC and UDR are far more vulnerable as they live 
within Northern Ireland and can therefore be more easily 
attacked off-duty. 117 In addition, from 1985 onwards the 
Provisionals targeted businessmen and their employees who 
were carrying out building work or providing services for the 
security forces, killing twenty-seven between 1985 and 1993. 
Thus the reduction in the targeting of the regular British 
Army in Northern Ireland, compared to the targeting of the 
RUC, the UDR/RIR, and civilian contractors to the security 
forces, can be seen as an example of target substitution 
caused by the increasing difficulty of killing British 
soldiers in Northern Ireland. 
Summary 
The protective measures taken to protect a target 
greatly affect the terrorist's opportunity. Protective 
measures affect a terrorist groups choice of targets in a 
number of ways. Firstly, the number of targets which can be 
protected is limited by the expense of providing protection. 
During the period of the maximum terrorist threat in Italy 
between the mid 1970s and early 1990s, the security services 
are reported to have provided 3,681 bodyguards to protect 671 
assorted politicians, judges, and businessmen. The average 
cost of an armoured car in Italy was estimated at $70,000.118 
Likewise, in 1990 personal protection costs were reported to 
116) S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 297. 
117) J. Bowyer Bellj IRA Tactics and Targets, 29-30. 
M. McKeown. Two Seven Six Three: An analysis of 
fatalities attributable to civil disturbances in 
Northern Ireland in the twenty years between July 13th 
1969 and July 12th 19899 (Lucan, Ireland: Murlough, 
1989), 7,21-22. 
118) "End of a bullet-proof era"i The Independents June 21st 
1991. 
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take up over 5% of the budget of the Metropolitan Police. 119 
Such protection cannot be given to all potential targets. 
Whilst some protection might be possible, some people 
or material targets cannot be given the absolute maximum of 
protection because it would not be possible for them carry 
out their normal business. With embassies for example, the 
precautions necessary to provide absolute protection would 
divert so much manpower from their primary mission and would 
make the embassy so inaccessible to those whom it is meant to 
do business with, that it would not function effectively-120 
The limitations on the amount of protection possible 
creates vulnerabilities which in turn provide terrorists with 
opportunities. 121 The terrorists choose which targets they 
wish to attack whilst - in the absence of information on the 
group - those trying to frustrate them can only make more or 
less informed judgements as to which targets they need to 
protect. Consequently the initiative in a terrorist campaign 
generally lies with the terrorists. 
As a terrorist campaign progresses, one will find that 
whilst the people trying to protect potential targets react 
to attacks by protecting new targets or hardening existing 
ones, the terrorists can select new targets or categories of 
targets or devise new methods or weapons to attack existing 
hardened targets. 122 There is, to an extent, a reciprocal 
relationship between the terrorists and their opponents. 
Ultimately it is in the interests of the terrorist 
group to select targets which will maximise the political or 
material benefits accruing from an attack whilst minimising 
the risks and material costs to themselves. As a resulto they 
will tend to select the softest possible legitimate targets. 
Howeverl they may expand their definition of legitimate 
targets until they include targets which are also easy to 
attack. Occasionally terrorists may select harder targets 
because of the publicity value of a successful attack on such 
119) "Huge costs force Yard to review VIP security"q The 
Independent on Sundays February 4th 1990. "Anti-IRA 
security costs must riset Police say", The Independent 
on Sundays September 23rd 1990. 
120) B. M. Jenkins. The Lessons of Beirut, s 5. 121) B. M. Jenkins. Lessons of Beirut, 4. 
122) P. Gurney. Braver Men Valk Away, 185. 
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a target and the impression of strength which such an attack 
may give. 
One should be careful not to see the relationship 
between target selection and target protection as purely 
reactive. Whilst it is undoubtedly true that terrorists have 
to take security measures into accounts neither theys nor 
their opponents, are necessarily limited to merely reactive 
strategies. Both sides are also capable - within limits - of 
taking initiatives which will alter the 'rules of the game' 
overall. One way in which this can be done is the way in 
which the security forces operate. 
234 
The Security Environment 
Introduction. 
Terrorist groups are severely affected by the matrix of 
laws and institutions which, ideally, protect the state and 
the public from crime and disorder. In this study this matrix 
is termed the security environment. The basis of the security 
environment in a liberal democracy is the various statutes - 
known collectively as the law - which constitute the rules 
which constrain those aspects of human behaviour judged to be 
undesirable. The law is enforced by a series of institutions 
- known collectively as the criminal justice system - which 
deal with the prevention, detection and punishment of crime. 
The primary elements of the criminal justice system are the 
legal system, the police, and the penal system. These 
institutions carry out the procedures whereby those who break 
the criminal law are detected, detained, tried, and - if 
found guilty - punished. 
An understanding of the criminal justice system is 
useful in order to understand how it hampers terrorists and 
why members of the system are often selected as targets. The 
legal system includes the laws, the courts, the judiciary, 
and the legal profession: in short the institutions 
responsible for determining whether people have broken the 
law and for deciding the appropriate measures to be taken 
against those found guilty. The police are responsible for 
apprehending suspects and preparing evidence for court. They, 
and other security agencies, are also responsible for 
gathering information on potential and actual threats, and 
for the physical protection of potential targets. The penal 
system is responsible for the confinement of those who have 
been found guilty of breaking the law and sentenced to 
imprisonment. In some cases it is also responsible for the 
rehabilitation of prisoners. The penal system includes the 
prisons, prison staffs and allied support services such as 
the probation service. Taken together these three elements - 
the legal system, the Polices and the penal system, make up 
the criminal justice system and underpin the rule of law 
within a state. 
Where the normal Policing and law-enforcement structure 
can no longer maintain order, the authorities may deploy the 
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armed forces. This will often be accompanied by comparatively 
repressive emergency laws and greatly strengthened powers for 
the security forces - that is the police, the intelligence 
agencies, and the military. Gwynn mentions three instances 
where the armed forces might be deployed to restore order: 
where police numbers are insufficient to maintain the 
existing law and the army's role is simply to reinforce the 
police; where civil control and the system of policing have 
totally collapsed and the army is needed to maintain order in 
the absence of the police; and where an internal 'small war' 
has broken out against an organised enemy. 
1 Like Field 
Marshal Haig in the 1920s, Gwynn believes that the deployment 
of armed soldiers should be a signal that lethal force might 
be employed, but he also argues that the army should only use 
the minimum force necessary when supporting the civil power-2 
To summarise, in a liberal democracy restraints may be placed 
upon the activities of a terrorist group by the law, by the 
criminal justice system, and as a last resort by the armed 
forces. 
In a totalitarian or authoritarian state, where the 
state's institutions may act in a thoroughly repressive 
manner, terrorists may face the same obstacles, but to a much 
greater degree. Laws can be drafted in such a way as to label 
the actions of peaceful opponents as criminals. The police 
may act as the partisan instruments of the government - 
arresting people on the grounds of mere suspicion or because 
of their political affiliations, whilst in some countries the 
police have set up official or semi-official death squads. 
Likewise, the prisons may serve as a means of incarcerating 
real or suspected political opponents, 'and of intimidating 
1) C. Gwynn. Imperial Policing, (London: Macmillan, 1934; 
1936), 3-4,16. Gwynn systemised doctrine concerning 
the use of the military in support of the civil power. 
Until recently British military doctrine concerning 
military aid to the civil power was based upon colonial 
precedents. See M. Dewar. The British Army in Northern 
Ireland, 219-220. I. F. W. kett. "Guerrilla Warfare: 
Insurgency and Counter-insurgency since 1945", 
C. McInnes & G. D. Sheffield. Warfare in the Twentieth 
Century: Theory and Practice (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1988), 206-207 0 
2) C. Gwynn. Imperial Policin. &, 32,14. K. Jeffrey & 
P. Hennessy. States of Emergency: British Governments 
and Strikebreaking since-1919, -(London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paulq 1983), 14. 
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their friends and families. Finally, in some countries the 
use of military force has not been seen as a last resort to 
be used sparingly, but as a desirable tool of oppression. 
This scenario is worth bearing in mind as it is far from 
uncommon and, as Laqueur notesl it is much more difficult for 
terrorists to operate in a security environment which is 
3 founded on a policy of severe repression. 
The role of the security forces. 
For the sake of clarity in defining the respective 
roles of the police and the militaryl this study will take as 
its model the theoretical division of labour between the 
police and the military in Great Britain. In this case the 
police are responsible for enforcing the law and for the 
maintenance of public order. This involves investigating 
offences against the law and seeking to convict the offenders 
through the due processes of the legal system. Whilst the 
military can be called upon to aid the civil powers this is 
ideally an act of last resort and the role of the military 
should be the protection of the state from external threats. 
With this model in mind, the security force response to 
terrorism can be divided into five broad functions. 
I Intelligence: The gathering of information and its 
analysis with other information to develop it into 
intelligence. 
0 Investigation: The investigation of specific illegal 
incidents. 
3) W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 6,154. Amnesty 
International. Getting away with murder. As an example 
the behaviour of the Argentine military junta between 
1976 and 1983 is well documented. See Amnesty 
International. Argentina: The Military Juntas and Human 
Rights, Report of the Trial of the Former Junta 
Members, (London: Amnesty International, 1987). 
Argentina, Comision Nacional sobre la Desparicion de 
Personas. Nunca Mas: A Report by Argentina's National 
Commission on Disappeared People, (English 
translation), (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de 
Buenos Aires, 1984; London: Faber & Faber/Index on 
Censorship, 1986). R. Cox. "Total Terrorism: Argentinas 
1969 to 1979"1 M. Crenshaw (ed). Terrorism, LeRitimag-Y, - and Power: The Conseguences-of Political Violencel 
(Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Pressy 
1983). 
_J. 
Burns. The Land That Lost it's Heroes, 20-23. 
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0 Protection: The physical protection of potential targets. 
I Public order maintenance: The prevention of disorder 
through the open deployment of police or troops. 
I Armed response : The use of lethal force to eliminate a 
specific threat. 
The intelligence, investigative, and protective 
functions are standard practice in states that are not 
experiencing a terrorist problem. The effects which 
protective functions have upon terrorist activities were 
examined in the previous chapter. 
The maintenance of public order and deployment of an 
armed response are generally only necessary in abnormal 
circumstances. In the case of mass violence, such as a riots 
the police or other security forces may use equipment such as 
batons, riot shields, and tear gas to disperse those whom 
they deem to be disturbing public order. On the other hand if 
the nature of the problem is such that lives are directly 
threatened, then armed police or soldiers may be deployed and 
the person responsible for the danger shot dead. For examplet 
this occurred in Melbourne in December 19949 where armed 
police killed a man who had been shooting at bystanders. 
4 
The roles of the police and the army in a terrorist 
campaign are different. Whereas the military aim in wartime 
is to locate, identify and physically destroy the enemy, the 
role of the police is to enforce the law by apprehending and 
convicting law-breakers-5 The different roles of the 
component parts of the security forces affect the security 
4) "Melbourne gunman who killed two shot dead by police 
marksmen", The Independent, December 6th 1994. 
5) E. Bramall. "The Place of the British Army in Public 
Order", and R. Mark. "Keeping the Peace in Great 
Britain: The Differing Roles of the Police and the 
Army", both in P. J-Rowe & C. J. Whelan (eds). Military 
Intervention in Democratic Societieso (London: Croom 
Helm, 1985), 82-84,85-88. J. R. Thackrah. "Reactions to 
Terrorism and Riots", J. R. Thackrah (ed). Contemporary 
Policing: An examination of 
-- 
society in the 1980s, 
(London: Sphere, 1985), 148. P. Wilkinson. Terrorism and 
the Liberal State, second edition, (London: Macmillans 
1986), 46. T. F. Baldy. Battle for Ulster: A Study-of 
Internal SecuriiZ, (Washington DC: National Defence 
University Press, 1987), 115. 
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environment within which terrorists operate. The first place 
where this is evident is in the sphere of intelligence. 
Intelligence. 
In defining what is meant by the term intelligence, the 
main distinction to be made is between intelligence and 
information. Using Northam's definitions, information is a 
fact or facts which come to the notice of the relevant 
agency. Intelligence is the product of the assessment and 
analysis of the information available. 6 
To carry out an effective investigation the police need 
to develop sufficient background intelligence. Building up a 
fund of information about neighbourhoods and suspects is part 
and parcel of ordinary police-work and is not confined to 
counter-terrorist work. 7 The necessary knowledge is often 
obtained by the collection of information from local gossips 
paid agents, informants, and the interrogation of suspects or 
people who are suspected of possessing information. The use 
of informers is a central part of the conduct of normal 
police operations against organised criminals such as drug 
traffickers and armed robbers as borne out by comments by Sir 
Kenneth Oxford, formerly Chief Constable of Merseyside, Sir 
Paul Condon, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Polices and 
other police officers. 8 Similarly, by far the most valuable 
6) G. Northam. Shooting in the Dark: Riot Police in Britaint 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1989), 77. 
7) British Society for Social Responsibility in Science. 
TechnoCop: New Police Technologies, (London: Free 
Association Booksl 1985), 20-24. G. Northam. Shooting in 
the Dark, 77-81. K. Oxford. "Patterns in a Labyrinth", 
A. R. Brownlie (ed). Crime Investigation: Art or Sciencel 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1984), 10. 
R. Baldwin & R. Kinsey. Police Powers and Politicsj 
(London: Quartet, 1982), 59-82,287-289. 
8) "1 don't seek it, but ... it could happen within 10 to 20 
years"'i The Independent on Sunday, June 20th 1993. 
"Three top police informers killed"q The Independent on 
Sunday, May 23rd 1993. "Rise of the gunmen", Evening 
Standard, (London)j August 16th 1993. K. Oxford. 
"Patterns in a Labyrinth", 10. M. Maguire & C. Norris. 
The Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations, 
15-16,78-799 89-95. N. Darbyshire & B. Hilliard. The 
Flying Squadq (London: Headline, 1993), 79-80v 1059 
214-215. M. Short. Lundy: The Destruction of Scotland 
Yard9s Finest Detectiveg (London: Graftong 1991)9 88- 
104. D. Hobbs., Doing tý-e Business: Entrepreneurship, The 
Working Class, and Detectives in the East End of 
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background information against terrorists comes from 
informers within the group passing on information to the 
police. 
Effective intelligence work can greatly damage a 
terrorist group, by allowing the security forces to frustrate 
terrorist operations in advance, and to apprehend terrorist 
group members and resources. In Italy in the late 1970s the 
shrewd use of informers allowed General Dalla Chiesal head of 
the Carabinieri anti-terrorist campaign, to capture most of 
the leaders of the Red Brigades and Front Lineq together with 
several ordinary terrorists, within a relatively short 
period. 9 Similarly, the arrest of leading members of the 
Angry Brigade -a British anarchist group which carried out a 
series of bombings between 1969 and 1972 - led to the 
effective demise of the group. 
10 
Information gained from informers can allow the 
security forces to frustrate or deter attacks. This could be 
done, for example, by deploying a heavy security presence in 
the vicinity of the target. Although ostensibly the security 
forces might seem to be carrying out routine operations, the 
terrorists would be deterred from carrying out the 
operation. 11 In December 1991 the Chief Constable of the RUC 
stated that security force measures were interrupting four 
out of five terrorist attacks, whilBt in June 1994 The 
Director General of the Security Service (M15) - the British 
internal intelligence agency - stated that the security 
forces prevented around four out of five attempted terrorist 
operations in Northern Ireland. 
12 A senior member of the 
Provisional IRA put the proportion of operations which were 
not carried out due to security force activities at around 
London, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 195- 
196,203,208,212. 
9) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 174,177,179-180,195- 
198. D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in 
Italy, 178-180. P. Willan. Puppet Mastersq 285. 
10) "10 years' jail after majority verdict", The Timesq 
December 7th 1972. 
11) M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 213. 
12) "Devastation from bomber who got through", The Guardian, 
December 14th 1991. S. Rimmington. The Richard Dimbleby 
Lecture 1994: Security and Democracy - Is There a 
Conflict?, (London: BBC Education, 1994)9 9. 
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nine out of ten, and another PIRA spokesman has stated that 
thousands of operations have been cancelled. 13 
Alternatively informers can give the authorities 
information - contact information - which in conjunction with 
other information and analysis allows the security forces to 
intercept the terrorists. This can lead to the capture of 
weapons and the apprehension or death of terrorists. As an 
example, in June 1993 the PIRA made a statement in An 
Phoblacht which outlined the damage which an alleged informer 
had inflicted upon the organisation over a three year period. 
During this period he was directly responsible for the 
arrest of at least six IRA Volunteers, three of whom 
narrowly escaped execution by the crown forces. He was 
also responsible for the seizure of weapons, explosive 
devices and material, laterly [sic] five tons of 
fertiliser in the Dairy Farm in Poleglass. He also 
informed on Volunteers who took part in IRA operations 
and about numerous houses, buildings, vehicles used by 14 
ourselves and also on young Volunteers joining the IRA. 
The alleged informer was found shot dead on a rural track in 
county Tyrone, near the Irish border. 15 
The fear of intelligence operations means that the 
terrorists have to spend a great deal of time and effort 
trying to evade detection. Toolis and Elliot point out that 
when carrying out a complex operation terrorists often need 
safe houses, cars, money, and false documents, as well as the 
arms and ammunition necessary to carry out the attack. 
Each purchase, each rented house provides a potential 
clue and a potential trail of evidence for its Special 
Branch and MI5 pursuers. The IRA men therefore go to 
extremely elaborate lengths to lay false paper trails 
based on fictitious identities and provide themselves 16 with emergency escape routes in the event of detection. 
In a similar fashion, members of the Red Army Faction and the 
French group Direct Action obtained false documentation and 
constructed false identities in order to evade police 
13) C. Foley. Legion of the Rearguard: The IRA and the Modern 
Irish State, (London: Pluto, 1992), 220. "'We remain 
totally committed and confident in victory' - Oglaigh 
na hEireann", APIRNj February 14th 1991. 
14) "Informer worked for RUC for three years", AP/RN, July 
1st 1993. 
15) M. Sutton. Bear in-mind thgse dead, 190. 
16) "Lethal mix of brutality and blun'ders"g The Sunday 
Correspondent, June 17th 1990. 
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intelligence systems. 17 Taking these precautions takes up 
time and disrupts terrorist operations. 
The terrorists' loss of material resources can be 
considerable. Following the Libyan shipments to the PIRA of 
the mid 1980s, the Irish Police (Garda Siochana - Civic 
Guard) - launched a major operation to capture weapons which 
had been stashed in the Republic. Between the start of 1985 
and May 1993, according to figures quoted by O'Brien, the 
Gardai made 557 arms finds, discovering 825 guns, about 
339,600 rounds of ammunition, 484 explosive devices, and 
2,170 items of bomb-making equipment. 18 In Northern Ireland 
between the beginning of 1985 and the end of 1993 the RUC 
found 2,121 firearms and 29.6 tons of explosives, although 
not all of these related to PIRA or other republican 
groups. 19 The massive size of the Libyan shipments meant that 
the Provisionals still had sufficient weaponry for many years 
activity but the fact remains that intelligence-related 
activities by the security force restricted the group's 
ability to function, by forcing it to waste time and 
resources on hiding weapons and evading detection when those 
resources could have been used in attacking targets. 
20 
Due to the threat which they pose, intelligence 
operatives and their informers are prime targets for any 
terrorist group. The classic example of the elimination of 
intelligence operatives occurred on the morning of Sunday, 
November 21st 1920. A group of IRA assassins known as 'The 
Squad' located and killed between twelve and nineteen British 
Army officers - accounts vary - the bulk of whom were 
intelligence officers. 21 One of the IRA's agents -a 
detective in the political 'G' Division of the Dublin 
17) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 115. J. Becker. Hitler's 
Children, 234-235. S. Segaller. Invisible Armies, 47-48. 
18) B. O'Brien. The Long War, 145-149. 
19) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual 
Report 1993, (London: HMSO, 1994), 98-99. 
20) "Arming the IRA: The Libyan Connection, The Economist, 
(London), March 31st, 1990. "Libyan arms fuel surge in 
terrorism", The Independent, May 8th 1990. "RUC chief 
proposes national Police units", The Independent, July 
22nd 1992. "IRA has enough Semtex for 15 years", The 
Independent on Sunday, March 19th 1995. 
21) T. P. Coogan. Michael Collinsl 157-160. C. Townshend. The 
British Campaign in Irela d, 129-130. 
The security environment 242 
Metropolitan Police - noted that the death of a detective 
meant the loss of his experience. 
The British could replace a detective. But [the new 
detective] couldn't step into the dead mans shoes and 
knowledge. 22 
A report made in 1922 regarding the role of 
intelligence in the Irish rebellion, confirmed this. 
23 
This view was reinforced in June 1994 when twenty-five 
senior personnel from the RUC Special Branch, British Army 
Intelligence, and MI5 were killed in a helicopter crash in 
Scotland. A columnist noted that whilst no intelligence 
sources or information had been lost, the experience in 
assessing and using the information had been. Furthermore, 
the personal relationships which made the system work more 
smoothly had been seriously disrupted. 24 For this reason 
British intelligence operatives and their informers are 
targeted by the PIRA, a point noted in a 1978 British Army 
report. 25 Some British undercover operatives detected by 
terrorists in Northern Ireland have had to call in 
reinforcements or shoot their way out of trouble, and in some 
cases they have been killed. 26 From the perspective of the 
terrorists this would mean that the threat posed by that 
person had been eliminated. 
Similarly, George Grivas, the military head of EOKAj 
describes why he ordered the assassination of a member of the 
Cyprus Special Branch. 
For some months Superintendent E. N. Peirces of the Special 
Branch, had been trying to penetrate my courier service 
in Limassol and we had to be rid of him. *... [Following 
the assassination attempt] Although seriously woundedi 
Peirce survived; but he was in hospital for several weeks 
22) T. P. Coogan. Michael Collins, 78. 
23) GHQ Ireland. Record of the r bellion in Ireland in 1920- 
21 and the part Played by the Army in dealing with it.. 
Volume II. Intelligencep (A-2448-2), 4-5. 
24) "An incalculable loss for MI5", New Statesman & Society, 
June 10th 1994. 
25) Taken from the 'Glover Report' of 1978 as reproduced in R. Fagilot. Britain S Military Strategy in Ireland, 233. 
S. Cronin. Irish Nationalism, 348. 
26) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 404-405,478. M. Urban. Big BoYs' 
Rules, 43-44,141-142. K. J. Kelley. The Longest War, 
275. M. Sutton. Bea7 in-mind these dead, 108,110. 
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and troubled us no more. His career was at an end and I 
slept the better for it. 27 
Israeli agents have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. In 
January 1973 an Israeli intelligence officerg Baruch Cohent 
was shot dead in a Madrid cafe by a Palestinian student whom 
he believed he had recruited as an agent within the circles 
of Palestinian exiles. According to Katz, Cohen was the 
Brussels station chief of the Israeli external intelligence 
agency Mossad (ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim - 
Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks). 28 More 
recently, in February 1994, one Shin Bet officer was killed 
and two others wounded when they were ambushed in Beltounias 
near Jerusalem, whilst on their way to a meeting. The 
'Izzedine al Qassem Brigade' - the armed wing of the 
Palestinian Islamic group Hamas - claimed responsibility for 
the attack. 29 Again this was an example of terrorists 
diminishing the threat to themselves, and attacking the 
morale of their opponents, by eliminating an intelligence 
officer and, they doubtless hoped, eliminating his knowledge 
and expertise. 
Investigation. 
The investigative role of the police during a terrorist 
campaign closely parallels their role in combating normal 
crime. 30 Their aim is to find out who has broken the law, to 
locate and detain the offender, and to build up a sufficient 
body of evidence to convict that person in a law court. To do 
this in the case of a terrorist incident the police initially 
need enough information to give them a lead as to which 
organisation has broken the law, though this-is not a problem 
if the terrorists concerned claim responsibility for the act. 
27) G. Grivas - Dighenis & C. Foley (ed). The Memoirs of 
General Grivas, 128. 
28) Raviv and Melman place Cohen in the the Israeli domestic 
intelligence agency Shin Bet (Sherut ha-Bitachon ha- 
Kalai - General Security Service), whilst Taylor and 
Katz place him in Mossad. D. Raviv & Y. Melman. Every Spy 
a Prince, 187-188. P. Taylor. States of Terror, 55-62. 
S. M. Katz. Guards Without Frontiers, 43. 
29) "Israeli agent is shot dead"i The Guardians February 14th 
1994. 
30) For an outline of normal practice concerning criminal 
investigations in Britain see M. Maguire & C. Norris. The 
Conduct and Supervision of-Criminal Investigations. 
T. Colman. Incident into Evidence: operational Police 
Skills, (Maidenhead, England: McGraw-Hill, 1989). 
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Once the police have this information they can try to 
determine which person committed the offence and then try to 
locate them. However, whilst the police can use intelligence 
as a means of identifying and locating suspects, unless they 
have the power to imprison suspects without trial they have 
to assemble sufficient evidence to convict the suspect of the 
offence with which he has been charged. The evidence may come 
in the form of statements from witnesses law-enforcement 
officers, civilians, or former-terrorists or confessions 
from the terrorists themselves, and may be supplemented by 
film from covert surveillance video cameras or closed circuit 
television, and forensic evidence. Where membership of a 
specific organisation is a crime in itself, the aim may be to 
prove that an individual is a member of that group. In cases 
where membership is not a crime, as was the case with the 
Ulster Defence Association until 1992, the police have to 
prove that a specific criminal offence has been committed. 
As a result of the threat which investigations can pose 
to terrorists, the various elements involved in the 
investigative process are often selected as targets. During 
the peak years of Red Brigade activity in Italy - in the late 
1970s and early 1980s - police investigators were frequently 
attacked. For instance, in June 1978 Antonio Esposito, police 
chief for the town of Nervi and former head of the Genoa 
anti-terrorist squad, was shot dead by two brigadists as he 
travelled to work by bus. He had been involved in the 
investigation of a number of Red Brigade kidnappings and 
directed an operation in connection with the 1976 
assassination of the Genoa Public Prosecutor*Francesco Coco, 
resulting in the arrest of suspected Red Brigadist Giuliano 
Naria. 31 Other high-ranking policemen attacked by the Red 
Brigades include the chief of the Venice anti-terrorist 
squad, Alfredo Albanesel who was shot dead at a road crossing 
in his car in May 1980, and Nicola Simone the deputy chief of 
the Rome anti-terrorist squad known as the DIGOS, whom the 
Red Brigades wounded during what seems to have been a kidnap 
31) Corriere della Seral June 23rd 1978. "Red Brigades gunmen 
kill police chief as he rides to work on a bus", The 
Times, June 22nd 1978. 
The security environment 245 
attempt in January 1982.32 In an unusual case the head of the 
Naples Flying Squadl Deputy Police Commissioner Antonio 
Ammaturo, was shot dead with his driver in July 1982 by the 
Naples column of the BR. He had been very active against the 
Camorra - the Neapolitan equivalent of the Mafia - leading to 
speculation that the Naples column of the - by then - badly 
split Red Brigades was trying to obtain the support of the 
Neapolitan criminal classes by assassinating an efficient 
officer. 33 
As well as attacking investigators, terrorists may also 
kill or threaten witnesses who give important evidence 
against their members. In January 1972 a local unit of the 
PIRA killed a witness who was to testify against three of 
their members for the comparatively minor offence of burning 
a bus. 34 In the early 1980s the relatives of some of the 
tsupergrasses' - terrorists who gave evidence against their 
fellow republican and loyalist paramilitaries - were 
kidnapped in an attempt to make the witnesses retract their 
evidence. 35 Similarly, in Italy in 1981, Red Brigadists 
kidnapped and then killed the brother of the former Brigadist 
Patrizio Peci when he gave evidence in court. 36 Witnesses 
also form a major target for criminal groups involved in 
political terrorism. Since he turned state's evidence in 
1984, Tommaso Buscetta has been one of the most productive 
32) "Terror squad chief murdered in Venice", The Guardian, 
May 13th 1980. Corriere della Sera, May 13th 1980. 
"Anti-Terrorist Officer Shot in Rome"i International 
Herald Tribune, January 7th 1982. The Irish Timesq 
January 7th 1982. Corriere della Seraq January 7th 
1982. 
33) Corriere della Sera, July 16th 1982. Corriere della Sera, 
July 16th 1982, July 19th 1982, July 26th 1982, August 
3rd 1982, August 30th 1982. P. Willan. Puppet-Masters, 
333-334 
34) P. Bishop 
i 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 241. M. Dillon & 
D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Irelandl 53-54. 
"Chronology of events: 18.1.72", R. Bellq R. Johnstone, 
R. Wilson (eds). Troubled Times, 153. 
35) "The Armalite and the Ballot Box", Magill, July 1983. 
Also see C. Ryder. The RUC, 286. "Six held as INLA 
hostages freed"q The 
- 
Guardian, August 19th 1983. 
"Informer's wife freed as INLA rethinks tactics", The 
Guardian, August 27th 1983. "IRA frees father of 
informer"g The Guardiang September 27th 1983. 
"Chronology of events: -22.12.82,16.5.839 25.8.83"1 
R. Bellq R. Johnstone, R-Wilson (eds). Troubled Times, 
195-1969 1969 197. 
36) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 189-190. 
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state witnesses which the Italian authorities has ever used 
against the Mafia, including allegations against leading 
Italian politicians. 37 By March 1995 it was reported that the 
Mafia had killed eleven of Buscetta's relatives, partly to 
punish him, and doubtless partly to discourage other people 
from turning state's evidence. 38 
Not all evidence comes from human sources. Forensic 
evidence has become increasingly important as a way of 
identifying suspects and gaining convictions in court. It 
includes fingerprints, DNA tracesp lead residue from 
firearms, traces of the components of explosive devices on 
either skin or clothing, or any other form of substance which 
may be attributed to the suspect and which would prove his 
guilt. 39 Thus, laser technology picked up a small sweat and 
palm impression on a hotel register left by the PIRA member 
who planted the bomb at the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 
1984.40 Similarly, in August 1994 a man was convicted of 
carrying out bombings for the PIRA on the basis of clothing 
fibres found on the barbed wire surrounding a bombed oil 
terminal, a footprint, and traces of Semtex explosive found 
in the boot of the mans' car. 41 However, the misuse or 
incorrect interpretation of forensic evidence can also lead 
37) "Supergrasses target Andreotti", The Independent on 
Sunday, April 11th 1993. "Andreotti accused of ordering 
murder", The Independentl June 10th 1993. "Judge deals 
blow to Andreotti over journalist's murder", The Timess 
June 10th 1993. 
38) "Rome turns a blind eye to Mafia's killing spree", The 
Independent, March 8th 1995. 
39) "Caught with suspicious genes", The Independentq April 
4th 1995. "World's first national DNA bank opens", The 
Guardian, April 11th 1995. "We need your DNA"q The 
Guardiang supplement, April 21st 1995. M. Dillon. The 
Dirty War, (London: Hutchinson, 1990; Arrowq 1991)9 329 
48. "One day their prints will come"q The Sunday 
Correspondentq August 12th 1990. B. Lane. The 
Encyclopedia of Forensic Sciences (London: Headlineq 
1992; 1993). 
40) "Police comb 'bomber's lair"'q The Sunday Correspondent$ 
September 24th 1989. 
41) "IRA terrorist guilty of bombing Tyneside sites"l The 
Independentq August 22nd 1994. "Threads from his 
clothes convicted IRA terrorist", The Timess August 
22nd 1994. "IRA bomber sentenced to 25 years", The 
Independent, August 23rd 1994. 
The security environment 247 
to wrongful convictions as occurred in the case of the 
'Birmingham Six' in 1975.42 
Terrorists have sought to combat the use of forensic 
evidence by a number of methods. Urban describes how, to 
avoid leaving forensic traces, the PIRA adopted measures such 
as wearing balaclavas to avoid photographic identification, 
wearing rubber gloves when handling weapons, wearing boiler 
suits over normal clothes during operations, and bathing soon 
after an operation. 43 Likewise, according to Pluchinsky by 
the 1980s the Red Army Faction had become sophisticated in 
the avoidance of leaving behind forensic evidence after an 
operation. 44 However terrorists can use more direct measures 
to combat the use of forensic evidence. In September 1992 the 
PIRA used a 2,000 pound vehicle bomb to destroy the Northern 
Irish forensic science laboratories in Belfast. 45 
Public order maintenance. 
In general public order maintenance consists of crowd 
control by the security forces - generally the police - 
seeking to prevent disorder or riots at events such as 
football matches, industrial disputes, and demonstrations. 
These can often be dealt with by the large-scale deployment 
of police officers, sometimes in riot-gear. 46 Such situations 
carry the risk of violence, and sometimes of death and 
injury, but combating a terrorist campaign requires 
additional measures because of the threat of deliberately 
targeted lethal violence. 
The first job of the security forces in a terrorist 
campaign is to contain the terrorists, by making it more 
difficult for them to operate. Having done this they can take 
measures to capture or eliminate members of the terrorist 
42) C. Mullin. Error of Judgement: The Truth about the 
Birmingham Bombings, revised edition, (Swords, Ireland: 
Poolbeg, 1990), 285-298. 
43) M. Urban.. Big Boys' Rules, 115. 
44) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 80. 
45) "Damage in huge blast put at 120m"l The Independento 
September 25th 1992. "Court laboratory bombed by IRA"p 
The Times, September 25th 1992. "'Troubles' chronology: 
Wed Sep 23"q Fortnight, no 311, (November 1992), 34. 
46) S. Uglow. Policing Liberal Society, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 76-77,80-83. G. Northam. 
Shooting in the Dark, passim. 
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groups. Overt and covert methods can be used to achieve these 
aims. The overt methods include sending out patrols, the 
setting up of check-points, and house-searches for weapons or 
suspects. 
The point of carrying out overt patrols is to make it 
difficult for terrorists to move weapons around and set up 
attacks. According to Michael Dewarl a former battalion 
commander in the British Army: 
Patrolling in Northern Ireland has two main purposes: 
domination of the ground, so as to deny the enemy freedom 
of movement and, secondlyl to get to know the area 
intimately in order to build uý a detailed knowledge of 4 the area and its inhabitants. 
Whilst the domination of the ground is important because it 
denies terrorists the opportunity to deploy for an attack, it 
can also provide the terrorist with what an RUC officer 
described as "... a classic slow-moving target". 48 
To be effective in deterring attacks, security force 
patrols need to be organised around a pattern rather than 
haphazardly deployed in the hope of bumping into the enemy. 
The coordinated deployment of a number of small patrolsq 
moving swiftly in an unpredictable pattern, denies snipers or 
other attackers a guaranteed escape route after they have 
carried out an attack. 
49 By making a subsequent escape 
unlikely one also makes the execution of a terrorist attack 
unlikely, with the exception of attackers who expect to die 
in the process. 50 In his study of a Catholic area of west 
Belfast between September 1972 and April 1973, Burton notes 
that whilst the intermittent patrolling of a conventional 
infantry regiment was fairly ineffective, the constant 
patrols and ambushes carried out by the Parachute Regiment 
limited the freedom of action of the local PIRAj killed many 
of its members, and reduced it to near impotence. 51 
Other overt activities where drivers or pedestrians 
have their identification documents checked and where they 
may be searched - for instance mobile vehicle check points 
(VCPs) and static road blocks - make it difficult for 
47) M. Dewar. 
' 
The British Army in__Northern Ireland, 180. 
48) D. Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 44. 
49) D. Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 119,141. M. Dewar., The 
British Army in Nor hern Irelandl 182. 
50) A. Feldman. Formations of Violence, 41-45 
51) F. Burton. The Politics of legitimacy, iii-113. 
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terrorists to move personnel, weapons, and supplies around 
the area affected. As noted in the last chapter, road-blocks 
and vehicle check-points have been widely used during the 
recent troubles in Northern Ireland, and occasionally in 
England. 52 Similarly, Duyker notes that intensive security 
operations by the Indian Army against Naxalites in Birbhum, 
West Bengal, between July and November 1971 severely 
restricted the group. 53 
The scale of such operations can be very large. In the 
two months following the kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1978 the 
various Italian security forces set up 72,000 road-blocks, 
and questioned 61 million people. 
54 However, whilst such 
methods may disrupt the ability of terrorist groups to move 
people, weapons and messages in the affected area, surveys in 
Northern Ireland indicate that they also cause a great deal 
of resentment on the part of the people subjected to themp 
and this may help the terrorists by creating sympathisers and 
possibly recruits. 55 
As well as trying to intercept terrorists and their 
equipment and disrupt their activities through patrols and 
check-points, the security forces can also try to achieve the 
same ends by searching property. During the Moro kidnapping 
the Italian authorities searched 37,000 dwellings, whilst in 
Northern Ireland between 1970 and 1993 a total of 3549524 
52) "Security alert as IRA admits bombings"l The Independents 
December 5th 1992. "Police set IRA road traps"s The 
Independent, December 6th 1992. "Police set road-blocks 
in effort to deter IRA"q "Belfast security measures 
accepted as normal", both in The Independent, December 
7th 1992. "Roadblock police stop drivers at gunpoint", 
The Times, December 7th 1992. "Police introduce IRA 
road-blocks in Manchester"l The Independents December 
8th 1992. "Home Office resists pressure for wider stop- 
and-search rules"i The Times, December 8th 1992. 
D. McKittrick. Despatches from Belfasts 196-202. 
Unattributable interview, September 1993. 
53) E. Duyker. Tribal Guerrillas, 92-93. 
54) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 224. 
55) A. Guelke & F. Wright. "On A 'British Withdrawal' from 
Northern Ireland" and A. M. Gallagher. "Civil Liberties 
and the State", both in P. Stringer & G. Robinson (eds). 
Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The Second 
Report, 1991-1922, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), 
49-50,83-84. A. M. Gallagher. "Policing Northern 




(Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1995), 54-55. 
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searches were carried out in both occupied and unoccupied 
houses. 56 By searching houses or entire areas, the security 
forces can achieve a number of aims. If they are acting on 
specific information they may find terrorists or terrorist 
weaponry. An example of this is provided by the case of an 
estate agent who allowed the security forces to bug empty 
houses where he allowed PIRA members to hold meetings and 
stash weapons. A number of arms caches were found in house 
searches based upon the information provided by the bugged 
conversations. 
57 
In other cases the aim of house-searches is to find as 
much material as possible by sealing off an area and carrying 
out a blanket search of the buildings and people within. This 
can be effective in finding material, and the need to guard 
against such searches means that the terrorists have to take 
time-consuming precautions. During the terrorist campaign by 
the Irgun and 'Stern gang' groups in Palestine in the late 
1940s, such searches were called 'cordon and search' 
operations. Wilson describes 'Operation Shark', an attempt by 
four British Army brigades to carry out a cordon and search 
operation in Tel Aviv between July 30th and August 2nd 
1946.58 According to Wilson the Army checked 100,000 people, 
detaining 787 for further questioning, and found 176 rifless 
four machine-guns, twenty-three mortarsl 127,000 rounds of 
ammunition, and a large quantity of explosives. 
59 
However, such operations tend to involve a large number 
of soldiers, providing the terrorists with targets. 
Furthermore the upset and damage caused by searches to people 
whose homes and lives have been disrupted can also cause a 
great deal of animosity to the security forces. 
60 This point 
is more relevant when one remembers that in Northern Ireland 
the bulk of house searches have been concentrated in the 
56) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 224. W. D. Flackes & S. Elliott. 
Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-93,472. 
57) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 309-325. 
58) R. D. Wilson. Cordon and Search, 66-74. 
59) R. D. Wilson. Cordon and Search, 71. Menachim Begin, the 
Irgun leader and later Israeli Prime Ministerl mentions 
having to hide in a secret compartment in his house 
during this operation; M. Begin. The Revolt, 227-229. 
60) P. Devlin. Straight Left: An Autobiography, (Belfast: 
Blackstaff, 1993), 1479 149. D. McKittrick. Des ac es 
from Belfast, 196-202. 
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relatively small geographical areas where republican 
terrorist groups have been most active, and the impact on 
these communities is therefore all the greater. 
61 
An extreme example of the animosity which overt 
military activities can arouse is provided by the widespread 
search of the Falls area in west Belfast by the British Army 
between July 3rd and July 5th 1970.62 During the searches, 
the Army is reported to have found approximately fifty 
pistols, thirty-five rifles, fourteen shotgunsl six automatic 
weapons, one hundred home-made bombs, a grenade, 250 pounds 
of explosives, 21,000 rounds of ammunition, and eight two-way 
radio sets. 63 However, the searches were extremely 
destructive of property, riots occurred in the course of the 
operation, and five civilians were killed during gun-battles 
between the Army and gunmen from the Official IRA. The troops 
used large amounts of tear-gas to contain public disorders 
causing a great deal of physical distress to people in the 
Falls area and generating widespread animosity towards the 
Army. 64 Hammill has described the operation as a military 
success and a political disaster, and a British Army officer 
who later commanded a battalion in Northern Ireland has 
noted: "The events of 3-5 July changed a sullen Catholic 
community into a downright hostile one". 
65 
As a measure of the effectiveness of a large overt 
military presence in repressing terrorist activities, Table 
8.1 and Figure 8.1 show the relationship between the levels 
of security force activity in Northern Ireland in terms of 
house-searches, and the number of terrorist incidents which 
61) K. Boyle, T. Hadden, & P. Hillyard. Ten Years on in Northern 
Ireland: The Legal-Control of Political Violence, 
(London: Cobden Trust, 1980), 26-27. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 1679 205. 
62) B. Markworthy. "The Falls Road Curfew: Army tactics and 
Catholic attitudes, 1970", A. Brown (ed). War in Peace, 
volume six, (London: Orbis, 1985), 1382. 
63) The statistics concerning the number of weapons found 
varies somewhat between accounts. See P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 159-161. K. J. Kelley. The 
Longest War, 147. J. Bowyer Bell. The Secret Army, 377. 
D. Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 37. M. Dewar. The British 
Army in Northern Ireland, 47. 
64) P. Devlin. Straight Left, 128-131. D. Hamill. Pig in the 
Middle, 37-39. 
65) D. Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 39. M. Dewar. The British 
Army in Northern Ireland, 47. 
The security environment 252 
occurred between 1970 and 1989. One needs to take care in 
trying to draw emphatic conclusions from statistics. As the 
experience of the security forces has increased over time it 
is possible that the number of houses which are searched has 
decreased as the security forces are better able to target 
their searches, although a number of blanket searches still 
seem to occur, possibly to protect sources of information 
which would be compromised by actions which revealed too 
clearly the type of information possessed by the 
TABLE 8.1 
LEVELS OF TERRORIST AND SECURITY FORCE 
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1970-1989 
Security force House Shootings & 
personnela Searches explosions 
1970 14489 3107 366 
1971 17146 17262 2778 
1972 29411 36617 12010 
1973 32365 74556 5996 
1974 32096 74914 3891 
1975 31925 30002 2202 
1976 32129 34919 2774 
1977 32267 20724 1447 
1978 32724 15462 1210 
1979 31903 6452 1150 
1980 32404 4106 922 
1981 30954 4104 1540 
1982 30728 4045 766 
1983 29147 1497 690 
1984 28533 1282 527 
1985 28259 812 385 
1986 29103 1818 564 
1987 28828 2474 910 
1988 28878 4136 790 
1989 28841 3027 790 
a. British Armyp UDRj and RUC. Since the late 1970s the 
police have carried out many military-style operations 
such as patrolling and the setting up of check-points. 
Sources: S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 297. Irish Information 
Partnership. Agenda: Information Service on Northern 
Ireland and Anglo-Irish Relations, sixth editionj 
(London: Irish Information Partnership, 1990)9 316. 
W. D. Flackes & S. Elliott. Norýhern Ireland: A Political 
Directory 1968-93,4719 472.00 
66) There are some slight differences concerning the number 
of house searches between Flackes and Elliot, and 
G-Hogan & C-Walker. Political Violence and the Law i-n 
Ireland, (Manchester: Mancheste-r University Press, 
1989), 62. For this table the figures in Flackes and 
Elliot have been used. 
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authorities. 67 However, there does appear to be a correlation 
between the number of shootings and bombings and the level of 
security force activity as measured by the number of house- 
searches. This seems to show that a rise in terrorist 
activity - measured as bombing and shooting incidents - tends 
to be followed by an increase in house-searches and a 
subsequent drop in the number of terrorist activities. Indeed 
this would partially explain the deep trouble which the PIRA 
found itself in by the mid 1970s. It also partially explains 
why the PIRA felt obliged to switch from a strategy involving 
a high-level of violence, to a less intense 'long war' 
strategy, allowing them to conserve their resources, and 
avoid the attritional effects of the previous strategy. 
68 
The main function of the security forces in their 
public order role lies primarily in disrupting operations and 
in discouraging terrorists from carrying out operations. 
69 By 
maintaining a visible and pervasive presence through the 
setting of checkpoints and frequent patrols, the army makes 
it extremely difficult if not impossible to concentrate in 
large numbers for attacks. In addition, by maintaining a 
permanent presence the troops are able to prevent widespread 
open intimidation of the populace by guerrillas or 
terrorists. 70 
However, intensive security force operations can 
provoke widespread dislike of the security forces and the 
authorities, and this can translate into support for at least 
some of the activities of the terrorists. An example of 
unpopular measures used by the security forces has been the 
activities of the Israeli Army in the areas of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip occupied by Israeli forces. The Israelis have 
a long-standing policy of destrying the houses of the 
families or helpers of alleged Palestinian terrorists. 71 
According to O'Brien, between 1967 and 1977 1,224 houses were 
67) D. McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast 
'1 
198. 
68) M. Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 59. M. Dillon. The Dirty 
War, 58. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 331- 
332. T. P. Cooganq The IRA, 601,604. 
69) M. Urban. 
' 
Big Boys' Rules, 11,238. 
70) J. J. McCuen. The Art-of Counter-Revolutionary War: The 
Strategy of Counter-insurgencY, (London: Faber & Faberp 
1966), 121. 
71) S. M. Katz. Guards Without-Frontiers, 96,136. P. Wilkinson. 
Terrorism and the Liberal State, 158. 
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destroyed or sealed-up by the Israeli authorities. The Arab- 
British Centre states that a further 135 houses were sealed 
or demolished between May 1985 and July 1st 1987, whilst 
O'Brien states that between 1987 and 1989 this happened to a 
further 224 houses. 72 During the Palestinian unrest known as 
the intifada, the Israelis blew-up the homes of the families 
of suspected terrorists, or houses from which attacks have 
allegedly been launched. 
73 Merari, Prat, and Tal remark that 
in early 1988 security measures such as house-searches were 
carried out in an "intentionally rude" manner as a means of 
cowing the Palestinian population. The Israeli Army also 
destroyed the houses of people who had been throwing stones 
or petrol bombs. 74 Such methods are, to say the least, 
unlikely to win hearts and minds. 
The terrorists may try to prevent the security forces 
from gaining a degree of dominance by attacking them. In 
Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA has aimed at reducing 
the presence of the police in particular, and the security 
forces in general, in areas bordering the Republic of 
Ireland. By November 1992 an estimated 330 attacks on RUC 
stations throughout the Province had meant that any stations 
being built had to be heavily fortified. 75 By damaging RUC 
stations, attacking fixed vehicle checkpoints, and then 
assassinating contractors or their employees who carried out 
repair work on them, the PIRA hoped to force the police and 
the other security forces back from the border. 
76 Due to the 
withdrawal of contractors from doing work for the security 
forces, repair work was done by military engineers, thus 
72) W. V. O'Brien. Law and Morality in Israel's War with-the 
PLO9 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 243. No author named. 
Punishing the Innocent: House Demolition and Sealing i 
the West Banks (London: Council for the Advancement of 
Arab-British Understanding, 1987)q 19. 
73) W. V. O'Brien. Law and Morality in Israel's War with the 
PLO, (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 243. 
74) A. Meraril T-Prat & D-Tal. "The Palestinian Intifada: An 
Analysis of a Popular Uprising after Seven Months", 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 2, (April 
1989)9 183. 
75) "State-of-the-art building for a state of siege", The 
Times, Saturday Review, November 21st 1992. 
76) "Ulster checkpoints to be closed over 'human bomb' 
raids", The Independent, March 20th 1991- 
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increasing the number of military targets for the PIRA. 77 In 
interviews and articles the PIRA and their supporters have 
emphasised the isolation of Army and police barracks and the 
lengths to which the Crown forces have to go to keep such 
bases functioning. 78 
To a degree they appeared to have achieved this aim by 
the early 1990s. In a report in November 19919 security force 
sources admitted that in some rural areas, PIRA groups were 
able to move around in large numbers, and thatj on occasionj 
Army patrols had been outnumbered by the PIRA. 
79 In another 
article, an RUC officer is reported to have said: 
At the moment the RUC's role along the border could be 
described as passive. We don't go out of the station - 
well out of say 30 days we might go about five days, 10 
days maximum,, gnd that can only be done with an army 
support team. 
When the RUC did venture outj their patrols consisted of 
eight men, with an escort of up to twelve soldiers. In such 
circumstances it is difficult to enforce the law or maintain 
public order effectively. 
Armed response. 
In warfare the aim is ultimately to win by 
concentrating superior forces against the enemy at a time and 
place of one's choosing. 81 Therefore, as well as carrying out 
measures designed to hinder terrorist operations, security 
forces often actively attempt to intercept terrorists on 
77) "The Provo's easiest coup", The Times, August 8th 1986. 
"The gunman's shadow falls across Ulster business", 
Financial Times, August 11th 1986. "Army deploys 1,000 
extra men in Ulster repair work", The Daily Telegraphs 
September 7th 1991. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 421. 
78) "War News: Guerrilla War bites deep in 1991"o AP/RNq 
January 2nd 1992. "IRA destroys main British border 
post", AP/RN, January 2nd 1992. "Growing crisis for 
British army", AP/RNj January 30th 1992. "British under 
pressure on check points", AP/RNj June 11th 1992. "The 
background to the Teebane ambush"l AP/RNj January 23rd 
1992. 
79) "Internment 'only way to beat IRA"'q The Independentt 
November 17th 1991. 
80) "Border blues"t Fortnights April 1992,25. 
81) H. Strachan. European Armies an-d the Conduct of War, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983), 2,96. 
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terms advantageous to the security forces. 
82 Much of this 
involves covert methods including information-gathering, 
surveillance, and the setting of ambushes. 
This is more difficult when countering a terrorist 
campaign than when fighting conventional forces, or indeed a 
guerrilla army. In urban terrorist campaigns, the terrorist 
conceals himself in the anonymity of the town or city. The 
authorities in liberal democracies are constrained by the law 
which, in the absence of legislation allowing imprisonment 
without trial, means that a terrorist cannot be arrested 
until the authorities have sufficient evidence to imprison 
him. The measures which were deemed tolerable for conflicts 
in former colonies - such as food rationing, strict controls 
on movement, and a rather more casual attitude towards the 
death of suspects - will generally not be tolerated for 
conflicts at home. 83 By way of contrast to colonial conflicts 
one can note the uproar which occurred in Germany after a 
known RAF terrorist was killed in questionable circumstances 
in July 1993, or the continuing questions in Spain as to 
whether the Government authori'sed GAL death squads to kill 
Basque activists in France in the 1980s. 
84 
Thus, it is generally necessary for the counter- 
terrorist to amass sufficient intelligence so as to be able 
to apprehend the terrorist or thwart his actions before they 
occur. In Northern Ireland attempts have been made to 
anticipate terrorist operations and to ambush the terrorists 
when they are vulnerable. To make such operations legally and 
morally palatable such operations have generally taken place 
when the terrorists are clearly armed. 85 Such ambushes often 
occur at PIRA arms caches. 86 In order to carry out operations 
82) R. Trinquier. Modern Warfare, 26. F. Kitson. Low Intensity 
Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeepin-rp 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1971), 95. 
83) N. Barber. The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan 
Emergency, 1948-1960, (London: 1971; New York: Bantamq 
1987), 250. Unnattributable information. 
84) "Shooting mystery tarnishes German anti-terrorist squad") 
The Independent, July 6th 1993. "Elite squad faces the 
axe", The Europeang July 8th-11th 1993. "Bonn terrorst 
in shoot-out", The Independent, August 19th 1993. 
"Madrid sues over 'd-irty war' claims", The Independent, 
January 11th 1995. P-Taylor. States of Terror, 98-104. 
85) M. Urban. 
, 
Big Boys' Rules, 164. 
86) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 370-372. 
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PIRA members - either couriers or the gunmen themselves - 
have to go to these caches to pick up their weapons. If the 
security forces find out where these weapons arel they can 
deploy covert teams near the caches. The PIRA members can 
then be apprehended or killed at minimal risk when they go to 
collect the weapons. Urban gives the example of an ambush 
carried out in December 1983 where an SAS ambush killed two 
members of the Provisional IRA who had just retrieved weapons 
from a cache, and in October 1990 an SAS team killed two PIRA 
members at an arms cache in County Armagh. 87 
In other cases the British Army has ambushed PIRA 
members about to carry out an operation, or on their way back 
from one. Brigadier Peter Morton describes how in 1976 he 
planned to lay ambushes at the spot where the PIRA had 
planted a bomb. When the PIRA volunteer arrived at the 
observation point from which he would detonate the bomb, the 
troops would ambush him. 88 Although in this case the ambush 
did not take place, in April 1986 an identical ambush 
resulted in the death of Seamus MacElwaine, the commander of 
the PIRA in south Fermanagh, and the capture of another PIRA 
member. 89 The worst PIRA loss suffered in a single action 
occurred at Loughall, county Armagh, where eight or more 
terrorists were ambushed as they attempted to destroy a 
police station using a bomb in the shovel of a mechanical 
digger. The security forces were expecting the attack and the 
SAS were waiting in ambush, killing eight terroristsq but 
87) "IRA man killed by Army wanted for corporal's murder"l 
The Independent, October 10th 1990. M. Urban. "Who 
dares, need not fear inquests", The Spectator, May 23rd 
1992. M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 639 118,173-177. 
J. Adams, R. Morgan, & A. Bambridge. Ambush, 97-100. "IRA 
man killed by Army wanted for corporal's murder", The 
Independentl October 10th 1990. "Man shot by army 'had 
record of violence"'i The Times, October 10th 1990. 
"Web of terror that spread across Europe", The 
Independent, April 3rd 1991. 
88) P. Morton. Emergency Tour: 3 PARA in South Armagh, 
(Wellingborought Northamptonshire: William Kimber, 
1989), 126-127. T-Geraghty. Who Dares Wins: The Story 
of the Special Air Service 1950-1980,, (London: Arms 
and Armour Press, 1986-)-, -152-153. 
89) M. Urban., Big Boys' Rules, 218-219. 
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also killing an uninvolved man who was driving through the 
area. 90 
overall, between April 1976 and November 1987 the SAS 
killed twenty-five members of the Provisional IRA compared to 
nine who were killed by uniformed troops, and five who were 
killed by the RUC. 91 In terms of military results, ambushing 
terrorists is an effective method, but as Urban points out it 
can create martyrs for the terrorist cause. 92 When such 
ambushes go wrong, an example being the mistaken shooting of 
a civilian who stumbled across an arms cache in 1978, the 
political consequences for the authorities are damaging, not 
to mention the consequences for the victims and their 
families. 93 Thus it is possible for a militarily successful 
security force operation to have adverse political 
consequences. However, it is crucial for terrorists to 
remember that they may be under observation, and take the 
necessary precautions. To fail in this may be fatal. 
The most conspicuous example of the use of armed 
response units against terrorists has been the use of hostage 
rescue units (HRUs). These units' responsibility is to 
release captives who are being held by armed captorsi and 
includes situations which are not terrorist-related. 
Incidents such as GSG9's (Grenzchutzgruppe 9- German Border 
Police Group 9) rescue of passengers on a hijacked Lufthansa 
aeroplane at Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977, and the SAS's 
rescue of hostages being held in the Iranian Embassy in 
London in 1980 have shown the utility of setting up such 
units. 94 Police units such as the Washington Emergency 
Response Team (ERT) also frequently include negotiators who 
90) M. Urban. 
, 
Big Boys' Rulesj 227-237. J. Adamsj R-Morgan, & 
A. Bambridge. Ambush, 107-118. B. O'Brien. The Long War, 
141-142. 
91) M. Urban. Big Boy's Rules, 248-251,254. 
92) M. Urban., Big Boy's Rules, 82-83. Private information. As 
an example of the coverage of terrorists' deaths by a 
sympathetic publication see, "Freedom's soldiers laid 
to rest in historic Tyrone"i AP/RN, June 13th 1991. 
"Obituaries: Kevin Barry O'Donnell", AP/RN, February 
20th 1992. 
93) D-Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 229-231. T. Geraghty. Who 
Dares Wins, 155-160. C. Ryder. The RUCI 216. 
94) P. Koch & K. Hermann. Assault at Mogadishul trans. J-Mant (Hamburg: Stern, 1977; London: Corgis 1977). Sunday 
Times Insight Team. Siege: Prince's Gate, London, April 
30-May 5 1980, (Felthaml England: Hamlyn, 1980). 
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will attempt to persuade the hostage-takers to surrender 
peacefully if possible. 95 The ability to negotiate 
successfully is dependent upon the location of the siege. If 
it is on territory controlled by authorities which control 
the HRU, or which are friendly to them this is much easier. 
If, however, the captives are being held in a place 
where the local powers are hostile to the rescuers, then the 
opportunities for such negotiation are limited because the 
authorities do not control the cordon, if there is ones 
around the area concerned. Thus during the 1976 hijacking of 
an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris the captives were 
held on the aircraft at Entebbe Airports near Kampala in 
Uganda, where the government was hostile to the state of 
Israel. Thus Israeli negotiations with the kidnappers or the 
Ugandan government were conducted in the knowledge that the 
Israelis did not command the means of entry and exit to or 
from the aircraft, and did not have the possibility of 
setting up a long-term siege of the aircraft to starve out 
the captors. 96 
The relevance of hostage rescue units to terrorist 
targeting strategy is that the successful deployment of HRUs 
has made holding hostages in a siege far more dangerous for 
the terrorists. This is a factor which terrorists need to 
take into consideration when assessing the feasibility of an 
operation, and the type of hostages to be seized. 
When attempts to rescue hostages are unsuccessful the 
consequences can be grim. Even if the HRU succeeds in 
eliminating the hostage-takersq the hostages themselves may 
be killed. The most notable early example of this was the 
death of all of the Israeli athletes taken hostage in Munich 
during the 1972 Olympics. 97 More recently, in November 1985 
an attempt by an Egyptian unit to storm a hijacked EgyptAir 
95) J. Teenbrook. "ERT Negotiators", RAIDS, UK edition, March 
1993. 
96) W. Stevenson. 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York: Bantam, 
1976). M. Hastings. Yoni: Hero of Entebbe, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 215-231. 
97) G. Rosie. The-Directory of-International Terrorism, 206- 
208. H. Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 
54. P. Seale. Abu Nidal, 83-85. 
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aeroplane at Luqa Airport in Malta resulted in the death of 
fifty-seven hostages. 98 
The authorities involved may also find their prestige 
seriously damaged by the failure of a hostage-rescue 
operation. This occurred in 1980 when the American Delta 
Force failed to rescue US diplomats being held by students in 
Tehran with the connivance of the Iranian authorities. Eight 
members of the unit died when a helicopter collided with a 
transport aeroplane. Although in this case the hostage-takers 
were not strictly non-state terrorists, the example is 
relevant because the failure of the mission directly harmed 
President Carter's re-election campaign in 1980.99 
TABLE 8.2 
INTERNATIONAL HOSTAGE/SIEGE TERRORIST INCIDENT: 1976-1985 
Barricade/hostage Hijack 
1976 6 6 
1977 11 9 
1978 19 6 
1979 16 29 
1980 31 36 
1981 32 32 
1982 18 30 
1983 35 6 
1984 6 10 
1985 2 7 
Source: US Department of State. 
100 
98) J. Adams. 
' 
Secret Armies, 89-95. G. Rosie. The Directory of 
' 
International Terrorism, 106-107. 
99) See C. A. Beckwith & D. Knox. Delta Force, (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1984; Fontana, 1985). P. B. Ryan. The 
Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failedl (Annapolis, 
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985)* S. E. Ambrose. 
Rise to Globalism: American Foreign PoiicY Since 1938, 
seventh edition, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 
1993), 300-302. H. Smith. The Power Game: How Washin%tton 
Works, (London: Fontana, 1989), 711. 
100) Robert A. Friedlander (ed). Terrorism: Documents of 
International and Local Control. Volume IV: _A 
World on 
Fire, (London: Oceana Publications Incl 1984. U. S. 
Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983 
(Washington DC: Office for Combatting Terrorism, U. S. 
Department of States September 1984). U. S. Department of 
State. 
' 
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984 (Washington 
DC: Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter- 
Terrorism, U. S Department of State, November 1985). 
U. S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 
1985, (Washington DC: Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, U. S Department of State, October 
1986). 
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It is difficult to ascertain whether the increased 
deployment of HRUs since the late 1970s has resulted in 
terrorists being less likely to attempt such operations. US 
State Department statistics concerning international 
terrorism - that is terrorism which involves the citizens or 
territory of more than one state - indicate that this might 
have occurred. The figures for barricade-hostage incidents 
and hijackings for the period 1976 to 1985, are shown in 
Table 8.2. 
The use of HRUs seems to have altered the way in which 
terrorist groups go about executing hijackings or other forms 
of hostage-taking. Terrorists may try to hold their captives 
in an area which is not controlled by the authorities. This 
is only really possible if the hostages were captured outside 
the jurisdiction of a state which might try to rescue them, 
as with the western hostages in the Lebanon, or in the case 
of the hijacking of an aeroplane or a ship. 
If possible the kidnappers might also disperse the 
hostages around a number of geographically separate 
locations. This lessens the ability of potential rescuers 
being able to locate the hostages. Even if they do, they are 
less likely to have the confidence and resources to plan and 
carry out a number of simultaneous operations-101 
The kidnappers may also move the hostages frequently so 
as to make it difficult for a rescue mission to be mounted. 
Although the western hostages in the Lebanon were often 
grouped in the same building they were moved around Beirut 
and other parts of the Lebanon. 102 Likewise, when TWA Flight 
847 was hijacked in June 1985 soon after leaving Athens, the 
aeroplane was constantly flown between the airports at 
Algiers and Beirut. When in Beirut some hostages were also 
taken from the aircraft and distributed around the city in 
order to make a successful rescue more difficult. 
103 By 
making hostage rescue operations as difficult as possibleg 
and by making it clear that the hostages will die if such an 
attempt is made, the terrorists can try to ensure that even 
101) P. B. Ryan. The Iranian 
-- 
Rescue Mission,, 100. J. Adams. 
Secret Armies, 130. 
102) C. Coughlin. Hostage, 110,349,352,358. 
103) J. Adams. Secret Armies, 274. J. T. Choi. Acts of violence 
against civil aviation, 206-243,210. R. Fisk. Pity the 
Nationp 607. 
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if they do not achieve their original demands, those 
responsible for ordering a hostage rescue mission will suffer 
adverse political consequences. 
International police and legal cooperation. 
An additional problem for terrorists is the trend 
towards international cooperation over matters such as 
intelligence sharing or the extradition of terrorist 
suspects. This can be due to bilateral agreements between 
states, treaty obligations between states belonging to a 
common international organisation, or the conditions laid 
down by international law. The effect of this can be to make 
life more difficult for members of the terrorist group. 
Leaving the territory of the state in which they have 
committed their offences may no longer mean that terrorists 
can relax the precautions which they take to avoid detection. 
An example of an agreement affecting the ability of a 
terrorist group to operate, is that between Spain and France. 
Until the mid 1980s the French authorities did very little to 
prevent the Basque separatist group ETA from using Francel 
and in particular the parts of the Basque Country which are 
located in south-west France, as a haven from which to plan 
operations and to which their operatives could retreat after 
an operation. No extraditions to Spain took place. 
This situation changed, largely because a group of 
mercenaries calling themselves the Anti-terrorist Liberation 
Group (Gruppos Antiterroristas de Liberacion - GAL), and 
possibly sponsored by elements of the Spanish state, 
assassinated up to twenty-seven suspected Basque separatists 
in France between 1983 and 1987. Nine of the-dead are 
reported to have had no provable links with ETA. 104 
Following these attacks the French authorities clamped 
down upon ETA activities in France, extraditing five suspects 
to Spain and deporting a further twenty-three from France in 
1984 alone. 105 Basque exiles from Spain were forbidden to 
104) "'Dirty war' scandal worsens", The Independents December 
21st 1994. "Madrid sues over 'dirty war' claims", The 
Independent, January 11th 1995. "Spain drops judge from 
GAL death squads inquiry", The Guardian, January 25th 
1995. "The noose is tightened around Felipe's neck", 
The Guardian, February 23rd 1995. P. Taylor. States of 
Terror, 97-104. 
105) P. Taylor. States of Terror, 104. 
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live in the departments adjoining the border with the Spanish 
part of the Basque Country, and from 1987 onwards France 
extradited ETA suspects to Spain without requiring the 
production of an extradition warrant. 
106 A series of top ETA 
members were arrested in France throughout the mid and late 
1980s and into the 1990s, including the arrest of what were 
believed to be the three most senior ETA leaders in the south 
of the country in March 1992.107 
This affected ETA's targeting. A state which extradites 
terrorist suspects may find itself coming under attack - 
either as a form of revenge or to discourage such action in 
future. ETA carried out attacks upon French business 
interests and material targets in the Basque Country, 
including Renault car dealerships, a furniture store, and 
French-registered vehicles. Some of these attacks coincided 
with extraditions, whilst an attack on a French-registered 
truck occurred on the evening of an ETA members' funeral. 
108 
According to Llera, Mata, and Irwin, ETA made over 500 
attacks on French material targets over an unspecified five 
year period. 109 So far ETA's displeasure at the actions of 
the French Government has not translated itself into attacks 
against human targetsp perhaps out of fear of even more 
severe actions on the part of the French authorities. 
The criminal justice system and security forces as targets. 
In addition to their functions, the criminal justice 
system and the security forces are symbols of the state. BY 
selecting police officers as targets, terrorists - in 
106) S. Segaller. Invisible Armies, 96. F. Jiminez. "Spain: The 
Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response", 
118. 
107) "Visit by Chirac crowns success of co-operation on Eta 
raiders", The Timesl November 7th 1986. "Net closes in 
on ETA unit of 'quiet men"', The Guardian, April 16th 
1990. "Eta reels after arrest of top leader", The 
Independent, September 25th 1990. "Spanish alert after 
Eta chiefs captured"l Financial Times, March 31st 1992. 
"Spain rejoices but awaits ETA reprisal", The Guardian, 
March 31st 1992. "Spain hails arrest of ETA chief", The 
Independent, February 22nd 1993. P. Taylor. States of 
Terror, 97-104. 
108) E. F. Mickoluss T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. International 
Terrorism in the-1980s: 1984-1987,, 551,5619 629,6309 
639. 
109) F. Llera, J. M. Mata & C. L. Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army to 
Social Movement", 131. 
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particular those with a revolutionary ideology - may seek to 
encourage the masses to revolt by showing that the state is 
vulnerable and can be attacked. 110 If the attacks force the 
security forces to lower their profile or withdraw from an 
area this has both functional and symbolic importance because 
it shows that the writ of the state no longer runs in that 
area. This allows the terrorists more freedom of action to 
operate against the authorities and to extend their influence 
over the population. 
At the most extreme extent, if the state can be 
sufficiently weakened it may collapseq or the conflict may be 
fmilitarised' by the military taking over the government, as 
occurred in Uruguay in 1972 and Argentina in 1976. Howevers 
even where the tactical objectives of the terrorists are more 
modest there are sound reasons for trying to minimise the 
influence of the law enforcement agencies in an area. 
As well as eliminating a threat to the terrorist groupp 
for insurgent terrorists the targeting of police officers and 
the system of law enforcement can also be attributed to the 
desire of the terrorists to weaken the state. In August 1983 
a spokesman for the INLA said: 
The INLA believes that we have the right to destroy that 
[judicial] system. Every person involved in that systemp 
be they police, judges or informers will be held 
accountable for their actions. 111 
Police officers have been targets in some insurgent terrorist 
campaigns, though not in all. As Table 8.3 shows, in the 
major European terrorist campaigns of recent years the 
proportion of police victims has varied relative to the 
overall total. Not all groups have made a point of 
specifically targeting the police. In The Urban Guerrilla 
Concept written in 1971, Ulrike Meinhof suggested that police 
officers who did not act against the RAF would not be 
attacked. 
The cop who finds himself in the contradictory position 
of being a 'little man' and a capitalist lackey, a low 
wage-earner and a Police officer of monopoly capitalismi 
110) R. Debray. Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle 
and Political Struggle in Latin America, 
(trans. B. Ortiz)l (France: 19-6-7; Harmondsworths England: 
Penguin, 1968), 51. 
111) "Informer's wife freed as INLA rethinks tactics"q The 
Guardiang August 27th 1983. 
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is not under an absolute compulsion to act. We sh? ot when 
we are shot at. We spare the cop who spares use" 
Whilst they attacked senior security officials the RAF did 
not generally select ordinary police officers as targets 
unless they were acting as bodyguards for the primary target 
of an attack. 
TABLE 8.3 
NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS KILLED BY TERRORIST GROUPS 
Police killed Total Victims Police 
as % 
Communist terrorists 
in Italy (1970-82)a 57 131 43.5% 
Provisional IRA in 
Northern Ireland (1970- 93)h 265 1653 16.0% 
INLA in NoEthern Ireland 
(1970-93) 13 122 10.7% 
ETA (1968-82)c 
Police 62 349 17.8% 
Civil Guard 103 349 29.5% 
TOTAL 165 349 47.3% 
Red Army Faction 1 2 
Germany (1968-92) 5 25 25.0% 
Sources: D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in ItalYj 
38. M. Sutton. Bear in mind these deadq 196. (The total 
number of PIRA killings excludes 102 PIRA members 
killed by their own bombs. ) Guardia Civil report cited 
in R. P. Clark. "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980"1 
1420. D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational 
Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group 
(1972-1991)". Unpublished chronology supplied by 
B. A. Scharlau. 
Some terrorist groups have targeted ordinary police 
officers in an attempt to lower police morale. According to a 
member of the Irish National Liberation Army: 
It demoralizes the police stiffing [killing] them at 
home. Everybody and particularly a cop wants to come home 
off the job and relaxi and the doorstep murder fucks up 
every cop that's looking for that relaxation. Not only 
the cop, you take the wife; the wife is going to demand 
that he gets out when one of his mates gets whacked. 
That's the whole purpose of that type of operation. You 
see, they can cope with the violence on the street in the 
Republican areas. They expect it theres it's part of the 
job, but when you hit the house or the car as he's coming 
home from work they hate that. They can't cope with it in 
the home. 113 
112) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 143. 
113) A. Feldman. Formationsof Violence,, 76. 
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According to L'Espresso, the Red Brigades targeted ordinary 
police officers so as to affect police morale. 
114 BR 
justified these attacks on the grounds that whilst the 
capitalist state could replace its leading members, it could 
not operate without its lesser functionaries. 
115 However 
communiques from BR also sought to portray some attacks as 
revenge for specific actions by the state. Thus, in November 
1979 two carabinieri were shot dead whilst drinking coffee in 
a cafe in Genoa, supposedly in revenge for the suicide of an 
imprisoned Genoese BR member the previous month. 
116 Later the 
same month, the Red Brigades shot dead another police 
officer, whom they subsequently described as an 'executioner 
in disguise'. 117 
Terrorist operations against the criminal justice 
system are not merely confined to attacks on the police. 
Terrorist operations which are most directly concerned with 
the penal system are those which are intended to allow 
imprisoned terrorists to escape. In October 1867 an attempt 
to break open the prison van containing Fenian prisoners in 
Manchester resulted in the death of one of the police 
escorts, whilst a bomb placed against the wall of Clerkenwell 
prison in London that December killed twelve people. Neither 
attempt was successful in releasing any prisoners and some of 
the would-be rescuers were hanged for murder. 
118 More 
recently, the first particularly violent act of the Red Army 
Faction - though it did not use that name at the time - 
occurred in May 1970 when Ulrike Meinhof and three comrades 
rescued Andreas Baader at gunpoint whilst he was in a local 
library accompanied by a police escort-119 
' 
114) L'Espressol February 24th 1980. 
115) L'Espresso, October 31st 1982. 
116) Associated Press, November 21st 1979. "Gunmen murder 
Italian police", Financial Times, November 22nd 1979. 
C. Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, 850. 
117) "Policeman shot dead as terrorists go on trial"i 
Financial Timess November 27th 1979. "Brigades victim"o 
The Guardian, November 28th 1979. C. Schaerf et al. 
Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, 851. 
118) C. Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 36-37. 
W. Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 104,113. D. G. Boyce. 
"'A Gallous Story and a Dirty deed': Political 
Martyrdom in Ireland since 1867", Y. Alexander & A. O'Day 
(eds). Ireland's Terrorist Dilemmas 14. 
119) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 83-86. J. Becker- 
Hitler's Children, 124-129. 
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In attempting to gain the release of imprisoned 
comrades or affect their conditions of imprisonment a 
terrorist group will not necessarily restrict its attacks to 
members of the penal system. The German left-wing terrorist 
groups in the 1970s, sometimes in collaboration with the PFLP 
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)q centred many 
operations around attempts to release imprisoned comrades, 
but did not often attack prison staff. 120 Their operations 
included; the seizure of the West German Embassy in Stockholm 
in 1975 by members of the Socialist Patients' Collective 
(Sozialistisches Patienten Kollektiv - SPK) who had joined 
the RAF, the Revolutionary Cells' (Revolutionaere Zellen - 
RZ) involvement in the hijack which ended at Entebbe in 1976, 
and the 1977 RAF kidnapping of Schleyer. 121 All centred on 
demands for the release of imprisoned German terrorists. In 
addition the 1977 PFLP hijackers of a Lufthansa jet demanded 
the release of German communist terrorists in addition to 
Palestinians held in Germany. 122 With the exception of the 
Schleyer kidnapping all of these operations resulted in the 
death or capture of the terrorists involved and all of the 
operations failed to gain the release of the terrorists. 
Another aspect is the role which prisons play in 
legitimising or delegitimising the terrorist group. By 
imprisoning terrorists in the same way that ordinary criminal 
offenders are imprisoned the authorities hope to delegitimise 
their activities, and by extension legitimise the moral 
authority of the government. Terrorists on the other hand 
have a vested interest in combating this view, and have used 
violence to reinforce their efforts to do this. 
This was seen in Northern Ireland after 1976 when the 
British government abolished the 'special category' status 
for prisoners convicted of scheduled terrorist offences, and 
sought to bring them under the auspices of a version of the 
criminal justice system. 123 Between 1976 and 1981 the 
120) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 91-93. 
121) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 289-292. J. Becker. 
Hitler's Children, 315-322. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing 
Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 45. 
W. Stevenson. 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 16. 
122) P. Koch & K. Hermann. Assault at Mogadishu, 79. 
123) T. P. Coogan. On the Blanket, 48,161. 
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Provisional IRA and the INLA launched a series of protests 
and hunger strikes in the prisons in Northern Ireland, and 
killed prison officers. Between April 1976 and the end of the 
hunger strike in August 1981 eighteen serving prison officers 
at various grades were killed by the PIRA or INLA together 
with a retired prison officer and his wife. 
124 
Terrorists have also attacked members of the penal 
system to highlight allegations concerning poor prison 
conditions, and force the people running the penal system to 
concede to prisoner's demands. In Italy both the Red Brigades 
and Front Line have killed or injured prison officers and 
other people associated with the penal system in an attempt 
to put pressure upon the authorities to change specific 
aspects of the penal system, or merely to continue the attack 
upon the state. 125 A notable example of this is the D'Urso 
kidnapping. 
On December 12th 1980 the Red Brigades kidnapped Judge 
Giovanni D'Urso, amongst whose responsibilities was the 
allocation of terrorists to high-security prisons. Their 
demand was for the closure of the high-security prison on the 
island of Asinara, near Sardinia, for an end to the isolation 
of imprisoned terrorists, and for the publication and 
transmission of documents drawn up by BR prisoners. 
126 On 
December 31st 1980 BR also assassinated Carabinieri General 
Enrico Galvaligi who was deputy director for security in the 
high-security prisons. 
127 The Italian government closed the 
prison at Asinara, and some Italian newspapers and radio 
stations cooperated in publicising the prisoners' 
documents. 128 On January 15th 1981 D'Urso was released. 
124) M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 89-132. T. P-Coogan- 
. 
On the Blanket, 153. L. Clarke. Broadening the 
Battlefield, 77,92. 
125) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 1459 150-151,210. 
V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in 
Contemporary Italy, 157-170. D. Moss. The Politics of 
Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 38,145. E. MacDonald. 
Shoot the Women First, 187. 
126) V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in 
Contemporary Italy, 68. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 
184-185. 
127) V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and-Violence in 
Contemporary Italy, 68. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 
184. 
128) A. Jamieson- The-Heart Attacked, 184-187. 
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A threefold motive can be seen for this particular 
operation. In the first place there was the symbolic 
importance of humiliating the Italian authorities, and in 
particular Judge D'Urso. 129 Secondly, the operation was 
prompted by a recognition of the need to consider the 
increasing proportion of Brigadists who were in prison rather 
than outside. 130 Lastly it reflected a particular interest of 
the Brigadist in charge of the operation, Giovanni Senzani, 
an academic criminologist specialising in research of the 
penal system. During D'Urso's thirty-three day captivity 
Senzani questioned him in detail about the operation of the 
prisons, and about people operating within the penal 
system. 131 
Finally, members of the legal system may be attacked as 
a means of delegitimising the state. Thus, in making the 
legal system inoperable by assassinating judges and lawyers, 
and by intimidating witnesses, the terrorists may hope to 
provoke the authorities into emergency measures which will 
reduce the legitimacy of the government in many peoples eyes. 
This has the added merit of disrupting the judicial procedure 
in specific cases. 
The legal system has vulnerabilities which can provide 
terrorists with potential targets. During the trial of 
members of the French communist terrorist group Direct Action 
in December 1986, one of the accused asked the judge how long 
police protection for the jurors would last for. When the 
jurors were told that protection would only be provided for 
only fifteen days, and found out that the defence had 
demanded and been given their names and addresses a month 
before the trial, a number of them declared themselves 
medically unfit for jury service. The trial had to be 
postponed and, as a result, the French authorities brought in 
provisions to replace ordinary juries with a panel of seven 
judges for terrorist trials. 132 
129) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 187. 
130) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 183. D. Moss. The 
Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 152. 
131) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 184. P. Willan. Puppet 
Masters, 326-327. V. S. Pisano. The Dynamics of 
Subversion and Vi lence in Contemporary Italy, 68. 
132) "Paris tested over terror trial", The Independent, 
February 23rd 1987. "Leaders of Action Directe 
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Likewise, judges and lawyers can be directly 
intimidated. According to Pearce, when, in 1985, the 
Colombian Supreme Court of Justice was about to hear an 
application for the annulment of the extradition treaty with 
the USA, each justice received the following note. 
We are writing to you to demand favourable positions for 
our cause. We do not accept resignations, we do not 
accept sabbaticals, we do not accept fictitious illnesses 
*90 Any position taken against us we shall take as an 
acceptance of our declaration of war. From prison, we 
will order your execution and with blood and Isad we will 
eliminate the dearest members of your family* 3 
On November 6th 1985, the day when the Supreme Court was due 
to hear the case, the communist group M-19, probably with the 
backing of drug-traffickers, seized the Colombian Palace of 
Justice building in Bogota. In the ensuing siege eleven of 
the twenty-four Supreme Court justices died, including the 
four who made up the Court's constitutional arm. 134 In 
December 1986 the Supreme Court suspended the extradition 
treaty with the USA. 135 
Attacks can also be intended to intimidate defending 
counsel. Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland have targeted 
lawyers whom they think are too sympathetic - or possibly too 
successful - when defending republican suspects or 
representing the interests of the families of republicans. 
According to Patrick McGrory, a Catholic solicitor who had 
defended PIRA members in court: 
In the minds of certain people I've as a result 
identified myself with the IRA's point of view. I don't: 
I've never agreed with the use of violence. ... the 
point's been reached once more where if people are 
arrested and brought to trial for terrorist offences, the 
mere idea that somebody's prepared to defend them is 
absolute anathema. It's unfortunate but I am afraid it's 
unavoidable now that mylgactice has become identified 
with a political cause. 
terrorist group seized", The Guardians February 22nd 
1987. P. Marnham. Crime and the Academie Francaise, 14. 
133) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 194. Also see 
S. Strong. Whitewash, 144. 
134) S. Strong. Whitewash, 145-148. R. A. Hudson. "Colombia's 
Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the 
Conspiracy Theory", Terrorism and Political Violence, 
7, no. 2, (Summer 1995). 
135) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 182,194. 
S. Strong. Whitewash, 152-153. 
136) T. Parker. May the-Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfasto 
237. 
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Thus, Patrick Finucane, a solicitor who often represented 
republicans or their families in court, was shot dead by the 
UFF in February 1989.137 
The desire to discredit the legal system by making it 
inoperable has also provided the motive for attacks upon 
judges and lawyers - including lawyers for the defence. In 
1976 the Red Brigades issued threats, not just against judges 
and lawyers who acted against them, but against those who 
attempted to act in their defence at the collective trial of 
fifty-two alleged brigadists in Turin. In order to make it 
more difficult for the state to prosecute brigadists as 
criminals, and thus discredit the legal system, the 
defendants dismissed their defence lawyers. Under Italian law 
the state had to provide replacements, but the brigadists 
stated that they did not recognise the right of the court to 
try them, and would regard any replacement lawyers nominated 
by the court as enemies. Accordingly, on April 28th 1977, Red 
Brigadists shot dead Fulvio Croce, the President of the Turin 
lawyer's association, who had been given the responsibility 
of organising replacement lawyers for the defendants and was 
therefore seen as an enemy. The death of Croce also made it 
difficult, in the short-term at least, to find lawyers 
willing to defend the brigadists. 
138 In West Germany in the 
1970s defence lawyers were also threatened, and in some cases 
attacked by communist terrorist groups whose members they 
were defending in court, for much the same reason as the BR 
attacked defence lawyers. 139 
137) "IRA defence solicitor killed", "Shooting marks 
broadening of targets", both in The Guardian, February 
13th 1989. "Hogg told by Dublin to retract remarks on 
Ulster solicitors"q The Independentq February 15th 
1989. 
138) D. Moss. 
, 
The Politics of Left-Wing Violence-in Italy, 
229-233. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 98-99. "Death 
of Turin editor shot Ey terrorists"q The Timess 
November 30th 1977. 
139) "Uproar as terrorism trial opens in Berlin", The Times, 
April 12th 1978. "Scuffles and insults disrupt Berlin 
terrorist trial"i The Times, April 13th 1978. "German 
terror trial lawyers attacked", The Timesq June 1st 
1978. "Berlin court to rule on 'terror' lawyer", The 
Guardian, June 8th 1978. "Terror trial lawyer cleared 
of aiding escape"i The Guardian, June 10th 1978. 
"Kidnap trial lawyers threatened"q The Timesq June 15th 
1978. "Lawyers trapped in bitter struggle"q The Times, 
November 13th 1978. S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group-, 
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The PIRA has threatened lawyers involved in prosecuting 
suspected Provisionals. 140 As the PIRA and their supporters 
have made clear, they wish to place the authorities in a 
position where they effectively 'declare war' on the PIRA, 
forcing them to treat the group as a moral equivalent. In 
1988 Danny Morrison, then the publicity director for Sinn 
Feing stated: 
What is at issue is that the British Government pretends 
it is somehow morally superl? r to its opposition and that 
it is using the civil law. ' 
By preventing the normal legal procedures from operating, the 
PIRA could portray the situation between itself and the 
British Government as a war, and try to achieve a degree of 
moral parity_with the Government. Indeed, where insurgent 
groups are concerned this desire for moral parity can be seen 
as one of the motives for attacking the criminal justice 
system and security forces as a whole. 
Summary. 
The security environment affects the targeting 
strategies of terrorist groups in a number of ways. In the 
first instance it acts as a restraint upon the activities of 
terrorists. The investigative and punitive functions of the 
criminal justice system force, combined with the 
intelligence, public order maintenance, and armed response 
activities of the security forces, compel terrorists to adopt 
a clandestine or semi-clandestine existence. This takes up 
time and makes it more difficult for a terrorist organisation 
to move personnel and equipment, to organise attacks and to 
communicate between different sections of the group if it is 
more than a single small group. The alternative - near- 
impunity for terrorists - has been seen where order has 
broken down and militias have arisen as in the Lebanon in the 
1970s and 1980s and in Bosnia in the early 1990s, or where a 
terrorist faction has received the tacit support of elements 
of the security forces as occurred in Italy in the 1970s and 
296-297,303-307. J. Becker. Hitler's Children, 323-324. 
B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 66,303. J. Wright. Terrorist 
Propaganda, 87-88. 
140) "Nightmare for the judges on 24-hour vigil", The 
Guardian, January 6th 1988. 
141) "Declare wars says IRA", The Guardian, March 9th 1988. 
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Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus an effective 
system of enforcing the law and public order creates a large 
obstacle for the terrorist, and is accordingly a target. 
Terrorists of all ideologies can secure concrete 
benefits by targeting elements of the criminal justice 
system. By its very existence the policing component of the 
criminal justice system is at least a nuisance and at most a 
danger to most terrorist groups, although it is not much of a 
problem for people belonging to terrorist groups which have 
the tacit or even active support of the police or of other 
elements of the state system. These factors cause some 
terrorist groups to target those elements of the police and 
criminal justice system which pose a threat to them. Thus as 
well as being a symbolic target, those members of the police 
force, or other intelligence-gathering units, who pose a 
direct threat to the terrorist organisation, are also 
functional targets. 
For revolutionary terrorist groups an attack upon the 
policeg the legal system, or the penal system, is also a 
symbolic attack upon the state. By attacking various aspects 
of the criminal justice system, revolutionary terrorists can 
demonstrate their rejection of the legitimacy of the state 
and show the vulnerability of the state to violent 
revolutionary action. By demonstrating the relative impotence 
of the organs of state in preventing terrorist attacks the 
terrorists may hope to show that the state lacks both the 
ability and the popular support to counter the terrorist's 
cause. Such attacks may advertise the terrorist's cause and 
encourage others to join the terrorists. In addition the 
terrorists may hope that their attacks will provoke the 
authorities into repressive measures which will alienate the 
civil population and lead them to turn to the terrorists. 
Even terrorists who do not have revolutionary aims may attack 
those elements of the criminal justice system whom they wish 
to intimidate into obedience, or whom they suspect of 
complicity with supposedly subversive elements. For these 
reasons the criminal justice system and the security forces 
are frequently prime targets of terrorist groups. 
Lastly, terrorists are liable to attack the penal 
system, directly or indirectly, to secure the release of 
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their colleagues from prison. Direct a 
staff or people connected to the penal 
attacks take the nature of operations 
hostages - aimed at releasing comrades 
over the politicians and officials who 
charge of the penal system. 
ttacks target prison 
system. Indirect 
- such as taking 
by gaining leverage 
are ultimately in 
Overall, the security environment, and the institutions 
which maintain it, restricts a terrorist group's freedom of 
action and consequently modifies its behaviour from what it 
would ideally like to do. However, it also provides the 
terrorists with targets and motives for attacking them. The 
danger presented by the security forces - in particular those 
elements working directly against the terrorists - makes them 
an obvious functional target. In addition, because these 
institutions such as the law, the police, and the armed 
forces represent the authority of the state, they are an 
ideal symbolic target for terrorists hoping to attack that 
authority and provoke the security forces into committing 
reprisals as a part of a strategy intended to advertise the 
terrorist's cause and mobilise popular support. Thus the 
security environment provides the terrorists with motives, 
restricts some opportunitiesp and supplies others. 
276 
The influence of external factors 
Introduction. 
Terrorists' actions are meant to have an effect upon 
their surroundings and are worthless if they do not. In turn 
terrorists are affected by their surroundings. They are 
dependent, to a greater or lesser extentl upon the support of 
people who are not clearly members of their group, but who 
operate on its' fringes or merely give the group tacit 
support by withholding assistance from the group's opponents. 
There is also that part of external opinion which is 
indifferent or even hostile to the activities of the 
terrorists, which can frustrate the terrorist's desires. 
Apart from any other consideration, it is often people who 
have no fixed opinion, or who are antagonistic to the group, 
whom the terrorists see as the psychological target to be 
influenced. 
Support for terrorist groups. 
The relationship between a terrorist group and the rest 
of society can be complex. Whilst society can affect the 
terrorist groups actions, these actions in turn affect the 
attitude of sections of society towards the group. 
Fitzpatrick points out that during the Irish Rebellion of 
1919-1921 there was no shortage of "strong-willed and 
bellicose men" to lead a fight against British rule, but in 
some areas there was a lack of demand for such leadershipol 
The existence of a favourable environment was necessary for 
IRA leaders to recruit supporters and ultimately members. As 
this factor affects the capabilities of the group, it must be 
considered. 
Both Wright and Schmid divide the 'audience' for the 
actions of insurgent terrorist groups into a number of 
categories. 
2 Both examine insurgent terrorism, and Wright 
examines those elements in society which are likely to 
support the terrorist group, or at least feel neutral. One 
1) D. Fitzpatrick. "The Geography of Irish Nationalism: 1910- 
192111, Past and Present, 78, (February 1978), 118. 
2) J. Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 77. A. Schmid. "Terrorism 
and the Media: Freedom of Information vs Freedom from 
Intimidation", L. Howard (ed). Terrorism: Roots, Impact, 
Responsesl (New York: Praeger, 1992), 105. 
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should also consider how the reaction of the various elements 
in society will affect non-insurgent terrorist groups - for 
example conservative vigilantes - and the effect of elements 
opposed to the terrorists. 
The relationship between a terrorist group and society 
has been likened to a series of concentric rings, with the 
core of terrorist leaders at the centre. In November 1987, a 
spokesman for the Provisional IRA outlined the nature of 
their support. 
Our support is in concentric rings. The centre is the 
republican movement; the next is the nationalist 
community in the north, followed by the south then 
solidaritý groups, left groups and finally international 
sympathy. 
Similarly, Scharlau gives a diagrammatic representation of 
support for communist terrorist groups in West Germany which 
spreads outwards from the core of active terrorists in a 
series of concentric circles, through various levels of 
support, to the uninvolved areas of soCiety. 
4 Pluchinsky puts 
forward a similar model in relation to the Red Army Faction 
using the analogy of a pyramid, with the hard core RAF 
commando level at the apex and the other various levels of 
support broadening out into greater numbers the further away 
they are from the core of active terrorists-5 
Viewed from the standpoint of a terrorist group9s 
objectives, society can be divided into categories. These 
categories are quite distinct, with some blurring at the 
edges between one and another. From the most favourable to 
the terrorists to the least favourable the categories are: 
I Members. Those in the terrorist group who carry out violent 
operations or provide active support for them. 
I Supporters. Those who support the political objectives and 
methods of the terrorist group. They may provide general 
logistical help such as food, money, or shelter if 
called upon, but generally do not have any role in 
operations. 
3) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 
11th 1987. 
4) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 164-165. 
5) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis 
of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 52. 
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I Potential sympathisers. Those who do not support the 
methods used by the terrorist group, but generally 
favour the same political objectives. They do not 
provide any form of tangible support for the terrorists, 
or necessarily have any sympathy for them. However, the 
terrorist leaders may see them as a constituency which 
can be turned against the terrorist's opponents or even 
as a group within which a degree of sympathy can be 
cultivated. 
I Uncommitted. People who have no opinions concerning the 
terrorist groups' political objectives or methods. 
I Unsympathetic. Those who have no opinions concerning the 
objectives of the terrorist group, but are opposed to 
their methods. 
I Opponents. Those who are opposed to the aims and methods of 
the terrorist group. 
I Enemies. Those who violently oppose the aims and methods of 
the terrorist group. Active enemies - such as hostile 
terrorist groups - may use similar or identical methods 
to the terrorist group which they are opposed to. 
The size of these categories differs greatly from one 
terrorist group to another and the proportionate size of one 
category to another can also vary greatly. Thus one group may 
have a very small number of supporters with large sections of 
the population uncommitted, whilst another group may have 
sizeable support, but be opposed by a large proportion of the 
population. This is illustrated by contrasting the rather 
different patterns of support shown in Table 9.1 for the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Red Army Faction. 
6 
6) "A difficult war to win", The Financial Times, Northern 
Ireland Survey, November 26th 1991. "Legacy of 'Bloody 
Sunday"', The Independent on Sunday, January 5th 1992. 
M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 31-32. "The IRA", The 
Independent on-Sunday, November 22nd 1992. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 391. T. P. Coogan. The 
IRA, 604. D. Pluchinsky. "An organizational and 
Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction 
Terrorist Group", 50,52. H. Horchem. "The Decline of 
the Red Army Faction", 66. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing 
Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 61-629 
65. J. Power. Against Oblivion: Amnesty International's 
fight for human rights, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981), 130, 
133. S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 231,250-251. 
J. Becker. Hitler's Children, 305. H. Horchem. "The 
Decline of the Red Army Faction", 66. 
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TABLE 9.1. 
CATEGORIES OF OPINION IN RELATION TO THE 
THE RED ARMY FACTION. 
Provisional IRA 
Members. About 250-650 
active terrorists 
and auxiliaries. 
Supporters. Some members of 
Sinn Fein. Part of 
the Catholic 
population in 
N-Ireland. A small 
number of people 
in the Republic. 
Some individuals 
outside. Foreign 








The majority of 
Catholics in 
N. Ireland. A high 
proportion of 
people in the 
Republic. Irish 
emigre groups, and 
some people on the 
political left 
outside Ireland. 






Much of public 








PROVISIONAL IRA AND 
Red Army Faction 
15-25 active 
terrorists at the 
commando level. 
20-50 'illegal 




Between 400 and 
2000 people. 
Individuals at the 
tresistance' level 
of the RAF. People 
in support groups 
such as Red Help 
(Rote Hilfe). 
Lawyers who carry 
messages in and 
out of the 
prisons. E. German 
intelligence 
agencies. 
Fringe groups in 
German politics. 
'Alternative' 





movements in the 
Third World. 
The bulk of 
foreign public 
opinion. 
The bulk of 
W. German public 
opinion. 
The W. German 
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Calculating support for the Provisional IRA shows how 
determining the size and nature of support for the terrorists 
is difficult because supporters may lie outside the formal 
structure of the organisation. Although Sinn Fein forms the 
political wing of the republican movement - PIRA being the 
military wing, it is too simplistic to see support for PIRA 
as being calculable from the number of votes which Sinn Fein 
receives. A survey in May 1989 suggested that about one fifth 
of Sinn Fein voters were opposed to the use of violence for 
political ends, and one third believed that Sinn Fein should 
renounce the PIRA campaign. 7 On the other hand, a poll 
undertaken in the Irish Republic in 1979 showed that 42% 
accepted the legitimacy of the PIRA's political motivation, 
and 21% supported their activities to some degree, 8% 
declaring moderate or strong support. 8 This is a much higher 
level of support than the 2% to 5% which Sinn Fein has been 
able to mobilise in elections in the south. 9 It is likely 
that some republicans vote for the mainstream parties as 
being more relevant to their everyday concerns in the 
Republic, whilst they support the Provisionals' activities in 
relation to Northern Ireland. 10 
As a generalisation, and measured by accepting some 
correlation between support for Sinn Fein and support for the 
PIRA, it would be accurate to say that PIRA gains most of its 
active support from Catholics in some rural areas and in the 
more deprived urban areas of Northern Ireland. 11 A smaller 
but useful level of support can be found in the Republic of 
Ireland, and some support can be found amongst Irish emigre 
groups - particularly in the USAj extreme left-wing grouplets 
in Great Britain and Europe, and, occasionally, foreign 
sponsors such as the Libyan government. 12 
7) C. Irvin & E-Moxon-Browne. "Not many floating voters here", 
Fortnight, May 1989. 
8) P. O'Malley. The Uncivil Wars: Ireland-Today, (Belfast: 
Blackstaff, 1983), 276,301. T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 594. 
9) "Labour fires first salvo on Irish privatisation", The 
Times, November 30th 1992. 
10) P. O'Malley. The Uncivil Wars, 276,301. K. J. Kelley- The 
Longest War, 304. 
11) "Not many floating voters here", Fortnight, May 1989. 
12) T. Downes-Le Guin & B-Hoffman. The Impact of Terrorism on 
Public Opinion, 1988 tn_1989, (Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporation, 1993), 16. J. Holland. The 
American Connection. "Deutsche Terroristen helfen IRA- 
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How terrorists may directly influence the public. 
Most acts which terrorists carry out in pursuit of 
their objectives will influence the public indirectly by 
forming their views of the terrorists and their cause. 
However, terrorists can also affect the public directly by 
actions aimed at gaining the compliance or endorsement. 
Intimidation is one way of doing this. It can take the 
form of killing, injuring, or threatening people who inform 
against the terrorists, who publicly defy terrorist edicts, 
or who merely criticise the terrorists. By such means some 
terrorists may hope to frighten people into compliance. As 
mentioned, in Peru Shining Path terrorists have attacked 
villages and religious communities opposing them, and 
development programmes and facilities which might act as an 
alternative focus of loyalty. These attacks have included 
large-scale massacres as a demonstration of the consequences 
of disobedience. 13 
In their relations with the public, terrorists use 
combinations of intimidation and exhortation. Whilst some of 
their violent actions may be aimed at scaring people into 
aiding them - or at least not opposing them - others can 
Kommando", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 13th 
1980. "Meinhof gang 'help IRA"', The Guardian, March 
15th 1980. "Student anarchist who became 'fixer' for 
IRA", The Independent, June 9th 1990. "Leftwing 
politics led to terror campaign", The Guardian, May 
14th 1994. J. Adams. Trading in Death, 17-30. "Voyage 
into business of terror", The Independentg January 12th 
1991. 
13) "In the killing fields of Peru", The Guardian, 
supplement, April 6th 1994. "Peru's guerrillas make 
slum into a 'shining example"', The Independent, 
November 30th 1991. "Terror grips Peru's capital as 
rebels take on the state", The Guardian, August 17th 
1992. "The end of a long march down the Shining Path"i 
The Independents October 3rd 1992. "Maoist rebels in 
Peru kill 28 peasants"i The Independent, September 9th 
1993. S. Strong. Shining-Path, 148-149,181,183. 
B. J. Isbell. "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in 
Rural Ayacucho", 73-74; R. H. Bergo "Peasant Responses to 
Shining Path in Andahuaylas", 92; M. L. Smith. "Shining 
Path's Urban Strategy", 127-128,136,138; S. Woy- 
Hazleton & W. A. Hazleton. "Shining Path and the Marxist 
Left", 214,216; all in D. S. Palmer (ed). Shining Path 
of Peru. T. D. Mason & J. Swartzfager. "Land Reform and 
the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 531. Amnesty 
International. Peru: Human Rights-in a Climate of 
Terror, (London: Amnesty International, 1991), 23-24. 
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conceivably be intended to garner their support. Various 
terrorist groups such as ETA, the Naxalites in India, and the 
Red Brigades in Italy, have attacked targets which they 
believe are unpopular with the elements of the public which 
are sympathetic to the terrorist's cause. However their 
success in doing this can depend on the type of society 
within which they operate. 
However, relations between terrorists and the public 
can be rather more complex than one of straight intimidation. 
The case of the Provisional IRA illustrates this with regard 
to a group which has roots in one side of a conflict which 
has aspects of communal antagonism. PIRA is not an outside 
body which has imposed itself upon the working-class Catholic 
population of Northern Ireland, it is indigenous in much the 
same way that Northern Irish loyalist terrorists are 
indigenous to parts of the Protestant working-class-14 As the 
RUC Chief Constable remarked, "The reality is that terrorists 
reside and operate within each community". 15 Members of the 
PIRA are often family members, friends of the family, former 
school-mates, or belong to a range of other personal 
relationships which might lead people to give them tacit if 
not active support. 16 In turn the Provisionals have become 
aware that such support could stop if they overstep the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour. 17 Thus, as well as 
providing support, the relationship places limits on the 
activities of the group. 
However, PIRA's position is reinforced by threats. They 
have made it clear that those who inform against the PIRA9 or 
who help the security forces in minor ways such as working on 
security force bases, are liable to be killed. 18 Sutton 
14) S. Nelson. Ulster's Uncertain Defenders,, 15. 
15) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual 
Report 1993,11. 
16) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern 
Ireland, 144. F0 Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 
109,22,23. P. Bishop & E-Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 
290-291. 
17) F. Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 109. See Danny 
Morrison's comment in P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 173. 
18) Gerry Adams interviewed in "Inside Story: The Informer"i 
BBC19 (television)l November 24th 1992. "The men of war 
promise third violent decade", The Independent, 
September 29th 1990. "'We remain totally committed and 
confident in victory' - Oglaigh na hEireann", AP/RNj 
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estimates that between 1970 and the end of 1993 the PIRA 
killed fifty-nine alleged informers and twenty-seven 
contractors or their employees who worked for the security 
forces. 19 This does not include people who have been injured 
or intimidated because of their opposition to aspects of 
republican political or terrorist actions, for instance the 
Belfast politicians Gerry Fitt and Paddy Devlin, the SDLP 
leader John Hume, and the 'Peace People' -a group who 
opposed republican violence, all had their homes attacked by 
republicans in the 1980s, Devlin eventually being driven out 
of Andersonstown by the attacks. 20 
The terrorist use of force within the community is not 
always unpopular, provided it is directed against those seen 
as deviants. Following on from the IRA's precedent in the 
rebellion of 1919 to 1921, the PIRA has acted at the local 
level as a vigilante force in Northern Ireland. 21 The 
activities of the Provisionals in the early 1970s made it 
extremely difficult for the RUC to police ordinary crime in 
some Catholic areas, giving the PIRA the opportunity to 
demonstrate that it could protect the Catholic community not 
only from outside elements such as sectarian assassins, but 
from 'anti-social' criminal elements within. 22 
In August 1977 the Derry City PIRA, claiming to be 
reacting to 'numerous complaints', warned bar and off-licence 
owners not to supply alcohol to under age drinkers, warning: 
February 14th 1991. "The IRA statement"q AP/RNq January 
23rd 1992. 
19) M. Sutton. 
, 
Bear in mind these dead , 196. 20) P. Devlin. Straight Left, 151-152,285-286. L. Clarke. 
Broadening the Battle field, 131-132,151-152,166. 
M. Rees. Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective, 
(London: Methuen, 1985), 304-305. D. McKittrick. 
Despatches from Belfast, 6. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The 
Provisional IRA, 289. 
21) M. Kotsonouris. "Revolutionary Justice - the Dail Eireann 
Courts", History Ireland, 2, no. 3, (Autumn 1994). 
C. Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 335. 
C. Townshend. The British Campaign in Ireland, 68-69. 
22) P. Bishop & E. Mallieq The Provisional IRA, 270,246. No 
author named. Volunteer Seamus Twomeyj 12. Interview 
with Dr. Joe Hendron, "Dispatches: Law of the Ghetto", 
television. J. Darby. Intimidation and the Control of 
Conflict in Northern Ireland, 159,157-162. "The 
benefits of a community police force", Republican News, 
(Belfast), August 27th 1977. 
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*** any resulting action that will be taken will rest 
solely on the shoulders of those who put ýSofit before 
the morality and well being of our youth. 
Fourteen years later, the Belfast PIRA was warning drugs 
traffickers: 
There is no instant or simple solution but for our part 
we in the IRA will deal militarily with those who are 
gaining profit from the misery of others, misery which 
they are responsible for creýýing and for which we will 
hold them fully accountable. 
Such warnings were not just issued to those supplying under- 
age drinkers or drug-users. A 1979 communication from the 
Belfast Brigade of the PIRA refers to a crackdown on 
Thugs, Vandals, Sex Offenders and Muggers ... " within 
nationalist Belfast at the request of the local population. 
25 
In a warning to petty criminals, in 1991 a PIRA 
representative stated: 
We will not of course permit individuals to inflict 
hardship on their own community unchecked. 
26 
Inevitably, mistakes have been made where the wrong person 
has been knee-capped, or a badly carried out knee-capping has 
resulted in the loss of a leg. 27 
McCann outlines cases where the Provisionals have acted 
in order to avoid losing support. He reports that in December 
1992 it was only after severe public pressure had been 
brought to bear on them to do something that the Derry PIRA 
knee-capped a man alleged to have sexually abused children. 
Given the fervour with which local people were demanding 
action ... it is fair to say that the republican movement 
might have lost support jg the area had its armed wing 
not exacted retribution. 
23) "Warning to Derry bar owners and off-licences"s 
Republican Newsp August 27th 1977. 
24) "War News: IRA action against drugs trade", AP/RN, 
October 10th 1991. "IRA orders shooting victims to quit 
country", The Independent, October 7th 1991. 
25) K. J. Kelley. The Longest War, 292. 
26) "IRA interview: Defending the community", AP/RN, December 
19th 1991. 
27) K. J. Kelley. The Longest War, 290. "Kneecap victim in IRA 
plea", The Irish Times, (Dublin)p September 9th 1992. 
"IRA expulsion order lifted", The--Irish Timesi 
September 10th 1992. 
28) "Few tears over IRA rough justice", The Independent on 
Sunday, December 20th 1992. 
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In May 1994 McCann reports that similar pressure was brought 
to bear on the Derry Provisionals to maim members of an 
alleged paedophile ring, but they declined to act. 29 
Vigilantism also provides a respectable way for PIRA to 
eliminate competing republican terrorists within Catholic 
areas. This happened when the PIRA killed one member of the 
IPLO (Irish People's Liberation Organisation) and wounded ten 
others on the grounds that they were peddling drugs in 
nationalist areas. 30 McKittrick remarked: 
they [the authorities] may regret the fact that the iýA has displayed its strength, asserted its authority in 
republican districts in the clearest possible way, and 
will be able to claim credit for dealing with a social 
problem that the sccurity forces had not managed to deal 
with successfully. 'j' 
The two feuding wings of the IPLO subsequently announced that 
they were disbanding as a result of the Provisionals' 
action. 32 
Finallyl the Provisionals have taken action against 
loyalist terrorists in their assumed role as defenders of the 
Catholic community in Northern Ireland. This role has been 
crucial to the Provisionals, as it was the failure of the IRA 
to defend Catholic areas in 1969 and 1970 which led to the 
PIRA splitting away. For instancel during 1993 and 1994 the 
Provisionals and the INLA carried out a series of attacks 
against alleged loyalist terrorists in an attempt to prevent 
increasingly successful loyalist attacks on Catholics and 
particularly on Sinn Fein members. In one incident, on the 
Shankill Road, Belfast in October 1993, a PIRA bomb intended 
to kill senior members of the Ulster Defence'Association 
killed one PIRA bomber and nine Protestant civilians. Again 
much of the impetus for these republican attacks came from 
demands from republican supporters that something be done to 
29) "Northern Exposure", New Statesman and Society, May 27th 
1994. 
30) "Action against drugs puts gunmen in 'policing' role", 
The Independent, November 3rd 1992. "RUC chief fears 
IRA plans to intensify mainland campaign", The Times, 
November 3rd 1992. 
31) "IRA looks set for victory over terrorist faction", The 
Independent, November 4th 1992. 
32) "Loyalist group threatens Catholic massacre", The 
Independent, November 7th 1992. "IRA claims demise of 
death group", The Times, November 7th 1992. 
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stop the loyalist attacks. However, they resulted in a spiral 
of reprisal killings against Catholics. " 
The Provisionals receive a fairly high degree of 
support in certain Catholic areas due to personal linkst and 
a degree of support for their political aims if not for their 
methods. In describing the relationship between the 
Provisionals and the Catholic population of Northern Ireland 
Moxon-Browne notes: 
The image of a small band of ruthless criminals holding a 
cowering population to ransom is a coW illusion 
but it has little to do with reality. 
jorting 
Howeverl there are limits to the degree of dissent which the 
Provisionals will tolerate without retaliation. Overall, the 
relationship between the Provisionals and the Catholic 
working-class is best summed up by Mary Holland's term of 
it 35 quiescent ambivalence"s 
In the case of other smaller groups, operating in more 
homogenous societies, support may be much less. Whilst there 
was some sympathy for the Red Army Faction in 1970-71, before 
they had killed anybody and confined their attacks to low- 
level bombings and arson, by the late 1970s 85% of the people 
polled were in favour of in favour of a more severe penalties 
33) "Loyalists target of sustained campaign", The , Independent, October 25th 1993. "Catholic front line 
waits in fear for retribution", The Independent, 
October 26th 1993. "It's going to be a tragedy for 
people in the Ardoyne"l The Guardian, October 25th 
1993. "Assassins are on the rampage", The Independent, 
October 27th 1993. "'The gunmen are savage, sinful, 
wicked, depraved"', The Independents November 1st 1993. 
"Major set to invite Hume to Ulster talks", The Times, 
November 1st 1993. "Anatomy of an atrocity"l The 
Guardian, November 29th 1993. "New wave of Ulster 
violence feared"i The Independent, June 20th 1994. 
"Reprisal fear after Catholic pub killings", The Times, 
June 20th 1994. "Ulster awaits backlash after IRA guns 
down loyalist", The Independent 
,, 
July 12th 1994. 
"Backlash feared as IRA kills leading loyalist", The 
Guardians July 12th 1994. "Loyalists pledge to avenge 
shootings", The Independent, August 2nd 1994. E. Mallie 
& D. McKittrick. The Fight for Peace 198-199,309-310. 
B. Rowan. Behind the Lines, 37,52-53,106-108,, 111-112. 
34) E. Moxon-Browne. "The Water and the Fish", P. Wilkinson 
(ed). British Perspectives on Terrorism, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 50. 
35) M. Holland. "The Growing Desperation of the British Army"s 
Magill, December 1979. 
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for terrorists. 36 The remoteness of their ideology from the 
day-to-day concerns of ordinary Germans meant that there was 
no reservoir of anti-state sympathy for them to tap into in 
the same way that the PIRA could amongst Northern Irish 
Catholics. In general, groups which establish a strong 
communal identity are in a much stronger position than those 
without one. 
The effect of societal divisions on targeting. 
Whilst some societies appear to be harmonious to the 
point of homogeneity, others are bitterly divided, and a vast 
swathe are somewhere in between. Communal divisions within a 
society - that is divisions between communities which see 
themselves as distinctly different - can affect terrorist 
target selection because they affect the size and composition 
of the categories of support outlined above. These divisions 
can provide supporters and sympathisers for a terrorist group 
within their own community, and also provide enemies in the 
shape of groups hostile to their community. In such a 
situation the terrorists may carry out attacks on the 'enemy' 
community in order to advertise their cause and mobilise 
support within their own community. 
Where there are severe communal tensions based upon 
ethnic, religious, or economic differences, there seems to be 
a likelihood of terrorism aimed at asserting the dominance of 
one community by another, or conversely at protecting a 
weaker community from such dominance. In terms of fatalities 
Northern Ireland is only a relatively minor example of this 
phenomenon. Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim groups in Sri Lanka 
have massacred large members of each others communities in 
order to gain local dominance, or in revenge for previous 
massacres. 37 For instance, in April 1992 The Independent 
reported that members of the LTTE had killed fifty Muslim 
villagers, whereupon Muslims attacked nearby Tamil villagest 
36) C. Hewitt. "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country 
Comparison", Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no. 29 
(Summer 1990), 152,153,158,163. S. Aust. The Baader- 
Meinhof Group, 154. 
37) "Tamils kill 350 Muslims in Sri Lankall, The Independent, 
August 13th 1990. "Civil strife makes Sri Lanka a 
tropical hell"i The Independent, April 8th 1991. 
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killing twenty Tamils. 38 In no single violent incident since 
1969 have twenty people been killed in Northern Ireland. (The 
two incidents relating to the Northern Irish conflict which 
involved twenty or more deaths occurred outside Northern 
Ireland, in Dublin in May 1974 and in Birmingham, England in 
November 1974.39) 
The state of Punjab in India in the 1980s and early 
1990s provides a good example of bitter communal rivalries 
resulting in terrorism. The Punjab was greatly affected by 
the capital-intensive 'Green Revolution' in Indian 
agriculture in the 1960s. Whilst bringing greater prosperity 
if averaged out over the population, it is arguable that it 
produced greater differentiation between richer farmers who 
could afford to invest in the latest agricultural technology, 
and the poorer farmers who could not and thus could not 
survive in the new agricultural economy. 40 Oberoi claims that 
the process of differentiation forced the higher-caste iat 
Sikhs, who often made up the farming class, to work amongst 
lower-caste harijans, thereby causing much resentment amongst 
the jats and exacerbating the religious differences between 
the Sikh and Hindu groups in the province. 41 Since the early 
1980s Sikh terrorists have deliberately killed unarmed Hindu 
civilians living in the Punjab - including some large-scale 
massacres - in order to force them out of the province with 
the aim of creating an homogeneous Sikh state - Khalistan. 
42 
By their words and actions some religious and separatist 
terrorist groups clearly wish to sharpen differences between 
members of their own religion and other communities. 43 
38) "74 villagers killed in Sri Lankan massacres", The 
Independent, April 30th 1992. 
39) M. Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 60,68. 
40) T. N. Madan. "The Double-edged Sword: Fundamentalism and 
the Sikh Religious Tradition", M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby 
(eds). Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1993)", 612. M. J. Akbar. India: The 
Siege Within, 170. 
41) H. Oberoi. "Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History into 
Theory", M. E. Marty & R. S. Appleby (eds). Fundamentalisms 
and the State, 264. 
42) "India train massacre caps year of violence", The 
Independent, December 29th 1991. "Sikh extremists 
massacre factory managers", Financial Times, March 12th 
1992. ""Sikh militants shoot 20 dead in street"t 
Financial Times, March 20th 1992. 
43) T. N. Madan. "The Double-edged Sword", 607. 
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However, the economic tensions between communities could also 
do much to explain the attacks. 
Some societies seem more prone to support the 
activities of terrorist groups or other law-breakers than 
others, particularly where respect for the systems of 
government and justice have been eroded. Hobsbawm and 
Angiolillo both explore the existence in peasant societies of 
what Hobsbawm terms social banditsl that is bandits who 
receive popular support because they are seen to stand for 
the alleviation of injustice and symbolise resistance to 
unpopular authority. 44 This idea has parallels with PIRA in 
Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque country, and various 
groups in the Kashmir province of India, where a substantial 
number of people have seen insurgent groups as reactions to 
existing injustices or to the behaviour of the security 
forces. 45 In such circumstances support for terrorism is 
likely to be higher than in a society where the law is 
respected. 
Such attitudes are not restricted to separatist 
conflicts. A poll conducted in Italy in the early 1960s 
demonstrated a high degree of public alienation from the 
governmental and economic systems at a time of relative 
economic prosperity in Italy. 46 Only 3% of Italians expressed 
pride in their governmental and political institutions - 
44) E. J. Hobsbawm. Bandits, second edition, (Harmondswortho 
England: Penguing 1985), 17-29. P. F. Angiolillo. A 
Criminal as Hero: Angelo Duca, (Lawrence: The Regents 
Press of Kansas, 1979), 1-16. 
45) F. Burton. The Politics of legitimacy 106-108. 
S. Belfrage. The Crack: A Belfast Yearl. (Andre Deutschl 
1987; London: Grafton, 1988), 88. R. P. Clark. The Basque 
Insurgents, 169-172,174-176l 180-182. "Valley of 
violence", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 24th 1990. 
"Indian ferocity alienates Kashmir"j The Independent, 
July 23rd 1990. "Kashmiris find cold comfort in 
Pakistan haven"l The Times, July 23rd 1990. "Security 
forces raze Kashmir town centre", The Independent, 
October 3rd 1990. "Indian villagers tell of mass rape 
by soldiers", The Independe_nt,, March 19th 1991. 
"Kashmiri villagers tell of gang rapes by Indian 
soldiers", The Times, April 4th 1991. "In the shadow of 
the gunmen"l The Sunday Timesl December 29th 1991. 
46) S. Verba & G. A. Almond. "National Revolutions and Political 
Commitment"t H-Eckstein (ed). Internal War, 230. 
A. Jamieson. The Heart Attackedq 32,519 57. V. S. Pisano. 
The Dynamics of. Subversion and Violence in Contemporary 
Italy, 23. 
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compared to 30% in Mexico, and 3% expressed pride in the 
Italian economic system - compared to 24% in less 
economically-developed Mexico. 
47 This disillusion extended 
across people with varying degrees of political 
participation. 48 One must be careful in drawing conclusions 
from such data, but it is noticeable that during the 
industrial unrest of the 1970s, Italian industrial workers 
were relatively ambivalent in their attitude towards Red 
Brigade attacks on politicians and industrial managers. 
49 
On the other hand the BR killing of ordinary police 
officers, such as the bodyguards of Justice Coco in June 1976 
and of Aldo Moro in March 1978, prompted widespread public 
opposition to the Red Brigades, forcing the brigadists to 
make defensive and defammatory comments about the police 
officers killed. 50 Similarly, the BR killing in January 1979 
of Guido Rossa -a worker at the Italsider car works and a 
PCI member, prompted large protests, with an estimated crowd 
of 250,000 at his funeral, and did much to destroy support 
for BR in the factories and on the left in general. 51 
Divisions within society can affect terrorist target 
selection. The decisive factors are the extent to which the 
terrorists allow themselves to be influenced, and the degree 
to which the communal group they belong to perceives the 
existence of an enemy group. Terrorists with a secure core of 
support within a specific community - however obtained - can 
probably afford to carry out attacks against the perceived 
communal enemy which would not be tolerated if they were 
against groups not seen as legitimate targets. On the other 
hand groups dependent upon fairly widespread. backing have to 
ensure that the bulk of their attacks can be justified to 
47) S. Verba & G. A. Almond. "National Revolutions and Political 
Commitment", 222. 
48) S. Verba & G. A. Almond. "National Revolutions and Political 
Commitment", 226. 
49) D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 101- 
104. A7. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 100,123-124. 
50) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 92,123,126,186. 
51) "Italian Terrorists Kill a Union Aide", Washington Post, 
January 25th 1979. "Italian labour protest over 
killing"i Financial Times, January 26th 1979. "Hero's 
funeral for party victim", Financial Times, January 
29th 1979. C-Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", 110. 
A. Jamieson. The Heart-Attacked, 1009 175-176. D. Moss. 
The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 227,285 
n42. 
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their supporters in ideological terms. If they do not, it can 
prove difficult to secure public cooperation by intimidation 
alone. 
Groups which do not have a wide base of support, 
generally those whose ideology is more abstract, are not so 
bound by the need to satisfy a section of public opinion. On 
the other hand, without such support they are very much 
dependent upon their own resources and cannot hope to expand 
-a position which is probably sustainable only by groups - 
such as large drugs traffickers, which already possess 
sufficient resources. However, the way in which terrorist 
actions are perceived can also depend upon the medium through 
which they are received. 
Terrorists and the media. 
Gerry Adams has described acts of violence by the 
Provisional IRA as 'armed propaganda' because they put the 
issue of the British presence in Ireland onto the political 
agenda. 52 The media undoubtedly has had an effect on the 
activities of some terrorist groups because it means that 
terrorists who wish to publicise their cause or other 
concerns through the media have to ensure that they carry out 
actions which are sufficiently newsworthy. 
Several terrorist actions have been specifically aimed 
at gaining publicity. In Argentina in September 1973, members 
of the Trotskyist People's Revolutionary Group (Ejercito 
Revolucionario del Pueblo - ERP) kidnapped the executive of a 
newspaper and forced the paper to carry an advert urging 
Argentines to support Peron in the forthcoming elections. 
53 
Other terrorist groups have put pressure on the print and 
electronic media to carry statements and communiques, usually 
by abducting people. 54 In June 1995 an American anarchist 
known as the 'Unabomber' because of his predilection for 
sending parcel bombs to scientists at universities and 
elsewhere, stated that he would stop his activities if his 
30,000 word statement on the "Future of Industrial Society It 
52) G. Adams.. The Politics of Irish Freedom, 64. 
53) A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf. Violence as-Communication, 25. 
54) A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 48- 
49. N. C. Livingstone. The War Against Terrorism, 
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1982), 66. 
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was printed in major American newspapers. In the event this 
was done by the New York Times and the Washington-Post. 55 
Other groups have been similarly enamoured of the power 
of the media, and have chosen either their targets or the 
location of their attacks in order to maximise media 
attention. During the Algerian War of 1954 to 1962 a leader 
of the separatist FLN emphasised this, stating: 
Is it better for our cause to kill ten of our enemy in 
the countryside of Telergmaj where no one will speak of 
, 
ýhat will be mentioned the next day it, or one in Algiers 
in the American press. 6 
Behr also recounts an FLN spokesman at the United Nations who 
justified bomb attacks upon European civilians in Algiers in 
1956-1957 by stating: 
You must realise that every time a bomb eWodes in 
Algiers we are taken more seriously here. 
More recently Schmid and de Graaf quote a PIRA spokesman as 
noting in the early 1970s that for publicity purposes one 
bomb in London's Oxford Street was worth ten bombs in 
Belfast. 58 Over twenty years later PIRA spokesmen were still 
using versions of that phrase. 59 Similarly, following the 
PIRA mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in February 1991 the 
republican press noted the amount of coverage which the 
attack generated in the British, Irish, and international 
press with some satisfaction. 60 
Some terrorists also believe that general coverage of 
their activities will generate publicity for their cause. 
Patricia Hearst - who was abducted in Berkeley in February 
1974 by a quasi-communist group which called itself the 
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) - claims that they were 
55) "Death in the post", The Guardian, supplementi May 15th 
1995. "Misfit's lonely downfall", The Guardian, April 
5th 1996. "Have they now caught the Unabomber", The 
Independent, April 5th 1996. 
56) G. Fairbairn. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The 
Countryside Version, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974) 
287, n7. 
57) E. Behr. The Algerian Problem, (Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin, 1961), 112. 
58) A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 43. 
59) M. Dillon. The Enemy Within, 211. 
60) "IRA 'SCUDS' steal Gulf headlines", AP/RN, February 14th 
1991. "Another mortar for ould Ireland"q AP/RNj 
February 14th 1991. "London chaos through the world's 
eyes"l AP/RN, February 14th 1991. 
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"absolutely publicity-crazy" and were "media-freaks" who 
constantly listened on the radio for mentions of 
themselves. 61 According to Baumann, himself a member of the 
June 2nd Movement in the early 1970s, the Red Army Faction 
believed that media reports about guerrillas fighting in 
Germany would help to inspire revolution against imperialism 
in other parts of the world. 
62 After terrorist actions, or 
during them in the case of prolonged abductions, terrorists 
often make use of the media to issue communiques which 
explain why they have carried out a specific attacks and also 
try to use the enhanced publicity to proselytise for their 
cause or to threaten further attacks if they do not get their 
way. During the Moro abduction between March and May 1978 the 
Red Brigades issued frequent communiques - usually statements 
left in locations which were communicated to the newspapers - 
setting out BR conditions for Moro's release, and claiming to 
demonstrate the corruption of the Italian Christian 
Democrats. 63 Thus the kidnapping served to advertise the BR's 
claims as well as being an attempt to free their comrades. 
One effect which media coverage may have is that of 
contagion whereby media reports of terrorist violence 
encourage other discontented groups to use violence and to 
adopt similar tactical methods. 64 The Red Brigades are said 
to have adopted the tactic of the politically-motivatedg 
high-profile kidnap from the Uruguayan Tupamaros. 65 Miller 
and'Schmid point out that there is little empirical research 
to prove a link between media coverage of terrorist actions 
and the occurrence-of similar actions elsewhere. 
66 However, 
based on a study of 168 terrorist attacks'agdinst immigrants 
and asylum-seekers in Scandanavia, Bjorgo notes that such 
attacks tend to occur in time-related clusters, and that this 
is probably because one attack sets off a spate of copycat 
61) P. C. Hearst & A-Moscow. Every Secret Thing, 78,151,43, 
68-69. 
62) M. Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing 1 100. 63) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 119-171, passim. 
64) A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 122- 
137. 
65) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 77. 
66) D. Miller. Don't Mention the War: Northern Ireland-, 
Propaganda and the Media, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 
247-250. A. P. Schmid. "Terrorism and the Media: The 
Ethics of Publicity", 558. 
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attacks elsewhere. 
67 One cannot say for certain that media 
coverage causes some people to adopt terrorist methods or 
copy the methods of other terrorist groups, but it seems 
unlikely that it has no effect. 
Having said this, one must not fall into the trap of 
over-emphasising the importance of media coverage to 
terrorism. To begin with, in some instances the news media 
may not be free to report terrorist incidents. Even in 
liberal democracies governments frequently try to restrict 
media reporting of the actions or communications of terrorist 
groups or their supposed allies. In 1971 the Irish Government 
invoked Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act to restrict 
interviews with spokesmen of both the Provisional IRA and the 
Official IRA, and after 1972 they were banned. From 1976 
interviews with members of Sinn Fein - the political wing of 
the republican movement - were also banned. 
68 The ban was 
lifted in January 1994.69 Between October 1988 and August 
1994 the British Government banned the transmission of the 
voices of members of Irish republican and loyalist terrorist 
groups, and members of groups held to be associated with them 
- such as Sinn Fein. 
70 In Greece it was made an offence to 
report the contents of terrorist statements, and in September 
1991 seven newspaper editors were imprisoned for publishing 
the contents of communiques by the communist terrorist group 
November 17th. 71 
Governments are not the only people to suppress the 
media and journalists have been attacked by terrorists who 
disapprove of their politics or of what they have written072 
Some of the attacks are not lethal. In his autobiographys 
67) T. Bjorgo. "Role of the Media in Racist Violence", 
T. Bjorgo & R. Witte (eds). Racist-Violence in Europe, 
98-100. 
68) L. Curtis. Ireland: The Propaganda War. The British Media 
and the 'Battle for Hearts and Minds's (London: Pluto 
Press, 1984), 190-193. 
69) "A gag that chokes freedom", The Independent, September 
12th 1994. 
70) Article 19. No Comment: Censorship, Secrecy and the Irish 
Troubles, (London: Article 19,1989), 23-25. 
71) "Jail for Greek editors who defied terror ban", The 
Independent, September 10th 1991. "Editors backed", The 
Timesj September 11th 1991. "Greece in the dock over 
gagging order on media"s The Independent, September 
16th 1991. 
72) A. P. Schmid & J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 44. 
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Michael Baumann notes how in February 1970 members of the 
'Blues' -a anarchist group in West Berlin - beat up a 
journalist who wrote an uncomplimentary article about them. 73 
However there are other cases where the intent has been 
lethal. In November 1977 Red Brigadists shot and mortally 
wounded Carlo Casalegno, a journalist and deputy-editor of La 
Stampa who had written articles criticising BR. 
74 Likewise, 
in May 1984 members of the UVF shot and seriously wounded Jim 
Campbell, a journalist investigating the activities of a 
Belfast UVF group subsequently known as the 'Shankill 
Butchers'. The intention had been to kill him. 75 In February 
1985 members of the Greek Revolutionary Organisation November 
17th (17N) shot dead Nikos Momferatos - the publisher of 
Greece's largest conservative newspaper - and his driver. 
Momferatos was President of the Association of Athens 
Newspaper Publishers and a close friend of the leader of the 
conservative opposition New Democracy Party. 17N claimed that 
Momferatos' newspaper, like most Greek newspapers, suppressed 
news of American domination of Greece, of CIA activities, and 
of the depredations of the Greek bourgeoisie. 76 Thus, as well 
as eliminating an opponent the attack was intended to 
frighten other publishers and members of the press into 
compliance. 
In some cases terrorist attacks on journalists have 
been more incessant. Since the military coup and suppression 
of elections in Algeria in January 1992, Islamist terrorists 
have attempted to silence media criticism by eliminating 
journalists as a class. In February 1995 twenty-nine 
journalists were reported to have been killed by terrorists 
since the outbreak of the conflict, and by early August 1995 
73) M. Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 54-55. 
74) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attackedl 100. 
75) M. Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, xi. _R. 
Bell, R. Johnstoney 
R. Wilson (eds). "Troubles Chronology: 17.5.84", 
Troubled Times, 199. 
_D. 
Miller. Don't Mention the War, 
274. 
76) A. Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 
17 November"q 105,118. Revolutionary Organisation 17th 
November. "Communique on the assassination in Athens on 
21 February 1985 of Nikos Momiferatos, publisher of 
Apogevmatini", Y-Alexander & D-Pluchinsky (eds). 
, 
Europe's Red Terrorists, 94-98. 
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the total had risen to forty-six. 77 Ironically newspapers 
have also been suppressed by the Algerian Government. 
According to Michael Colomes, the foreign editor of the 
French weekly Le Point, the conflict in Algeria had not 
attracted sufficient interest because government suppression 
and terrorist attacks made it difficult to provide television 
coverage. 78 
Not all terrorist groups necessarily wish to gain 
widespread media attention for their actions. The 
effectiveness of many conservative terrorist groups in Latin 
America tend to depend on individual threats and the spread 
of rumours locally for the purposes of intimidation. For 
example, in Barrancabermeja, Colombia, Amnesty International 
reports that a group calling itself 'Toxicol-90' which 
carried out 'social-cleansing' operations against alleged 
vagrants and petty thieves, distributed leaflets within the 
city warning of its intentions. 79 Likewise, news of the 
killings of trade unionists and workers in Colombia seem to 
spread by word of mouth rather than mass media coverage. 80 
Amnesty International also reports that Guatemalan 
trade unionists have received messages from groups - thought 
to be in the pay of employers or even set up by them - 
threatening them and their families with injury, abduction, 
rape, or death if they do not leave their union. In some 
cases these threats have been carried out. 
81 one note, 
delivered to the pregnant wife of a union activist in August 
1995 after a number of previous threats, read: 
Remember that you have had a long time and that we have 
left you alone. If you love your baby, convince your 
77) "Islamists kill 29th journalist", The Independentq 
February 18th 1995. "Algeria murder"l The Daily 
Telegraph , February 18th 1995. "Editors fired at from 
both sides in a vicious war", The Independent, March 
13th 1995. "Algerian woman journalist killed", The 
Guardian, August 9th 1995. 
78) "France fears upsurge of Islamic terror", The Independent 
on Sunday, April 10th 1994. 
79) Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 
19. 
80) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 254-255. 
Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 
75-76. 
81) Amnesty International. Guatemala: Maquila workers among 
trade unionists tar etpdl (London: Amnesty 
International, 1995). 
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husband since neither of you has taken any notice. But if 
he loves his baby, he will have to decide now, either 
leave the union or his wife and child will pay the 
consequences. 9es Ask ygur husband what he prefers, to have you alive or dead. 2 
The couple were subsequently told to leave the country within 
seventy-two hours. 83 In such circumstances it is likely that 
far from wanting media publicity the terrorists would seek to 
prevent being publically connected with these activities, 
hoping that the intimidatory nature of such threats would 
spread to the wider psychological target - the unionised 
workers - by word of mouth. 
On some occasions terrorist groups definitely do not 
want any form of publicity, as when the media reports 
unsavoury activities such as extortion for funds or 
revelations about other terrorist actions. One of the 
greatest blows to the image of the Ulster Defence Association 
occurred in August 1987 when a television programme showed 
secretly-taken film of a senior UDA member trying to extort 
money from a television journalist posing as a businessman. 
As a result four UDA members were imprisoned. 84 Newspaper 
revelations in 1981 that fascist groups in Britain were 
attempting to import guns and planned to bomb the Notting 
Hill Carnival in London, caused similar problems for the 
groups concerned. 85 
The publicity from operations which go wrong can cause 
problems. When eleven civilians were killed in Enniskillen in 
November 1987 by a bomb intended for the military guard at a 
Remembrance Day parade, the subsequent publicity was 
disastrous for the image of the PIRA amongst potential 
sympathisers and the uncommitted. As a PIRA spokesman noted 
that whilst their core support was unaffected, the outer 
reaches were "devastated". 86 
82) Amnesty International. Guatemala: Maquila workers amon 
trade unionists targeted, 8. 
83) Amnesty International. Guatemala: Maquila workers among 
trade unionists targeted, 9. 
84) "Journalist helped end building site racket", The 
Independent, December 10th 1988. S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 
245,248. J. Cusack & M. Taylor- "The Resurgence of a 
Terrorist Organization", 6-8. 
85) R. Hill & A. Bell. The Other Face of Terror, 99-106,216- 
219. 
86) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 
11th 1987. 
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Supposedly bad publicity may not adversely affect the 
core support for terrorist groups. After the death of two 
children in the Warrington bombing of March 1993, reports 
indicated that potential sympathisers in the Republic of 
Ireland and elsewhere were more likely to withhold support, 
or even actively oppose the republican movementl thus 
affecting its political and possibly logistical base. 
87 
Mitchell McLaughlin, a Sinn Fein spokesman, noted that from 
the republican perspective, Warrington 'didn't help'. 
88 
However, O'Brien and Gorman argued that despite the 
opprobrium, the bombing was a PIRA success in that it put the 
Northern Irish conflict back into the headlines in Britain. 
89 
Uncommitted groups may also be affected. Miller reports 
that in the aftermath of the Enniskillen bombing, polls 
showed a steep reduction in support in Great Britain for 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland, from 61% in January 1987 to 
40% in late November 1987 -a few days after the bombing. 
Miller also reports a sharp reduction in support for 
withdrawal in the opinion polls after the Warrington bomb. 
90 
In practice political or strategic gains from mass casualty 
attacks on civilians are generally only transitory unless 
sustained attacks take place as with the FLN bombing campaign 
in Algiers. 
Overall the media can be important to a terrorist group 
because the ability to gain media attention may amplify the 
influence of the group and its cause. This, in turn, may 
influence the way in which terrorist groups select their 
targets. Howeverl there is little evidence to suggest that 
the prospect of getting publicity leads terrorists to attack 
targets which they would not normally consider legitimate. 
However, they may choose to attack those legitimate targets 
which have a higher news profile than others. 
Media attention by itself is rarely vital to the 
continued existence of terrorist groups, rather the more 
active groups are newsworthy because of their continued 
87) "The angry south, the weary north"i The Independent on 
Sunday, March 28th 1993. 
88) D. McKittrick. Ennig-ame, 269. 
89) "Caging the godfathers of terror"q The Independent, March 
26th 1993. E. Gorman. "Back in the frame", Fortnight, 
June 1993. 
90) D. Miller. Don't Mention the War, 279-280. 
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existence. Schmid and de Graaf believe that terrorist attacks 
are often intended to fulfil tactical objectives, and the 
resultant media attention, whilst possibly beneficial, is 
frequently incidental to the main purpose of an attack. 91 
John Conway, the editor of news and current affairs for the 
BBC in Belfast, estimated in August 1988 that 78% of all 
violent happenings there were not covered by the media. 
92 
Whilst the mass media can be important to terrorist groupsq 
it is more important to some than to others, and for some 
groups, particularly vigilante-style groups operating in a 
limited locality, it hardly matters at all. 
External political events. 
Political terrorism is usually a reaction to a 
perceived fault in the existing order, whether it be a need 
to preserve the existing order in its entiretyl overthrow itt 
or affect certain parts of it. In that sense, terrorism is a 
reaction to the political environment. Hence the reaction of 
terrorists to specific political events varies from group to 
group. 
The way in which a terrorist group can react directly 
to a specific political event can be seen in the campaign by 
Hamas to destabilise the 1993 autonomy accord between Israel 
and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Since the 
agreement - under which the PLO governs Jericho and the Gaza 
Strip with the possibility of this area being extended to the 
Israeli-occupied West Bank of the River Jordan - Hamas has 
sought to mobilise Palestinians and Arab governments against 
the agreement by provoking the Israelis into 
' 
breaking the 
agreement and into further military repression. In order to 
do this bomb attacks have been carried out against civilian 
targets in Israel itself. 93 Between April 1994 and March 1996 
thirteen suicide bomb attacksl mainly on buses or near bus 
queues, killed over 130 people. 94 
91) A. P. Schmid & 
92) Quoted in "A 
Telegraph, 
93) "Bus suicide 
Telegraph, 
94) "Portrait of 
10th 1996. 
J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 184. 
re we feeding IRA bloodlust"i The Sunday 
August 28th 1988. 
bomber kills five Israelis", The Daily 
July 25th 1995. 
a suicide bomber", The-Independento March 
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The pattern for such attacks was 
1994, when a member of the Izzedine al 
Hamas, killed twenty-two people with a 
in Tel Aviv. 95 The Israeli Army immedi 
restrictions on Palestinians who lived 
administered territories but worked in 
seen on October 19th 
Qassem Brigade of 
suicide bomb on a bus 
Ettely placed travel 
in the PLO- 
Israel, and the Prime 
Minister stated that he was considering tougher laws against 
suspected terrorists. 96 A few days later the Israeli Army was 
reported to be preparing to blow-up the home of the Tel Aviv 
bomber having put the town where he had lived under a 
curfew. 97 Additionally, Hamas attacks on civilian and 
military targets not only provoked Israeli repression, but 
drove the Israeli Government to put pressure on the PLO 
administration to attack Hamas, making the PLO seem like 
Israel's puppet. 98 The same pattern of bombing and 
retaliation occurred after a series of Hamas suicide bombings 
in the first few months of 1996 killed over sixty Israelis. 99 
The Israeli retaliatory methods were unlikely to win 
Palestinian hearts and minds for the accords. 
Other terrorist groups have been sensitive to political 
events to an even greater degree. Corsun notes that the 
Revolutionary Organisation November 17th in Greece appears to 
be particularly sensitive to political events in Greece and 
elsewhere. 
100 Doyle notes that 17N's attacks have generally 
95) "Suicide bus bomber kills 22", The Daily Telegraph, 
October 20th 1994. 
96) "Suicide bus bomber kills 22"1 The Daily Telegraph, 
October 20th 1994. 
97) "Israel steps up war on Hamas", The Daily Telegraph, 
October 21st 1994. "Arab village stunned by martyrdom"s 
The Daily Telegraph, October 22nd 1994. 
98) "The menacing face of Hamas", The Daily Telegraph, 
October 21st 1994. "Arabs search for honour in the 
peace", The Independent on Sunday, October 23rd 1994. 
99) "Suicide bombs rock Middle East peace", The Guardian, 
January 23rd 1995. "Bus stop bombers kill 19 in 
Israel"s The-Independent, January 23rd 1995. "Bus 
suicide bomber kills five Israelis", The Daily 
Telegraph, July 25th 1995. "Onward march of terrorist 
violence", The Independent, March 4th 1996. "Calls grow 
for 'total war' as press loses patience", The Guardians 
March 6th 1996. "Israel puts ring of steel around the 
Palestinians"t the Independents March 7th 1996. 
"Israeli blockade keeps mother and baby apart", The 
Guardians March 19th 1996. "Bombers kin await Israel's 
revenge", The Independent, March 19th 1996. 
100) A. Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 
17 November", 98,105-108,115-116,117. 
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related to "... whatever is upsetting Greek public opinion at 
the time". 101 Thus in May 1988 17N bombed a number of Turkish 
diplomatic vehicles on the eve of a visit from the Turkish 
Foreign Minister, whilst a series of bombings in a wealthy 
suburb of Athens was intended to highlight the alleged 
inconsistency between the conservative Greek Government's 
austerity measures and the toleration of widespread tax 
evasion by the wealthy. 102 In early 1991 17N carried out low- 
level attacks against targets belonging to companies, 
diplomatic facilities, or other people or property whose 
countries had been involved on the Allied side in the Second 
Gulf War against Iraq in January 1991, and they killed a US 
Army sergeant in Athens in March 1991, linking the attack to 
the US presence in Greece and the Turkish presence in 
Cyprus. 103 In fact in early 1991 a number of European 
terrorist groups attacked targets or targets belonging to the 
USA and other members of the Allied Forces. 104 
The Provisional IRA has adopted an ambivalent tone over 
whether they plan operations to coincide with particular 
dates or events. In late 1978 a PIRA spokesman denied that an 
upsurge in activity represented a "winter offensive" or a 
"pre-election blitz" as this would run counter to the long 
war strategy of attrition which the Provisionals claimed to 
be waging against the British. 105 Similarly, in 1983 a 
spokesman stated: 
Our tactics are determined by intelligence and logistics 
- the availability of weapons and personnel. The military 
101) "Greek bombers target the tourists", The Independent, 
June 13th 1994. 
102) A. Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 
17 November", 106,11. 
103) Revolutionary Organisation 17 November. "Communique on 
the assassination of Ronald Stewart, a US Air Force 
Sergeant, in Athens on 12 March 1991", Y. Alexander & 
D. Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 111. 
104) U. S. Department of State. Press Statement, March 4th 
1991. First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups. 
"Communique on the Bombing of Oil Pipelines in Spain on 
22 February 1991"l Revolutionary Left. "Undated Dev Sol 
communique on 'Operation Desert Storm"', and editors 
comments, Y. Alexander & D. Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's 
Red Terrorists, 23,58,93,117,130-131,233,249-250. 
105) M. L. R. Smith. The Role of the Military Instrument in 
Irish Republican Strategic Thinking: An Evolutionary 
Analysis, Ph. DY King's Colleget University of London, 
1991,345. 
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struggle will not slow 
political activities. 10gown 
to relate to Sinn Fein's 
Joe Austin, a senior Sinn Fein member, made a similar remark 
to the effect that PIRA attacks on dates symbolic to the 
republican movement would be self-indulgent posturing and 
would help the security forces by making attacks 
predictable. 107 
On the other hand, in March 1973 the PIRA specifically 
detonated a bomb in London on the day of a referendum in 
Northern Ireland which was likely to show that the majority 
of people there did not want a united Ireland. 108 In an 
article in March 1992, a PIRA representative was ambivalent 
about organising operations around political events, stating 
that they did not plan operations around political events 
such as the forthcoming British General Election. 
Operations within England and elsewhere are part of our 
long-term strategy and it would be playing into our 
enemy's hands to build any degree of predictability into 
our activities. 109 
However he conceded: 
as* it is fair to comment that operations around major 
political events do carry the added bonus ofJorcing the 
Irish war onto the British political agenda. 
0 
Thus, whilst the spokesman denied that the Provisionals 
necessarily planned operations to coincide with major 
political events, he noted the advantages of doing so. In 
fact the PIRA set off two massive bombs the day after the 
1992 British General Election. One badly damaged a major road 
flyover in west London, whilst the other in the City of 
London killed three people, injured seventy-five others, and 
caused about Z350 million worth of damage. "' 
Similarly, in February 1996 the Provisionals ended 
their ceasefire by setting off a bomb in the Docklands area 
106) "The Armalite and the Ballot Box", Magill, July 1983. 
107) M. L. R. Smith. The Role of the Military Instrument in 
, 
Irish Republican Strategic Thinkingi 311-314. 
108) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRAj 251. J. Bowyer 
Bell. The Secret Army, 398. 
109) "We are doing all in our power to shorten this war' 
IRA", AP/RN9 March 12th 1992. 
110) "We are doing all in our power to shorten this war' 
IRA", AP/RNq March 12th 1992. 
111) "London counts the cost of IRA bombs", The Independents 
April 13th 1992. "Insured loss may hit 9150m"$ Lloyd 
List, February 12th 1996. 
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of London, killing two people, injuring about one hundred, 
and causing damage estimated at 975 million to E150 million. 
They claimed that had done this because the British 
Government was stalling and acting in "bad faith" over 
whether to allow Sinn Fein to participate in all-party talks 
on the future of Northern Ireland. 
112 The PIRA statement 
clearly linked the attack to political developments. 
Even if a political event does not have a direct 
influence on the terrorists cause, occasions such as the OPEC 
Conference in Vienna in 1975 and the Conservative Party 
Conference in Brighton in 1984 provide terrorists with 
opportunities for kidnap and assassination. 113 These attacks 
occurred because a lot of high-profile targets were known to 
be in a relatively small area on a specific date. Such 
opportunities may be rare, and it is hardly surprising if 
terrorists take them when they can. 
Whilst acknowledging that terrorism is frequently a 
reaction to the perceived political climate in a country, one 
must be careful not to overstate the extent to which 
individual terrorist actions are linked to specific political 
events. Many actions, for example the PIRA killing of a 
police officer in Northern Ireland or the killing of an 
immigrant by a fascist group in Germany, are not related to a 
particular political event, but are part of a continuing 
campaign of violence with its own internal dynamic. However, 
on other occasions attacks by terrorist groups seem to be 
prompted by events - either because the terrorists are 
reacting to events, or because the events provide the 
112) 'ItThe ceasefire is over': IRA bombers blast London"s The 
Independent, February 10th 1996. "Bomb shatters IRA 
ceasefire", The Times, February 10th 1996. "IRA 
statement", The Guardian, February 10th 1996. 
"Statements from republican sources and the prime 
minister", Financial Timess February 10th-11th 1996. 
"Damage adds up to 985m", The Independent on Sunday, 
February 11th 1996. "Insured loss may hit E150m", 
Lloyd's List, February 12th 1996. "Premiums threat as 
cost estimate tops 9150m", Financial Times, February 
12th 1996. 
- 
"IRA cessation ends after 527 days", "IRA 
blames Major for end of cessation"s AP/RNI February 
15th 1996. 
113) C. Dobson & R. Payne. The Carlos Complex, 126-127. 
D. Yallop. To the Ends of the Earth, 375-376,378-379. 
IfSecurity alert sent to police before bombing in 
Brighton", The Times, October 15th 1984. P. Bishop & 
E. Mallie. The Provisional-IRA, 423-426. 
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terrorists with targets or the chance to advertise their 
cause by carrying out an attack at a time of heightened media 
attention. 
Summary. 
To a greater or lesser degree, terrorists have to take 
account of intangible factors such as public opinion and the 
social and political atmosphere when selecting their targets. 
The fact that terrorist groups normally depend on supporters 
and sympathisers outside the group, as well as group members, 
means that their freedom of action is constrained. Even if 
the terrorists feel that they might be justified in attacking 
certain targetsl to do so might risk alienating support with 
the possible consequence of resources being denied, 
facilities being refused, and - most deadly for a terrorist 
group - of people informing to the group's enemies. The 
desire to persuade potential sympathisers and the uncommitted 
to support the terrorists cause can also lead to restraints 
being placed upon target selection. Conversely the terrorists 
can also take steps to control the civil population. Threats$ 
the use of vigilantism, or judiciously selected 
assassinations and maimings, can intimidate selected people 
or whole communities into cooperation with - or at least 
tacit acceptance of - the terrorists. Likewisel the 
terrorists may attack unpopular people or institutions in 
order to generate popular support. 
When selecting their targets terrorists may try to 
maximise the amount and nature of the publicity they receive 
by choosing targets which have a high publicity value. This 
can be a double-edged sword. Although terrorist acts may 
increase the awareness of a groups existence, this does not 
necessarily have a favourable influence on the way in which 
the group is perceived. This may not be too important if they 
belief that all publicity is good publicity, but as the PIRA 
bomb at Enniskillen or the revelations about UDA racketeering 
showed, this is far from being the case. Groups wishing to 
obtain publicity which is favourable to their cause - if not 
actually supportive - must be careful to select targets which 
are widely seen as legitimate. The degree to which they do 
this may depend on their own perception of what is 
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acceptable, and the extent to which they need support outside 
their own core of members and supporters. 
The influence of social and economic structures can 
also greatly influence target selection. These structures can 
cause communal divisions or cleavages based on social class 
causing certain groups of people to be automatically deemed 
as enemies. In the Punjab, communal and economic divisions 
greatly polarised Sikhs and Hindus and provided Sikh 
separatist terrorists with a motive to carry out mass 
casualty attacks on Hindu civilians. Similar communal or 
sectarian attacks have been seen in Northern Ireland and Sri 
Lanka and are ofter subsumed beneath the surface of campaigns 
of terrorism which support or oppose separatism. 
Finally, political events can affect target selection. 
For terrorist groups wishing to influence political 
developments in their part of the world, the occurrence or 
likely occurrence of a major political event can be important 
in influencing target selection. Thus, in Italy in the late 
1970s the Red Brigade's desire to frustrate a stabilising 
'Grand Compromise' between the Christian Democrat and 
Communist parties appears to have been pivotal in the Red 
Brigade decision to kidnap a major Christian Democrat 
politician - resulting in the Moro abduction of March 1978. A 
number of political factions wanted the compromise to faill 
as fail it did after Moro's death. 114 In other cases, such as 
PIRA's bomb in the City of London in April 1992 after the 
General Election, a political event provides a useful peg - 
in terms of media attention already in the area - upon which 
to hang an operation. Lastly, political events such as 
conferences can provide targets in themselves because of the 
wealth of suitable targets which they attract. 
Factors external to the terrorist group can provide 
terrorists with motives, means, and opportunities for their 
actions. Motives are supplied by the emotions generated in 
divided societiesi by the possibilities for boosting their 
cause provided by the mass media and by linking their attacks 
to current events, and by the desire to generate support. The 
means to carry out their campaign - in terms of both material 
114) For a summary of various conspiracy theories see 
P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 214-324. 
The influence of external factors 306 
aid and facilities such as shelter - are often provided by 
people external to the group. Finally, opportunities are 
provided by events - such as conferences - which cause a 
number of targets to become vulnerable to attack. These - 
with the possible exception of communal division - are all 
fairly rational considerations. However, the types of targets 
selected by terrorists depend not only upon the rational 
calculation of the factors involved, but also upon internal 
group dynamics. 
307 
The Human Factor 
Introduction. 
Whilst previous chapters have largely concentrated upon 
those factors which are dependent upon terrorists making 
dispassionate operational decisions, one has to bear in mind 
that one is dealing with people and all their imperfections 
and unpredictability. Moreover, in the case of terrorist 
groups these are often people operating under a great deal of 
psychological and possibly physical pressure. Arthur 
Schlesinger - an historian who became a member of John F. 
Kennedy's White House Staff - has noted: 
Nothing in my own recent experience has been more 
chastening than the attempt to penetrate into the process 
of decision. I shudder a little when I think how 
confidently I have analyzed decisions in the ages of 
Jackson and Roosevelt, traced influences, assigned 
motives, evaluated roles, allocated responsibilities and 
in short, transformed a dishevelled and murky evolution 
into a tidy and ordered transaction. ' 
The pressures under which terrorist groups operate mean that 
their decisions are usually made under circumstances much 
less ideal than those found in government. 
Their decisions go through some form of decision-making 
structure. Even a small informal group such as the Symbionese 
Liberation Army develops a pecking order, and decisions are 
filtered through the resulting processes. 2 In larger groups 
these processes can be fairly intricate, involving decision- 
making at a number of levels. The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the extent to which this, and the vagaries of 
human behaviour, have implications for terrorist target 
selection. 
The structure of terrorist groups. 
As already noted, terrorist groups tend to have a 
leader or core of leaders, with followers who might be as 
adept operationally as the leaders, but who are not as 
interested or competent in the ideology and internal politics 
of the group. 
3 Similarly, some people tend to be better at 
1) A. Schlesinger. "The Historians and History", Foreign 
Affairs, 41, (April 1963), 4939 quoted in B. Brodie. War 
and Politicss (London: Cassell, 1973)9 279. 
2) P. C. Hearst & A-MOscow. Every Secret Thing, 131-132,109. 
3) D. Beresford. Ten Men Dead, 152. 
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operational planning than at the execution of operations, 
although in some groups participation and demonstrated 
competence in the operational side is often necessary to gain 
the credibility to assume a leadership role. 
Group structures vary. Some terrorist groups are a sub- 
section of a wider organisation, as with the Hizbollah and 
the Tamil Tigers. In other cases, whilst the wider movement 
is notionally in charge, in practice the terrorist section 
has a great deal of autonomyj an example of this being the 
Combat Organisation of the Social Revolutionary Party in 
early twentieth century Russia. 4 
Where the terrorist group is an autonomous body, its 
structure may be bureaucratic and hierarchical like the Red 
Brigades or-the Provisional IRA - though in practice 
operational decisions often take place near the bottom of the 
structure rather than descend from the top. 5 An exception was 
the Greek-Cypriot group EOKA - which fought a highly 
effective terrorist campaign against the British between 1955 
and 1959. This was organised along highly centralised lines, 
with its commander, George Grivas, exercising strict - though 
not total - control over all aspects of operations. Grivas 
states that had he been captured, EOKA could not have 
survived because of the degree of centralisation. This mode 
of organisation might have been as much a result of Grivas' 
rather authoritarian nature as of any strategic 
considerations. 6 
Other groups are more amorphous in structure. In small 
informal groups like the early Baader-Meinhof group or the 
Symbionese Liberation Army, decisions appear 
' 
to be decided by 
force of personality rather than by any formal hierarchical 
4) A. Geifman. "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian 
Terrorism: The Socialist Revolutionary Combat 
Organization", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 
2, (Summer 1992), 299 34-35,38-39. N. Schliefman. 
Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary 
Movement: The SR Partv, 1902-14, (London: Macmillan, 
1988), 82-118. 
5) A-Jamieson. "Entryl Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red 
Brigades", 5. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 84-85. 
G. C. Caselli & D. della Porta. "The history of the Red 
Brigades", 74. D-Mossq The Politics of Left-Wing 
Violence in Italy, 57. J-Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and 
Targetsi 27,48,116. 
6) G. Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare, 25,69. 
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structure. At the extremep the structure of the group may be 
diffuse as with the Animal Liberation Front in Britain or the 
Revolutionary Cells (Revolutionaeren Zellen - RZ) in Germany, 
which consist of independent groups who have little if any 
contact with each other, and who correspond through a very 
small number of contacts, or communicate policy lines through 
publications. 7 For example in the case of the ALF such 
communications may take place through articles and 
communiques in journals such as the ALF Bulletin. 8 As Henshaw 
points out: 
ete everyone knew who the targets wereq so there seemed little point 6n having all operations directed from 
headquarters, 
However, if a group carries out an action and then claims it 
in the name of the ALF, the communique is published in an ALF 
supporters bulletin and is acknowledged by the ALF as their 
work. 10 In such a case the divide between group members and 
non-members is permeable. Part of the reasoning behind such a 
dispersed structure is that by minimising the contacts 
between individual groups, and between groups and the 
national offices, there is less chance of the ALF being 
infiltrated by the police. 11 On the other hand coordinated 
action is also made difficult. 
Zawodny, who served in the Polish Resistance, points 
out that there is nearly always an intrinsic tension between 
the need for centralised control in order to coordinate 
actions, and for decentralisation in order to maintain 
security from enemy penetration. 12 The risk of sending 
7) "The making of a martyr"l The Daily Telegraph, February 
3rd 1995. B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the 
Federal Republic of Germanyl, 43. H. J. Horchem. Terrorism 
in West Germanýyp 6. 
8) "Far-Right entering anti-hunt groups", The Daily 
Telegraph, April 7th 1993. 
9) D. Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 51. 
10) "The making of a martyr", The Daily Telegraph, February 
3rd 1995. 
11) D. Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 50. 
12) J. K. Zawodny. "Guerrilla Warfare and Subversion as a Means 
of Political Change". Paper presented at the 1961 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St Louis, 
Missouri, September 6th-9th 1961,7. J. K. Zawodny. 
"Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of 
Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of 
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messages from the leadership to the active terrorists is that 
the messages may be intercepted by informers or enemy 
surveillance. The greater the number of messages, the greater 
the risk. 
This is not such a great problem with small groups - 
such as the original Baader-Meinhof group - because they only 
consist of one relatively small group. For larger clandestine 
groups the overall effect is that operational decisions are 
made by small groups either on the ground or at the higher 
levels of the group structure. If the organisation covers 
more than a small area in terms of geography or population 
then sometimes, but not always, the small local group 
operates within the guidelines laid down by the leadership of 
the organisation. 13 The impact of this in terms of terrorist 
targeting can be judged by observing the behaviour of 
terrorist groups, and by seeking to explain their behaviour 
through existing theories of group behaviour. 
The impact of clandestinity on group behaviour. 
The pressures of being in a small group involved in a 
low-intensity conflict are described in a study of soldiers 
suffering from mental disorders, who were evacuated from 
Algeria to France during the Algerian War. 
The fighters live a long time in little contained 
collectivity in the same group, with the same chiefs, and 
often in physically precarious conditions. Tensions of 
group and conflicts are facilitated and exacerbated, and 
the drawbacks and insufficiencies of anyone in the group 
have important repercussions. In the other hand, 
friendship is strong and durablej the confidence in the 
chief is total and the selflessness and sacrifice are 
very spontaneous. However, the wound or the death of a 
buddy or of the chief can break th morale and 
combativeness of the whole group. 11 
The degree to which the members of a terrorist group are 
turned in on themselves in this fashion will vary. Such 
introspection is not so likely in groups which can operate 
overtly in certain safe havens, such as Hizbollah, some of 
Violence", Terrorism: An International Journal, 1, nos. 
3/4,278. 
13) M. Crenshaw. "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis 
of Political Terrorism", 467. 
14) L-Crocq, M-Crocqj C-Barrois, G. Belensky, & F. D. Jones. 
"Low-intensity combat Psychiatric casualties", 
P. Pichot, P. Berner, & K. Thau (eds). Psychiatry: The 
state of the art, 548. 
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the Palestinian groups in various sponsoring countries, the 
LTTE in the Jaffna Peninsula of Sri Lanka, or conservative 
vigilante groups to whose activities the authorities turn a 
blind eye. 
At the other extreme, such pressures are intense for 
the hard-core leaders of the Red Army Faction in West Germany 
and members of the Red Brigades in Italy. These terrorists 
had to live clandestine. isolated lives in states where the 
degree and extent of surveillance was high, and the result 
appears to have been similar to that described for the 
soldiers in Algeria. According the Italian Red Brigadist 
Adriana Faranda: 
[Clandestinity] means choosing to occupy yourself from 
morning till night with problems of politics, of 
organization, with fighting, and no longer with normal 
life ... . And when you remove yourself from society - 
even from the most ordinary things - when you no longer 
share even the most basic experiences or emotions with 
other people you become abstracted, removed. In the long 
run you actually be 
you are different. 
gin to feel different - why? - because 
Patricia Hearst describes a similar experience when the SLA 
members were hiding in a house in Los Angeles. 
We were cut off from the outside world and lived in an 
isolated realm of our own, We had only our battery- 
operated radio for news. ' 
She later notes that: 
We had turned in upon ourselves in our own private 
worlds, and beyond ourselves we only had each other. 
... The atmosphere in that, lirty little safehouse was 
overwhelmingly oppressive. 
In a small cell-like organisation of this sort, the 
group becomes the only source of information regarding the 
outside world and the only source of confirmation of the 
rightness of the terrorists actions, In the face of external 
pursuit the group becomes the sole source of security. The 
group, or more likely the dominant members of the group, 
interpret events and ideology for the individual, determine a 
collective moral code, and determine what is and what is not 
operationally legitimate. 
15) A. Jamieson. "Identity and Morality in the Italian Red 
Brigades", 514. 
16) P. C. Hearst & A-MOscow. Every Secret Thing, 197. 
17) P. C. Hearst & A-MOscow. Every Secret Thing, 201. 
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Former members of the Red Army Faction have testified 
the extent to which, even before they went underground, they 
tended to mix only with like minded people. 18 In such 
circumstances it becomes easy for judgements by the group or 
by individuals in the group to be affected by self- 
reinforcing group values rather than more generally held 
values. In his examination of the political socialisation of 
West German left-wing terrorists, Wasmund notes that 
individual terrorists acted as though they were absolved of 
responsibility for their terrorist actions by the group's 
ideology. 19 ETA members and their families also appear to 
lead restricted lives, although they do maintain links with 
the world outside the organisation. 20 As will be seen, much 
the same applies to members of the Provisional IRA. 
Thus, operational decision-making in clandestine 
terrorist organisations tends to take place in small groups 
which operate under a high degree of external pressure. 
21 
Given this state of affairs, it is worthwhile examining 
theories on decision-making in small groups in order to see 
if any might be appropriate in helping to explain the actions 
of terrorist groups. 
Theories of group behaviour and terrorist groups. 
There are various theories concerning the ways in which 
individuals interact within groups. Some of these appear to 
be applicable to the circumstances in which terrorist groups 
operate. A factor which is applicable to terrorist groups is 
the extent to which people are willing to conform either to 
authority, or to peer pressure. A number of experiments from 
the mid 1930s onwards have shown a fairly strong tendency for 
subjects to accept the judgement of their peers if they find 
18) K. Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist 
groups in West Germany", Journal of Political and 
Military Sociology, 11, (Fall 1983)9 228, 233. 
19) K. Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist 
groups in West Germany", 236. K. Wasmund. "The Political 
Socialization of West German Terrorists", P. H. Merkl 
(ed). Political Violence and Terror, 219. 
20) R. P. Clark. The Basques, 121-124. R. P. Clark. "Patterns in 
the Lives of ETA members", 283-284,293-294,303-306. 
21) Contrasting images of life underground are given by 
G. Capotorto, "How Terrorists look at Kidnappings". 
J. Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamicsit, 
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themselves in a minority. 22 The surprising extent to which 
people obey those in authority - even to the extent of 
causing pain to others - was demonstrated by the psychologist 
Stanley Milgram in experiments in the early 1960s. 
23 Finally, 
Janis' study of decision-making in foreign policy, and the 
phenomenon of 'groupthink' appears to be highly applicable to 
the activities of terrorist groups. 
24 Janis defines 
groupthink as: 
** .a mode of thinking that people engage in when they 
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members' striving for unanimity override their motivation 
to realigtically appraise alternative courses of 
action. 
As a result the group overestimates its own capabilities, 
assumes a moral superiority relative to the enemyp closes its 
mind to alternatives to the agreed consensus, exerts pressure 
to conform upon group members, and assumes that silence on 
the part of group members implies consent to any decision 
made. 26 
This accent on conformity does seem to apply to 
terrorists. The Red Brigadist Adriana Faranda has noted that 
when one is so absorbed in a long-term committment one 
accepts decisions, even if one is in a dissenting minority: 
"You support the others. It's a kind of pact of obedience". 
27 
Scharlau has examined the applicability of groupthink to 
left-wing terrorist groups in the former West Germany - in 
particular to the desire of the RAF leadership to escalate 
the level of violence following the suicide of the leaders of 
the RAF in Stammheim Prison in 1977. He believes that 
groupthink might partially explain how the leadership was 
able to conceive of committing acts - bomb attacks on the 
22) H. Brown.. People, Groups. 
-and 
S ociety, 2-7,9,11-15. 
23) K. Heskin. Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis, 87- 
88. H. Brown. People. Groups, and Society, 16-19. 
24) I. Janis. 
' 
Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy 
Decisions and Fiascoes, revised and enlarged, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1982). 
25) I. Janis., Groupthink, 9. 
26) I. Janis. 
' 
Groupthink, 174-175. J. E. Dougherty & 
R. L. Pfaltzgraf. Contending Theories of International 
Relations, third edition, (New York: Harper & Row, 
1990), 499. 
27) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 281. 
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police - which it turned out, the membership was not willing 
to endorse, and which had to be abandoned. 28 
One can also see how the Army Council of the 
Provisional IRA, as described by Bowyer Bell, could be seen 
as the types of group to which groupthink could apply. 29 
Mostly the IRA has been dominated at the top by very few 
commanders, one to three, who are associated on the Army 
Council or Executive with colleagues they have known for 
years, often a lifetime. Real power, based on consensus, 
tacit agreement, like minds, remains at the center within 
the Army Council, the nexus of the system and still for 
some the legitimate government of Ireland. 30 
He also notes that there is an ingrained conservatism and 
pragmatism within the top levels of the organisation. 
31 
Arguably, such a high degree of consensus does not extend 
throughout the Provisionals, otherwise it is difficult to 
explain the divisions which followed the ceasefire of 1975- 
1976, nor why the republican leadership felt it necessary to 
reassure the membership that the ceasefire of 1994-1996 was 
in accordance with republican interests and was not an 
abandonment of the republican tradition. 
32 However, the fact 
that the ceasefire of 1994-1996 was largely observed by the 
Provisional - with the permitted exception of attacks on 
tanti-social' criminal elements in Belfast and Derry - 
demonstrates that the leadership persuaded or commanded a 
high degree of acquiescence amongst the members. 
The concept of 'risky shift' or 'shift to extremity' is 
also relevant to terrorist target selection. This is the 
notion that decisions made by groups tend to be more extreme 
than the individual preferences of members of the group, and 
are also more extreme than the average of the individual 
preferences of group members. A number of reasons have been 
attributed to this phenomenon, including the desire to 
conform, the desire to appear decisive, and the notion that 
28) B. A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 187-188. 
29) J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets,, 15. 
30) J. Bowyer Bell. FRA Tactics and Targets, 14. 
31) J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 111-112. 
32) For the rise of the northerners & the split in 1986 see: 
P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 275-287,3109 
315. L. Clarke. Broadening-the Battlefieldl 299 84-85, 
228-241. E. Mallie & D. McKittrick. The Fight for Peace, 
201-202,314-318,381-383. B. Rowan. Behind the Lines, 
55,84-85. 
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one can afford to take riskier decisions as part of a group 
because one can spread responsibility if things go wrong. 
33 
Of relevance is the fact that regular soldiers appeared 
likelier to take risky decisions than student reservists, who 
in turn took riskier decisions than other students. 
34 The 
relevance of this to the behaviour of terrorist groups is 
that, like regular soldiers, terrorists are - as noted 
earlier - action-orientated, favouring action over words. By 
the fact that they are willing to make the change from 
legality to illegality terrorists show that they are willing 
to take risks. Thus, if the concept of 'risky shift' is 
correct - and given the clannish nature of terrorist groups, 
there are substantial grounds to believe that these theories 
should be applicable to terrorist groups - then one could 
expect that terrorists would take greater risks and possibly 
become more reckless over time. Thus, McKee and Franey's 
detailed account of the activities of a PIRA cell in London 
in 1974 and 1975 suggests that as time went on they became 
more and more affected by a form of bravado. This ended in 
December 1975 when they openly carried out a gun attack from 
a moving car on a restaurant in the centre of London. They 
were chased and trapped by the police in a flat in Balcombe 
Streets where they surrendered six days later. 
35 
Observation of other groups seems to bear some of these 
points out. Zawodny - who was a member of the Polish 
resistance - claims that reckless actions by the more violent 
or impetuous members of a group, can force the leadership to 
endorse such actions retrospectively for fear of losing the 
groups internal cohesion or even splitting the 
organisation. 
36 This area has already been touched on in the 
33) A. I. Teger & D. G. Pruitt. "Components of Group Risk 
Taking", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3 
(1967). S-Moscovici & M. Zavalloni. "The Group as a 
Polarizer of Attitudes", Journal of Personality and 
. 
Social Psychologyj 129 no 2. R. Brown. Group Processes: 
, 
Dynamics within and between Groups, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), 143,142-158 passim. 
34) A. K. Semmel & D-Minix. "Small-Group Dynamics and Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach", 
L. S. Falkowski (ed). Psychological Models in 
International Politics, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1979). 
35) G. McKee & R-Franey. Time Bomb, 330-347. 
36) J. K. Zawodny. "Infrastructures of Terrorist 
Organizations"i L. Z. Freedman & Y. Alexander (eds). 
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chapter concerning ideology, where it was noted that the 
leadership of some terrorist groups issued retrospective 
ideological justification for actions of which they 
disapproved. However, in one case early in the Northern Irish 
troubles) the PIRA initially denied involvement in an 
operation which was carried out by one of their own units. In 
March 1971, Provisional IRA members who had lured three 
unsuspecting off-duty soldiers into a trap by befriending 
them in a bar and inviting them to a party. They were shot 
dead by a roadside outside Belfast. At that time PIRA 
standing orders were to only attack soldiers who were on 
duty. Dillon and Lehane argue that the killings may have been 
instigated by a local unit which believed that the central 
leadership was insufficiently militant. 37 
Similarly, Chris Hani, the head of the African National 
Congress' armed wing, Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe 
- MK), stated that he allowed bomb attacks on soft white 
civilian targets such as supermarkets because: 
If we don't increase our level of violence, we'll risk 
losing the support of young blacks in the townships. 
38 
In 1985 the ANC President, Oliver Tambo, noted the 
difficulties of restraining the relatively untrained and 
embittered township youths who increasingly made up much of 
MK, from attacking soft white targets. 39 
This tendency is not confined to communist and 
separatist terrorist groups. Studies of racial attacks on 
immigrants in Scandanavia indicate that group membersi 
particularly those who are relatively new to the group, are 
put under pressure by other members of the group to carry out 
riskier attacks than they would do otherwisel', 40 
The theories of groupthink and risky shift could 
provide a partial explanation as to why some terrorist groups 
Perspectives on Nuclear Terrorism, 67. J. K. Zawodny. 
"Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of 
Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of 
Violence", 281-282. 
37) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 233-236. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. 
The Provisional IRA, 177-178. K. J. Kelley. The Longest 
War, 150. M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in 
Northern Ireland, 255-256. 
38) H. Holland. The Struggle, 228. 
39) H. Holland. The Struggle, 206,219. 
40) T. Bjorgo. "Terrorist Violence against Immigrants and 
Refugees in Scandanaviall, 40-42. 
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escalate their campaigns, both in the intensity of their 
actions and the nature of the targets which they attack. 
Commenting on German communist terrorist groups Wasmund notes 
that: 
The isolation of the group and the resulting constriction 
of reality promotes the proces 710 f mutual escalation to 
more and more radical actions. 
Those who dissent from this can be isolated or threatened 
with expulsion. Andreas Baader, who established his 
leadership role in the RAF through a rather venomous and 
incoherent force of character, demanded conformity by 
threatening to expel members of the group who were not 
sufficiently 'tough'. Members who did not subjugate their own 
judgement to that of the group - for example by protesting 
that certain operations would endanger bystanders - were 
isolated by other members. 42 Having said this, an individual 
terrorist with a strong enough character can still defy the 
collective morality. When in 1977 the RAF threatened to bomb 
three Lufthansa passenger jets if three of their comrades 
were not released, one of their members, Hans-Joachim Klein 
made it clear that once the first plane went down he would 
"tell everything" to the authorities. Soon afterwards Klein 
left the RAF. 43 
This leads on to Jenkins' view that terrorists operate 
under self-imposed moral and practical restraints. He does 
not believe that terrorists generally indulge in 'pure 
terrorism' - that is violence aimed at getting the most 
41) K. Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist 
groups in West Germany", 235. 
42) S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 92-93. B. A. Scharlau. 
Left-WTng Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
1769 184. J. M. Post. "Hostilite, Conformite, 
Fraternite", 216. J-M. Post. "Prospects for Nuclear 
Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and Constraints"i 
P. Leventhal & Y. Alexander (eds). Preventing Nuclear 
, Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International 
Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 
(Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987), 94. J. M. Post- 
"Terrorist psycho-logic", 33-34. K. Wasmund. "The 
political socialization of terrorist groups in West 
Germany", 235. P. Taylor. States of Terror, 80. 
43) Der Spiegell August 7th 19789 cited in G. Bass et al. 
Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal 
Adversaries of US Nuclear Programs, 7. 
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attention and causing the most alarm due to its sheer 
randomness. 44 
For years, I have been convinced that the actions of even 
those we call terrorists are limited by self imposed 
constraints that derive from moral considerations or 
political calculations. The growing volume of testimony 
from terrorists interviewed while still at large, 
interrogated in prison or testijýing at trials has, I 
believe, borne out that notion. 
The moral restraints occur because most terrorists are not 
"wanton killers" and only see certain targets as 
legitimate. 46 He differentiates between left-wing and right- 
wing groups, believing that left-wing terrorists tend to 
target the personnel or institutions of the state rather than 
carry out indiscriminate attacks whilst right-wing groups 
carry out indiscriminate attacks in order to create a popular 
clamour for a strong (i. e. right-wing authoritarian) 
government. He attributes this difference in target selection 
to ideological differences; the left-wing groups seeing 
themselves as acting against the state in the interests of 
ordinary people, whilst right-wing terrorists see ordinary 
people as a disorganised mass to be manipulated through 
fear. 47 
Another theory relating to human behaviour which might 
be worth exploring in greater depth for its applicability to 
terrorist target selection, comes from David Canter, a 
criminal psychologist. He notes that serial offenders - in 
this case murderers and rapists - tend to commit their 
initial crimes in the vicinity of their place of residence. 
Later - even if they make a point of carrying out their 
crimes away from their home area - the pattern of their 
actions forms a rough circle within which their place of 
residence is generally located. 48 
The need for a secure runback, and the desire to 
operate in areas with which one is more familiar might result 
in similar patterns emerging with terrorist groups operating 
from a particular base area. It corresponds with the comment 
44) B. M. Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of 
Warfare, 4. 
45) B. M. Jenkins. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, 7. 
46) B. M. Jenkins. High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War) 
11. 
47) B. M. Jenkins. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, 8. 
48) D. Canter. Criminal Shadows, 125-158. 
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of Sean MacStiophain, PIRA Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, 
that PIRA members should ideally be from the locality in 
which they operate, in order to operate within a supportive 
environment and to have an intimate knowledge of their area 
of operations. 49. This has its disadvantages. Clarke points 
out that in Northern Ireland up to the 1970s, the security 
forces could often identify who was responsible for a 
terrorist attack by the location of the initial stages of the 
operation such as the hijacking of a car. 50 The author of the 
PIRA reorganisation document of 1977 also noted this when he 
stated that it was desirable for cells to operate away from 
their home territory in order to confuse British 
intelligence, although the extent to which this actually 
happened is uncertain. 51 
In practice Canter's ideas may be of some relevance in 
studying a group like the Provisionals. McKeown and McKeever 
both note that fatalities resulting from the conflict in 
Northern Ireland are concentrated in particular parts of the 
Province. 52 McKeown demonstrates this by showing the number 
of deaths in areas of roughly equal population - 
parliamentary constituencies. This is shown in Table 10.1. It 
is worth noting that different types of operation are also 
more likely in some areas than in others. Those areas 
containing a high proportion of Catholics and a low 
proportion of Protestants have seen a high proportion of 
deaths resulting from clashes between republicans and the 
security forces, whilst those with a more even religious 
spread have a higher proportion of deaths resulting from 
sectarian attacks. Those areas with a high proportion of 
Protestants and a low proportion of Catholics have seen a 
relatively low level of violence overall. Thus one sees 
republican terrorists carrying out attacks on the security 
forces in relatively strongly Catholic areas such as Newry & 
Armagh and west Belfast whilst sectarian attacks by both 
49) R. W. White & T. F. White. "Revolution in the City", 107. 
50) L. Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 41. 
51) L. Clarke. Broadening the. Battlefieldl 252. T. P-Coogan- 
The IRA, 580. 
52) M. McKeown. Two Seven Six Three, 49-54. R. McKeever- 
"Repartition: An Irish Solution to the Northern Irish 
Problem". Paper for presentation at ECPR Joint Workshop 
on Theories of Political Violence in Bochum, West 
Germany, April 2nd to 7th 1990,26-32. 
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republican and loyalist terrorists are more pronounced in 
areas such as north Belfast. 
The pattern also has implications for the likely 
location of attacks by specific terrorist units. In 
particular West Belfast, which has a strong concentration of 
Catholics in the Falls area and is close to the Protestant 
Shankill, has a high proportion of sectarian attacks and 
attacks on the security forces. This suggests that terrorists 
on both sides tend not to operate too far from home areas to 
TABLE 10.1 
INCIDENCE OF FATALITIES ACROSS THE PARLIAMENTARY 
CONSTITUENCIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 





















STRUGGLE CONFLICT TOTAL 
Numbe r% Numbe r% Number % 
1 0.1 5 0.6 8 0.3 
18 1.2 4 0.5 23 0.8 
63 4.2 17 2.0 81 2.9 
32 2.2 32 3.8 75 2.7 
44 3.0 50 6.0 103 3.7 
258 17.4 53 6.3 352 12.7 
182 12.2 35 4.2 228 8.3 
99 6.7 13 1.6 119 4.3 
235 15.8 14 1.7 275 10.0 
49 3.3 8 1.0 59 2.1 
1 0.1 5 0.6 8 0.3 
18 1.2 14 1.7 24 0.9 
9 0.6 37 4.4 53 1.9 
150 10.1 281 33.5 544 19.7 
253 17.0 156 18.6 544 19.7 
50 3.4 59 7.0 137 4.6 
22 1.5 55 6.6 ill 4.0 
1486 100.0 838 100.1 2763 98.9 
N. B. Percentages rounded up or down to nearest 0.1%. Armed 
Struggle category includes security force personnel and 
associated civilians killed by republican terrorists, 
republican terrorists killed by security force 
personnel, chance civilian fatalities, and accidental 
republican terrorist and security force fatalities. 
Sectarian Conflict category includes Catholic civilian 
fatalities due to loyalist attacks, Protestant civilian 
fatalities due to republican attacks, and accidental or 
unintended Protestant victims of loyalist activities. 
Source: M. McKeown. Two Seven Six Three,, 50,52. 
which they can quickly retreat after an operation, with 
republicans attacking the security forces patrolling their 
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areas whilst the loyalists attack ordinary Catholics an 
adjoining area. 53 This pattern is not confined to Northern 
Ireland. With regard to the Basque group ETA9 Clark has found 
that the bulk of actions occur in the areas where the group 
receives most of its support and recruits. 54 
One should be careful here not to read too mush into 
apparent parallels between the actions of the serial 
attackers studied by Canter and the activities of terrorists. 
This is particularly so if the terrorists are prone to carry 
out attacks abroad - such as Palestinian groups like the PFLP 
and FRC - or do not have a defined territorial base - such as 
the Red Army Faction or Japanese Red Army. However, where the 
terrorist campaign is mainly confined to a given area, and 
where much of the decision-making takes place at the local 
level, one might see similar patterns. 
Case study: The structure of the Provisional IRA. 
The Provisional IRA has a well-defined command 
structure although, as with any formal design, the reality is 
somewhat less tidy. In theory the supreme body in the PIRA is 
the Army Convention, which is made up of delegates from the 
various PIRA units. It elects the Army Executive, an advisory 
and oversight committee of twelve. This in turn elects the 
Army Council -a committee of seven - which elects one of its 
number as Chief of Staff -a chairman whose power seems to be 
largely dependent upon force of personality and the respect 
in which the individual is held. 
The Army Council is technically where power and 
legitimacy lie in the Provisional IRA. General Headquarters 
(GHQ) coordinates the PIRA campaign, and the activities of 
the two geographical commands. Northern Command deals with 
the day to day running of the military campaign in Northern 
Ireland. Southern Command essentially acts as a logistics 
base. Under Northern Command and Southern Command are the 
smaller geographical units at brigade and battalion level as 
shown in Figure 10.1. These have a coordinating function 
53) On this form of loyalist attack see M-Dillon & D. Lehane. 
Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 177-178,182, 
211-212. M. Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 159. 
54) R. P. Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 185-203. 
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FIGURE 10.1 

















































Sources: M. Dillon. The Dirty War. B. O'Brien. 
-The 
Long War. 
P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA. 
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FIGURE 10.2 
BRIGADE ORGANISATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA 
IN THE NORTHERN COMMAND AREA 
N. B. a) OC means Officer Commanding. 
b) Cells do not necessarily contain the same number of 
operatives. For example there might only be one or two 
snipers. 
c) The number of cells varies from one brigade to 
another. 
Sources: M. Dillon. The Dirty War. B. O'Brien. The Long War. 
P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA. L. Clarke. 
Broadening the Battlefield. 
within their area. Control over weapons is often held by 
quartermasters at this level. Active Service Units (ASUs) are 
the small cells which carry out the bulk of attacks against 
the security forces and against other targets. They consist 
of between approximately four and twelve members depending on 
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the area of operations with urban ASUs tending to be at the 
lower end of this scale and whether they are training 
people. The companies carry out low-level enforcement 
activities such as knee-capping joy-riders, creating 
diversions, acting as couriers for weapons and messages, and 
gathering intelligence. Membership of the various levels is 
not mutually exclusive, (with the exception that one may not 
be a member of the Army Executive and the Army Council). 
In theory PIRA strategy is set by the bodies within the 
shaded area in Figure 10.1. However, the links between this 
area and the units on the ground can be tenuous due to the 
need for clandestinity and the minimisation of internal 
communications in order to avoid surveillance by security 
organisations. For these reasons the operation of the PIRA is 
theoretically on a 'need to know' basis with minimal contact 
between different levels within the organisation or between 
different cells. One person within an ASU may be responsible 
for referring ideas up to the brigade level and for 
transmitting orders from above to other members of the ASU. 
Communications are deliberately kept to a minimum, and are 
often conducted either in face to face meetings, or by 
couriers rather than through quicker but less secure methods. 
PIRA members tend to live in a highly-supportive but 
closeted environment. In the early 1990s a member of the 
Provisional IRA remarked; "The longer you move in the IRA the 
more you know you're moving in a very incestuous 
community". 55 Whilst the PIRA is comparatively well 
integrated into the local community, PIRA members and senior 
Sinn Fein members have had to live within relatively safe 
Catholic areas for security reasons if for no other. 56 This 
is exacerbated by the high degree of residential separation 
between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. 57 A 
result, according to a senior PIRA member in August 1994, 
local PIRA units tend to concentrate on their immediate 
conflict with the police, British Army, and loyalist 
55) F. O'Connor. In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1993), 125. 
56) F-O'Connor. In Search of a State, 125. E. MacDonald. Shoot 
the Women First, 141. "Local Hero", Esquire, December 
1993/January 1994. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional 
IRA, 12. 
57) D. McKittrick. Endgam-e, 36-46. 
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paramilitaries, to the exclusion of the wider context. 58 This 
is also caused by a fairly limited perception, verging on 
indifference, to the way in which they are viewed by people 
outside the Northern Irish Catholic community - that is 
outside their circle of supporters and potential 
sympathisers. For instance, whilst the Provisionals claim 
that their attacks on local security forces or contractors 
for the security forces are not sectarian, they appear to be 
indifferent to the fact that they are seen ad sectarian by 
the Protestant community. 59 
This localism, in combination with security 
considerations and the differing circumstances between one 
area and another, has meant that units are largely allowed to 
operate on the basis of local initiative. This should mean 
that they choose their own targets within the guidelines set 
at the higher levels of the organisation. In practice it can 
involve the influence of local enmities and the shortcomings 
of local intelligence-collection. 60 This was illustrated in 
November 1987 when a PIRA unit planted a bomb near the 
Enniskillen war memorial with the intention of killing 
members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. A PIRA spokesman 
noted: 
58) "No surrender", Fortnight, September 1994,16. Also see 
P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA 
,, 
390-391. 
59) "Ex-Speaker killed by IRA as reprisal", The Times, 
January 23rd 1981. "Tyrone IRA group one of the most 
active", The Irish Times, May 11th 1987. S. McAughtry. 
Down in the Free State, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 
1987), 58. M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in 
Northern Ireland 
,, 
259-260. J. Darby. Intimidation and 
the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 136-137. 
"Gritting it out on Border farmlands"l The Irish Times,, 
March 3rd 1983. "Centre of hatred returns to Armagh", 
The Irish Times, November 23rd 1983. "Troubles prompt 
moves to 'fortresses"', The Independent on Sunday, 
November 1st 1992. D. McKittrick. Endgame, 232. 
60) "A tribal past lingers in modern hate"l The Independents 
June 4th 1991. "Rising tide of death threats sharpens 
fear in East Tyrone", The Irish Timesj September 8th 
1992. "Attempt by IRA to murder church caretaker 
condemned as sectarian", The Irish Times, September 
10th 1992. "The deadly results of pub talk suspicions 
The Irish Timesj September 14th 1992. S. MacStiofain. 
Revolutionary in Ireland, 253. T. P. Coogan. The IRA, 
472. M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in North 
Ireland, 260. J. Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 
27,48,110-114,116. 
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The unit probably described it to the next most senior 
person as an attempt to kill three or four soldiers. 
Well, we try that several tiWTs a week, you don't 
need to have a meeting about it. 
Instead they killed eleven civilians and injured sixty- 
three. 62 The Enniskillen bombing illustrated the pattern of 
decision-making within the Provisional IRA, in particular the 
extent to which decision-making over routine operations is 
delegated downwards, and the operational short-comings of 
such a system. 
Summary. 
Terrorist groups tend to start off as informal groups, 
but if they survive for long they usually develop a form of 
hierarchy. However, due to the requirements of clandestinity, 
decisions are often taken at the operational level by 
relatively small, introspective, groups within the overall 
structure. Theories on group behaviour and some practical 
examples suggest that such groups will tend to follow an 
authoritative leader and will display high degrees of 
conformity to group decisions. However, they are also action- 
orientated and, unless strictly controlled by the leadership, 
may be prone to taking increasingly reckless decisions as 
time passes. These latter tendencies increase with the extent 
to which group members are isolated by clandestinity from 
personal opinions and judgements emanating from people 
outside the group. Again, without stron leadership this can 
lead to an escalation of the campaign in terms of the number 
and types of targets attacked. When much of the PIRA 
leadership was interned in 1971-1972, one result was a higher 
volume of uncoordinated, indiscriminate violence carried out 
by young, aggressivet and undisciplined terrorists. 63 
Where the terrorist campaign takes on a localised 
nature, as in Northern Ireland, one will find that in 
addition to the precepts of ideology and strategy proclaimed 
by the leaders of the group, decisions are likely to take 
61) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 
11th 1987. 
62) "11 die in Poppy Day massacre", The Times, November 9th 
1987. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 459- 
461. 
63) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern 
Ireland, 257-258. M. L. R. Smith. Fighting for Irelandq 
120. 
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into account local enmities, perceptions, and priorities. The 
factors which determine target selection are manifold, but 
the question which remains to be answered is how they relate 




At the outset of this study, it was said that terrorist 
target selection can be seen in terms of motive, means, and 
opportunity. Even though terrorist groups and their 
objectives may be wildly different, this observation largely 
holds true, and provides a means of weaving into a coherent 
pattern the various strands which have been examined in the 
previous chapters. At the end it should prove possible to 
construct a model which, whilst is broad enough to cover the 
bulk of groups, and at the same time is detailed enough to 
provide some idea as to why terrorists attack the targets 
which they do. 
Motive. 
The terrorist's motive-for an attack is the reason why 
they believe that it may be both right and beneficial to 
attack that target. A number of elements make up the motive, 
or more commonly motivest behind a terrorist attack. Although 
not all of these elements will apply to all attacks, they are 
not mutually exclusive, and in some respects they are 
interdependent. 
The first element in a terrorist group's motive for 
attacking a specific target is the ideology of the group. 
Their reason for existence in the first place is to achieve 
those political goals which flow from their ideology. In 
addition to this, the ideology conditions the way in which 
the terrorists view the surrounding world, or at least those 
parts of it which they deem relevant to their cause. Peoplel 
institutions, and events are viewed through the prism of 
their ideology, leading to an interpretation of them which 
may bear little resemblance to those perceived by their 
victims or other actorso but which influences the way in 
which the terrorist group reacts to them. 
Most importantly for this study, ideology enables the 
terrorists to determine to their own satisfaction those 
specific people, institutions, or objects which may be seen 
as 'legitimate' targets. As noted, this notion of legitimacy 
is not the same as commonly-held notions of guilt and 
innocence. The terrorists may deem some of their targets to 
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be 'guilty' of what they may view to be an offence in terms 
of their ideology, but this concept must be seen in terms of 
their own idiosyncratic beliefs and indeed may not be based 
upon any particular action which the target has taken. Thus 
members of a European communist terrorist group may attack a 
prominent businessman because he is seen to be part of the 
capitalist economic system, whilst a Latin American 
conservative terrorist group may attack membe 
, 
rs of a trade 
union as suspected subversives, even though in each case the 
victims did not see themselves in the terms formulated by the 
terrorists. Indeed at the extreme people may be attacked 
because the terrorists deem them to be targets on the basis 
of an affiliation or grouping such as ethnicity, religion, 
colour, or merely the fact that by being in a certain place 
they are deemed to have somehow placed themselves in 
opposition to the terrorists. At the extreme, such as random 
mass casualty attacks, the terrorists may believe that all 
but their own members can legitimately be attacked if it 
furthers the overriding interest of their cause. 
However, whilst ideology provides the basic motive for 
an attack, it only provides an initial range of targets - 
sometimes narrow, sometimes very wide - whom the terrorists 
deem it legitimate to attack. With the exception of strategic 
and tactical manuals written by ideologists such as Mao, 
Guevara, and Marighela, ideology does not generally provide 
the terrorists with a motive for attacking specific targets 
as a way of furthering their political objectives. 
Furthermore, terrorists tend not to return to ideological 
first-principles each time they plan an attack, largely 
taking for granted their early judgements that certain people 
or things are legitimate targets. Instead they work to an 
outline which is generally supplied by their strategy. 
A terrorist group's strategy is the general plan or 
approach by which the terrorists intend to use suitable 
methods to achieve their Political objectives. Whilst it need 
not be particularly complex, it provides the practical - as 
opposed to ideological - rationale for an attack because it 
identifies the practical benefits which the terrorists hope 
to gain by it. In the chapter concerning strategy these 
benefits were identified in terms of strategic objectives 
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such as the elimination of threats to the group, the 
advertisement of the terrorist's cause, the attrition of 
their opponent's willpower, and various other objectives. In 
order to attain these objectives the terrorists have to 
attack suitable targets. They will not attain their 
objectives merely by attacking any targets which they 
consider to be legitimate, indeed to do so may be counter- 
productive if it provokes the disapproval of their 
supporters. Returning to the model of terrorism outlined near 
the start of this study: 
attack TERROR > .. IYSICAL TARGET 
PSYCHOLOGICAL reacts TARGET(S) -> 
the terrorists have to affect the psychological target in 
such a way that its reaction will gain the desired strategic 
objectives. 
In contrast to conventional warfare, or even guerrilla 
warfare, where the aim is to attain political goals by 
achieving physical military objectives, the point of 
terrorism is to attain political goals by achieving primarily 
psychological objectives. These may include imposing 
psychological pressure or even fear upon an enemy, but can 
also include raising the morale of one's supporters, coercing 
neutral bystanders, provoking the enemy into actions 
detrimental to himself, or eliminating threats to the group. 
This is the point of using terrorism as part of a wider 
strategy, and in order to do this the terrorists have to 
attack physical targets which will induce the desired 
reactions in their psychological targets. 
If necessary it would seem that ideological 
considerations may be overridden, or at least stretched, in 
order to promote a group's strategic objectives. The 
Provisional IRA's attacks on senior businessmen in 1977 and 
those on civilian contractors from 1985 onwards, were both 
cases where the terrorists attacked people who had previously 
fallen outside the range of legitimate targets because of the 
> PSYCHOLOGICAL reacts 
affects 
F TARGET(S) -> 
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ease with which they could be attacked and because of the 
strategic objectives which could be attained by attacking 
them. Similarly, the Hizbollah's kidnapping of the western 
hostages in the Lebanon did not involve abducting people who 
were necessarily in open conflict with Hizbollah, but 
abducting people whose states could supply weapons to Iran, 
or apply pressure to have Hizbollah prisoners released from 
prisons in Kuwait, Israel, and elsewhere. Being somehow 
affiliated to aa state or institution in a position to 
influence a terrorist's enemy could lead to one being 
classified as a legitimate target for strategic reasons even 
if the ideological justification for the act may be rather 
shaky. Thus the strategy adopted determines, to a degree, the 
range of targets which the terrorists will think it 
beneficial to attack. 
Those considerations affecting the strategy of the 
group supply additional motives for the choice of targets. 
The desire to protect the group can often lead to attacks on 
people or institutions which threaten the group or constrict 
its abilities - such as informers, internal dissidents, 
hostile elements in the security forces, enemy terrorists, 
and various other threats. However this is a somewhat 
negative consideration, and terrorists are primarily 
concerned to carry out attacks which help to achieve 
strategic by the effect which they have on various 
psychological targets. 
For instance, if terrorists wish to maintain their core 
support and obtain the endorsement of potential sympathisers, 
they will generally try to minimise their attacks on targets 
which have a high degree of public sympathy and maximise 
their attacks on targets which are unpopular. Likewise, if 
they wish the attacks to advertise their cause they will 
probably attack targets which are highly symbolic in relation 
to it, and which have sufficient publicity value to gain 
widespread attention. This can be reinforced by the release 
of statements which attempt to link the attack to their 
cause, and which may seek to present the terrorists in a 
favourable light despite the bloodshed or destruction which 
they may have caused. 
Conclusions 332 
On the other hand, if their strategic objective 
includes enforcing compliance by the psychological target - 
such as uncommitted or even unsympathetic people - terrorists 
will attack targets, and possibly release statements, which 
will create fear and obedience in the psychological target. 
Similarly, if they wish to disorientate the psychological 
target - whether it be a small group or a large mass of 
people - their attacks will aim at creating an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and anxiety amongst them. 
An important point to note in examining ideology and 
strategy as motives in terrorist target selection, is that 
whilst strategy may be affected by considerations such as the 
group's capability, the security environment, and external 
opinion, such considerations are very unlikely to affect the 
ideology of the group except over the very long term. Thus 
ideology provides a fairly rigid framework within which a 
strategy may evolve and be altered as required. 
Finally, in considering those elements which motivate 
the selection of terrorist targets, one should consider the 
impact of internal factors. The dynamics within a terrorist 
group may do much to determine target selection because they 
can affect the ideology, strategy, and tactics of the group. 
The selection of targets can be due to factors such as the 
need for the leadership to keep the members in line and avoid 
splits, and the extent to which local rather than central 
factors take priority in determining target selection. In the 
first place the terrorist leaders may use violence against 
members whom they believe are threatening to split the group 
or are otherwise behaving in a disobedient fashion. However, 
they may also permit attacks which damage the interests of 
the group if they fear that resistance to such actions will 
risk a split in the group. This problem may be exacerbated 
where there are local units of a larger terrorist 
organisation, who give priority to local factors over the 
ideological and strategic precepts of the leadership. As the 
terrorist campaign continues, the psychological effects of 
clandestinity and the self-reinforcing belief that a strategy 
of violence is the correct path to choose, may lead the 
terrorist leaders and their members to behave in an 
increasingly reckless manner - attacking targets which they 
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would not have attacked previously and showing less regard 
for the risk of causing incidental damage or deaths. 
The important thing to bear in mind about the elements 
which constitute the motives for an attack is that they do 
not function separately, but act upon each other. Thus, the 
ideology of a terrorist group has an impact upon strategy 
because it equips the terrorists with a world-view and a 
moral framework which defines, to a degree, what is 
acceptable and what is not. The strategy in turn affects - 
and is affected by other motivating factors such as public 
opinion and the internal dynamics of the group. These factors 
can affect the way in which members of the group think and 
thus, over the long term, affect some aspects of the group's 
ideology. However, whilst motivating factors may indicate the 
range of targets which the terrorists may wish to attack, 
other factors narrow the range of potential targets. 
Means. 
The means available to a terrorist group are both 
tangible and intangible. On the one hand there are tangible 
means such as weapons, financial resources, and personnel. 
These give the terrorists the physical means with which to 
carry out an attack. The absence of such resources places 
constraints on the terrorist's scope in selecting targets. A 
lack of powerful weapons means that certain targets are too 
difficult to attack, whilst a lack in the quantity of weapons 
limits the number of attacks which they can carry out. 
The intangible means such as technical skill, strategic 
ability, political judgement, and the ability to organise 
both people and resources, allow the terrorists to use the 
tangible means to the best effect. On the other hand poor 
operational leadership can result in the failure of 
operations, the loss of personnel and resources, and in 
botched attacks which cause unintended deaths or damage, 
alienate potential sympathisers and supporters, and possibly 
split the group. Even with those terrorists who are 
technically competent, a lack of strategic ability and 
political judgement amongst the leaders can mean that whilst 
individual operations are successful in material terms, they 
do not advance the Political objectives of the group. The aim 
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of the leadership must be to synchronise terrorist operations 
with strategic objectives, otherwise all one has is violence. 
The ability of terrorists to attack their targets of 
choice can be both constrained and enhanced by the means at 
their disposal. In the obvious sense, their ability to attack 
targets can be affected by the weaponry at their disposal. 
However, it must be remembered that this is affected by the 
ability of the terrorists to obtain them in the first place, 
necessitating money, contacts, or the ability to carry out 
straightforward theft. 
Attacks on especially soft targets - such as 
unprotected civilians - may be possible with pistols, crude 
bombs, or even knives, but successful attacks on heavily- 
protected targets9 such as government members or protected 
buildings, generally require more powerful or more 
sophisticated weapons. This is not to say that groups using 
unsophisticated weapons such as knives are necessarily 
ineffective. The Naxalites in India in the early 1970s were 
very effective at attacking civilians and low-grade police 
officers, and the so-called 'Shankill Butchers' unit of the 
Ulster Volunteer Force were highly proficient at terrorising 
Catholic civilians, but neither group attempted to attack 
particularly hard targets. The only benefit from automatic 
weapons and explosives for such groups would be the ability 
to kill larger numbers of civilians more quickly. 
On the other hand groups such as the Red Army Faction 
and the Provisional IRA have proved capable of attacking 
well-protected targets - such as the chairman of a major bank 
and the British Prime Minister's residence respectively - 
because of their ability to make relatively sophisticated 
weapons. In larger conflicts, such as the LTTE's conflict 
with the Sri Lankan Government, a terrorist group may also be 
capable of fighting a guerrilla war or even an open 
conventional war. Essentially, a groups ability to attack 
targets of choice - either specific people or objects or 
those people or objects belonging to a targeted category - 
depends upon the range of weapons available to it. 
This factor leads on to the ability of the terrorists 
themselves. However well-equipped the terrorists may be in 
terms of material resources, it is of little use if they are 
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unable to use them effectively. In the first instance their 
capability is affected by their competence with weapons. With 
simpler firearms, bombs, and knives, there is no necessity 
for a great deal of expertise, but the range of targets 
available to the terrorists is consequently limited. However, 
if terrorists are capable of using or indeed manufacturing 
sophisticated weaponry, it expands the range of targets which 
they can attack. 
If the attacking terrorists are willing to face a 
certain death, the range of potential targets is greatly 
increased because protective measures based on the deterrent 
value of certain death have no worth. Examples include the 
suicide bombers from the Hizbollah in Lebanon, Tamil 
militants in Sri Lanka, and Hamas in Israel and the Israeli- 
occupied territories. In these cases a protection system 
which depends upon reactive security - for instance guards 
able to react to an attack - but which lack barriers 
sufficient to keep assailants out in the first place, becomes 
worthless. Obviously this greatly increases the means 
available to those planning the attacks. 
Allied to the ability to use weapons is the ability to 
plan operations. If the terrorists are incompetent when it 
comes to the mechanics of setting up a logistical network in 
terms of safe houses and arms dumps, collating information 
and transforming it into usable intelligence, planning the 
insertion and withdrawal of the operational team, and the 
various other aspects of terrorist operations, then they are 
unlikely to survive for long. For instance, slipshod 
operations based upon poor intelligence - such as the PIRA 
bombing of the Remembrance Day Parade in Enniskillen in 
November 1987 - are as likely to end in the death of 
bystanders as the intended target. 1 Furthermore, in some 
cases the Provisionals have attacked somebody, only to find 
that due to poor intelligence work they had attacked the 
wrong person. 
2 Thus, shortcomings in the operational 
1) D. McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 203-207. 
2) "11 die in Cenotaph blast"t The Independent, November 9th 
1987. "Attacks fits into a pattern of errors", The 
Independentl April 13th 1989. "IRA apologises for 
murder of Australians", The Independenti May 29th 1990. 
"Car bomb attack on Thatcher advisor fails", The 
Independentq August 7th 1990. "Belfast statements"i 
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abilities of the terrorists can seriously impair target 
selection. 
The quality of terrorist leaders is also important. In 
considering terrorist target selection it has been assumed 
that terrorists are rational in their use of violence to gain 
political ends. Those terrorist campaigns which have endured 
for a length of time - such as that of the Provisional IRA, 
ETA, the RAF, Shining Path, and various others - are able to 
do so at least partly because their leaders are capable of 
learning from their own experiences and where possible from 
those of other groups, devising long-term strategies, or 
because the group possesses the capacity to renew its 
leadership when necessary. Although in the short-term a group 
without effective leadership may be extremely violent, as was 
seen with the Provisionals after internment was introduced in 
March 1971 its violence over time can become less well- 
focused and less effective. Indeed the Provisionals were 
ultimately saved by the entry of new blood into the groups' 
leadership in the mid and late 1970s. Where an effective 
alternative leadership does exist - as appears to have been 
the case with the Shining Path in Peru after the arrest of 
their leader Abimael Guzman in September 1992 - the group may 
continue to function effectively albeit at an initially 
reduced level. 
3 Where no such alternative exists, as was the 
case with the Angry Brigade in Britain in the early 1970s and 
the Red Brigades in the early 1980s, the loss of the 
leadership can mean the demise of the group as an effective 
force. 
Such a demise can be due to the security environment. 
The extent to which it affects the opportunities available to 
terrorists will be considered later. However, it should be 
noted that it imposes restrictions upon the terrorist's means 
in addition to those already imposed by the group's inherent 
capabilities. The loss of terroristsl their weapons, and 
other resources at the hands of the security forces, can have 
AP/RN, June 6th 1991. "Regret at Michael Logue's 
death"q AP/RN, June 6th 1991. D. McKittrick. Despatches 
from Belfast, 206. 
3) T. D. Mason & C. Campany. "Guerrillass Drugs and Peasants: 
The Rational Peasant and the War on Drugs in Peru"j 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 49 (Winter 
1995), 164-165,166. 
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a great effect upon the ability of a terrorist group to 
function. Furthermorej the amount of time, effort and 
material resources used up in evading the security forces 
also depleted the resources available to carry out attacks. 
For this reason the security forces are often selected as 
targets. Of course where the security forces, or elements 
within the security forces, are aiding the terrorists - or 
indeed where members of the security forces are also members 
of the terrorist group - then the ability of the terrorists 
to obtain intelligence material, weapons, and training is 
greatly increased, and the need to avoid the threats of the 
security environment are decreased. 
Within the constraints imposed by the means available 
to them, and by the motives which impel them to choose 
certain people as legitimate targets, terrorists can select 
those people or things which they wish to attack. Howevers to 
carry out such attacks successfully they need more than 
motives and means. They need opportunities. 
Opportunities. 
A terrorist group's opportunity to attack a target is 
dependent upon the target being vulnerable to assailants with 
the motive and means to attack it. The terrorists' role in 
relation to targeting opportunities can be passive or active. 
On the one hand a potential target may almost deliver itself 
to the terrorists, becoming vulnerable at a time and place 
where the terrorist is able to take advantage of the 
circumstances - in fact a target of opportunity. This is 
often the case where terrorism runs along communal lines, 
with attacks taking place against members of the opposing 
ethnic, social, or cultural community who happen to be in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. On the other hand terrorists 
often have to create their own opportunities if they are to 
attack their preferred targets. With such pre-planned targets 
the task of the terrorists is to detect a time and place when 
their preferred target or target category will become 
vulnerable. This necessitates some knowledge of the obstacles 
which the terrorists have to overcome in order to carry out a 
successful attack. 
In practice the people protecting likely targets do not 
have the means to provide absolute security against an 
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absolute threat. Instead, within the constraints imposed by 
the resources available, they aim to provide likely targets 
with sufficient protection against credible or likely 
threats. The aim of the terrorists is to penetrate or 
circumvent that protection. The initial obstacles which 
restrict the terrorists' opportunities are caused by the 
security environment within which the terrorists operate. If 
those defending the target have foreknowledge*of the 
terrorist's intentions they will be able to frustrate the 
attack by increasing the protection for the target, and 
possibly capture or kill the terrorists concerned. 
The security environment can also restrict the 
opportunities for terrorists through the overt deployment of 
security force patrols, checkpoints, document checks, 
surveillance equipment, and any other methods which make it 
difficult for the terrorists to move around and to carry the 
weapons needed for the attack. A heavy security force 
presence can mean that whilst an attack can be carried out, 
the chances of the assailant escaping afterwards are 
correspondingly reduced. Consequently, one of the most 
important targets for terrorists are those people and 
institutions who constitute such a threat. This may include 
informers, police and intel-ligence operatives and facilities, 
and the overt security forces whether military or police. By 
eliminating the constrictions imposed by these threats the 
terrorists increase their own opportunities to carry out 
successful attacks on other targets. 
Before attacking a potential target the terrorists must 
be able to locate it and determine a time when it will be 
vulnerable. Without the ability to gather and analyse 
intelligence it is unlikely that they will identify those 
specific people or objects who fall within their range of 
legitimate targets. Conversely, those people or objects about 
which the terrorists can gain intelligence, are more likely 
to be selected as targets. If the terrorists cannot discover 
a suitable occasion for attacking a target, either because 
their intelligence gathering capability is insufficient or 
because the potential target has succeeded in disguising its 
locat. ion, they are unlikely to attack it. Instead they are 
likely to select another suitable target. Such target 
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substitution applies to a number of cases where for one 
reason or another the terrorists are unable to attack their 
target of choice or indeed identify the most suitable target. 
This also applies if the target is felt to be too well- 
protected for an attack to be practical. The degree of 
physical protection for a target can vary greatly according 
to the importance accorded to it and the resources available 
for its protection. At one extreme, an ordinary person is 
generally totally unprotected, and provides the softest of 
targets. On the other hand the physical protection for a hard 
target can consist of a number of layers: barriers intended 
to make it difficult for the terrorists to penetrate the 
perimeter of the protected area, security checks at points of 
access in that perimeter, alarms which warn of the presence 
of intruders within the protected area, guards who can try to 
prevent an attack and who will ensure that the assailant is 
killed or apprehended if an attack does take place. Finally 
the target itself can be physically protected, by a bullet- 
proof jacket if a human targets by armour-plating and bullet- 
proof glass if a car carrying a target, and by a strengthened 
structure if a building. 
If the target is protected well enough to make it too 
difficult or too costly for the terrorists to attack it using 
the means available, they have to decide between three 
options: to give up altogether; to attack using different 
means; or to attack a different, more vulnerable target. If 
they take the first option then they proceed no further with 
the operation. If they take the second option, attacking the 
same target by using different means, then they have to 
acquire the means necessary to carry out the*attack. This may 
be done by using more terrorists to overrun the protection 
provided to the target, or more powerful weapons. In any 
case, the intention is to overwhelm the protection or to 
render it useless. Suicide bombings would fall into this 
category as they provide terrorists with a way of attacking 
the target which renders useless the deterrent effect upon 
which protection often rests. 
Alternatively, they may try to bypass the protections 
using a method which circumvents it. The mortar attack on 10 
Downing Street in February 1991 is an example where the 
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weapons system employed allowed the terrorists to bypass 
barriers which had been erected to prevent gunmen, bombers, 
or vehicle-bombs from getting close to the building. Such 
attacks might be worth doing if the terrorists perceive 
sufficient benefits - such as favourable publicity - might be 
gained from carrying out the attack. 
Finally, they may decide to attack a softer target from 
which they may still derive benefits, and which they can 
justify attacking in ideological terms. As mentioned in the 
chapter on tactics, an important reason why the Red Brigades 
chose to abduct former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in March 1978 
rather than Italian Prime Minister Andreotti or Senate 
President Fanfani, was that Moro was the most predictable and 
least well-protected of the three. Likewise, the Provisional 
IRA has attacked British soldiers in England or in 
Continental Europe, where they are less well-protected and 
security-conscious than in Northern Ireland. 
It should be noted that attacks on soft targets are not 
necessarily carried out because of the difficulty of 
attacking a better-protected target. The Tamil Tiger's 
killing of Sinhalese or Muslim villagers has been executed 
with the deliberate intention of moving them from areas which 
the Tigers wish to turn into an ethnically exclusive area 
which they can control, as is also the case with Sikh 
terrorists who have killed Hindus in the Punjab. Likewise, 
the bombing of ordinary Italian civilians has been perceived 
by fascist terrorists as the most effective way of creating 
the type of panic which would lead to a public desire for an 
authoritarian government to restore order. Thus attacks on 
soft targets are sometimes a reaction to the difficulties of 
attacking hard targets, but often the fact remains that the 
soft target concerned is seen as the most appropriate 
physical target to attack in order to gain the desired 
reaction from the psychological target. The fact that such 
targets are easy to attack is, for the terrorists, simply a 
fortunate coincidence. 
How terrorists select targets. 
Whilst the factors which influence terrorist target 
selection can be determined, it is more difficult to 
generalise about how they interact. This is because, despite 
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surface similarities, each terrorist group is unique in its 
personnel, in its ideology, and in the environment within 
which it operates. Therefore, one must avoid creating models 
or theories which are so specific that whilst they may fit 
some groups like a glove, they are totally inappropriate to 
others. 
Bearing in mind this reservation, it is still possible 
to construct some simple models explaining how terrorists 
select their targets. This process can best be seen in two 
stages, the process by which a target is selected, and the 
process by which the terrorists decide whether to proceed 
with an attack once they have selected a potential target. 
The first stage - the selection of a potential target - can 
best be regarded as a process by which the terrorist's 
freedom of action is narrowed down by the influence of 
various factors. Figure 11.1 shows how the dynamics behind 
terrorist target selection: ideology, strategy, and tactics, 
are constrained by various other factors. The touchstone for a 
group's initial decisions about target selection is provided 
by the group's ideology. This is because the ideology lays 
down the initial parameters of what can be deemed acceptable 
behaviour by the terrorists and also enables the terrorists 
to judge those people who are deemed to be legitimate 
targets. It cannot be over-emphasised that this concept of 
'legitimacy' is seen in terms of the group's beliefs and may 
often be far removed from what is seen as legitimate or moral 
behaviour by their enemies or indeed more widely. However, 
what it does is to set up the mental and moral framework 
within which the terrorists operate, and provide the 
terrorists with some sort of value system to which they can 
refer in deciding what actions they can take, or in seeking 
to justify them afterwards. 
However, ideology does not, and indeed cannot, provide 
the only reference point for terrorists in selecting their 
targets. With the exception of some communist writers, 
ideologies do not generally provide political activists with 
a blueprint for achieving their political objectives. The 
decision to use terrorism, rather than - or as well as - 
other methods, is in itself made in relation to circumstances 
and the inclination of the people involved, rather than as a 
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necessary consequence of their ideology. Where the decision 
to use terrorism has been made, few groups have such a narrow 
range of legitimate targets or such infinite resources that 
they do not have to choose amongst the range of legitimate 
targets which they could attack. The translation of political 
objectives into concrete actions, and hence the selection of 
targets is thus crucially shaped by the strategy of the 
group. 
FIGURE 11.1 
CONSTRAINTS ON TERRORIST TARGET SELECTION 
<- Scope for action -> 
The strategy of the group is based on an assessment of 
the reactions which they wish to evoke in certain 
psychological targets in order to promote their political 
objectives. The actions of the group should ideally be 
intended to achieve strategic objectives such as 
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advertisement, compliance, or whatever the group feels to be 
most appropriate, as a way of setting the ground for 
achieving their overall political aims. A terrorist group's 
strategy can be quite crude and simple. However, by 
determining what the terrorists wish to achieve by their use 
of violence, it provides a further refinement to the 
framework for target selection set by the group's ideology. 
Whilst ideology sets out the range of people , 
and things which 
it is legitimate for the terrorists to attackp the strategy 
sets out those targets which the terrorists believe it will 
be beneficial for them to attack. This does not mean that the 
terrorists will make the right decisions in this area, and 
whether their strategic choices actually prove to be 
beneficial is a task for hindsight and historians. 
However, the setting of strategy does not occur in a 
vacuum. Terrorists are constrained in their plans by the need 
for support, by their own capabilities, and by the security 
environment. To take the first point, terrorists generally 
need some support from outside the immediate confines of the 
group. Most terrorist groups - with the possible exception of 
animal rights terrorists - intend to ultimately benefit some 
people, whether it be an ethnic group, a social class, or 
some other constituency, and therefore few terrorists wish to 
alienate those very people whom they see themselves as 
helping. Furthermore, in practical terms, terrorists 
frequently need supporters to provide them with a potential 
flow of recruits, with at least some of the means to get and 
hide weapons, and, if they have been identified and have to 
adopt a clandestine lifestyle, with shelter,. food, and 
possibly documents. 
To retain this support - and to discourage erstwhile 
supporters from betraying the terrorists to their opponents 
or enemies - the terrorists need to ensure that their 
activities are not so unpopular with their supporters that 
they can no longer rely on their support. If the terrorists 
are powerful enough for instance if they have effective 
control of an area they may be able to enforce the 
compliance of people to their actions. However if they do not 
have such control, or even if they do but want active rather 
than enforced support, they have to tailor their actions so 
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as to be acceptable to their supporters. If they wish to 
extend their support base to include potential sympathisers, 
they need to be even more selective in their attacks, but as 
was seen in the case of PIRA attacks on alleged criminals or 
against loyalist terrorists, in some cases the need to 
maintain the allegiance of supporters can mean carrying out 
attacks which are disapproved of by others. Consequently 
terrorists have to ensure that their actions are such that - 
however much their actions may repulse their enemies or 
opponents - they do not needlessly repel supporters. Ideally 
they do not wish to needlessly repel potential sympathisers 
or those people who are uncommitted. In order to do this they 
must be able to justify their actions in their own 
ideological terms. 
This particular constraint can cause problems. So far 
the model of target selection outlined in this chapter has 
assumed that the strategy of a terrorist group operates 
within the constraints of what can be deemed as ideologically 
acceptable - in other words only legitimate targets are to be 
attacked. However, it might be the case that the terrorists 
concerned could gain strategic benefits by attacking a target 
which is not seen as being a legitimate target. For the 
terrorists themselves this may or may not represent a 
dilemma. Some terrorists may decide that attacks cannot be 
made against targets which do not bear some form of guilt in 
terms of the ideology of the terrorist group concerned, 
whilst others may feel that the very fact that attacking a 
particular target fulfils a strategic objective makes it a 
legitimate target. In the latter case the strategic benefits 
to be gained override any ideological fastidiousness. If 
necessary the attacks can be given some form of retrospective 
ideological justification. This occurred with the previously 
mentioned examples of the PIRA killing of businessmen in 
1977, the Red Brigades' killing of police bodyguards, or the 
RAF's killing of an American serviceman in Germany in 1985 in 
order to obtain his identification documents. Whilst the 
terrorists may attempt to justify such attacks, they can 
badly damage the terrorists' support base, and unless the 
terrorists control much of an area and its population- like 
the Shining Path in Peru or the LTTE in Sri Lanka - they will 
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tend to avoid carrying out attacks which are unpopular with 
their supporters unless there is an overwhelmingly important 
benefit to be gained. 
The terrorists' strategic options are also 
circumscribed by their capabilities. Whilst the terrorists 
may have a long list of things which they may wish to do, 
they are constrained by their material resources and by the 
abilities of their operatives. Terrorists may make 
misjudgements as to their capabilities and overreach 
themselves, as ultimately did most of the communist terrorist 
groups in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. Even at the 
tactical level terrorists can make serious and repeated 
errors of judgement - as is shown by the litany of PIRA 
members who have been killed by their own bombs. However, 
there are few examples of terrorists constructing a strategy 
which they are manifestly incapable of starting. 
Finally, the terrorists' strategy is constrained by the 
security environment. Initially this restricts the 
terrorists' freedom of action through the need to avoid 
police surveillance and arrest. However, if the conflict 
escalates it can also entail surviving - at the most extreme 
-a severe military crackdown as occurred in Uruguay and 
Argentina in the mid 1970s, and even to an extent in Northern 
Ireland at about the same time. Not only can the security 
environment restrict the terrorists' freedom of action, it 
can also result in their capability being further restricted 
through the loss of personnel and resources. Whilst there are 
opportunities for the terrorists to provoke the security 
forces into brutal actions which alienate the public - 
assuming that the security forces do not carry out such 
actions of their own accord - the constraints placed by their 
activities are far greater. 
Thus the strategic options of the terrorists are 
affected, and mainly restricted, by factors which in turn 
restrict their targeting options. Such restrictions continue 
at the tactical level. The successful execution of the 
various types of operation outlined in the chapter on tactics 
is initially constrained by factors such as the capability of 
the group and the acceptability of certain methods. As an 
example of the importance of the latter, it is notable that 
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the PIRA stopped using an otherwise successful tactic whereby 
on October 24th 1990 three men deemed to be collaborators 
with the security forces - in fact a kitchen assistant at the 
Ministry of Defence, a garage owner who had sold goods to 
soldiers, and a worker in an Army base - were tied into bomb- 
laden vehicles and forced to drive them into Army checkpoints 
and installations. Although the attacks were successful - 
killing six soldiers and one of the drivers - the tactic was 
widely condemned by nationalist politicians and several 
Catholics, and was not repeated. 4 
In addition to these restraints terrorists are also 
constrained by the various protective measures which may be 
taken to defend specific targets from attacks. The effect of 
this may be to discourage the terrorists from carrying out 
any attacks in the extremely unlikely event that they had 
only selected one specific target for their operations. On 
the other hand, on the basis of strategic judgement or sheer 
bloody-mindedness - they may feel that despite the risks 
inherent in the operationg the strategic benefits to be 
obtained from attacking the target using the planned methods 
are great enough to make it worthwhile persevering. 
Alternatively, as is shown in Figure 11.2, if the 
protective measures surrounding the terrorists' initial 
target are too difficult to surmount using the tactics 
originally envisaged, the terrorists have the option of 
either using a different method to attack the same target, or 
of substituting an alternative target. The former course may 
be taken where the strategic benefits of attacking that 
particular target - such as the ability to exert pressure to 
comply, or the propaganda benefits - are felt to be great 
enough to justify the increased difficulty of persisting with 
the attack. Howeverl where there are a number of potential 
targetsl attacking which would yield a roughly equivalent 
strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists 
will choose to attack the softest target as carrying out such 
an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists. 
4) "IRA uses human bombs"q The Independentq October 25th 
1990. "Hume denounces IRA 'cowards"'q The Independent 
October 26th 1990. "Sitting ducks for the IRA killers"$ 
The Sunday Corres-pondentq October 28th 1990. B. O'Brien. 
The Long War, 56. 
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FIGURE 11.2 
PROCESS OF TERRORIST TARGET SELECTION 
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Indeed, terrorists wary of taking too many risks may be 
willing to attack softer targets even if they yield lower 
strategic benefits than targets which are harder, on the 
basis that it is necessary to conserve resources for future 
operations. Thus a long-term strategic perspective may 
override the benefits which an attack may gain in the shorter 
term. 
From the above factors it is possible to construct a 
general model of terrorist target selection. Firstly, the 
general moral framework within which terrorist activities 
will take place is provided by the ideology of the group. On 
the whole terrorists will tend to attack those people or 
institutions which they deem to be somehow guilty - or at 
least not innocent - of an offence in the terms of the 
terrorists' ideological and moral outlook. 
The range of targets is refined by the strategy of the 
group concerned. This is important because by its nature, 
terrorism is a method which - with the exception of 
expressive attacks - is intended to yield certain benefits by 
causing people to react to violence or the threat of 
violence. Unlike conventional warfare where the destruction 
of the enemy may be an end in itself, a successful terrorist 
operation is one which, whilst it may result in the 
destruction of a physical target, is primarily intended to 
force a psychological target to react in a certain way. Thus 
the terrorists will generally select physical targets so as 
to cause the desired reaction in the psychological target. 
This may occasionally result in the terrorists stepping 
outside their proclaimed ideological framework, where they 
perceive that the strategic benefits to be gained from such 
an attack are felt to be important enough to justify such 
action. However the terrorists also have to take into account 
the possibility that such action may damage their standing 
amongst supporters, with concrete consequences in terms of 
the loss of facilities and the possibility of betrayal. 
Once the terrorists have determined the range of 
targets which they may 'legitimately' attack, and have 
determined those which will best fulfil their strategic 
objectives, they are faced with a number of restrictions in 
terms of the group's capability, the security environment, 
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and the protective measures taken to safeguard specific 
targets. The terrorists' ability to overcome or circumvent 
these constraints will strongly determine whether they attack 
their targets of choice, or whether they substitute other 
targets in their stead. Where the benefits from attacking any 
one of a range of targets are roughly equivalent, it is 
likely though not certain that they will attack the most 
vulnerable. Once the terrorists' ideological and strategic 
framework has been determined, and they have decided upon a 
range of legitimate targets, the options which they face are 
as outlined in Figure 11.2. 
However, the ability to predict terrorists actions must 
be severely qualified. It must always be borne in mind that 
terrorists are as likely as other people to make curious 
decisions, misjudgements, and decisions influenced by 
emotional rather than logical factors. Due to the pressures 
caused by the danger and clandestinity under which terrorists 
operate, there is a possibility that they will have a 
tendency over time to become more blinkered and 
introspective, and quite possibly to escalate their violence 
and to become more reckless in their actions. The more 
isolated terrorists become from the world outside other group 
members and the cocoon of supporters, the more likely it is 
that such escalation and recklessness will occur. 
Paradoxically - and leaving aside the question of resources - 
the greatest threat of indiscriminate violence in the short 
term may come from disorganised groups with little outside 
support rather than from well organised groups with a high 
degree of support. 
Implications for terrorism in the mid-1990s. 
An examination of terrorist trends in the 1990s 
suggests that, despite some changes in the nature of 
terrorism and terrorist groups in the past ten to fifteen 
years, the model outlined above still applies. Bruce and 
Donna Hoffman identify a number of trends in international 
terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s. By the term international 
terrorism they are referring to incidents which involve the 
citizens or territory of more than one country, or which are 
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intended to create international incidents by attacks on 
5 
airline resources or passengers. 
There are problems in using data-bases concerning 
international terrorism to analyse or predict terrorism as a 
whole. Firstly, 90-95% of terrorism falls outside the scope 
of international terrorism. 
6 Furthermore the coverage of 
events in the Third World by Western news media - and hence 
the open source material for data bases - is comparatively 
scanty. 7 This can lead to an over-emphasis on'terrorist acts 
in countries where the media is better developed, or indeed 
in which the western media has most interest. Additionally, 
actions intended to kill foreigners or damage foreign 
property are more likely to be symbolic acts - and thus 
intended to gain widespread publicity - than acts of domestic 
terrorism. This might explain why Hoffman and Hoffman's 
statistics for 1994 show bombings as the most common tactic 
of international terrorists - 121 out of 349 terrorist 
incidents where a tactic is indicated, whereas in Northern 
Ireland in 1994 there were 348 shootings compared to 222 
bombings or bomb defusings, the latter rising to 337 if one 
8 includes incendiary attacks as bombings. 
Another consideration which may account for differences 
between trends in the lethality of international terrorism 
compared to terrorism as a whole is that actions connected 
with aviation - such as hijackings and mid-air explosions - 
are on the whole disproportionately likely to be acts of 
international terrorism. This is because, with a few 
exceptions, acts against a perceived legitimate target are 
unlikely to include mass casualty attacks on domestic 
5) B. Hoffman & D. K. Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology 
of International Terrorism, 1994", Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 7, no. 4, (Winter 1995), 183. 
6) B. Hoffman & D. K. Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology 
of International Terrorism, 1994", 180. 
7) C. D. Brockett. "Measuring Political Violence and Land 
Inequality in Central America"l American Political 
Science Review, 86, no. 1, (March 1992). I. Geldard- 
Chronology of Terrorism 1989, (London: Intel, 1990), 
13. 
8) B. Hoffman & D. K. Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology 
of International Terrorism, 1994", 226. Royal Ulster 
Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994, 
103. 
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flights-9 This relative concentration upon attacks on 
aircraft can cause an apparent statistical increase in 
lethality because modern aircraft carry hundreds of people 
and an aircraft exploding in mid-air is likely to have no 
survivors due to the drop. An equivalent sized bomb on a bus 
for instance would almost certainly kill far fewer people. 
Given these reservations, the Hoffmans' work finds: the 
increased prevalence of terrorist acts; that more groups have 
been using terrorism as a method; and the increased lethality 
of individual terrorist attacks. 10 Bruce Hoffman also claims 
that terrorists display an increasing level of ruthlessness 
and lack of idealism as the groups get older. He argues that 
over time terrorists may come to see violence as an end in 
itself. 11 
The first two elements - the increase in the number of 
terrorist groups and the increase in the number of terrorist 
incidents - bear an obvious relation to each other and are 
not too surprising in a world which appears to have become 
more volatile since the end of the Cold War. For instance, 
the demise of the Soviet Union, whilst possibly reducing the 
degree of state terror, has led to more overt terrorism in 
Russia and its possessions. 12 Likewise, in northern Africa, 
tensions due to existing governmental corruption and 
authoritarianism, and the rise of religious fundamentalism, 
have been accompanied and exacerbated by rapid population 
increases leading to large numbers of young people with few 
prospects. Thus, in Algeria the population rose from nine 
9) An exception to this was the mid-air bombing in November 
1989 of a flight between Bogota and Cali by Colombian 
drug traffickers seeking to prevent the extradition of 
drugs traffickers to the USA. One hundred and seven 
died. Strong alleges that this was an attempt to kill 
the Liberal presidential candidate Cesar Gaviria. 
S. Strong. Whitewash, 225-226. 
10) B. Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and 
Potentialities", 12. B. Hoffman & D. K. Hoffman. "The 
RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 
1994", 181. 
11) B. Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and 
Potentialities", 15. 
12) "Chechenya: how, why and what next? ", The Independent 
January 21st 1996. "Chechen rebels deliver hostages to 
safety", The Independent, January 25th 1996. "Bomb 
kills four on Moscow's metro", The Guardian, June 12th 
1996. "Three killed as blast rocks Moscow metro", The 
Independent, June 21st 1996. 
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million Muslim Algerians in 1954 to 16 million in 1977 and 
about 29 million by 1994, with about 63% of the population 
aged under twenty-five. 13 Whilst such a demographic 
transition cannot by itself cause terrorism - as was noted in 
the case of the Punjab - the political and economic strains 
created by a framework unable or unwilling to sustain such 
changes, makes a climate of volatility more likely. 
The rise in the lethality of individual, international 
terrorist attacks is shown in Table 11.1. 
TABLE 11.1 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
INCIDENTS WHICH INVOLVE FATALITIES: 1990-1994 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total Incidents 321 484 341 359 350 
Fatal Incidents 64 66 60 86 96 
% of incidents 
which are fatal 19.9 13.6 17.6 24.0 27.4 
N. B: A fatal incident is one in which at least one person is 
killed as a direct result of a terrorist attack. 
Source: 'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International 
Terrorism', computer database, 1990-1994. 
Bruce Hoffman has attributed this rise in lethality to a 
number of factors. One of the most important is the rise in 
the number of terrorist groups with religious or nationalist 
motives. 14 He believes that religious terrorists may carry 
out attacks of greater lethality than groups with secular 
ideologies because the former's actions are "... motivated by 
a religious imperative ... " and therefore assume the 
attributes of a "... sacramental act or divine duty" which is 
unrestrained by other constraints. This lack. of constraint is 
reinforced by the fact that religious terrorists see 
themselves as outsiders seeking to change a corrupt existing 
order, and therefore perceive a much greater range of enemies 
to be attacked. As an example of this lethality, Hoffman 
notes that whilst Shia Islamic terrorists only carried out 8% 
of international terrorist incidents between 1982 and 1989, 
they were responsible for 30% of the deaths. He attributes 
13) A. Horne. A Savage War of P ace. 64 & n. D. Fishburn. 
"North Africa could tý-r-nnastytv, D. Fishburn (ed). The 
, 
World in 1995, (London: The Economist Publications, 
1994), 81. 
14) B. Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and 
Potentialities", 16. 
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similar characteristics to militant Christian white 
supremacists in the USA and Jewish terrorists in Israel. 
15 
The lethal effect of such terrorism since the early 
1990s, and the influence of the campaigns of Kurdish 
separatists since 1992, and the attacks by Muslim terrorists 
against foreigners in Algeria and Egypt since 1993, can be 
seen if one compares the US State Departments statistics 
concerning the number of casualties - dead and injured - 
caused by terrorism in the Middle East - including northern 
Africa compared to that in Latin America where religiously- 
motivated international terrorism is comparatively rare. It 
should be borne in mind that the Latin American statistics 
include two Middle East related attacks in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. In March 1992 a Hizbollah suicide vehicle bomb at 
the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killed twenty-nine 
people and injured 242, whilst in July 1994 a bomb - alleged 
to have been planted by Hizbollah or by people with links to 
the Iranian Government - destroyed a building housing 
Argentine-Israeli and other Jewish organisations, killing 
ninety-six people and injuring 236.16 
FIGURE 11.2 
CASUALTIES CAUSED BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST & LATIN AMERICA: 1989-1994 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Middle East 96 97 33 236 178 235 
Latin America 94 92 68 374 66 327 
Source: U. S. Department of State. Patterns of Global 
Terrorism: 1994_(Washington 5C: U. S Department of 
State, 1995). 
Thus even the statistics for Latin America bear out the 
comparative lethality of the type of terrorism practiced in 
the Middle-East. Hoffman's supposition - that the ideology of 
the terrorist group crucially affects their range of targets 
and the type of attacks which they carry out - confirms one 
15) B. Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trendsj and 
Potentialities", 17. 
16) U. S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 
1992, (Washington DC: U. S Department of State, 1993)1' 
25. 'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International 
Terrorism', (St Andrews: University of St Andrews)q 
computer database, 1994. B. Hoffman & D. K. Hoffman- "The 
RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorismq 
199411,210. 
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of the tenets of the model of terrorist targeting outlined in 
this study. 
However, one must however be careful not to attribute 
this lethality so heavily to the religious impulse of the 
terrorists concerned that one ignores the methods employed. 
The previously noted suicide bomb attacks by Palestinian and 
Lebanese terrorist groups are highly lethal because they 
largely nullify the deterrent effect of protective measures 
as the terrorist does not intend, or indeed wish, to make an 
escape. The suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in 
Israel between 1994 and 1996 were particularly effective 
because the bombs could be detonated in the close proximity 
of their intended victims. 
However, the deadliness of these attacks is not just 
due to the motivation which lies behind them, but depends on 
the capability of the group to use such lethal methods. In 
the case of the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbollah 
this method has been relatively cheap in personnel terms as 
reports suggest that many of the suicide bombers are highly- 
motivated sympathisers on the fringe of terrorist activities 
rather than core members of the groups concerned. 17 However 
not all such attacks in the Middle East have been by groups 
motivated primarily by religion. Merari found that out of 
thirty-one suicide vehicle-bomb attacks in the Lebanon 
between 1983 and 1986, only seven belonged to overtly 
religious Shia Muslim groups. Another two belonged to Amal, 
which whilst Shiite was - according to Merari - primarily 
concerned with secular issues. The other bombers belonged to 
groups with non-religious affiliations. 18 
Some separatist groups have also carried out suicide 
attacks. Thus suicide bombings are also effective against 
military targets as shown by the Kurdish PKK attack on a 
17) "Arab village stunned by martyrdom"q The Daily Telegraph, 
October 22nd 1994. "Who are Hamas"t The Independent, 
March 6th 1996. "Hundreds 'wait in line' to commit 
suicide attacks", The Independent, March 6th 1996. 
"Hamas recruit reveals ease of enlisting bombers", The 
Independent, March 8th 1996. "Portrait of a suicide 
bomber", The Independent on Sunday, March 10th 1996. On 
Hizbollah see A-Merari. "The-readiness to kill and die: 
Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East". 
18) A. Merari- "The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal 
terrorism in the Middle East", 204-205. 
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Turkish Army parade in the eastern Turkish town of Tuncel in 
June 1996 which killed five people. 
19 As noted the Tamil 
Tigers have also used suicide bombers to inflict mass 
casualties. This happened in the central business district of 
the Sri Lankan capital Colombo in January 1996, when a 
suicide truck bomb outside the Central Bank killed ninety-one 
people and injured 1400.20 The relevant point about the LTTE 
is that they consist of both Hindus and Christians rather 
than being a religiously-based group. Unlike the cases of 
Hamas and Hizbollah, it is far more difficult to argue that 
their willingness to carry out such attacks is motivated by 
the sort of 'sacramental' motivation mentioned above unless 
one sees such motivation as dedication to the national cause, 
rather than as a specifically religious devotion. They also 
have the advantage of having a ready supply of young people 
ready to carry out suicide-bomb attacks. 21 
The willingness to kill large numbers of supposed 
enemies is not confined to religiously-motivated or 
nationalistic terrorist groups confronting different 
religions or nationalities. As pointed out previously, the 
communist Shining Path in Peru has frequently massacred large 
numbers of fellow countrymen, drugs traffickers in Colombia 
have killed several Colombians in bomb attacks, and 
conservative death squads in Latin America have occasionally 
massacred large numbers of union members or ordinary workers 
in order to discourage disobedience to the existing social, 
political, and economic order. Thus, whilst it may be true 
that religion or an extreme nationalist ideology provides 
such terrorists with a wide range of potential terrorist 
targets, the same applies to groups with other motivations - 
such as fascism or organised criminality - who have also 
19) "Suicide-bomb attack kills five in Turkey", The 
Independent, July 1st 1996. 
20) "Tiger massacre in Colombo", The Guardian, February 1st 
1996. "Sri Lankan suicide bomber kills 60", The 
Independent, February 1st 1996. "Train bombs kill 70 
and injure 600 in Colombo", The Daily Telegraph, July 
25th 1996. 
21) "Dignity and death with the Freedom Birds", The 
Independent on Sunday, May 26th 1991. "Inside the Tiger 
Mind", Time, September 16th 1991. "Boys and girls come 
out to die", The Tndtp_endent on Sunda , February 26th 1995. "Fanatical Tamils take revenge for Jaffna", The 
Independent, February 1st 1996. 
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carried out mass casualty attacks. What is important for the 
terrorists is whether such attacks can be regarded as 
legitimate -a point which corresponds with Hoffman's theory, 
but also whether these attacks further their strategic aims, 
and whether they have the means and opportunity to carry out 
such attacks. 
Hoffman and Hoffman also note that Americans and 
American property, form the most common target of 
international terrorism. 
TABLE 11.3 
CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY FIVE NATIONALITIES MOST FREQUENTLY 
TARGETED BY ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1990-1994 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
USA 116 155 76 74 79 
UK 33 61 45 54 36 
ISRAEL 26 -- -- 23 29 
FRANCE 16 37 -- 23 
USSR 13 -- -- -- 
TURKEY -- 28 35 
JAPAN 17 -- -- 
UN -- 38 34 
N. B. Attacks on UK targets include Irish republican 
operations in Great Britain, and attacks on French 
targets include Corsican separatist operations in 
metropolitan France. 
Source: 'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International 
Terrorism', computer database, 1990-1994. 
There are a number of reasons for the USA's possession of 
this rather dubious honour. The US State Department's reports 
indicate that well over 50% of anti-US international 
terrorist attacks occurred in Latin America usually 
approaching 70-80%. 
22 This is not surprising if one bears in 
mind the prominent political and economic presence which the 
USA has maintained in Latin America practically since the 
22) U. S. Department of State. Patte rns of Global Terrorism: 
1990,40. U. S. Department of State. Patterns of Global 
Terrorism: 1991,, (Washington DC: U. S Department of 
State, 1992), 85. U. S. Department of State. ' 
Patterns of 
Global Terrorism: 1992,59. U. S. Department of State. 
Patterns of Global Teýrorism: 1993, (Washington DC: U. S 
Department of State, 1994), 71. U. S. Department of 
State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 (Washington 
DC: U. S Department of State, 1995)l 67. 
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formulation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.23 Quite simply, 
for any terrorist group wishing to attack a perceived foreign 
presence, the Americans are the most numerous and noticeable 
economic and political presence, and hence the most 
accessible. Furthermore, the emergence of communist 
revolutionary groups, particularly since the Cuban Revolution 
of 1959 but also deriving inspiration from Guevara and Mao, 
has led to an anti-capitalist philosophy which - despite the 
collapse of communism in Russia and central Europe - has 
meant that the USA, as the chief capitalist interest in Latin 
America, is also the most likely target. 
In the Middle East, whilst there have not been as many 
attacks upon US targets, those which have occurred have 
included the most lethal. These include the death of sixty- 
three people - including seventeen Americans - when the US 
Embassy in Lebanon was bombed in April 1983, and the death of 
241 American servicemen when the US Marines' barracks in 
Beirut was bombed in October of that year. 
24 More recently 
seven people, two Indians and five US servicemen, were killed 
by a bomb at an American training facility in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia in November 1995, whilst in July 1996 a bomb at an 
accommodation block in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was caused the 
death of nineteen American servicemen and injured up to 160 
people. 
25 Such attacks can be partially explained by the 
prominence of the USA's military presence in the Middle East. 
However, it is also closely tied to Arab resentment of what 
they see as the USA's uncritical backing of Israel and 
Israel's influence over American policy in the Middle East. 26 
As a Saudi militant stated after the Dhahran bombing: 
23) For an overview of US-Latin American relations see G. Pope 
Atkins. 
, 
Latin America in the International Political 
S stem, third edition, (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 107- 
132. 
24) R. Fisk. Pity the Nation, 480,515. G. Rosie. The Directory 
of International Terrorism, 49-50,51. 
25) "Bomb kills 11 at US Saudi base", The Guardian, June 26th 
1996. "Scenes of carnage return to haunt US", The 
Independent, June 27th 1996. 
26) "Lebanese hit by deadly dollars", The Independent, August 
1st 1993. "Why Arabs condemn but do not grieve", The 
Independent, April 21st 1995. "Big bucks keep US lined 
up in pro-Israel camp", Independent on Sunday, May 21st 
1995. H. Smith. The Power. Game, 296-316. 
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We knew that the Americans supprt the Jews in Palestine 
and that they are our enemies. 
Furthermore, the opposition of successive US governments to 
revolutionary Islam, their support for repressive pro-western 
governments in countries such as pre-revolutionary Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, and the common Islamic 
perception that contemporary Western values - and 
particularly American values - are inimical to Islam, makes 
Americans and American facilities prime targets for 
revolutionary Islamists. 
28 Quite simply, the ideology of many 
terrorist groups in the Middle East - primarily Islamic 
groups but also ostensibly secular Palestinian groups - deems 
Americans and their property to be legitimate targets, whilst 
their presence makes them accessible targets. 
The applicability of the model also appears to be 
confirmed by the activities of conservative terrorist groups. 
Such terrorism has been common in the 1990s. Out of 324 
killings by republican and loyalist terrorists in Northern 
Ireland and elsewhere between 1990 and 1993,145 people were 
killed by loyalists. 29 In Northern Ireland itself loyalist 
terrorists killed more people than republican terrorists in 
the years between 1992 and 1994.30 It is also notable that 
whilst loyalist terrorists carried out just under twice the 
number of shootings carried out by republican terrorists in 
Northern Ireland, republicans carried out more than twice the 
number of bombings carried out by loyalists. 31 This indicates 
the different capacities and strategies of the loyalist and 
republican terrorist groups in Northern Ireland, with the 
former concentrating on the assassination of suspected 
republicans and the 'subversive' Catholic population. 
Elsewhere, in July 1996 the Associated Press reported 
an incident where about twenty rural labourers or members of 
27) "Why we reject the West - by the Saudis' fiercest Arab 
critic", The Independent, July 10th 1996.. 
28) "Why we reject the West - by the Saudis' fiercest Arab 
critic", The Independent, July 10th 1996. J. L. Esposito. 
The Islamic Threat, 91-92,127-128,209-211. 
29) M. Sutton. 
, 
Bear in mind these dead. 
30) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual 
Report 1992,12. Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief 
Constable's Annual Report 1993,11. Royal Ulster 
Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994,11, 
39. 
31) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual 
Report 1994,103. 
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their families had been burned, shot or hacked to death with 
machetes by up to fifty gunmen in the Bhojphur district of 
Bihar State in eastern India. According to the police the 
killers were from the Ranvir Sena - an illegal private 
militia formed three years previously to defend the interests 
of upper-caste Hindu landowners. According to the police, the 
victims of the attack had been organising themselves against 
exploitation by landowners. The Ranvir Sena had also been 
blamed for about fifty deaths in the 1994 Bihar State 
elections. 32 Of particular note is the relatively localised 
nature of the attack, the unsophisticated nature of the 
weapons required to make a successful attack against a soft 
target, and the relative lack of discrimination necessary in 
targeting a community deemed to be generally subversive. 
In the same week, a conservative terrorist group in El 
Salvador sent a one-page communique to members of the foreign 
press. The 'Major Roberto D'Aubuisson Nationalist Force', 
denounced as "destabilisers and traitors to the country", 
people accused of constantly criticising the government of 
Armando Calderon Sol, leader of the ARENA party. 
33 Again, 
those targeted were portrayed by the terrorists as subverting 
the exiting political order. 
The activities of these groups corresponds with the 
model outlined. The range of targets - in these cases people 
deemed to be subversive of the existing order - are 
determined by the terrorists' ideology. Attacking such people 
appears to cause little concern amongst the terrorists' 
supporters and is relatively easy. The method of killing is 
generally simple - using small arms, knives,. or bludgeons - 
at least partly because the physical targets are usually soft 
targets - normally unarmed and unprotected civilians. 
A general factor worth noting is that many terrorist 
groups in the 1990s are not the hierarchical structures - 
such as those possessed by the PIRA, Hizbollah, or other such 
groups - but are instead small diffuse groups. These groups - 
such as the Animal Liberation Front, the American fascist- 
32) "Militia kills 20 in Indian caste wars"l The Daily 
Telegraphs July 13th 1996. 
33) "Church leaders on hit list", The Universe, (Manchester), 
July 14th 1996. "In the face of terror", The Catholic 
Times, (Manchester), July 14th 1996. 
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anarchist groups, and the Latin American death squads - act 
towards a common political agenda, but without a formal 
central structure to control, coordinate, and if necessary 
restrain their terrorist activities in order to conform to 
the wider political and strategic objectives. Thus in April 
1995 it was estimated that there were about 100 militia 
groups in the USA, containing up to 50,000 members, often 
corresponding via the Internet. 34 Such small groups, 
operating on the basis of their own perceptions and agendas 
are, as discussed, prone to be dominated by strong 
personalities within the group. They might, therefore, be 
more prone to carry out expressive actions directed by 
individual rage rather than by rational calculation and 
regard for strategic and political ends, and as a result be 
more reckless. At the extreme one finds cases of terrorism by 
solitary individuals. Example include the afore-mentioned 
Unabomber in the USA, or Ferdinand Gamper, a German-speaking 
neo-Nazi who, over a three week period in February and March 
1996, killed six Italian-speakers or their associates around 
the town of Merano in Alto Adige, the German-speaking 
province of north-eastern Italy. 
35 
This last factor highlights the extent to which 
terrorist target selection is ultimately shaped by the 
idiosyncratic processes of the small groups of decision- 
makers or in some cases by the individuals in charge of 
groups. The greater the extent to which a groups' ideology is 
unique unto itself, the more the decision-making element 
creates unpredictability with regard to target selection 
because it is more difficult to ascribe an underlying 
ideological rationale to the terrorists' decisions. To a 
degree this problem was encountered in the 1980s and early 
1990s with organised criminal groups in Colombia and Italy 
which sought to obtain immunity from the law by carrying out 
disorientating mass casualty attacks against civilians and 
34) "Militiamen go to war on American gun laws", The Dail 
Telegraph, November 21st 1994. "FBI sets its sights on 
far-right US groups", The Independent, April 22nd 1995. 
"Militias air battlecries on wilder shores of 
Internet", The Independent, April 24th 1995. 
35) "Gun battle ends hunt for Italian serial killer", The 
Independentj March 2nd 1996. "Fear and loathing in the 
Alto Adige", The Independent, supplement, March 7th 
1996. 
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the selective assassination of conscientious law enforcement 
and state officials. Concerned primarily for their own 
material gains, such groups believed themselves to be free of 
the restraints imposed by public opinion and the need for 
external support. However, the actions of these groups could 
be understood in terms of their easily-comprehensible overall 
objectives. 
This does not apply to some of the smaller or more 
outlandish groups which have emerged since the early 1990s. 
Some of these have the ability to carry out massive attacks 
with weapons which they themselves have manufactured: for 
instance the World Trade Center Bombing of February 1993 
which killed six people and injured over 1,000, the Tokyo 
subway gas attack of March 1995 which killed twelve people 
and injured over 5,000, and the Oklahoma City bombing of 
April 1995 which killed 168 people. 36 In particular, whilst 
one can question the extent to which the actions of the Aum. 
cult in Japan can be considered as political terrorism, their 
decision to carry out the first major non-governmental use of 
poison gas to kill bystanders is an indication of the extent 
to which a messianic leader-driven group is unconstrained by 
many of the restraining factors which apply to the more 
conventional and hierarchical terrorist groups. Indeed the 
Tokyo gas attack may prove to have broken the taboo against 
such attacks previously observed by other groups. 
What is notable about some of the more eccentric groups 
which have evolved in the early 1990s - such as the American 
fascist-anarchists, religious extremists, and bizarre cults - 
is their combination of outlandish or extreme ideologies with 
the potential for inflicting massive destruction and a 
36) "The $400 Bomb", Time, March 22nd 1993. "Four found 
guilty of NY bombing", the Independentl March 5th 1994. 
"Religious cult suspected of gas attacks"l The Times, 
March 21st 1995. "300 commuters in hospital after new 
gas incident", The Daily Telegraph, April 20th 1995. 
"Tokyo gas attack cult leader held"t The Guardian, May 
16th 1995. "Aum cultists admit making nerve gas", The 
Independent, May 18th 1995. "Aum cult doctor admits 
making sarin nerve gas", The Independent, October 25th 
1995. "Bomb massacre in Oklahoma", The Daily Telegra 
April 20th 1995. "Bomb built for damage, not 
slaughter", The Independent, April 22nd 1995. "FBI 
piles up evidence against McVeigh", The Independent, 
April 28th 1995. "FBI close to arresting bombers", The 
Independent, May 22nd 1995. 
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relative disdain for the restraints of public opinion. Whilst 
the formula of motive, means and opportunity still applies 
when explaining target selection by these groups, their 
actions are more difficult to predict than those of more 
conventional groups. However destructive the larger and more 
conventional terrorist groups might be, the rationale behind 
their attacks can be determined in terms of readily 
comprehensible ideological precepts. With the more outlandish 
groups it is more difficult to make general assumptions about 
their likely actions by referring to broad ideological 
categories. In order to comprehend the logic behind their 
selection of targets one has to examine the specific groups 
and understand their beliefs - however apparently bizarre, 
their capabilities, and the way in which they make decisions 
and react to external constraints imposed by the security 
environment and by the wider society within which they 
operate. 
Recent developments in terrorist targeting are 
explicable by the model developed in this study. As Hoffman 
points out the greater lethality of Middle Eastern terrorist 
groups can be explained by their ideological world-view, but 
it can also be explained by the strategies which they are 
pursuing - destabilisation of any Arab-Israeli agreement by 
Palestinian groups, the ejection of non-Muslims by Islamic 
extremists in Algeria - and by their use of the particularly 
lethal method of suicide-bombing. Likewise, the concentration 
of attacks by conservative terrorists against civilians 
belonging to communities considered subversive, combines 
ideological motivation, a strategy aimed at disorientating 
and enforcing compliance in such communities, and the tactic 
of attacking extremely soft targets using simple weapons. 
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